An incisive look at the intellectual and cultural history of free enterprise and its influence on American politics
Throughout the twentieth century, “free enterprise” has been a contested keyword in American politics, and the cornerstone of a conservative philosophy that seeks to limit government involvement into economic matters. Lawrence B. Glickman shows how the idea first gained traction in American discourse and was championed by opponents of the New Deal. Those politicians, believing free enterprise to be a fundamental American value, held it up as an antidote to a liberalism that they maintained would lead toward totalitarian statism. Tracing the use of the concept of free enterprise, Glickman shows how it has both constrained and transformed political dialogue. He presents a fascinating look into the complex history, and marketing, of an idea that forms the linchpin of the contemporary opposition to government regulation, taxation, and programs such as Medicare.
One of the most important books I’ve read in the domain of public discourse and politics in the past few years, “Free Enterprise: An American History” is a etymology of the phrase “free enterprise” as used in American politics; which like a tick, hitched a ride on the raucous dog of “American exceptionalism” early in the 20th century, and never let go. Even today, as income inequality skyrockets, poverty ascends to new levels, and the nature of work is in doubt, with the advent of machine intelligence, casting aside all notions of status-quo, the idea of “free enterprise” is still a verity that captures large percentages of the educated and establishment, throughout the entire political spectrum of the United States.
Yet, what is “the free enterprise”? Glickman makes a distinction early on that differentiates two threads of this etymology. As a student of economics, I am aware of the one, which in the popular (college-educated) mind, is distilled by the debates between Hayek and Keynes early-to-mid 20th century. This thread became wildly popular among the “pop-economics” crowd about a decade ago in the early teens/late-aughts as policy makers grappled with the implications of the great recession. This book does not follow that thread, which however is interesting to the ‘learned mind’, never penetrated deeply into the general public.
Instead, Glickman focuses on a second thread which follows how the notion of ‘free enterprise’ was formed, mostly, during the New Deal era of the 1930s (although has it’s origin in the industrial era of the United States in the mid-1800s), as a cudgel of ‘big business’ and it’s associated non-profits like chambers of commerces and other business-focused lobbying entities, to beat back ‘new deal’ programs and laws in favor of the interests of private and public enterprises. It is this story that ends up being far more consequential to the modern reader, because with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, there was a disconnect among the cognoscenti within the left and the right ends of the political spectrum because Donald Trump did not leverage vapid slogans like ‘magic of the marketplace’ nor did especially support ‘free market’ ideals (he leveraged other vapid slogans in the blood-soil vain instead). No, in fact, in many ways Donald Trump’s world view, especially on trade, would be at home in a far more ‘protectionist’ environment that prevailed over much of the earth in the mid-20th century (though many would probably characterize Trump’s perspective as ultimately mercantilist), especially within leftist governments in South America during that time.
Observers had troubles squaring the GOP’s seamless transition from “free enterprise” ideology to a “Trumpist” one. However, by separating the two threads that are often viewed as one by economic and political historians, that of the economic-dialogue and the political-one, we can easily see how it came to be that the GOP abandoned their so-called core-philosophy, which is simply that it was a tool that had outlived its usefulness, and the penetration of it among the majority of the conservative-movement, either within the rank-and-file, or in the leadership, was never more than a convenient tegument to bind together several disparate groups of interests. Glikman methodologically outlines this history, and how the notion of ‘free enterprise’ mutated to accommodate or integrate a new group in what became the GOP “big tent”.
My own hunches on the shallowness of conservative belief in the “free market” was tipped off after I witnessed an Ohio congressmen in the late aughts stammer when asked to explain his beliefs in “the markets”, barely able to construct a coherent sentence that a high-schooler taking micro/macro economics would be to convey with more finesse. Along those lines, there are several striking things brought to light in this book: The victimization narrative of “free marketers” and their associates, which often claim that any slight deviation from the business-centric policies would be a “slippery slope to socialism” is not a novelty of our modern era, or even the earlier Reagan one. This talking-point has its origins in the new-deal era. In fact, almost all the talking points of aggrievement found in the standard (and non-standard Trump era) of conservative ideology is either a strong echo of something espoused during the new deal by conservatives, or is a verbatim copy of things said in that time.
The depressing conclusion of all this is that there’s very little substance in the rhetoric of the “free enterprise”. It’s a phrase that finds its origins before the “formalization” of modern economic theory, so the period of time where it and the “science” of economics were congruent is mostly coincident. In fact, as modern economics diverges becomes more empirical, and diverges from the neoclassical theory of economics, we see that there is not a subsequent change in “free enterprise” thinking among the conservative true-believers. This is because theirs is not an informed application of “science to policy”, but of self-interests and ideology, faith perhaps, as a guidestone towards policy.
Prior to the publication of this text, I have not come across all of these facts, historical research combined in one (or many, any?) books. Most texts that deal with this topic in academic press tend to focus much more on the Keynes/Hayek dichotomy (or some derivative of those two camps thereof). This book is important because it coalesces these findings in a well-written narrative and in one source. Highly recommended, especially for those trying to understand how it is that the US politics has reached this impasse, which seems to be intractable. The notion that reason can guide both camps into a compromise is a naive one. If compromise is to occur, it will have to be achieved via the application of raw political power and deft maneuverings.