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Osprey Campaign #339
Kos and Leros 1943: The German Conquest of the Dodecanese
An illustrated account of the disastrous British-led effort to occupy the Dodecanese in autumn 1943.
This title is an illustrated account of the autumn 1943 battle for the Dodecanese, as Winston Churchill attempted to secure the Aegean islands in the wake of the Italian armistice. The occupation was a gamble intended to increase pressure against Germany and at the same time possibly provide encouragement for Turkey to join the Allies. Spearheaded by the Special Boat Squadron and the Long Range Desert Group, garrison troops were deployed to the Italian-occupied Dodecanese, but they were too late to prevent the Germans from taking control of the key island of Rhodes and its all-important airfields. An all-out German offensive followed. Air force and naval units supported a series of assaults by infantry and paratroopers, including specialist forces of the Division Brandenburg. Within three months, only Castelorizzo was still in British hands. Rhodes, Kos and Leros remained under German occupation until May 1945 and the end of the war in Europe. The Dodecanese would be Adolf Hitler's last enduring victory – and the last enduring British-led defeat.
This title is an illustrated account of the autumn 1943 battle for the Dodecanese, as Winston Churchill attempted to secure the Aegean islands in the wake of the Italian armistice. The occupation was a gamble intended to increase pressure against Germany and at the same time possibly provide encouragement for Turkey to join the Allies. Spearheaded by the Special Boat Squadron and the Long Range Desert Group, garrison troops were deployed to the Italian-occupied Dodecanese, but they were too late to prevent the Germans from taking control of the key island of Rhodes and its all-important airfields. An all-out German offensive followed. Air force and naval units supported a series of assaults by infantry and paratroopers, including specialist forces of the Division Brandenburg. Within three months, only Castelorizzo was still in British hands. Rhodes, Kos and Leros remained under German occupation until May 1945 and the end of the war in Europe. The Dodecanese would be Adolf Hitler's last enduring victory – and the last enduring British-led defeat.
96 pages, Paperback
First published August 20, 2019
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
April 28, 2024
A Decent Book on the Battle but with Weaknesses on the Strategic Level
Any review of this book would have to start out by pointing out that it is part of Osprey Publishing’s “Campaign” series. As such it is relatively short, at only 96 pates in length. Plus, about a rough third or so of those pages consist of illustrations of one type or another (i.e. maps, photographs of leading figures, etc.). Hence if one is looking for an academic tome on the subject, this book is not it. It is intended as a relatively high-level succinct overview of the campaign. For those interested in a lengthier treatment of the topic this reviewer recommends Anthony Roger’s previous book on the subject, “Churchill’s Folly: The Battle for Kos and Leros 1943”. That book is in the hundreds of pages.
Kos and Leros starts off with, like all Osprey Campaign books, the strategic picture and goals of each side. The German’s goal is pretty obvious here, to prevent the English from establishing a foothold in Greece. With respect to the British goas, however, the book is not that clear. It mentions that Churchill hoped a victory would draw Turkey into the Allied camp but how realistic was that goal really? It is difficult to believe that this alone would have been enough. More realistically, Turkey would have to have been made an offer of something substantial for this to come about. For example, British or French concessions of territory in the middle ease or parts of Bulgaria or Greece. Any of these would have been very unrealistic.
Were there any other potential British goals? For example, drawing away German forces from the Eastern front or Italy? Considering that only a few British companies were involved, combined with the fact that there were already numerous German infantry divisions based in Greece, this too seemed unrealistic. If anything, the expedition would draw resources away that were badly needed in Italy. It should be remembered that this campaign occurred between the battles of Salerno and Anzio which were pretty close-run affairs. Hence, if anything, this campaign had an opportunity cost on that front. Unfortunately, this book makes no mention of this fact (neither does Churchill’s Folly though).
Lastly, even if the British were able to hold off the initial German attacks how would they have been able to hold off any follow-on attacks? The Germans had many infantry divisions available and ready in Greece. It is difficult to believe they would not have used these to launch follow-up attacks. The book provides the standard Osprey TOE of the forces directly involved in the battle itself but, unfortunately, does not provide a list of forces that each side could have drawn on after the initial confrontation (i.e. to establish or prevent the bridgehead on these two islands).
Even if the Germans had not launched significant follow up attacks (or if they failed), holding on to Kos and Leros would have required a significant garrison as well as significant resources to supply. These two small islands were surrounded by many, many German held Greek islands that could have supported aircraft and small naval vessels that would have made supply maintenance, very, very difficult for the British. If anything, this looks like one battle that was really lost strategically from the beginning, before it even started. Unfortunately the book does not analyze this or, for that matter, even mention it.
With respect to how the campaign itself played out, the book does much better. The narrative of how it occurred is quite good. Unlike most other campaign books, where coverage of action is usually at the division level or higher (hard not to do as many of those battles involved many corps if not armies) this narrative includes actions even down to the platoon level. Very close up and personal. The book does a very good job of showing how dynamic and fluid this campaign was.
In short, a four-star book.
As stated previously, this reviewer also recommends “Churchill’s Folly”. That book serves as a good complement to this Osprey book. “Churchill’s Folly” contains many first-hand accounts and experiences of the battle and more of what happened at sea while this Osprey book provides TOE of military forces involves as well as a superior set of maps.
Any review of this book would have to start out by pointing out that it is part of Osprey Publishing’s “Campaign” series. As such it is relatively short, at only 96 pates in length. Plus, about a rough third or so of those pages consist of illustrations of one type or another (i.e. maps, photographs of leading figures, etc.). Hence if one is looking for an academic tome on the subject, this book is not it. It is intended as a relatively high-level succinct overview of the campaign. For those interested in a lengthier treatment of the topic this reviewer recommends Anthony Roger’s previous book on the subject, “Churchill’s Folly: The Battle for Kos and Leros 1943”. That book is in the hundreds of pages.
Kos and Leros starts off with, like all Osprey Campaign books, the strategic picture and goals of each side. The German’s goal is pretty obvious here, to prevent the English from establishing a foothold in Greece. With respect to the British goas, however, the book is not that clear. It mentions that Churchill hoped a victory would draw Turkey into the Allied camp but how realistic was that goal really? It is difficult to believe that this alone would have been enough. More realistically, Turkey would have to have been made an offer of something substantial for this to come about. For example, British or French concessions of territory in the middle ease or parts of Bulgaria or Greece. Any of these would have been very unrealistic.
Were there any other potential British goals? For example, drawing away German forces from the Eastern front or Italy? Considering that only a few British companies were involved, combined with the fact that there were already numerous German infantry divisions based in Greece, this too seemed unrealistic. If anything, the expedition would draw resources away that were badly needed in Italy. It should be remembered that this campaign occurred between the battles of Salerno and Anzio which were pretty close-run affairs. Hence, if anything, this campaign had an opportunity cost on that front. Unfortunately, this book makes no mention of this fact (neither does Churchill’s Folly though).
Lastly, even if the British were able to hold off the initial German attacks how would they have been able to hold off any follow-on attacks? The Germans had many infantry divisions available and ready in Greece. It is difficult to believe they would not have used these to launch follow-up attacks. The book provides the standard Osprey TOE of the forces directly involved in the battle itself but, unfortunately, does not provide a list of forces that each side could have drawn on after the initial confrontation (i.e. to establish or prevent the bridgehead on these two islands).
Even if the Germans had not launched significant follow up attacks (or if they failed), holding on to Kos and Leros would have required a significant garrison as well as significant resources to supply. These two small islands were surrounded by many, many German held Greek islands that could have supported aircraft and small naval vessels that would have made supply maintenance, very, very difficult for the British. If anything, this looks like one battle that was really lost strategically from the beginning, before it even started. Unfortunately the book does not analyze this or, for that matter, even mention it.
With respect to how the campaign itself played out, the book does much better. The narrative of how it occurred is quite good. Unlike most other campaign books, where coverage of action is usually at the division level or higher (hard not to do as many of those battles involved many corps if not armies) this narrative includes actions even down to the platoon level. Very close up and personal. The book does a very good job of showing how dynamic and fluid this campaign was.
In short, a four-star book.
As stated previously, this reviewer also recommends “Churchill’s Folly”. That book serves as a good complement to this Osprey book. “Churchill’s Folly” contains many first-hand accounts and experiences of the battle and more of what happened at sea while this Osprey book provides TOE of military forces involves as well as a superior set of maps.
April 22, 2023
If diligence of research alone recommended a book, I'd give KOS AND LEROS five stars. Author Anthony Rogers did considerably more than his due diligence in compiling this brief history of an unknown and, for the Allies, tragic campaign: he not only meticulously documented every aspect of this battle, he visited the islands personally, which is no easy feat considering their location, in the far eastern Mediterranean off the coast of Turkey. (This kind of caretaking is rare in historians, especially scholarly ones.) Unfortunately, while the book is a trove of knowledge, it is also very heavy going. Literary aesthetics are not considered important to most scholarly writers of history, which is why most of them are broke and unknown, and more popular authors such as Ryan, Ambrose, Irving, Keegan, Whiting etc. got rich. I know that sounds harsh, even cruel, but as someone with a degree in history who had to slog through brilliantly researched but tedious books by folks like David M. Glantz, I have less patience for dull writing than I used to. I wish Rogers had seen fit to liven up his prose and trim down some extraneous detail: it would have made this book much more fun to read. But I digress.
KOS AND LEROS is about the failed attempt by the British to conquer the Dodecanese Islands in October-November of 1943, presumably as part of a hoped-for larger offensive into the Nazi-occupied Balkans. It was the brainchild of Winston Churchill, who was obsessed with not landing in France, and pursued a "peripheral strategy" against the Axis in direct contradiction to the basic laws of war. The American part of the Alliance rejected the plan as surplus to strategic requirements and refused to lend it any resources, so the Brits had to go it alone, using first-rate ground forces and their excellent navy, but insufficient air cover. When the Germans realized what their enemy was up to, they launched a bold airborne and seaborne invasion of these islands backed up with a very powerful Luftwaffe presence, the likes of which the Allies hadn't encountered in a long time. The result was a slugfest reminiscent of the Guadalcanal campaign on a smaller scale: the British dominated by night, when they could bring the fleet up and pound the Germans with their heavy naval guns. The Germans dominated by day, when their dive bombers swarmed over everything that moved, sinking or damaging numerous British ships and making life miserable, and in some cases short, for their troops. The situation was further complicated by the Italians, who had switched sides and come over to the Allies following the downfall of Mussolini a few months previously. The Germans rounded up the Italians and shipped them by boat to Greece: unfortunately several of these ships were accidentally sunk by the British with the tragic loss of thousands of lives. In the end, after fierce fighting, the Germans wiped out or drove off the British invaders, secured the islands, and claimed an impressive but ultimately meaningless victory in a moribund theater of war. The whole campaign was in fact a waste of time, resources and human lives -- Admiral Ernest King referred to it as "absolutely asinine" -- and promptly swept under the historical rug. So despite my rather harsh criticisms above, I greatly appreciate Rogers meticulous efforts to shed light on it. Maybe others will find his style more enjoyable, but I found its presentation a slog.
In an interesting aside on how the winners of a war write history, the events of this campaign were used as fuel for Alistair McLean's GUNS OF NAVARONE, which put a happy, victorious and entirely fictional ending on this tragic farce.
KOS AND LEROS is about the failed attempt by the British to conquer the Dodecanese Islands in October-November of 1943, presumably as part of a hoped-for larger offensive into the Nazi-occupied Balkans. It was the brainchild of Winston Churchill, who was obsessed with not landing in France, and pursued a "peripheral strategy" against the Axis in direct contradiction to the basic laws of war. The American part of the Alliance rejected the plan as surplus to strategic requirements and refused to lend it any resources, so the Brits had to go it alone, using first-rate ground forces and their excellent navy, but insufficient air cover. When the Germans realized what their enemy was up to, they launched a bold airborne and seaborne invasion of these islands backed up with a very powerful Luftwaffe presence, the likes of which the Allies hadn't encountered in a long time. The result was a slugfest reminiscent of the Guadalcanal campaign on a smaller scale: the British dominated by night, when they could bring the fleet up and pound the Germans with their heavy naval guns. The Germans dominated by day, when their dive bombers swarmed over everything that moved, sinking or damaging numerous British ships and making life miserable, and in some cases short, for their troops. The situation was further complicated by the Italians, who had switched sides and come over to the Allies following the downfall of Mussolini a few months previously. The Germans rounded up the Italians and shipped them by boat to Greece: unfortunately several of these ships were accidentally sunk by the British with the tragic loss of thousands of lives. In the end, after fierce fighting, the Germans wiped out or drove off the British invaders, secured the islands, and claimed an impressive but ultimately meaningless victory in a moribund theater of war. The whole campaign was in fact a waste of time, resources and human lives -- Admiral Ernest King referred to it as "absolutely asinine" -- and promptly swept under the historical rug. So despite my rather harsh criticisms above, I greatly appreciate Rogers meticulous efforts to shed light on it. Maybe others will find his style more enjoyable, but I found its presentation a slog.
In an interesting aside on how the winners of a war write history, the events of this campaign were used as fuel for Alistair McLean's GUNS OF NAVARONE, which put a happy, victorious and entirely fictional ending on this tragic farce.
February 15, 2020
Why Churchill insisted on the conquest of the Dodecanese I will never understand. What an unnecessary pair of battles! Rodgers gives us a good workmanlike account of these battles.
July 18, 2022
Very informative book.
However descriptions of German and Italian units and ranks are very confusing for me. I wish author used English equivalents terms.
However descriptions of German and Italian units and ranks are very confusing for me. I wish author used English equivalents terms.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews