Biased as always but the heroism of the German patriots shines through the childlike critique of the author. Worth the read simply for the names of those involved that are often over looked.
Nigel Jones' Hitler's Heralds dramatizes the violent escapades of the Freikorps, a loose collection of right wing paramilitary groups which wreaked havoc on interwar Germany. Jones argues that the Freikorps was a natural outgrowth of German nationalism frustrated by defeat in the First World War, which despite military loss and political bungling was easily blamed on Jews and socialists through the "stab-in-the-back" myth. Thus ex-soldiers unable to adjust to civilian life, young men who hadn't served themselves and rightist hatemongers, with support from politicians and military leaders, were authorized by the shaky Weimar Republic to crush an abortive communist uprising. Jones damningly shows how Friedrich Ebert and his cohorts connived in the Freikorps' creation, while also showing that the soldiers become a law unto themselves. Crushing communist uprisings in Silesia and Bavaria; attacking strikers, leftists and anyone perceived as an enemy; launching invasions of Latvia and Estonia that left thousands dead and nearly triggered renewed war with the Western Allies; and finally, the Kapp Putsch, when Freikorpsmen feeling betrayed over the government's about-face in the Baltic states overthrew the Republic, only losing power due to a socialist-led general strike. Even after their defeat, however, the Far Right merely went underground, resorting to terrorism and assassination or blending with the Reichswehr and allied groups like the Stahlhelm and, of course, the Nazi Party, many of whose leaders (Himmler, Rohm, Bormann, etc.) fought with the Freikorps before donning the swastika. In 2021 Jones' tale of violent extremists coddled by politicians who find them useful is depressingly familiar, even their modern equivalents are incompetent thugs too dumb and disorganized to pull off their grand designs. But then, the Freikorps failed in their early attempts too, only to come back stronger until they conquered Germany. A gripping, disheartening read about how easily extremists can undermine democratic governments - often with that government's connivance.
After four years of war, Germany's army was exhausted and on the brink of revolution, tired of fighting endlessly for a front that never seemed to move. Faced with fresh foes from the United States, courtesy of "He Kept Us Out of the War" Wilson, Germany's leadership decided to sue for peace -- and, seeing how vindictive the Entente's demands were, German authorities decided to let the demands be someone else's problem. Specifically, the Social Democrats' problem, who were trying to form a government even as a leftist revolution began breaking out piecemeal throughout the country. Seeking stability first, the SPD began relying on "Freikorps", paramilitary units formed of committed veterans and fresh young men who regarded the 'spectre of communism' with hostile loathing, to put down insurrections. For months, these mostly-independent Freikorps would range across the country, attacking cities like Munich which had been taken over by revolutionaries, but once the red menace had been put down, the Freikorps weren't ready to stop fighting. This is an absolutely fascinating history of Germany during a time of near-civil war, frothing with violence and driven by a restless spirit.
Although I faintly remembered a socialist revolution breaking out at the very end of the Great War -- one that began with sailors -- plainly it's been a long time since my German history courses at university, or since I visited this particular area in my reading -- I had no idea how successful it was. Were it not for the assassinations of two of its prominent leaders, the left may have created its own version of the DDR. After the armistice but before the diktat of Versailles, Germany frothed with militant drama, with violent eruptions seemingly every few weeks, taking over cities like Bremen and Munich. With Russia still embroiled in its own civil war -- the Bolsheviks had not yet triumphed over the White Russians, let alone executed their coup over the Mensheviks -- militant leftists in Germany thought their time had come. Germany barely had a government and its people had been through the wringer of a four-year war. Because so much of the regular army was demoralized and refused to fight, the provisional government of the SPD began making use of paramilitary forces -- some of which organized themselves, some of which were initiated by the government itself. These forces were not 'regular' troops, but had their own private cultures and were devoted to their independent Fuhrers. This led to some volatility: one Freikorps, dispatched to help the Baltic states fight for independence from Soviet factions, was successful but then decided that it might as around stick around and rule a bit: one leader pledged his conquered city to the Tsar, but decided to rule in Nicholas' stead since the Romanovs were no longer around. Interestingly, one inducement to get the Freikorps to attack leftists outside of Germany proper was the promise -- from German authorities, not Baltic -- of Baltic estates. Hitler's lust for the east was not new -- and nor was use of the swastika, as one of the Baltic-venturing freikorps wore them on their helmets.
The German government, too, would feel the sting of the Freikorps' battle-lust and interest in power: in March 1920, one Freikorps seized the city of Berlin itself, intending to establish a new Reich that dismissed Versailles. (Hitler and a comrade were not involved in this, although they'd intended to be -- on their arrival they realized the effort was a shambles not worth contributing to.) It was such a poorly planned and almost impulsive action, though, that there was almost no support from the other freikorps. Coordination between the groups had previously proven necessary (especially retaking Munich from the socialists who had begun killing prominent citizens), but the Kapp putsch did little to bring in other groups and the one it contacted happened to be stone drunk celebrating the arrival of their namesake, von Hindenberg. Of course, just as leftist coups created Freikorps reaction, so too did Freikorp actions generate reactions: in the case of the Kapp putsch, workers and revolutionaries took over much of the Ruhr, only to be brutally put down by the regular Army and arriving Freikorps. It's worth noting that the Beer Hall Putsch occurred in 1923, only three years after this, and in a place (Munich) that had already been part of leftist-Freikorp back and forth fighting: the Nazi attempt to seize power was only one of a series from varying factions and ideologies. Jones closes the book with a chapter on Hitler's putsch, which was more successful than I realized, taking over several government buildings in Munich. The putsch was the result of Hitler forcing two other paramilitary organizations to cooperate, but their leaders switched sides once the actual fighting began.
This is an all around fascinating book, because the subjects are not all of a kind. It's good storytelling, though facts are sometimes repeated too quickly, and I found Jones' probing of the Freikorps zeitgeist to be especially interesting, as he reflects on both the romantic German youth movement and the forge of trench warfare itself.
Note: this book was also published under another title, The Birth of the Nazis. I'm fairly certain, anyway: the table of contents matches this book's progress to a T.
Related: Life and Death in the Third Reich, Peter Fritszche. The "Volksgemeinshaft", which Fritzschze studies in part, apparently originated as a concept with the Youth Movement that's detailed in Heralds.
As a writer of history, Mr Jones has not learned to keep his obvious bias out of the book and present it to the reader in as much a neutral manner as possible. This book was an amateurish attempt to get Mr, Jones’ personal opinions of the Freikorps to the reader. The book is so opinionated, that it is hard to take seriously. The author is so obviously anti-Freikorps that one wonders why he chose to write about the subject. Mr. Jones takes pages to highlight the atrocities committed by the Freikorps, while ignoring those committed by the Spartacus and the Reds. He mentions the Freikorps capturing communist revolutionaries and executing them. He also mentions the Reds/Spartacus taking Freikorps prisoners but fails to mention their fate. He glosses over the period the Freikorps were fighting in the Baltics. There are no battle reports or tactics or strategies, just that they committed atrocities in Riga. The same with the Silesian uprisings by militant Poles. He mentions the last one that took place in 1921, but relegates it to one or two paragraphs. He never mentions the two previous Silesian uprisings put down by the Freikorps in August 1919 or the one in August 1920. He chooses instead to write about 5 or 6 sentences about the third that took place from May-July 1921. He writes as though the uprising lasted one afternoon. He only reports on the taking of the Annaburg by the Freikorps. So much information was missing in this book. He uses his book as a platform to point out all of the Nazis that were Freikorps veterans while ignoring the many thousands that did not side with Hitler or were anti-Hitler. He uses numerous quotes from Freikorps veteran Ernst von Salomon, who himself was anti-Hitler. He calls Von Salomon a Freikorps apologist for writing his autobiography of his time in the Freikorps. The book is also rife with detail mistakes. For instance he insists on spelling von Schleicher’s name as “von Schliecher.” Writes that Hitler only earned the Iron Cross second class, when in fact he earned the Iron Cross first class, a higher award for bravery. He also writes about Hitler in the beer hall during the Putsch holding a beer stein; when in fact Hitler didn’t drink alcohol. I conclude that Mr. Jones is at best a Germanophobe or at worst a Communist sympathizer. I suggest reading “Vanguard of Nazism” by Robert G. Waite or “The Outlaws” by Freikorps veteran Ernst Von Salomon. These books are more informative and less biased. Wikipedia would be a better source of information on the Freikorps than Mr. Jones’ pathetic attempt to slander German patriots.
Nigel Jones “Hitler's Heralds” describes the violent actions taken by the Freikorps, a loosely grouped collection of right wing paramilitary associations which brought terror to Germany from 1920 to 1923.
Jones asserts that the Freikorps was an outgrowth of German nationalism frustrated by the catastrophe of the Great War. Ex-soldiers, alienated, with support from politicians and military leaders, were authorized by Noske, Ebert, Seeckt, and other Weimar activists.
Jones recounts how Ebert and Noske birthed the Freikorps, he also describes how disaffected soldiers became an anarchic force. After dealing with threatening communist insurgencies in Berlin and Bavaria; the Freikorps were unleashed on the Baltic states.
Thousands were killed. These activities led to conflicts with the West. Eventually, the Freikorps, betrayed by Ebert and Noske’s volt-face attempted to overthrow the Republic. It failed due to a socialist-led general strike. Subsequently, the Right went below the radar, and resorted to street action and assassinations. They found careers in the Reichswehr, media, or political parties.
Jones' narrative is instructive, although simplistic; the author’s attempt to draw a straight line from Luther to Hitler, fails to connect the dots. Ludwig von Mises would have pointed out that the corrosive acids of socialism wrought by WWI destroyed much. That said, this book is well written, despite the absence of footnotes and a bibliography.