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A Treatise on God as First Principle
This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.
85 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1308
About the author
John Duns Scotus
296 books63 followersJohn Duns, commonly called Duns Scotus (c. 1266 – 1308), is generally considered to be one of the three most important philosopher-theologians of the High Middle Ages. Scotus has had considerable influence on both Catholic and secular thought. The doctrines for which he is best known are the "univocity of being," that existence is the most abstract concept we have, applicable to everything that exists; the formal distinction, a way of distinguishing between different aspects of the same thing; and the idea of haecceity, the property supposed to be in each individual thing that makes it an individual. Scotus also developed a complex argument for the existence of God, and argued for the Immaculate Conception of Mary.
Duns Scotus was given the scholastic accolade Doctor Subtilis (Subtle Doctor) for his penetrating and subtle manner of thought. He was beatified by Pope John Paul II in 1993.
Duns Scotus was given the scholastic accolade Doctor Subtilis (Subtle Doctor) for his penetrating and subtle manner of thought. He was beatified by Pope John Paul II in 1993.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
July 31, 2022
I wanted to read what I had of Scotus in my library. I’ve done that. As seemed to be the norm among the Scholastics, you have propositions relating to the thesis presented and Scotus commenting in either a detailed affirmation or refutation. You do get a fairly detailed picture of his position relating to God as the first principle, and as I said in my review to the other Scotus collection I just finished, there was nothing in his arguments that I found patently fallacious—at least with this initial reading. Admittedly, some of the background of the propositions and his responses probably deserves more study than I have probably dedicated to them, but, for now, I’ve spent as much time with it as I am willing to. We’ll see if I revisit it with a bit more enthusiasm later.
Overall, a notable work of Scholasticism. I doubt it would appeal to the average armchair philosopher.
Overall, a notable work of Scholasticism. I doubt it would appeal to the average armchair philosopher.
January 16, 2026
Duns Scotus was pretty good when he clarified and elaborated others. But when he innovated he did it in an ominous way. His most dangerous legacy is the notion of the contingent Divine will, which radicalises certain aspects of Ibn Sina's metaphysics.
Scotus' argument: Something exists contingently, God by nature cannot be moved by anything but Himself as an End, so God caused everything else contingently. The only acting principle that acts contingently is the will, so God wills contingently. (Scotus' made some other minor points, like that if anything follows its nature it will act as if there is no final End.)
Objection I: It might be objected that contingency is itself a category arising from our imperfect human understanding. We say that it is contingent that it snows today, but we say this only because our information is not enough. If we know enough (even if not perfectly), it is not contingent at all. So it is not necessary that anything exists contingently.
Objection II: If by "nature" we mean the statistical rules of the behaviour of a certain thing, then it can be abstracted from teleology. But according to Maximus the Confessor, when Grace transforms something, its nature remains the same but is renewed so that its previous behaviour is totally destroyed. Therefore nature is not something that is exhaustible by observable facts. Indeed even everyday experiences give us examples that something behaves in an unimaginable way but remains itself. As long as you admit the "depth" of nature it is not contradictory (in my own opinion it is inevitable) to associate it with a telos (as in Maximus' doctrine of the Logoi). My view seems to be that there is a "nature I" that is the sake for which something is created and there is a "nature II" that is how one thing appears statistically. "Nature II" is an imperfect, even fallen representation of "nature I". Ontologically I doubt whether "Nature II" is even intelligible as independent of "Nature I" without assuming Ibn Sina's metaphysics that God creates by choosing from essences. Even modern philosophers like Christine Korsgaard teach that a bad moral behaviour can destroy personal identity, that is, destroying one's own nature.
Objection III: I would rather define free will as the sensitivity to telos (following Anselm), not the faculty of arbitrary choice. It seems to be contingent because it is not determined by physical or biological necessity, but that does not mean that it is not determined by a higher, rational necessity. Even in ordinary language we say that "my friend is so free that he will not betray me for money", not that "my friend is so free that it is absolutely contingent what he will do under such and such a condition". We do make choices but even after we make choices and reflect on ourselves we say that our choices are based on our good or bad "characters" that determine our choices in a way that we previously do not know. Scotus' did not show how to deduce from that "will appears contingent to our human beings" to that "will is contingent even for God". Indeed his argument against prescribing Wisdom to God just because Wisdom is good for human beings can be used to argue against himself here.
Objection IV: To say that God is not necessarily moved by anything else but Himself as the End is true only if it means that God is not forced to move by anything else by Himself. But firstly when God causes anything there is nothing necessitating God Himself to be moved, and secondly I am inclined to think it legitimate to deduct from Divine Goodness certain consequences without destroying Divine Freedom (again, following Anselm). Again when I deduct from my friend's virtue that he will not have me murdered even if he can I am not destroying his freedom or forcing him to do anything.
By introducing contingency Scotus implicitly introduced a "field of choice" independent of God from which God chooses. That is structurally similar to Plato's introduction of the "indeterminant dyad". A similar modern move is Schelling's introduction of a material principle that cannot exists without God but is however different from God to explain creation and freedom. While I am suspicious of both Scotus' and Schelling's approaches, Schelling is more redeemable here. Firstly Schelling was aware that he was doing something dangerous by introducing a certain dualism, but Scotus' pretended as if he did not. Secondly, Schelling's God first determines to create the world out of Love alone, suffers and then triumphs (all at the same moment, as Eternal Past, Eternal Now and Eternal Future), but Scotus' God seems to cause things arbitrarily by His Will alone. Schelling at least embraced light, but Scotus seemed to embrace gravity. (Ironically, he used the example that a stone will by nature falling to the ground to demonstrate that God can by nature love only Himself.)
One may appreciate Schelling's (and even Duns Scotus') attempt to guard God's Freedom from crude necessity. But it is a difficult problem and I do not think that introducing contingency is a good move. Contingency is always contingency with respect to something else that is finite (for instance, one's name is contingent to one's character) and it is not evident that contingency in God is even thinkable. Indeed Epicurus did similar things before (introducing atomic swerving to guard free will). Celebrating contingency will always give rise to empiricism that values rules above principles. That is the worst kind of slavery imaginable.
Scotus' argument: Something exists contingently, God by nature cannot be moved by anything but Himself as an End, so God caused everything else contingently. The only acting principle that acts contingently is the will, so God wills contingently. (Scotus' made some other minor points, like that if anything follows its nature it will act as if there is no final End.)
Objection I: It might be objected that contingency is itself a category arising from our imperfect human understanding. We say that it is contingent that it snows today, but we say this only because our information is not enough. If we know enough (even if not perfectly), it is not contingent at all. So it is not necessary that anything exists contingently.
Objection II: If by "nature" we mean the statistical rules of the behaviour of a certain thing, then it can be abstracted from teleology. But according to Maximus the Confessor, when Grace transforms something, its nature remains the same but is renewed so that its previous behaviour is totally destroyed. Therefore nature is not something that is exhaustible by observable facts. Indeed even everyday experiences give us examples that something behaves in an unimaginable way but remains itself. As long as you admit the "depth" of nature it is not contradictory (in my own opinion it is inevitable) to associate it with a telos (as in Maximus' doctrine of the Logoi). My view seems to be that there is a "nature I" that is the sake for which something is created and there is a "nature II" that is how one thing appears statistically. "Nature II" is an imperfect, even fallen representation of "nature I". Ontologically I doubt whether "Nature II" is even intelligible as independent of "Nature I" without assuming Ibn Sina's metaphysics that God creates by choosing from essences. Even modern philosophers like Christine Korsgaard teach that a bad moral behaviour can destroy personal identity, that is, destroying one's own nature.
Objection III: I would rather define free will as the sensitivity to telos (following Anselm), not the faculty of arbitrary choice. It seems to be contingent because it is not determined by physical or biological necessity, but that does not mean that it is not determined by a higher, rational necessity. Even in ordinary language we say that "my friend is so free that he will not betray me for money", not that "my friend is so free that it is absolutely contingent what he will do under such and such a condition". We do make choices but even after we make choices and reflect on ourselves we say that our choices are based on our good or bad "characters" that determine our choices in a way that we previously do not know. Scotus' did not show how to deduce from that "will appears contingent to our human beings" to that "will is contingent even for God". Indeed his argument against prescribing Wisdom to God just because Wisdom is good for human beings can be used to argue against himself here.
Objection IV: To say that God is not necessarily moved by anything else but Himself as the End is true only if it means that God is not forced to move by anything else by Himself. But firstly when God causes anything there is nothing necessitating God Himself to be moved, and secondly I am inclined to think it legitimate to deduct from Divine Goodness certain consequences without destroying Divine Freedom (again, following Anselm). Again when I deduct from my friend's virtue that he will not have me murdered even if he can I am not destroying his freedom or forcing him to do anything.
By introducing contingency Scotus implicitly introduced a "field of choice" independent of God from which God chooses. That is structurally similar to Plato's introduction of the "indeterminant dyad". A similar modern move is Schelling's introduction of a material principle that cannot exists without God but is however different from God to explain creation and freedom. While I am suspicious of both Scotus' and Schelling's approaches, Schelling is more redeemable here. Firstly Schelling was aware that he was doing something dangerous by introducing a certain dualism, but Scotus' pretended as if he did not. Secondly, Schelling's God first determines to create the world out of Love alone, suffers and then triumphs (all at the same moment, as Eternal Past, Eternal Now and Eternal Future), but Scotus' God seems to cause things arbitrarily by His Will alone. Schelling at least embraced light, but Scotus seemed to embrace gravity. (Ironically, he used the example that a stone will by nature falling to the ground to demonstrate that God can by nature love only Himself.)
One may appreciate Schelling's (and even Duns Scotus') attempt to guard God's Freedom from crude necessity. But it is a difficult problem and I do not think that introducing contingency is a good move. Contingency is always contingency with respect to something else that is finite (for instance, one's name is contingent to one's character) and it is not evident that contingency in God is even thinkable. Indeed Epicurus did similar things before (introducing atomic swerving to guard free will). Celebrating contingency will always give rise to empiricism that values rules above principles. That is the worst kind of slavery imaginable.
October 20, 2021
Fie ca primul principiu al lucrurilor să îmi îngăduie să cred, să ştiu şi să dezvălui cele ce plac măreţiei sale şi ne înalţă spiritele la contemplarea lui. Doamne Dumnezeul nostru, i-ai răspuns lui Moise, servitorul tău, care căuta să îţi afle numele de la tine, cel mai drept Învăţător, spre a-I face cunoscut fiilor lui Israel, , care ştii cât poate concepe despre tine intelectul muritorilor, dezvăluind binecuvântatul tău nume: "Eu sunt cel ce sunt". Tu eşti fiinţa adevărată, tu eşti Întreaga fiinţă. Eu cred aceasta, iar dacă mi-ar fi cu putinţă, aş vrea să o şi cunosc. Ajută-mă, Doamne, pe mine care caut" cât poate să cunoască din fiinţa adevărată, începând de la fiinţa pe care ai predicat-o despre tine.
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May 28, 2024С "За първия принцип" определено захапах хапка, твърде голяма за моята уста. Това е наистина, ама наистина висш пилотаж сред религиозно-етическо-философско-логическата литература, на която трябва да се отделят не дни, а седмици за прочит и разбиране.
May 8, 2020
Exceptional work of philosophy Should be must reading for everyone interested in metaphysics and philosophical theology.
November 17, 2021
Muito bom, mas é um dark souls da escolástica.
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February 19, 2022Brilliant but torturous.
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August 8, 2022Es increíble encontrar un tratado lógico a finales del siglo XII. Un desarrollo al planteamiento causal aristotélico. Claro, conciso, corto.
September 27, 2025
Este libro es uno de esos que cuando lo tome en las manos no lo pude soltar. Para el que desee una joya de metafísica, esta obra es hermosa dando una idea clara de la filosofía franciscana.
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July 18, 2021What I got most out of this work was humility...for I understood very little of it...just as with Aristotle who obviously influenced Scotus. Therefore I am not qualified to give it a rating...though this by no means deminishes it's value.
July 11, 2023
This was an extremely heavy and condensed read. In a review one should try to summarise and point out the important arguments in the book and I wish I could do so, but I find myself unable to do it. Much because I simply must be a dunce, although not because I am opposing him, but because I don't understand.
Although I find some arguments very interesting, in particular how he argues about infinity. He certainly debunks Anselm very well as well.
I think I will have to look in to some secondary literature her, but that is such a minefield too since it seems so fashionable to have 'your reading' of Duns. I can understand why though because there is so much here, and there is also much room for projection of your own views I suppose.
2023: Duns Scotus is sharp, but not an easy read. I would like to use his argument on different views of causation in combination with the discussion of ultimate and proximate causes in evolutionary psychology. I think there is some clarity from Duns Scotus that might be needed in that area.
Although I find some arguments very interesting, in particular how he argues about infinity. He certainly debunks Anselm very well as well.
I think I will have to look in to some secondary literature her, but that is such a minefield too since it seems so fashionable to have 'your reading' of Duns. I can understand why though because there is so much here, and there is also much room for projection of your own views I suppose.
2023: Duns Scotus is sharp, but not an easy read. I would like to use his argument on different views of causation in combination with the discussion of ultimate and proximate causes in evolutionary psychology. I think there is some clarity from Duns Scotus that might be needed in that area.
June 1, 2015
I'm not sure if it is the translation or the text itself, but having studied a fair amount of the Ordinatio in a more contemporary translation, I must say that the prose in this book was particularly difficult for me ( and Scotus' work is notoriously difficult as it is). As far as the content itself goes; it may not be a perfect proof of the existence of God, but the incredible subtlety and rigor of Scotus' arguments and his vast understanding of the entire realm of logical possibility and necessity was astounding. I will definitely be giving this another read through some time in the near future.
July 11, 2016
Top notch philosophical theology from one of the greatest of medieval philosophers and theologians.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews