THE FOUNDER OF UTILITARIANISM LOOKS AT POLITICS
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was an English philosopher, jurist, and social reformer, who is the founder of Utilitarianism.
He wrote in the first chapter of this 1780 book, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think… In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.” (Pg. i)
He explains, “By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness… [or] to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.” (Pg. ii)
He outlines, “There are two classes of men… by whom the principle of asceticism appears to have been embraced: the one a set of moralists, the other a set of religionists… The religious party, however, appear to have carried it farther than the philosophical: they have acted more consistently and less wisely. The philosophical party have scarcely gone farther then to reprobate pleasure: the religious party have frequently gone so far as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain. The philosophical party have hardly gone farther than making pain a matter of indifference… From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle: some from the philosophical, some from the religious, some from both.” (Pg. viii-ix)
He states, “There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered separately they may be termed the PHYSICAL, the POLITICAL, the MORAL and the RELIGIOUS: and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them [be] termed ‘sanctions.’” (Pg. xvii)
He asks, “Does the political sanction exert an influence over the conduct of mankind? The moral, the religious sanctions do so too. In every inch of his career are the operations of the political magistrate liable to be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers: who, one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave them out in his calculations? He will be sure almost to find himself mistaken in the result.” (Pg. xx)
He states, “To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by ITSELF, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances: 1. Its intensity. 2. Its duration. 3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness… These are the circumstances which are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of them by itself.” (Pg. xxi)
He continues, “To a NUMBER of persons, with reference to each of whom to the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less according to seven circumstances… 5. Its fecundity. 6. Its purity… 7. Its extent… Sum up all the values of all the PLEASURES on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the GOOD tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interest of that INDIVIDUAL person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole… It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view…” (Pg. xxii-xxiii)
He summarizes, “The general tendency of an act is more or less pernicious, according to the sum total of its consequences: that is, according to the difference between the sum of such as are good, and the sum of such as are evil… It is also to be observed, that into the account of the consequences of the act, are to be taken not such only as might have ensued, were intention out of the question, but such also depend upon the connexion there may be between these first-mentioned consequences and the intention. The connexion there is between the intention and certain consequences is… a means or producing other consequences. In this lies the difference between rational agency and irrational.” (Pg. lvii)
He observes, “If any sort of motive then is either good or bad on the score of its effects, this is the case only on individual occasions, and with individual motives; and this is the case with one sort of motive as well as with another. If any sort of motive then can, in consideration of its effects, be termed with any propriety a bad one, it can only be with reference to the balance of all the effects it may have had of both kinds within a given period, that is, or its most usual tendency.” (Pg. xcix)
He again outlines, “Public offenses may be distributed under eleven divisions. 1. Offenses against external security. 2. Offenses against justice. 3, Offenses against the preventive branch of the police. 4. Offenses against the public force. 5. Offenses against the positive increase of the national felicity. 6. Offenses against the public wealth. 7. Offenses against population. 8. Offenses against the national wealth. 9. Offenses against the sovereignty. 10. Offenses against religion. 11. Offenses against the national interest in general.” (Pg. clxxxiv) Later, he adds, “In this deduction, it may be asked, what place is left for religion?... To diminish… or misapply the influence of religion, is pro tanto to diminish or misapply what power the state has of combating with effect any of the before-enumerated kinds of offenses; that is, all kinds of offenses whatsoever. Acts that appear to have this tendency may be styled ‘offenses against religion.’ Of these then may be composed the tenth division of the class of offenses against the state.” (Pg. clxxxix)
He summarizes, “Ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men’s actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest in in view… What then are the actions which it can be in a man’s power to direct? They must either be his own actions, or those of other agents. Ethics… may be styled the ‘art of self-government,’ or private ethics.” (Pg. cclxiii)
He continues, “As to ethics in general, a man’s happiness will depend, in the first place, upon such parts of his behavior as none but himself are interested in; in the next place, upon such parts of it as may affect the happiness of those about him. In as far as his happiness depends upon the first-mentioned part of his behavior, it is said to depend upon his duty to himself. Ethics, then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man’s actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one’s duty to one’s self: and the quality which a man manifests by the discharge of this branch of duty… is that of PRUDENCE… Ethics then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man’s actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one’s duty to one’s neighbor. Now the happiness of one’s neighbor may be consulted in two ways: 1. In a negative way, by forbearing to diminish it. 2. In a positive way, by studying to increase it. A man’s duty to his neighbor is accordingly partly negative and partly positive: to discharge the negative branch of it, is PROBITY: the discharge the positive branch, BENEFICENCE.” (Pg. cclxiv)
AND, in Chap. XVII, IV, footnote 1, his famous quote: "The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they REASON? Nor, Can they TALK? but, Can they SUFFER?"
This book will be “must reading” for serious students of philosophy.