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The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It?
Could the Allies have destroyed the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1944, saving the lives of tens of thousands of Holocaust victims? Could the Allied forces have cut the railway lines leading to Auschwitz, disrupting the transportation of the Hungarian Jews to their deaths? For years these questions have been debated heatedly by historians and military experts (though seldom in the same forum).This book, inspired by a conference held to mark the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, brings together the key contributions to this debate with new articles by eminent historians of World War II and the Holocaust. It also includes a selection of the most important historical documents, as well as crucial aerial reconnaissance photos from 1944.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2000
About the author
Michael J. Neufeld
13 books8 followersMichael J. Neufeld is Senior Curator in the Space History Department of the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. He has appeared on History Channel, PBS, NPR, and BBC programs, and is the author of the award-winning The Rocket and the Reich, Von Braun, and other books.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 12, 2024
A FINE COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (BOTH ‘PRO’ AND ‘CON’) ON THIS ISSUE
Coeditor Michael Berenbaum wrote in the Preface to this 2000 book, “ ‘Why wasn’t Auschwitz bombed?’ is one of the most basic questions that students of the Holocaust ask… The question … gnaws, not just at the student, but at the scholar as well… [Elie Wiesel] 'had been in Buna-Monowitz when the bombs were dropped on the camp… ‘To see the whole works go up in fire---what revenge!.... We were not afraid… if a bomb had fallen… [it] would have claimed hundreds of lives on the spot. We were no longer afraid of death… Every bomb filled us with joy and gave us new confidence in life.’” (Pg. ix-x) “[This book] endeavors to present all sides of the debate… Original documents are presented so that readers can gain a keener sense of they climate of the debate and see for themselves some of the raw material from which scholars have drawn their opinion.” (Pg. xi)
Gerhard Weinberg states, “It is… important to recall that at the time practically no one inside or outside Germany anticipated that these measures were steps on the road to mass murder… The actions of the German government were generally understood… as a return to the kinds of persecutions and restrictions imposed on Jews in prior centuries.” (Pg. 15) He continues, “Any examination of the failure to do more must... carefully avoid a most dangerous shift in the apportioning of responsibility. It is the killers, whether in an office, a murder squad, or a killing center, who bear the central responsibility for their deeds. Any general distribution of blame, the ‘we are all guilty’ syndrome, only serves to exculpate the truly guilty. And those were not to be found among the Allies.” (Pg. 26)
Gerhart M. Riegner observes, “It is true that we did not know all the details about Auschwitz, but we knew that Auschwitz was a death camp. We knew it from the people in Theresienstadt, and camp… from which many transports went to Auschwitz… We did not know the details, but we knew for certain that those who were going to Auschwitz were condemned to death…. I am certain… that hundreds of thousands of people … could have been saved if there had been a greater determination to save them and a greater concern for their lives.” (Pg. 78-79)
James Kitchens III argues, “The tragic side effects of bombing on the camps’ populations are much easier to envision. Dazed, debilitated, and disoriented, most escapees would have quickly been rounded up…. trains destined for the two camps would have been sent to Mauthausen, Belsen, Buchenwald, or any of the Reich’s … other camps. The rate of genocide at Auschwitz might have been slowed for a few days or a few weeks, but no one can calculate what impact this might have had on the Holocaust.” (Pg. 98)
Richard Levy asserts, “The actual bombing of Hungary helped bring the total cessation of deportations… [This] lends support to the view, often expressed at that time, that the most effective way to help the Jews was to win the war as soon as possible.” (Pg. 111) He adds, “two facts bear on the question. First, the general war situation was much less tense in August after the Normandy victory and the liberation of … most of France. Second, the only organization to raise the question of bombing Auschwitz with the British was Weizmann’s JA [Jewish Agency]. Relations between Weizmann and Churchill were cordial, contacts between the JA and the British Government frequent. The bombing of Auschwitz was at no time vigorously pressed by the JA, which had a different agenda.” (Pg. 125)
Stuart G. Erdheim argues, “Kitchens dismisses any attack by heavy bombers, arguing that their limited accuracy would have killed too many prisoners… He ignores… the fact that most of these prisoners would have been killed anyway, focusing only on how many Jews might have been killed by the bombing, rather than how many could have been saved…” (Pg. 145) He concludes, “With the kind of political will and moral courage the Allies exhibited in other missions throughout the war, it is plain that the failure to bomb Birkenau, the site of mankind’s greatest abomination, was a missed opportunity of monumental proportions.” (Pg. 156)
Rondall Rice notes, “What military personnel called ‘precision bombing’ during World War II bears no resemblance to the use of the same term today. Instead, it meant that a specific target was being attacked rather than an area target. The precision arose from planning to bomb a specific target… The alternative was area bombing, or ‘carpet bombing,’ in which bombardiers did not select specific targets, but dropped their bombs on geographic areas.” (Pg. 172)
Henry Feingold points out, “A fact rarely mentioned by researchers who seem ignorant of the historical context is that the rejection of bombing follows a long line of rejections of other opportunities to help save Jewish lives… There were … opportunities that developed when knowledge that the Reich had embarked on a policy of genocide became known.” (Pg. 194) He states, “Beyond the question of whether or not the bombing of Auschwitz was feasible, or whether the bombing of rail lines would have appreciably slowed down the killing process, lies the unanswered, perhaps unanswerable, question of why the destruction of the Jews of Europe was largely ignored… The story might have been different had Hitler been obsessed with liquidating the Dutch. The difference was that the Jews of Europe were not fully part of the ‘universe of obligation’ that informs the Western world. Had they been, there would have prevailed a sense that that world, founded on Christian and democratic principles, was also burning in Auschwitz.” (Pg. 203)
Williamson Murray contends, “Allied senior military leaders would have resisted any lessening of the pressure of the Germans in terms of support for the ground fighting or the bombing of the Reich’s petroleum industry. From their perspective… they would have been absolutely right. Their obligation was to end the war as quickly as possible, and such an approach to the conflict would in the end save far more lives than any misbegotten efforts to attack targets that in no conceivable way have contributed to the ending of the war and to Allied victory.” (Pg. 212)
This book will be “must reading” for anyone concerned with this issue.
Coeditor Michael Berenbaum wrote in the Preface to this 2000 book, “ ‘Why wasn’t Auschwitz bombed?’ is one of the most basic questions that students of the Holocaust ask… The question … gnaws, not just at the student, but at the scholar as well… [Elie Wiesel] 'had been in Buna-Monowitz when the bombs were dropped on the camp… ‘To see the whole works go up in fire---what revenge!.... We were not afraid… if a bomb had fallen… [it] would have claimed hundreds of lives on the spot. We were no longer afraid of death… Every bomb filled us with joy and gave us new confidence in life.’” (Pg. ix-x) “[This book] endeavors to present all sides of the debate… Original documents are presented so that readers can gain a keener sense of they climate of the debate and see for themselves some of the raw material from which scholars have drawn their opinion.” (Pg. xi)
Gerhard Weinberg states, “It is… important to recall that at the time practically no one inside or outside Germany anticipated that these measures were steps on the road to mass murder… The actions of the German government were generally understood… as a return to the kinds of persecutions and restrictions imposed on Jews in prior centuries.” (Pg. 15) He continues, “Any examination of the failure to do more must... carefully avoid a most dangerous shift in the apportioning of responsibility. It is the killers, whether in an office, a murder squad, or a killing center, who bear the central responsibility for their deeds. Any general distribution of blame, the ‘we are all guilty’ syndrome, only serves to exculpate the truly guilty. And those were not to be found among the Allies.” (Pg. 26)
Gerhart M. Riegner observes, “It is true that we did not know all the details about Auschwitz, but we knew that Auschwitz was a death camp. We knew it from the people in Theresienstadt, and camp… from which many transports went to Auschwitz… We did not know the details, but we knew for certain that those who were going to Auschwitz were condemned to death…. I am certain… that hundreds of thousands of people … could have been saved if there had been a greater determination to save them and a greater concern for their lives.” (Pg. 78-79)
James Kitchens III argues, “The tragic side effects of bombing on the camps’ populations are much easier to envision. Dazed, debilitated, and disoriented, most escapees would have quickly been rounded up…. trains destined for the two camps would have been sent to Mauthausen, Belsen, Buchenwald, or any of the Reich’s … other camps. The rate of genocide at Auschwitz might have been slowed for a few days or a few weeks, but no one can calculate what impact this might have had on the Holocaust.” (Pg. 98)
Richard Levy asserts, “The actual bombing of Hungary helped bring the total cessation of deportations… [This] lends support to the view, often expressed at that time, that the most effective way to help the Jews was to win the war as soon as possible.” (Pg. 111) He adds, “two facts bear on the question. First, the general war situation was much less tense in August after the Normandy victory and the liberation of … most of France. Second, the only organization to raise the question of bombing Auschwitz with the British was Weizmann’s JA [Jewish Agency]. Relations between Weizmann and Churchill were cordial, contacts between the JA and the British Government frequent. The bombing of Auschwitz was at no time vigorously pressed by the JA, which had a different agenda.” (Pg. 125)
Stuart G. Erdheim argues, “Kitchens dismisses any attack by heavy bombers, arguing that their limited accuracy would have killed too many prisoners… He ignores… the fact that most of these prisoners would have been killed anyway, focusing only on how many Jews might have been killed by the bombing, rather than how many could have been saved…” (Pg. 145) He concludes, “With the kind of political will and moral courage the Allies exhibited in other missions throughout the war, it is plain that the failure to bomb Birkenau, the site of mankind’s greatest abomination, was a missed opportunity of monumental proportions.” (Pg. 156)
Rondall Rice notes, “What military personnel called ‘precision bombing’ during World War II bears no resemblance to the use of the same term today. Instead, it meant that a specific target was being attacked rather than an area target. The precision arose from planning to bomb a specific target… The alternative was area bombing, or ‘carpet bombing,’ in which bombardiers did not select specific targets, but dropped their bombs on geographic areas.” (Pg. 172)
Henry Feingold points out, “A fact rarely mentioned by researchers who seem ignorant of the historical context is that the rejection of bombing follows a long line of rejections of other opportunities to help save Jewish lives… There were … opportunities that developed when knowledge that the Reich had embarked on a policy of genocide became known.” (Pg. 194) He states, “Beyond the question of whether or not the bombing of Auschwitz was feasible, or whether the bombing of rail lines would have appreciably slowed down the killing process, lies the unanswered, perhaps unanswerable, question of why the destruction of the Jews of Europe was largely ignored… The story might have been different had Hitler been obsessed with liquidating the Dutch. The difference was that the Jews of Europe were not fully part of the ‘universe of obligation’ that informs the Western world. Had they been, there would have prevailed a sense that that world, founded on Christian and democratic principles, was also burning in Auschwitz.” (Pg. 203)
Williamson Murray contends, “Allied senior military leaders would have resisted any lessening of the pressure of the Germans in terms of support for the ground fighting or the bombing of the Reich’s petroleum industry. From their perspective… they would have been absolutely right. Their obligation was to end the war as quickly as possible, and such an approach to the conflict would in the end save far more lives than any misbegotten efforts to attack targets that in no conceivable way have contributed to the ending of the war and to Allied victory.” (Pg. 212)
This book will be “must reading” for anyone concerned with this issue.
June 23, 2024
The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies have Attempted It? is a somewhat repetitive but immensely didactic selection of 15 arguments for and against the bombing of Auschwitz, with more than 40 primary source documents.
You’ll learn a lot about the terrible dilemma that the Allies faced—and some of them tried to ignore—during World War II.
Neufeld and Berenbaum offer 15 points of view, but, of course, the question can’t be answered with full confidence.
Sadly, we can’t re-do the solitary track of history.
Read more of my book reviews and poems here:
www.richardsubber.com
You’ll learn a lot about the terrible dilemma that the Allies faced—and some of them tried to ignore—during World War II.
Neufeld and Berenbaum offer 15 points of view, but, of course, the question can’t be answered with full confidence.
Sadly, we can’t re-do the solitary track of history.
Read more of my book reviews and poems here:
www.richardsubber.com
May 8, 2020
A very informative book, laying out the many angles of this argument.
August 1, 2013
This will challenge you to really question your preconceived notions. Before reading this I didn't even know that there was a possibility to have bombed Auschwitz and save thousands. This book will bring you face to face with both sides of the argument.
June 17, 2015
This is a very good book. Could have been done much faster if I hadn't stopped to read another in the middle of all this. It did become a little repetitious, as it is a serious of articles/essays from varying viewpoints on both the feasibility and morality of such an undertaking.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews