Holger Herwig holds a dual position at the University of Calgary as Professor of History and as Canada Research Chair in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He received his BA (1965) from the University of British Columbia and his MA (1967) and Ph.D. (1971) from the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Dr. Herwig taught at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, from 1971 until 1989. He served as Head of the Department of History at Calgary from 1991 until 1996. He was a Visiting Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in 1985-86, and the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Distinguished Visiting Professor of Judaic Studies at The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia in 1998.
A great book, presenting a history of the Imperial German Navy, concentrating on its primary architect, Admiral Tirpitz. This is a book written in the early 1980s, and there has been a lot of work on the topic since then. But I believe the author, German historian Holger Herwig, did a great job explaining both the strategic process that created the Fleet and the resultant culture it operated under. Herwig goes into much detail on how the Imperial Navy was organized. The complications with organization directly resulted in a Fleet that was never quite able to achieve its goals, both in peace and in war. Three different command structures existed, all reporting directly to the Kaiser: the Fleet itself (operational and tactics), the Navy Cabinet (personnel and strategy), and, the center of most of this book, the Navy Office (shipbuilding). There was no direct linkage between the building of the Fleet and its actual use. The first part of the book talks about the growth of the Fleet. Tirpitz’ belief in risk theory, building a fleet just big enough to scare England, is well explained. . There is a very good comparison process with its main rival, the Royal Navy. This comparison is more than just guns and armor; the costs, industry, and politics of this shipbuilding are also compared. It quickly becomes apparent that the Royal Navy far overestimated its opponent - the only German advantage being, perhaps, in the survivability of its ships. The book then transitions into a discussion of the Fleet at war. Here the focus shifts, with the central controversy of grosskrieg (big war; Mahanian battleship fights) vs kleinkrieg (small war; submarine warfare) being well explained. The Germans were very slow to shift over to the different style of fighting required when the risk theory advocated by Tirpitz proved to not have much teeth. Though interesting, this change in the book’s focus did break up the flow a bit. The book ends with a good summary of the overall goal. One is left with a very strong impression that Germany was more burdened by her Luxury Fleet than helped, given her geographic and economic position. Highly recommend anyone studying the rapid growth of navies and the purpose thus growth is meant to serve.
This was a quick re-read. I gave this book to my father back in 1991, six years before his death. The Dreadnought era was his favorite historical subject. This short volume is an excellent survey history.