This book is to obscure and convoluted to be of any use to me. It has moments of lucidity, but most of it reads like this (I think this passage might be in 50 different places in this book, with only slight alterations. See if you get anything out of it)
'Noumenon' necessarily is total potentiality. If it functions, in functioning it must be subjective, and thereby inevitably objective also. That is to say, subject objectivises itself and so becomes apparent to itself as object, manifesting phenomenally 'within' itself. It looks at itself and perceives the universe—which is then apparently outside itself, since objectivisation is a process of apparent exteriorisation.
This is what most of this book reads like. It was frustrating for me. I sense that this man has a deep understanding of these things, yet he can't articulate them clearly enough for a dummkopf like me to understand. Its like he doesn't really want to communicate. Which is what makes this a frustrating read, like having a word at the tip of your tongue but not actually finding it, this book stops just short of my understanding.
There are moments of lucidity, and those are what kept me going, thinking "ah, now we might turn a corner here". But alas, give it a page and he always fades back into obscurity
I want to share some of the lucid moments:
Knowing that the observed has no existence Apart from the observer,
Knowing that the observer has no existence Apart from the observed,
Divided mind is re-united.
Then there is no other, so there can be no self.
Then there is no self, so there can be no other.
Without extension in space, without duration in time,
In mind that is whole,
There is no being to suffer, to experience pain or pleasure,
To hate or to love.
Gone with its ego, the scourge of volition.
Mind as a concept, utterly absent,
Pure noumenality, none to conceive it,
Untrammelled and radiant, is all that we are.
And as sound an argument for idealism as i've read:
OBJECTS ARE only known as the result of reactions of the senses of sentient beings to a variety of stimuli.
These stimuli appear to derive from sources external to the reagent apparatus, but there is no evidence of this apart from the reagent apparatus itself.
Objects, therefore, are only a surmise, for they have no demonstrable existence apart from the subject that cognises them.
Since that subject itself is not sensorially cognisable as an object, subject also is only a surmise. Since the factual existence of neither subject nor object can be demonstrated, existence is no more than a conceptual assumption, which, metaphysically, is inacceptable.
There is, therefore, no valid evidence for the existence of a world external to the consciousness of sentient beings, which external world is therefore seen to be nothing but the cognisers of it, that is—sentient beings themselves. But there can be no factual evidence for the existence of sentient beings, either as subject or as object, who therefore are merely a conceptual assumption on the part of the consciousness in which they are cognised.