Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942

by David Stahel

A gripping and authoritative revisionist account of the German Winter Campaign of 1941-1942

Germany's winter campaign of 1941-1942 is commonly seen as its first defeat. In Retreat from Moscow, a bold, gripping account of one of the seminal moments of World War II, David Stahel argues that instead it was its first strategic success in the East. The Soviet counteroffensive was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. Despite being pushed back from Moscow, the Wehrmacht lost far fewer men, frustrated its enemy's strategy, and emerged in the spring unbroken and poised to recapture the initiative.

Hitler's strategic plan called for holding important Russian industrial cities, and the German army succeeded. The Soviets as of January 1942 aimed for nothing less than the destruction of Army Group Center, yet not a single German unit was ever destroyed. Lacking the professionalism, training, and experience of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army's offensive attempting to break German lines in countless head-on assaults led to far more tactical defeats than victories.

Using accounts from journals, memoirs, and wartime correspondence, Stahel takes us directly into the Wolf's Lair to reveal a German command at war with itself as generals on the ground fought to maintain order and save their troops in the face of Hitler's capricious, increasingly irrational directives. Excerpts from soldiers' diaries and letters home paint a rich portrait of life and death on the front, where the men of the Ostheer battled frostbite nearly as deadly as Soviet artillery. With this latest installment of his pathbreaking series on the Eastern Front, David Stahel completes a military history of the highest order

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction, Germany, Military Fiction, Russia

545 pages, Hardcover

First published November 19, 2019

About the author

David Stahel was born in Wellington, New Zealand in 1975, but grew up in Melbourne, Australia. He completed an honours degree in history at Monash University (1998), an MA in War Studies at King's College London (2000) and a PhD at the Humboldt University in Berlin (2007). His research focus has centered primarily on the German military in World War II and particularly Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. Dr. Stahel's latest book Operation Typhoon was released by Cambridge University Press in March 2013 and will be followed by another book focusing on German operations on the eastern front in November and early December 1941.

David Stahel completed his undergraduate studies at Monash University and Boston College. He has an MA in War Studies from King's College London and a PhD in 2007 from the Humboldt University in Berlin. His dissertation has been published by Cambridge Military Histories as Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. He joined the University of New South Wales Canberra in 2012.

Books:

Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009).

Kiev 1941. Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012).

(Together with Alex J. Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (Rochester, 2012).

Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (Cambridge, 2013).

Moscow 1941. Hitler's Battle for the Soviet Capital (forthcoming).

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Stahel's Retreat from Moscow picks up where The Battle of Moscow left and examines what is commonly believed to be the Wehrmacht's "first defeat" in the Second World War.

In his previous studies of German operations in the East, Stahel argues that, in fact, the battle of Moscow was neither the Nazi's first defeat, nor the turning point of the war, because both already took place as early as the summer of 1941.
As Stahel explains in this volume, the accumulation of battlefield "victories", which - considering how much the exhausted German men and resources - could hardly be considered victories in the long term, wasn't enough to knock the Soviet Union out of the war. Consequently, Operation Barbarossa failed to reach its goal, and it is this failure that ultimately proved so ruinous for the Wehrmacht.

However, what made German operations throughout 1941 so crucial to the war's ultimate outcome, Stahel explains, wasn't only the failure to win the fast victory that was so important to Hitler – he dreamt of securing Lebensraum (living space) in the east and ensuring limitless access to almost any resources Germany might require in the war against Great Britain – but also the cost of so many battles to the Wehrmacht's panzer groups. In its merciless and reckless pursuit of immediate triumph, the Ostheer became "a very blunt instrument", and there was no way of restructuring this offensive power without a very long halt, which the unrelenting warfare on the Eastern Front didn't permit. "An army, like that of June 1941, will henceforth no longer be available to us," acknowledged Colonel-General Franz Halder in his diary on November 23. Once Operation Barbarossa turned from a blitzkrieg into a a slogging war of matériel, Stahel argues, large-scale economic deficiencies doomed the Nazi state to defeat.

The author sets out to examine what exactly is the relevance of the winter campaign of 1941-1942 if it's not Germany's first loss. He asserts that it should not be assumed that Germany's winter retreat was any more a sign of "defeat" than its summer advance was a sign of "success". "In the vast expanses of the east, ground mattered far less than resources, but both the Nazi and Soviet regimes struggled to understand this," writes he.
By the beginning of December 1941, both the Ostheer and the Red Army were suffering tragic shortages and living in desperate conditions across most of the line.
The most common problem among German men, for example, was the absence of winter clothing. While on November 1 the army’s senior quartermaster-general, Major-General Eduard Wagner, gave absolute assurances that the Ostheer would be adequately supplied for the winter and Goebbels happily wrote, "Everything has been thought of and nothing forgotten. If the enemy places his hopes in General Winter and believes that our troops in the east will freeze or go hungry he is completely mistaken", Wagner's assessment, in fact, went beyond being optimistic – it was simply impossible. According to Colonel Wilhelm von Rücker, attached to the planning staff of the quartermaster-general’s office, “a few hundred additional trains would have had to be sent” to meet the needs of the troops for the coming winter. Not only was there not the transport capacity for winter equipment, but also other high-priority matériel, such as fuel and ammunition, were already failing to arrive in the required quantities.
With their summer uniforms so inadequate for the winter conditions, Stahel narrates, soldiers were wearing anything they could get their hands on. "So we covered ourselves up with anything … We used bed covers, tablecloths, curtains, anything at all to provide a layer of warmth," wrote Franz Frisch. Under any normal circumstances wearing nonregulation clothing while in uniform was a serious offense, but by then everyone was doing so including the officers. Edmund Blandford described his unit as being “wrapped up like mummies” with scarves covering everything but their eyes. The absurdity of their appearance was not lost on the men, but it was no laughing matter: “Outside we were covered in frost and ice and had to keep on the move to prevent freezing up.” Similarly, Helmut Günther noted: “Even the wild-man picture that we presented in these clothes failed to draw a smile. No longer was there anything to be seen of a military uniform."

As Stahel argues, in 1941 another serious problem for both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht was the lack of coordination between operational planning and strategical reality. With armies stretched, resources scarce, and mobility limited, avoiding exhausting, wasteful operations was very important. Yet, both the German and the Soviet commands had little understanding of this – positions were to be captured, or defended, "at any cost." (Interestingly, Stahel explains this phenomenon with the clash of Nazi/Soviet ideologies.)

Initially the Soviet offensive, which began on December 5, benefited from the overextension of the central part of the German front, where multiple armies were left dangerously exposed. Soviet success was also aided by the enemy's unpreparedness for the cold:
Goebbels announced that between December 27 and January 4, a gigantic collection of winter equipment for the Wehrmacht would be carried out. He called it “a Christmas present from the German people to the Eastern Front,” and the response was huge, with over 67 million items donated. Yet while this response is commonly considered evidence of the great success of Goebbels’s winter relief campaign, Stahel shows that the public opinion reports reveal it was in fact received by many Germans as confirmation of a crisis in the east, which also explains their willingness to give generously. At the front the soldiers were also hearing of Goebbels’s campaign, which they openly mocked as "a public relations whitewash", having already seen far too many cases of frostbite and knowing that few of the garments being donated were likely to appear anytime soon. Some, like Albin Gagel, were scathing in there remarks, questioning the basic practicalities of Goebbels’s campaign: “Trainloads of fur coats were supposedly sent east. That enterprise was surely grandstanding on the part of our leaders. How could a few fur coats make any difference to the poor bastards in the middle of a snowstorm in Russia? And how would a small woman’s coat be made to fit a man, especially over his uniform and gear? I wondered what really happened to those fur coats.” Yet, Goebbels was less interested in practicalities than in what he believed was an enthusiastic public response. Some absurd items were indeed shipped east, narrates Stahel, including a bright blue jacket with gold buttons and fastenings. Wilhelm Moldenhauer cynically observed that the troops could “put on the finest masquerade."

Yet, each new Soviet advance encouraged ever more ambitious thinking until soon Stalin and the Stavka were themselves undermining their own potential to strike a major blow. To make matters worse, Stahel explains, the Red Army on the offensive was in no way comparable to the Wehrmacht in 1941. Its hard-won professionalism, training, and experience enabled the German army to cope much better with excessive expectations than could the fledgling Red Army, whose ill-prepared officer corps was barely able to handle the more passive demands of defensive warfare, much less the skills required for a major offensive. Little experience in conducting forward operations and far too few qualified staff officers made functional command and control haphazard at best, leading in many instances to the infantry attacking in isolation without the support of heavy weapons or coordinated movements. A remarkable number of Soviet officers did not even attempt to “soften up” German positions and simply charged the enemy lines in senseless massed attacks.

On the other hand, December 5 put a much-needed end to the Wehrmacht's disastrous offensive, and at last, it could concentrate its remaining resources on its neglected defense. Retreat bought the German armies precious time, allowed them to replenish their supplies. As Stahel demonstrates, this functioned well for the first two weeks until Hitler insisted he saw no end to such withdrawals and even suggested they could “go right back to the Polish border."
According to Stahel, Hitler's halt order was a military disaster, which took no account of local circumstances and proved deeply unpopular among Army Group Center's commanders. While Hitler reasoned that in the First World War he had often endured ten-day-long artillery barrages and that the troops had continued to hold their position even with only 10 percent of their strength, Field Marshal Klug,dumbfounded by Hitler's ignorance of the situation, pointed out that it was not minus twenty to thirty degrees Celsius in France during WWI and cited a comment from Lieutenant-General Ernst-Eberhard Hell, commanding the 15th Infantry Division: “The commanding general has insisted that if one ordered the 15th Div. to hold, the troops would cease to do so as a result of excessive exhaustion." In response, Hitler emphatically declared: “If that is the case, then it means the end of the German army."
In his study Stahel makes a curious revelation: the generals at the front deeply resented Hitler's new order and demonstrated an orchestrated pattern of coordinated defiance. From the commander of the Army Group Center down, Stahel argues, the halt order was typically viewed, like the Red Army, "as something to be staunchly opposed and carefully outmaneuvered." Hitler and the high-command could not oppose what they did not know about, after all.

However, the real crisis period of the German winter campaign extended from mid-December to mid-January, when Hitler finally relaxed his halt order and allowed three German armies a last-minute withdrawal. Yet, Stahel narrates, even in this period of strategic crisis, the Red Army operated "as an unwieldy, blunt instrument smashing itself relentlessly against German lines." Sometimes it overran German positions and broke through the line, but those were exceptions to the rule – in general, the cost to the Red Army was staggering.

David Stahel's work covers all six of Army Group Center's armies, and presents a complete, graphic picture of events instead of a general one because - as he explains - every army experienced a crisis at a different time and to a different degree. The author again focuses on the German side of the conflict, although some valuable insights into Soviet logistics are provided. Stahel also draws upon many war letters and diaries, adding a human element to his book. Especially touching are his descriptions of Christmas celebrations at the front.
Retreat from Moscow is a compelling, meticulously researched history, which shines new light on the winter campaign of 1941-1942. Recommendable.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dr. David Stahel concludes the saga of Army Group Center's campaigns during Barbarossa, Typhoon and the Soviet counterattacks in front of Moscow with this fine volume (the fifth in the series) that covers the fighting in December-January. Having failed to reach the Soviet capital, AGC found itself stretched out along too much front, too deep inside Russia for the febrile German logistical system to support and, perhaps most important, totally unprepared and unequipped for winter fighting. Nonetheless, under the firm leadership of von Kluge (who replaced Bock in command), the army group managed to survive and, indeed, inflict horrendous casualties on the Soviets. In the end, it was the over-stretched and tactically adept Germans that won against the numerically superior but unprofessionally-led Russians. Dr. Stahel's standpoint throughout the series is that the Wehrmacht "won itself to death" and that the long list of impressive operational victories in the summer and fall of 1941 left the Germans worn down and incapable of winning the war in Russia. As usual, the narration of the battles is interspersed with struggles within the German high command (especially concerning Hitler's "stand fast" orders), the morale and physical conditions of the troops and the situation on both the home and other combat fronts. There is even an interesting examination of how the German troops of the Ostheer celebrated Christmas. With this series, David Stahel has established himself as one of the premier historians of the Russian Front, and his books are not only thorough but also pleasurable reads. Highly recommended.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

TL;DR

David Stahel’s Retreat from Moscow provides a comprehensive, effective argument for looking anew at the battles of the 1941-1942 German winter campaign. Highly recommended for history and WWII buffs.

Disclaimer: I received a free copy of this book in exchange for my honest opinion.

Find more reviews at Primmlife.com!

Review

Once, I watched a friend build frames for a renovation on his house. He built a solid frame that would hold up under building codes, but he didn’t know why those codes existed. How did the code relate to the actual loading and structural requirements? What was really happening with the loads in the frames? How did the load transfer from the ceiling to the walls to the ground? As a structural engineer, all of that stuff was my language. My friend didn’t understand any of it, but that didn’t stop him from building a structurally sound frame. When I read history books, I sometimes feel that way. I learn something from the texts but not as much as someone immersed in history. When it comes to Retreat from Moscow by David Stahel, I definitely felt that way. I enjoyed this book, but I’m not sure I got everything out of it that someone more versed in World War II military history could get. From the introduction, I knew this would be a very deep, very well researched book. David Stahel didn’t disappoint. Retreat from Moscow is a book with big aims at revising a bit of WWII military history.

Retreat from Moscow

It’s commonly accepted that the winter of 1941-1942 was Germany’s first defeat. But in his previous work, David Stahel argued that the first defeat and the turning of the war occurred in the summer of 1941. In Retreat from Moscow, he argues that Germany wasn’t as defeated as the current narrative would suggest. The Red Army paid a heavy price with the front line stabilizing deep in Soviet territory from February to March of 1942. The book is meticulously built around proving this argument through exquisitely researched details. The notes and bibliography at the end of the book are detailed, numerous, and comprehensive. The bibliography is broken out into archival, websites, primary and secondary sources. All this research punctuates the text with more than just statistics; the maps helped me locate the detailed movements. Usually, I’m not a big map fan, but they worked for me in this book for some reason.

Retreat from Moscow starts in early December 1941 with the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive to the halt Hitler ordered in mid-December to the supply crisis of Christmas 1941 to the end of January 1942. Twenty-one chapters of detailed description and analysis that supports his conclusion. The Germans weathered the Soviet offensive by causing massive casualties among the Red Army. Stahel dictates the ups and downs of this campaign with accessible writing that held my attention. The writing is lively and tells a story rather than a dry recitation of the facts. This is excellent historical writing.

Depth

Retreat from Moscow is a deep book. Stahel moves from the unit level movements to the greater strategic decisions being made. The information is dense while remaining readable. Stahel has done extensive research. Of all the nonfiction books I’ve read this year, Stahel has collected the largest endnotes and bibliography. I cannot imagine the amount of work that went into just preparing for this book. His notes must be a few books unto themselves. I wonder if war gamers could use the book to reenact the winter campaign because the descriptions are so in-depth.

As much as I enjoyed this book, I didn’t know enough to get everything out of it that a military history buff could. It might have been too much for me at this point in my studies of World War II. The troop level movements were interesting, but I preferred the strategy and tactics a level up from there. I think for the casual history reader, this might be too information. However, the casual history reader can still enjoy Stahel’s work.

Did Stahel Argue Effectively?

In the introduction, Stahel states his thesis well and clearly. He uses the rest of the book as supporting arguments. So, was he successful? That’s a question for someone more knowledgeable about this material than I am. Success here would be defined as changing the current view of the winter campaign. It would also be defined among the scholars of WWII military history. Has he changed the course of the dialogue around the winter campaign? I don’t know. However, he argued effectively enough that I now view the winter campaign in a different light. Though Germany retreated, the high cost to the Red Army and the front line remaining deep in Soviet territory cannot be called a victory for the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

David Stahel’s Retreat from Moscow spares no detail in analyzing the German and Soviet troop movements. This in-depth account of the 1941-1942 winter campaign is a must have for military history fans. Retreat from Moscow caters to the hardcore scholars but is accessible to even the average history buff like me. Stahel have given us an excellent historical analysis. Recommended.

7.5 out of 10!

[Arthur · Rating 3 out of 5]

A 15 and a half hour unabridged audiobook.

I know of Barbarossa in general, and have a bit more thorough knowledge regarding Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kursk, etc. But I'm lacking in the areas this book covered.

I'm glad I listened to it. It did not drag on or get boring at any points and definitely gave a new and different view on understanding the Russian counteroffensive after the Germans stalled at Moscow.

I appreciate that this book was not merely about central planning, leader personalities, and logistics. It also put a fair amount of time on studying the soldiers - how they kept warm, how they dealt with frozen weapons, how important mail delivery was, etc. Overall I liked this book, would absolutely check out more of this authors works.

[Venky · Rating 4 out of 5]

Riding on the back of research that can only be appropriately described as ‘monumental’, David Stahel’s “Retreat From Moscow”, portrays in an unsparing and eviscerating fashion, Germany’s ill-fated winter campaign between 1941 – 1942. Drawing on new sources of history, Mr. Stahel argues that the despotic dictator Adolf Hitler’s “first defeat” took place as early as in the summer of 1941. Operation Barbarossa (the code name for Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union) which was to have culminated in the Fuhrer securing his much trumpeted Lebensraum (living space) in the East, instead transformed into a bloodied and blithering blunder of irredeemable proportions. From the beginning of 1941 till early 1942, both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, competed with each other in resorting to tactics that were inexplicable and maneuvers that could only be termed indecipherable. It would be wrong to foist the responsibility for such mindless mechanics solely upon the Generals commanding their troops. While Hitler and Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres –OKH)’s Halt Orders and War Directives prohibiting beleaguered groups from withdrawing, in the face of a continued and relentless onslaught had the German Army in a bind, Stalin’s equally incalculable but vengeful determination to hurl everything the Soviets had at a more experienced and well entrenched opposition, in spite of staggering losses of life and limb had the Soviet forces in veritable tatters. What’s more all of this fighting was being conducted in the most inhospitable and treacherous of conditions. For e.g. the diary of Erich Hager claimed that on the 6th of December, the thermometer had reached minus 46 degrees Celsius near Tula.

As Mr. Stahel painstakingly informs us, what prevented the German army from a complete annihilation was the ingrained hall-mark system of “mission oriented tactics” (Auftragstaktik) which enabled bold “initiatives” to be taken at the front. A combination of brazen and tactful disregard of Hitler’s “retain-ground-at-any-cost” instruction resulted in the Germans retreating to temporary safety.

The Soviets, suffering from an appalling lack of leadership and experience did not have the luxury of any mission oriented tactics. Drawing upon statistics provided by Lev Lopukhovsky and Boris Kavelerchik, Mr. Stahel informs his readers about the casualties suffered by the Big Bear. “. revised upward the Soviet winter total, arriving at more than 1.6 million Soviet losses, which tells its own story when set against the German total of just 262,524 casualties for a slightly longer period (November 26, 1941, to February 28, 1942).

Pandering to Hitler’s whims and wanton mood swings, his coterie, as Mr. Stahel demonstrates, filtered information coming in from the front thereby distorting the actual goings on and feeding the murderous leader only what he wanted to hear. The likes of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel who controlled the Fuhrer’s Headquarters and Franz Halder, then chief of staff of the Army High Command (OKH), provided detailed instructions to the “Generals” about both the news to be conveyed and the manner which was to be adopted while presenting oneself before Hitler. However, as Mr. Stahel demonstrates with extraordinary clarity and verve, there were brave and brilliant Generals and Commanders who cocked a snook at the famous “halt order” (Halthefehl) issued by their Supreme leader. Chief amongst such dissenters was the immensely respected and incredibly measured Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge. The man who later on became an active conspirator in the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler, and who took his own life on 19 August 1944, when the plot failed, was almost single handedly responsible for the Army Group Centre remaining intact during the winter campaign. As Mr. Stahel elaborates, “His so called “middle solution” sought, under the most difficult circumstances, to chart a response between the all-out retreat practiced by the likes of Heinz Guderian and the fanatical resistance demanded by Hitler. Kluge’s limited withdrawals sought to avoid exhausting the men, while seeking to preserve as much equipment as possible.” This was no easy task, especially considering the predilections of Hitler to ingloriously sack anyone possessing the will, if not the temerity to challenge his diktat. An unfortunate but classic case in point was the case of Walther von Brauchitsch, a Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief. Contemptuously treated or mistreated by Hitler, this decorated war veteran was dishonorably discharged from his duties upon incurring the wrath of his leader.

The German’s while strategically retreating from the positions that they had captured and occupied followed a scorched earth policy. Burning every village in their wake, their main objective was to leave not one structure standing or one inhabitable building intact. For example, in December 1941 the retreating forces of Schmidt and Guderian’ s armies wreaked wanton misery upon both people and property in Orel. “An MG 42 was set up in the main aisle of a church. Then the Russian men, women and children were made to shovel snow; then they were taken into the church, without knowing at all what was happening. They were shot immediately with the MG 42 and petrol was poured on them and the whole place was set on fire.”

With the propaganda machine on both the warring sides working overtime, the losses incurred by each side was grossly overestimated by their opponents. The propaganda Minister and a rabid Nazi, Josef Goebbels cranked out incredulous quantum of fictitious victories thereby satiating the anxious Germans. The Soviet Union on the other hand had its own share of mercurial writers such as Ilya Ehrenberg, churning out reams of glorious battle field exploits which either had taken place only in the author’s mind or whose outcomes grossly exaggerated glorifications.

While two sparring vainglorious and pretentious men played dice with the future of their respective countries and country men, the gallant soldiers who were sacrificial pawns in the broader scheme of things fell prey to a legion of uncontrollable factors. A crippling loss of materiel, and men not to mention the specter of frost bite and lice infestation, took an enormous toll. “While epidemic typhus was the most common of louse-borne diseases on the Eastern Front, it was not the only disease transmitted by the lice. Rickettsia Quintana caused trench fever, and Borrelia recurrentis, relapsing fever. There was also spotted fever, but this was spread by mites, ticks, and fleas, not lice.” Consumption of the stimulant Pervitin, colloquially termed Panzerschokolade (tank chocolate) became rampant and led to the drug being subject to the Reich opium law.

Ultimately, when the dust settled and the spoils of war were temporarily counted, both sides were left not just licking their wounds or massaging hurt prides. They were left to nurse permanently etched scars that would haunt them for not just their lives, but future generations as well. To quote Willy Peter Reese, who was in the eye of the storm and was returning home on furlough:

“I lived on the edge. Death, the blind strangler, had failed to find me, but a human being had died in Russia, and I didn’t know who it was…We were required to subject our own lives to the will of the age, and our destiny began like a tale of duress, patience, and death. We could not escape the law, there was a breach in our unfinished sense of the world, and, like a dream, the march into the other and the unknown began, and all our paths ended in night.”

“Retreat from Moscow” – a Masterpiece dealing with a perfectly avoidable tragedy; or was it inescapable?

[Terence · Rating 3 out of 5]

Cliff Notes review: If you like military and/or WW2 histories, I would recommend this book. Retreat from Moscow goes deep into the weeds to chronicle how the Nazis were able to stabilize the Eastern Front over the winter of 1941-42 after the failure of Operation Barbarossa (the initial invasion of Soviet Russia). Stahel focuses on Central Army Group, whose commander, Kluge, pulled off a minor miracle to hold his command together in the face of Hitler's wholly unrealistic order to not give up an inch of occupied territory and unrelenting (however incompetent it proved to be) Soviet pressure.

I will say, on a more general note, that I occasionally read these histories (primarily of the American Civil War or the two world wars) and am fascinated by how field commanders often creatively interpret their orders in the face of real-world conditions or because they feel they know better than the HQ staff behind the lines. Stahel goes into great detail on how Kluge and his subordinates contrived to make strategic withdrawals and establish a defensible front in the face of Hitler's obtuseness and the HQ staff's obsequious kow-towing to der Fuehrer.

[Perato · Rating 4 out of 5]

David Stahel finishes his 5 book long Army Group Center in the Eastern Front 1941 study on a high note. Although it is not named as such, it is what it is.

While he argued that the whole Barbarossa was a strategic defeat for the Germans, this time he goes against the more common conception and argues that the winter campaign was a strategic defeat for the Russians and a victory for the Germans. In this book he is very critical of Hitler's 'halt order' and somewhat more nice to German generals unlike in his previous books.

His center argument lies in the fact that while Germans had to retreat, they inflicted proportionally great losses to the Red Army. His other argument is that Hitler's Halt order wasn't exactly obeyed and was in most cases detrimental to the survival of German forces rather than preventing a full scale rout. In this he especially lifts Kluge as a centerpiece to successful German Strategy being an effective middle man between obstinate Hitler and Generals who wanted more flexibility.

I enjoyed this 'last' book as it gave fresh ideas and thoughts to the field and while I'm not 100% convinced on his arguments this time, I rather lean on them than what I have been previously learned. Stahel can be a bit repetitive but in this book it didn't feel as bad as in his Kiev 1941.

The edition I read(Picador 2020) wasn't very good quality, especially the text was sometimes blurry and not even straight. Maps were decent, although the book didn't have any sort of OOB so they were sometimes hard to follow as Corps' were sometimes mentioned only by their leader in the text and roman numerals in the maps, so I had on occasion resort to either not caring or googling where exactly the mentioned action was happening.

[AcademicEditor · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent, well-researched book that would make a great foundational text for a college history class. It might be a little deep for the average reader. There are visuals that are interesting, but hard to see on an e-reader.

Thanks to the publishers and NetGalley for a digital ARC.

[Simon Mee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Retreat from Moscow is good history writing.  Not because of the book's argument that the German Army did a good job Soviet winter offensive 1941-1942 despite Hitler's hold order.  I can't assess that in detail and tend to believe whatever book I read last. What makes it good is that it takes a particular subject and slices it from a moral, human, tactical, operational, and strategic level, smoothly weaving into a single narrative.

One danger when analysing German war performance is to end up idolising its subject. Yes, the German Army generally performed in a superior manner to the Soviet one, but it wasn't a "good" one.  Yes, the soldiers were human, suffering in the winter, and half-baked travelling theatres:

Overall, the standard was not high, and there were continual complaints about the poor level of performances.

...but there was criminality at every level, from the average soldiers shooting local guides and burning villages, up to generals accepting payoffs and relying of the triumph of National Socialist will to succeed. One interesting point made if the generals, particularly Kluge, tried to work around Hitler's hold order, then:

It also strongly suggests that the commanders in the east possessed a much greater latitude to "interpret" and act on Hitler’s criminal orders than they exercised during the war.

...undermining the "just following orders" defence to the atrocities in the east.

This is a "niche" campaign and not a critical read. The prose is solid rather than outstanding. However, in a crowded market, I recommend it as an insight as to how to write good history.

[EJ · Rating 4 out of 5]

This work is massive in scope, involving vast geographic areas and millions of men. It does not discuss the retreat from Moscow at the individual soldier’s level, but at the corps and army level. We are treated to the workings of the very highest-ranking German generals on the Eastern Front. David Stahel, the author, is a professional historian, teaching both at the University of New South Wales and the Australian Defence Force Academy. This is the latest in a number of books he has written about the German Army on the Eastern Front during World ll. His purpose in writing this book is to show that the German retreat from Moscow was a victory “tactically, operationally, and even strategically”, and not a defeat as is often claimed by other historians.
Retreat From Moscow is also a very detailed telling of the German high command’s three-way battle with the Communists, Hitler, and the Russian winter. It is packed with historical facts of which most people are generally unaware. Which German general on the Eastern Front could mostly be likened to U.S. General Omar Bradley, the “soldier’s general”? Which side’s generals were most afraid to contradict their ruler? What motivated Hitler to give the Halt Order, thus preventing his armies from making orderly and life saving retreats in the face of vastly superior numbers? Why did the Communists throw wave after wave of mass attacks against well-entrenched National Socialist armies? These and many other questions are answered here.
The author’s treatment of the Wehrmacht Generals is uneven. At times it seems as if the author has taken a break from writing and then come back in a different frame of mind. This is particularly true in his treatment of Field Marshal Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center. Stahel shows a particular animus towards General Heinz Guderian, but does not tell the reader why. This may have been developed in one of the author’s earlier works. There is an impression that perhaps things were said in Mr. Stahel’s earlier books that should have been repeated for clarity’s sake in this volume. Stahel blames Guderian for the German army’s failure to be prepared for winter warfare. This hardly seems fair, though, because Guderian was a blitzkrieg general who had no expectation of having to fight winter warfare. The author also appears ambivalent in his attitude toward the opposing forces. He illustrates some of the German’s inexcusable treatment of Russian civilians, but insinuates that reports of Russian brutality toward German prisoners were mere rumors. He never calls the Soviets “Communists”, but usually refers to the Germans as “Nazis.” The writer does show human understanding for the suffering of the Wermacht troops in the field, but very little for the generals. One might expect a professional historian to show a bit more detachment than our author does, but there may be a good explanation for this. He is an academic, after all, writing in an environment not known for its tolerance of deviation from expected viewpoints.
On the whole, this is a very good book, especially for professional historians and serious students of history. For casual readers, it could be one or two hundred pages shorter. It is to be heartily recommended, but not in its e-book version. Professor Stahel makes generous use of maps and footnotes, which can be extremely difficult to utilize in an e-book edition.

[Cristie Underwood · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author's painstaking research and attention to detail is obvious in the writing of this book. There were many facts that I only discovered after reading this!

[Joe · Rating 2 out of 5]

I really couldn't get into this book. It was pretty boring in my opinion. It talked more about the petty squabbling of the German Generals on the Russian Front than anything else.

[Raime · Rating 3 out of 5]

A story of how Hitler and Stalin competed who would lose faster

[Andrew Canfield · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Soviet counterattack during the winter of 1941-1942 is viewed by many World War Two historians as a near total failure on the part of the German Army. Following the abandoned attempt to take Moscow in the fall, the subsequent Wehrmacht retreat-both at the time and afterward-drew comparisons to the retreat of Napoleon’s Grand Armee during France’s disastrous 1812 Russian campaign of their own.

But professor David Stahel uses Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany’s Winter Campaign 1941-1942 to put forward a different interpretation. He paints a picture of a strategic retreat that, while far from ideal when it came to Germany’s goals at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, nevertheless was pulled off in the best way possible under challenging circumstances.

German Panzer commander Heinz Guderian is one of the generals who plays a prominent role in the book. The blitzkrieg tactics which had served his men well in the western theater were not as amenable in the eastern one, and he showed a non-Adolf Hitler-endorsed independent streak during his time in Russia. Dismissive of orders he did not like and willing to tell the top brass in Berlin no when he felt it was called for, Guderian became such a lightning rod that he was dismissed during the winter campaign.

The topic of how much flexibility to grant commanders on the ground was an important part of Retreat from Moscow. Hitler had issued an order for the Wehrmacht to stand their ground instead of retreating in the face of the enemy, and many of his subordinates present in the east were contemptuous of this mode of thinking. Stahel links national socialist ideology and the emphasis it placed on a strong willpower being able to overcome seemingly impossible circumstances as the driving force behind Hitler and Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) head Franz Halder’s willingness to issue directives like this ‘halt order’ in 1941.

Holding out until the last man was not something many generals in the Soviet theater looked fondly upon. Not only was Guderian let go, but Walter von Brauchitsch had been the Commander-in-the-Chief of the German Army before his own dismissal during the winter campaign. Hitler then placed himself in charge of the army after throwing von Brauchitsch to the curb, and the book demonstrates that relieving the commander-in-the-chief of his duties in the middle of a campaign did a lot to cast doubts on the direction of the German war effort for the first time.

Both Hitler and Joseph Stalin had promised 1942 would bring the breakthrough that would ensure their side’s total victory in the war; both of these rash guarantees would fuel the furious fight as January 1942 dawned with the Germans having failed to take Moscow. This failure was the first time up to that point in the Second World War that the Germans had been turned back.

Stahel focuses primarily on the Wehrmacht, which relegates Georgie Zhukov and the Red Army’s offensive actions for lesser examination. Much of the fighting is from the perspective of the now-defensive Germans reacting to Soviet movements.

But the damage Stalin’s purges did to the first year of his country’s war effort was impossible to miss. Despite achieving local successes, it is hypothesized that these were more from the Soviet’s ability to throw massive amounts of cannon fodder on the front lines than from any strategic mastery. The Communist lack of regard for human life was held up as a huge reason why the Red Army was able to swarm the Germans and absorb major loss of life in the process, and the lopsided casualty totals in one attack after another were evidence of these reserves of manpower.

The KVI and T-34 also did a number on the Wehrmacht, although the usage of hollow charge shells did go some way toward neutralizing these tanks.

While the Germans were of course steeped in ideology, this was shown to pale in comparison to the Red Army’s indoctrination of their officers. Questioning an order from Moscow was not even entertained. The limited independence in command which ultimately was given to Germany’s generals as well as the encouragement of creative solutions to insoluble problems was shown to not to be present at all about Soviet commanders.

German Army Group Centre and the 4th Army Commander Gunther von Kluge play big roles in the eastern front, and Joachim Lemelson’s 47th Panzer Division also figures heavily in the strategic withdrawal. Withdrawal to the Konigsberg Line was a tremendous source of disagreement between the OKH and those experiencing the relentless Red Army attacks firsthand on the front line.

Gunther von Kluge’s friction with Guderian over the latter’s insubordination underscored the divisions between commanders in the eastern theater. 43rd Army Corps commander Gotthard Heinrici summed up the unwillingness of military liaisons to okay their local generals’ requests for strategic eastern front withdrawals by stating “they have declined all suggestions out of fear of the highest authority.”

One non-Guderian individual willing to question OKH’s order directly was Ninth Army’s Walter Model. The book held him out as someone confident enough in his defensive tactics to openly spurn the halt order. While the winter withdrawal was a blow to Germany’s hopes for a quick victory, it was done in such a manner that the means were still present in the spring to achieve a win in the east.

Battling against the Red Army was one thing, but the elements were another one entirely.

Retreat from Moscow reveals to readers the lack of preparation for the winter on the part of the Wehrmacht. From a lack of winter clothing to the jamming of guns and many Panzers’ inability to even start, the Russian winter certainly made life harder for the Germans. Needless to say, frostbite and the fight against demoralization among the rank and file (and this was where the emphasis on national socialist individual will also played a key part) was a major concern. Even Joseph Goebbells came to lament the lack of readiness for winter fighting on the part of Germany’s army.

Sexual assault and rape were rampant in Russia during the war, and the Germans ultimately set up numerous brothels in the areas they held so as to better vet the women the troops they were sleeping with. The book claims that between fifty and sixty thousand women worked in European brothels run by the Nazis during the course of the war.

The willingness of this book to focus solely on one aspect of the German-Russia war makes it a tremendous resource. By not trying to zoom out and do more than this, it gives a good feel for the situation on the ground and the manner in which the Wehrmacht managed a strategic withdrawal despite tremendous internal divisions and awful winter weather.

David Stahel has written a great history of the German Army's attempt to salvage something from fall 1941's disappointed expectations. That this prevented a total collapse and left open the possibility for later campaigns in what would become a drawn out fight could be seen as a qualified victory for the Wehrmacht.

The battles and the internal dynamics of the army are written about fluidly, and this book will be enjoyed by those interested in World War Two's eastern front campaign.

-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

David Stahel is back with another slab of hell on the Eastern Front, this time to make the argument that, as bad as it was, the collapse of Operation Typhoon was not quite the disaster that the Germans deserved to experience. That this was the case is a commentary on the limitations of Soviet military of the time and how the professional leaders of the Red Army had their own delusional maximum leader to cope with.

Apart from that it occurs to me, seeing as this is the fifth book in this epic, Stahel might have done a little recapitulation of the themes of his earlier books, which dwelt on personal and professional failings of the German officer corps. Seeing as this is more of a popular book, not everyone is familiar with the erosion of reputations that have occurred in the cases of men such as Guderian and Halder since the end of the Cold War, and the fading of the polite lie of a German army that did not share in the criminality of the Third Reich.

Originally written: February 2, 2020.

[Philip Kuhn · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent book as usual by Stahel, but a ir too many extra pages added.

Huge thanks to Stahel for writing this book. Most books on the war just glaze over the winter war of 41 to 42, or even just give it a few sentences. But this book covers all aspects very well.

The only problem is there is about Aan extra 100 pages to it.

Recommended for Wwii buffs.

Phil Kuhn

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

Probably more of a 3.5, it has a lot of interesting bits, but I wish he laid out the timeline more coherently. Like the title says, it covers the winter campaign from 1941-1942, which means it feels like it starts abruptly and ends abruptly.

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Surprisingly dull narrative given the subject matter

[Friedrich Von der weth · Rating 5 out of 5]

Normalmente se tiende a pensar que en el invierno de 1941 se produce la primera derrota alemana en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Lo anterior, según David Stahel no es cierto.

Retreat from Moscow: A new history of Germany’s Winter Campaign: 1941-1942 ofrece una reflexión profunda de uno de los puntos más interesantes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tras casi llegar a Moscú; el Cuerpo de Ejército Centro aleman debe detenerse. Las severas condiciones climáticas y la sobre extensión de las líneas de comunicaciones terrestres materializaron lo que Clausewitz denomina como el punto de culminación. La ofensa requiere un gran cantidad de energía y cuando se llega a niveles de agotamiento la fuerza queda expuesta a un contraataque (así funciona conceptualmente).

Pese a lo anterior y una masiva contra ofensiva, al término del invierno de 1942 los rusos solo pudieron recapturar un 7% de su territorio. Las causas son variadas , pero la más recalcable es la superioridad táctica alemana. La razón de muertes durante el periodo era de cerca 11:1 en favor de Alemania. Si, por cada 11 rusos moria 1 alemán.

Uno de los aspectos interesantes del libro es la investigación sobre la orden de detención total emitida por Hitler. Ninguna unidad estaba autorizada a retroceder sin su permiso directo. Está orden fue una de las peores resoluciones estratégicas de la guerra. En vez de mantener una postura defensiva de corte ofensivo, aplicando una defensa móvil operacional; las unidades debieron persistir en defensas de áreas, generando condiciones para penetraciones y envolvimientos rusos. Muchos historiadores apuntan a que esta orden fue la muerte de la doctrina Auftragtaktiks, sin embargo la investigación arroja otra verdad. Mucha unidades desobedecieron abiertamente la orden de Hitler y resolvieron según la realidad y contexto que vivían. Algo típico del modo alemán de hacer la guerra.

Relacionado con la articulación de objetivos estratégicos, operacionales y tacticos, se llega a la conclusión de que el diseño operacional no obedecía a la realidad táctica. Las unidades fueron sobre exigidas llevándolas a niveles de agotamiento prematuro. Mucho menos se cumplió el objetivo estratégico de Hitler basado en el lebensraum.

Pese a que el invierno de 1941-42 no fue la primera derrota alemana; fue efectivamente el punto de culminación en el este. De las 132 divisiones empleadas en 1941 solo 58 estarían en condiciones de ejecutar operaciones ofensivas en la primavera. La energía invertida sería imposible de recuperar y en 1943 se iniciaría el abandono voluntario del frente. Alemania había mostrado su efectividad en campañas cortas y enérgicas; pero nunca tuvo buenos resultados en la atrición prolongada.

El historiador es reconocido como una referencia en estudios relacionados a el Ejército Aleman. Es un libro de gran calidad histórica y de una mejor narrativa, la que nos transporta a las duras y brutales condiciones en la que se vieron enfrentados.

[David AL · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Stahel es un investigador y autor sencillamente espectacular. Con cada vez menos tiempo para leer todo lo que querría, siempre empujado por la necesidad de lecturas de fragmentos, capítulos y artículos, los libros que selecciono intento que sean una garantía de calidad. La pentalogía del primer medio año de guerra germano-soviética que culmina con este volumen es para mí la mejor historia militar del Frente Oriental que se ha hecho hasta ahora, con algunos como Jean Lopez a la par en calidad y ambición. Ya no es que ofrezca un análisis riquísimo y complejo, por la visión multinivel de la campaña, por la sensibilidad humana, por la agudeza en la comprensión de lo militar y de cómo lo político influía en las concepciones operativas del conflicto, sino que es trepidante a nivel narrativo. Stahel demuestra el tremendo éxito táctico de la Wehrmacht a la hora de hacer frente a la contraofensiva soviética del invierno del 41-42, en parte debido a la intromisión constante y el alejamiento de Stalin respecto a la realidad del frente y las posibilidades del Ejército Rojo. Plantear como primera victoria soviética lo ocurrido en el primer invierno del conflicto es un mito en el más puro sentido de la palabra, por mucho que si lo fue es porque la sociedad soviética del momento lo necesitaba y porque así lo vivió, al conseguir alejar a los alemanes de Moscú, que aún con todo jamás hubieran podido alcanzar la capital con los medios y con la situación en que se encontraban a finales de noviembre de 1941. De hecho, Stahel también demuestra que de no haber sido por la orden de alto de Hitler, la defensa flexible y la autonomía total de los oficiales con mando sobre el terreno habrían provocado un daño mayor si cabe a las fuerzas soviéticas, que pagaron con cifras escalofriantes la incompetencia de Stalin y su desprecio por la vida, así como el dogmatismo de muchos de sus oficiales y los enfoques táctico-operaciones absolutamente anticuados de los que se servían. Parte del éxito alemán fue posible también por su guerra sin restricciones y su sumisión al imperativo militar, que en todos los territorios que se vio obligado a ceder desde primeros de diciembre de 1941 dejaron un reguero de crímenes de guerra terribles en forma de territorio devastado donde la población civil quedó condenada a la muerte más cruel por frío y hambre. Sea como sea, la obra concluye demostrando después de cinco volúmenes trepidantes el coste material irreparable que tuvo el primer medio año de guerra en el este para el Tercer Reich, que nunca pudo recuperarse de todas las pérdidas del fracaso operativo de Barbarroja, de modo que la ofensiva del 42 fue una sombra de la del año anterior. Imprescindible en el grado de detalle y en la capacidad de desplegarlo en un relato sumamente atractivo.

[Metal Nyankos · Rating 5 out of 5]

start of the book

hitler: fufufu "go go gadget wehrmacht!"
*fails to take moscow*
stalin: FUFUFU "many of you may die, but that is a chance i am willing to take"
*throws wave after wave of his own men into the enemy death cannons*
hitler: "we can TOTALLY still win this guys, we have like...a billion tanks. i should know, i built them all myself because i am *~a genius~*"
OKW: "um, mein fuhrer, we have, uh, 200 tanks, half of them are stuck in the snow, 10 of them are french, and we have no gas"
hitler: "idk sounds sus"
stalin: "NOW MY HAWK MEN"
*Russian army continues to suffer uninmaginable casulties*
zhukov: "fuckfuckfuckfuck"
hitler: "no one move! ever! through willpower alone we will hold the line and take the day! i should know, because willpower is my middle name"
average Hitlerite soldier: "my fingers freeze to my gun, i am covered in lice, and i am le tired...my only joys are burning down villages, wrapping myself in newspaper to stay warm, and listening to American jazz via the BBC"
average Stalin enjoyer: "what the fuck is a gun? you guys are getting guns? Blyat. all i know is charge enemy, eat hot goulash, and die."

interlude

Goebbles: "our troops are listening to WHAT? from WHO? that is some bull-scheisse"
264,954 German horses: dead
US/UK: *craning their necks to see the eastern front* "the fuck they doin' over there?"
Japan: *circles December 7th on the calendar* FU FU FU

end interlude

zhukov: "whew, ok, despite having the world's worst boss and no artillery i took 50km of ground. it only cost..." *checks casualty list that rolls cartoonishly onto the floor of his office and out the door* "oh ffs"
OKW: "whew, ok, despite having the world's worst boss (who fired several of our top and most winningest generals) we only lost 50 km of ground. looks like it only cost..."*proceeds to check the official war diary but gets distracted by Hitler popping another Pervitin* "mein fuhrer, no! stop! okay, who gave the fuhrer Panzerschokolade???"
stalin: "despite all odds I won the day!"
hitler: "despite all odds I won the day!"
average Hitlerite soldier & average Stalin enjoyer at the same time: "chat, are we cooked?"

end of the book

[Scott Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Audiobook) A quality history of perhaps one of the most critical military campaigns in World War II. There has been a fair amount of mythology regarding the winter of 1941-2, especially in regards to the role and actions of the Nazi and Soviet militaries. For some, the winter campaign highlighted the stupidity of the Nazi High Command for seemingly ignoring history about fighting a land war in Western Russia in the middle of winter. For others, the much-ballyhooed “Stand or Die” order from Hitler held firm against the counter-attacking Soviets, setting the stage for the resumption of the Nazi offensive in 1942, later setting up the spectacular defeat at Stalingrad.

For the author, the winter campaign does not fit perfectly into either camp. This work is primarily told from the perspective of the German Army, from the politicking at the high command down to the struggles of the common soldier trying to survive in sub-zero temperatures. There is some Soviet perspectives, but not enough to call this a balanced analysis. However, the insights of the German Army are spectacular reading and offer accounts that most would not otherwise come across. In some respect, the struggles of the German soldier are the common struggles of every deployed soldier. Other times, it takes on a very unique German experience, especially with specific atrocities. Not that the Soviets were innocent either. Reinforced in the words of both sides, and in other accounts, you would not want to be captured if at all possible by either side.

Overall, a specific, worthy addition to the literature about World War II and the Eastern Front. The reader did a solid job with the material, but the rating would be the same regardless of format. Worth a read for the military historian.

[A · Rating 4 out of 5]

Maybe read half - at work- just because an interesting topic. We learn a lot about the author's core thesis / point: that while the Russians made impressive attacks - with incredible bravery and risk- their whole vaunted winter offensive was a dud in the end. Yes, the Germans were pressed- even crazed- at the attacks- but hey held on and one has the impression of giving 10 to 1 losses to the Russians for every attack. Leading to the question of: Hitler's halt order (give up no more ground or else). Was this responsible for the Germans holding on? Some say yes- but the author says no. and that Hitler drew the wrong conclusions, thinking his Halt order did save the day.

[Arya Tabaie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Okay, I'm not going to call Stahel a Wehraboo because he's not one.
This work however relies almost exclusively on German sources and ignores Russian ones, which I assume have also been made available by now, to an extent that gives the impression that the author has a bias towards the Wehrmacht, perpetuating the myth of "Soviet hordes" simply throwing human wave after human wave at superior Germans, finally overwhelming them by numbers alone.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am interested in Russia and to some extent World War II - I thought this "new" history of this part of Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union would be interesting. It was.

This is primarily from the German point of view, drawing on a wide variety of sources, with some comparisons to Russian operations and thinking. It has detailed endnotes but it very readable.

[Andy Anaya · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an extremely detailed and thorough exploration of not only the numbers and timeline but also insight into the mentality and decision-making by commanding officers at each stage of the deteriorating situation in the Russian theater, and I enjoyed Stahel's extensive use of excerpts and quotations from memoirs and personal accounts.

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another brilliant book from a brilliant writer. One of the best WW2 historians, especially regarding the German campaign against the USSR. Detailed analysis of the failure of the Soviet winter offensive in 1941/42 covering the strategy, tactics and experiences of the German and Soviet soldiers in the front line, as well as the attitudes of the civilians on the home front.

[Michael Ross · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent account of the Soviet counter offensive at Moscow in December1941. Various sources from German and Soviet to piece together the history of the battle as well as challenge preconceived notions of the battle.

[Tim]

Excellent read. Could have done with more detailed maps but nevertheless a fascinating insight into war on the Eastern Front.

[Ulysese · Rating 5 out of 5]

Highly recommended for detailed analysis and insight. Leaves no stone unturned.