I quite agreed with this book's methodology: rather than trying to divine vague, Barnum-esque principles about the making of strategy, the editors let history speak for itself and confined themselves to a summary of the major themes (bureaucracy, ideology, mass politics, and technology/economic power) to tie everything together at the end. This resulted in a surfeit of concrete analysis of individual polities and rulers (from republican Rome to Louis XIV to Stalin) that really gave me an appreciation of the contingencies, considerations, and constraints inherent in the strategy-making process. The theme of geography, though not mentioned in the summary, was also prevalent throughout all the articles. It was discussed in the introduction though, which leads me to consider that combining the introduction with the summary at the end into one article might have been more coherent. Also, considering how widely referenced Clausewitz was throughout the book, I find that it behooved the editors to have added a section on the context, details, and implications of Vom Kriege.
As with all edited books, some articles are better than others, but the overall quality was remarkably high. The standouts for me were Kagan (Peloponnesian War), Parker (Philip II), Lynn (Louis XIV), and Cohen (America c.1920-45). The major limitation of this series is its historical coverage. With the exception of a single chapter on Ming Chinese strategy, the case studies are Western with especial focus on Great Britain, Germany, and the U.S. Lack of geographic spread is just one dimension; chronological is the other. Five out of nineteen chapters have to do with the World War period, while four treat with fin de siècle Europe. If you discount the introduction and summary, that means half the book deals intensively with the end of the "long nineteenth century". While that has the advantage of providing a kaleidoscopic, multivariate examination of the strategies of the major participants in the World Wars, it does detract from the thesis of seeing how strategy was made through the ages, circumscribing as well the ability to look for continuities outside of the relatively narrow geographic, cultural, and chronological milieu proposed. And considering how much ink was spilt on World War Two, it was almost a travesty that Imperial Japan's strategy was not given due consideration.
So, while this book was definitely insightful and had its merits in reconstructing the fractured and turbulent struggles of the early twentieth century, its reduced scope belies its intention to "offer an introduction to the wide variety of factors that influence the formulation and outcome of national strategies", since that variety is delimited by the chapter selection process. However, I do commend their broad view of strategy as the matching of broad ends with means as it allows one to see that operational success (as with Hannibal or the Six Day War) does not necessarily or easily translate into the achievement of one's strategic goals. It also allows for factors beyond the purely military-- like economics, ideology, and psychology--to appear in their apposite roles.