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The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia
The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume 2, Part 1: From c. 1800 to the 1930s
Volume 3 charts the establishment of the colonial regimes during the period c. 1800 to 1930 and defines this period as one of intensified European penetration, political consolidation by the dominant states, and economic transformation. Anti-classical and nationalist movements are discussed.
- GenresHistoryNonfictionAsia
364 pages, Paperback
First published January 28, 2000
About the author
Nicholas Tarling
76 books3 followersNicholas Tarling was Professor of History at the University of Auckland from 1968 until 1997 and a Fellow of its New Zealand Asia Institute. He was the editor of The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia and wrote nearly 50 books and a large number of articles on the region.
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May 24, 2014
The Cambridge series on South East Asia is a compilation of articles in history from various authors. The articles are densely packed with information and the discussion on bibliography (sources) comes only at the end. This makes it a slow although highly informational read. Who would have known, for example, that one of the Rajah’s of Sarawak would be Mr. James Brooke- born in India to a family of East India company officers and moving on to control a large part of Borneo.
Such initial escapades of were soon strengthened and used for further expansions (e.g. with the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824). In areas where Spanish and Dutch had early success, the involvement of German forces (in Bismarck’s time) was blocked by assisting the continuation of Spanish and Dutch occupations. In this process, maintaining buffer states was to be key. While British controlled India and annexed Burma, Siam was deliberately left on itself so that Dutch Malaya and the French CochinChina (Vietnam) posed no significant threat. In purely economic terms, this happened to be a blessing in disguise for Siam.
The transition from the Company Raj to the British empire was not really smooth. East India Company did not answer directly to the Queen and disagreements within the company over expansion schemes were common. Lord Dalhousie, the architect of the principle of lapse in India, remained against the British annexation of Burma. He believed the need to secure India was higher than to expand Eastwards. He would have wanted a protectorate in Burma, but it was only until Lord Dufferin came to power that Burma was annexed, exiling King Thibaw after three Anglo-Burmese wars (1885). The cooler heads in Indian administration still wanted the old order to be retained so as to avoid discontent - but instead, more and more troops were deployed to control Burma, the royal throne moved from Mandalay to Calcutta.
The book describes the history of South-East Asia from a broader European perspective. It looks into the reasons why the dissent did not lead to a united rebellion against the European powers. The answer that the authors hint at is that the nationalist movements were delayed in SE Asia because of the non-uniformity of traditions and identities in South-East Asia. Siam, for example, considered itself better off with the status it was granted by the British and given the differences in military strengths and informational networks between Thai and European armies, its options were limited - hence the slow submission to the British treaties.
The bureaucracy and the administrative network was to slowly become westernized in the occupied territories. The standardization spurred trade but the political issues remained unaddressed. The difference in subtle differences in British, Dutch, American and French rule has defined the character of the modern nations that have appeared today. In Dutch rule, even a European was just a policeman - an implementer of the colonial regime, while English (and American ones in Phillipines) colonies relied on an elite educated in the Western framework.
The trade of commodities flourished once this framework was established. The trade also resulted in immigration and mixture of peoples. This was particularly due to import of plantation labor from China and India and more in Burma’s case, the administrators and engineers travelled from India. In his classic 1956 work, J.S. Furnivall used the term “plural” society to describe the state of Burma - a term that can be applied to any South-East Asian country. It was this plurality, as it would turn out, that delayed the unity against the empire. The transformation and emphasis of power-inheritance resulted in embrace of race-doctrines which presumably still haunt the modern states in the region. The socio-political conditions in Burma were particularly fragile. The administrators trained in India had neither the desire or the ability to understand local customs. Their reliance on trained Indians for cost-reasons meant that no native urban institutions were developed in Burma - a condition that resulted in further underdevelopment once the educated Indian elite departed Burma.
In 1915, King Vajiravudh, the first Thai king to be educated in the West, famous described Chinese as the Jews of the East. It was a similar free-trade commerce after all that had created the new merchant class of Jews in Europe itself. Large corporations like Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation and Burma Oil company flourished during these times and new cities like Bandung were developed (where the 12% population of Europeans occupied half of the land). The role that immigrants played was, however, key to the empire. The credit in Burma was, for example, provided by a Chettiar class - immigrants from South of India. The rubber boom and mining had resulted in immigration of cheap labour from India and China. About 5 million Chinese are supposed to have arrived in Malaya during the 19th century. After 1907, this process was formalized by formation of a fund that financed recruitment of laborers. The formalization of labour in fact acted in favor of stopping the previously coerced labour. The British had stopped Indian indenture in 1910 and that of Chinese in 1914 (Dutch stopped in 1942).
The conflict between Western and native institutions always occurred on societal levels. The religious movements against the Western culture would later develop into nationalist movements. Western institutions claimed obvious advantages in the areas of education and medicine - institutions that were up against a belief in spirits and demons. At one time responding to an outbreak of cholera in Bangkok, the king fired cannons to ward off evil spirits. The superstition thrived in discontinuity of native institution and a reversion to the native spirit remained widely tempting. The phumibun movements in Thailand were an example where a widespread Buddhist movement clashed with the government. The characteristics of such a movements becomes clear from the example of Ong Man, a lieutenant of Ong Keo (a phumibun)- a celestial being in the eyes of his believers who captured Thai governor of Khemarat and claimed that French militia’s ammunition would turn into frangipani flowers. The result was of course far more devastating.150 of Ong Man soldiers were killed and Ong Keo was shot after being lured into investigation. Such voices of dissent were classified as “dacoity” (British) and successfully suppressed. Another example is the Batak king, Si Singa Maharaja, revered as a divine king was pushed his anti-missionary chiefs into a confrontation with the Dutch and was killed in 1907. The natives believed that he had disappeared.
The result of these struggles was sometimes a merger of Eastern and Western traditions - although it always seemed more the case of native institutions learning from the enemy they were set against. The idea of Maitreya in Buddhism, of Mahdi in Islam matched up with Jesus in the West. A lot of institutions did vanish during the colonial rule (e.g. adjar in Java) but the colonial powers had incorporated a lot of native institutions (priyayi) in their framework to control discontent - the priyayi system in Mayala which Dutch had maintained was later challenged by Islamic movements (e.g. ulama movements which recruited peasants into a Holy war - the precursor to jihad movements that echo in the modern world).
In Burma, much like in other parts of SE Asia, the Buddhists united in a rather Western manner. An interesting case is that YMBA (Young Men Buddhists’ association) - established in 1906 and became of political significance in 1910s and split itself to serve Burmese (rather than Buddhist) interests under the colonial rule. The political organizations had to choose between possibly missing out on the concessions to Indian nationalist movement and restriction on Indian immigration through splitting. The nationalist movements suffered during depression and war years when clashes developed between economically constrained Indians and primarily rural Burmese community. The misalignment of interests of Shan nationalists (sawbwa), Karen National Association (some of whom supported British rule), Muslim Associations (representing Indian Muslims) and Burmese nationalists themselves diffused the nationalist spirit that developed elsewhere. The race riots and the culmination of anti-Indian sentiments resulted in splitting of Burma away from the Indian union in 1937 (acting on recommendations by the Simon Commission).
The merger within the framework of Christianity too were often perceived as dangerous by colonial powers. The rift between Filipino and Spanish Catholic priests that developed in 1830s is one example where colonial and religious ambitions clashed. New converts like Thomas Matulesia were likely to revolt against the colonial rule. It was probably due to that foresight, that Dutch had only allowed proselytization only in 1850. Though missionary work started late, it was instrumental in fanning protests against the colonial governments. Sadrach, a mystic who converted to Christianity, took up the case of expulsion of foreigners with an independent church. The martyrdom of the likes of Dr Jose Rizal spurred Christianity in Philippines as it would have in Byzantium. The American control of Philippines, however, saw fast change. Woodrow Wilson stressed the importance of independence for the US controlled islands in 1913 and Philippines followed a route much different than other South-East Asian countries.
It does seem that South-East Asia got worst of the both worlds during this time of occupation. Trade and Western-inspired development didn’t quite develop the structures of social progress that were established in the West. This trend only worsened during the Depression years - when commodity prices plummeted and labor spending became more constrained. The Chettiar moneylenders in Burma, for example, didn’t find liquid capital lucrative any more and hence stuck to holding lands - controlling about 25% of cultivated land in the lower Burma by 1937. It was during these times, however, when free labor increased (e.g. indentured labour dropping from 76% to 7% in Sumatran plantations).
It was in also 1930s when nationalist movements - inspired with Marxism - started to resemble their Western counterparts. The PNI (Perserikatan Nat. Indonesia) or PPPKI (Association of Political Organizations of the Indonesian People) were a few examples. This is the time when modern flags were first formed for the countries. As need arose for the Dutch to cooperate with such organizations during oncoming World-War, the conditions were created for the nationalists to exercise their bargaining powers. The Marxists in Vietnam became particularly strong. Under Vichy France, the cooperation with Japan strengthened and the nationalist movements had to submit to stationing of Japanese military forces. Thailand saw a closer coordination with the French because of the decision to redraft country’s laws on basis of the Napoleonic law. This necessitated a France-educated elite - which followed the Marxist movements in the West closely. The People’s party formed in 1932 in Thailand - a movement that would merge cultural nationalism and economic nationalism in the country. A Pan-Thai nationalism developed in 1940s that had limited success.
The presence of Chinese in all over South-East Asia helped sustain the pan-Chinese movements. Chinese often had dual nationality (due to colonial rules) and were in high-demand as labour throughout South-East Asia. Unified by Sun-Yat-Sen in 1905 under Tung-Men-Hui (Common Alliance Society), they now had a higher negotiating power and reacted together in response to Sino-Japanese conflicts, China exclusion act of 1910 or the fall of Qing in 1911. Unlike with Indians, who posed far less danger because of their low-incomes (Burma as exception), the pan-Chinese movements often clashed with regional nationalism in South East Asia. It would seem that the current clashes and non-uniformity in South-East Asia has had a long history and that a lot of factors that have either diffused or accentuated this non-uniformity are still around.
Such initial escapades of were soon strengthened and used for further expansions (e.g. with the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824). In areas where Spanish and Dutch had early success, the involvement of German forces (in Bismarck’s time) was blocked by assisting the continuation of Spanish and Dutch occupations. In this process, maintaining buffer states was to be key. While British controlled India and annexed Burma, Siam was deliberately left on itself so that Dutch Malaya and the French CochinChina (Vietnam) posed no significant threat. In purely economic terms, this happened to be a blessing in disguise for Siam.
The transition from the Company Raj to the British empire was not really smooth. East India Company did not answer directly to the Queen and disagreements within the company over expansion schemes were common. Lord Dalhousie, the architect of the principle of lapse in India, remained against the British annexation of Burma. He believed the need to secure India was higher than to expand Eastwards. He would have wanted a protectorate in Burma, but it was only until Lord Dufferin came to power that Burma was annexed, exiling King Thibaw after three Anglo-Burmese wars (1885). The cooler heads in Indian administration still wanted the old order to be retained so as to avoid discontent - but instead, more and more troops were deployed to control Burma, the royal throne moved from Mandalay to Calcutta.
The book describes the history of South-East Asia from a broader European perspective. It looks into the reasons why the dissent did not lead to a united rebellion against the European powers. The answer that the authors hint at is that the nationalist movements were delayed in SE Asia because of the non-uniformity of traditions and identities in South-East Asia. Siam, for example, considered itself better off with the status it was granted by the British and given the differences in military strengths and informational networks between Thai and European armies, its options were limited - hence the slow submission to the British treaties.
The bureaucracy and the administrative network was to slowly become westernized in the occupied territories. The standardization spurred trade but the political issues remained unaddressed. The difference in subtle differences in British, Dutch, American and French rule has defined the character of the modern nations that have appeared today. In Dutch rule, even a European was just a policeman - an implementer of the colonial regime, while English (and American ones in Phillipines) colonies relied on an elite educated in the Western framework.
The trade of commodities flourished once this framework was established. The trade also resulted in immigration and mixture of peoples. This was particularly due to import of plantation labor from China and India and more in Burma’s case, the administrators and engineers travelled from India. In his classic 1956 work, J.S. Furnivall used the term “plural” society to describe the state of Burma - a term that can be applied to any South-East Asian country. It was this plurality, as it would turn out, that delayed the unity against the empire. The transformation and emphasis of power-inheritance resulted in embrace of race-doctrines which presumably still haunt the modern states in the region. The socio-political conditions in Burma were particularly fragile. The administrators trained in India had neither the desire or the ability to understand local customs. Their reliance on trained Indians for cost-reasons meant that no native urban institutions were developed in Burma - a condition that resulted in further underdevelopment once the educated Indian elite departed Burma.
In 1915, King Vajiravudh, the first Thai king to be educated in the West, famous described Chinese as the Jews of the East. It was a similar free-trade commerce after all that had created the new merchant class of Jews in Europe itself. Large corporations like Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation and Burma Oil company flourished during these times and new cities like Bandung were developed (where the 12% population of Europeans occupied half of the land). The role that immigrants played was, however, key to the empire. The credit in Burma was, for example, provided by a Chettiar class - immigrants from South of India. The rubber boom and mining had resulted in immigration of cheap labour from India and China. About 5 million Chinese are supposed to have arrived in Malaya during the 19th century. After 1907, this process was formalized by formation of a fund that financed recruitment of laborers. The formalization of labour in fact acted in favor of stopping the previously coerced labour. The British had stopped Indian indenture in 1910 and that of Chinese in 1914 (Dutch stopped in 1942).
The conflict between Western and native institutions always occurred on societal levels. The religious movements against the Western culture would later develop into nationalist movements. Western institutions claimed obvious advantages in the areas of education and medicine - institutions that were up against a belief in spirits and demons. At one time responding to an outbreak of cholera in Bangkok, the king fired cannons to ward off evil spirits. The superstition thrived in discontinuity of native institution and a reversion to the native spirit remained widely tempting. The phumibun movements in Thailand were an example where a widespread Buddhist movement clashed with the government. The characteristics of such a movements becomes clear from the example of Ong Man, a lieutenant of Ong Keo (a phumibun)- a celestial being in the eyes of his believers who captured Thai governor of Khemarat and claimed that French militia’s ammunition would turn into frangipani flowers. The result was of course far more devastating.150 of Ong Man soldiers were killed and Ong Keo was shot after being lured into investigation. Such voices of dissent were classified as “dacoity” (British) and successfully suppressed. Another example is the Batak king, Si Singa Maharaja, revered as a divine king was pushed his anti-missionary chiefs into a confrontation with the Dutch and was killed in 1907. The natives believed that he had disappeared.
The result of these struggles was sometimes a merger of Eastern and Western traditions - although it always seemed more the case of native institutions learning from the enemy they were set against. The idea of Maitreya in Buddhism, of Mahdi in Islam matched up with Jesus in the West. A lot of institutions did vanish during the colonial rule (e.g. adjar in Java) but the colonial powers had incorporated a lot of native institutions (priyayi) in their framework to control discontent - the priyayi system in Mayala which Dutch had maintained was later challenged by Islamic movements (e.g. ulama movements which recruited peasants into a Holy war - the precursor to jihad movements that echo in the modern world).
In Burma, much like in other parts of SE Asia, the Buddhists united in a rather Western manner. An interesting case is that YMBA (Young Men Buddhists’ association) - established in 1906 and became of political significance in 1910s and split itself to serve Burmese (rather than Buddhist) interests under the colonial rule. The political organizations had to choose between possibly missing out on the concessions to Indian nationalist movement and restriction on Indian immigration through splitting. The nationalist movements suffered during depression and war years when clashes developed between economically constrained Indians and primarily rural Burmese community. The misalignment of interests of Shan nationalists (sawbwa), Karen National Association (some of whom supported British rule), Muslim Associations (representing Indian Muslims) and Burmese nationalists themselves diffused the nationalist spirit that developed elsewhere. The race riots and the culmination of anti-Indian sentiments resulted in splitting of Burma away from the Indian union in 1937 (acting on recommendations by the Simon Commission).
The merger within the framework of Christianity too were often perceived as dangerous by colonial powers. The rift between Filipino and Spanish Catholic priests that developed in 1830s is one example where colonial and religious ambitions clashed. New converts like Thomas Matulesia were likely to revolt against the colonial rule. It was probably due to that foresight, that Dutch had only allowed proselytization only in 1850. Though missionary work started late, it was instrumental in fanning protests against the colonial governments. Sadrach, a mystic who converted to Christianity, took up the case of expulsion of foreigners with an independent church. The martyrdom of the likes of Dr Jose Rizal spurred Christianity in Philippines as it would have in Byzantium. The American control of Philippines, however, saw fast change. Woodrow Wilson stressed the importance of independence for the US controlled islands in 1913 and Philippines followed a route much different than other South-East Asian countries.
It does seem that South-East Asia got worst of the both worlds during this time of occupation. Trade and Western-inspired development didn’t quite develop the structures of social progress that were established in the West. This trend only worsened during the Depression years - when commodity prices plummeted and labor spending became more constrained. The Chettiar moneylenders in Burma, for example, didn’t find liquid capital lucrative any more and hence stuck to holding lands - controlling about 25% of cultivated land in the lower Burma by 1937. It was during these times, however, when free labor increased (e.g. indentured labour dropping from 76% to 7% in Sumatran plantations).
It was in also 1930s when nationalist movements - inspired with Marxism - started to resemble their Western counterparts. The PNI (Perserikatan Nat. Indonesia) or PPPKI (Association of Political Organizations of the Indonesian People) were a few examples. This is the time when modern flags were first formed for the countries. As need arose for the Dutch to cooperate with such organizations during oncoming World-War, the conditions were created for the nationalists to exercise their bargaining powers. The Marxists in Vietnam became particularly strong. Under Vichy France, the cooperation with Japan strengthened and the nationalist movements had to submit to stationing of Japanese military forces. Thailand saw a closer coordination with the French because of the decision to redraft country’s laws on basis of the Napoleonic law. This necessitated a France-educated elite - which followed the Marxist movements in the West closely. The People’s party formed in 1932 in Thailand - a movement that would merge cultural nationalism and economic nationalism in the country. A Pan-Thai nationalism developed in 1940s that had limited success.
The presence of Chinese in all over South-East Asia helped sustain the pan-Chinese movements. Chinese often had dual nationality (due to colonial rules) and were in high-demand as labour throughout South-East Asia. Unified by Sun-Yat-Sen in 1905 under Tung-Men-Hui (Common Alliance Society), they now had a higher negotiating power and reacted together in response to Sino-Japanese conflicts, China exclusion act of 1910 or the fall of Qing in 1911. Unlike with Indians, who posed far less danger because of their low-incomes (Burma as exception), the pan-Chinese movements often clashed with regional nationalism in South East Asia. It would seem that the current clashes and non-uniformity in South-East Asia has had a long history and that a lot of factors that have either diffused or accentuated this non-uniformity are still around.
August 22, 2017
Yanking on the reins a bit, the third volume in this series pauses and reflects on less concrete shifts in the greater SE Asia region. This is more the history of ideas from the beginnings of the true European irruption in the early 19th century up to World War II, basically. The best bits discuss the rise of religious-based anti-colonialism, various ethno- and geographical nationalisms and the responses of elites and masses to shitty European and then American policies. As always, I find, the economic sections are yawn-inducing, but probably important to someone somewhere.
October 11, 2022
Like the other “Cambridge History” collections, this volume is a collection of dense, highly scholarly chapters from various historians. I found the Cambridge History of Japan to be better put together, but the Cambridge History of Southeast Asia keeps the high level of detail and care I expect from these series’. That said: this is not a casual read, it’s meant for serious students of the topic, researchers, or similar who are looking for information, not narrative. It also should be considered more of an overview of the region rather than an all-encapsulating work, and the extensive citations are an excellent resource on what works to seek out for further research.
I would certainly recommend it for those with a serious, scholarly interest in southeast asia.
I would certainly recommend it for those with a serious, scholarly interest in southeast asia.
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October 24, 2010oleh-oleh dari Bangkok...:)
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews