Giấc Mộng Châu Á Của Trung Quốc

by Tom Miller, Đoàn Duy (Translator), Phạm Sỹ Thành (Editor)

"Giấc mộng châu Á" là một phần của "Giấc mộng Trung Quốc" do Tập Cận Bình khởi xướng, được hiện thực hóa bằng "Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường" (Nhất đới nhất lộ) hay "Con đường Tơ lụa mới" để tăng cường kết nối trong khu vực. Trên đất liền, "Vành đai" xây dựng hệ thống cơ sở hạ tầng đường vận tải và các hành lang công nghiệp mới, kết nối Trung Quốc với Trung Á, sang tận châu Âu và Trung Đông. Trên biển, "Con đường Tơ lụa" thiết lập hải cảng và tuyến mậu dịch mới xuyên qua Biển Đông và Ấn Độ Dương. Sáng kiến này được hỗ trợ bằng nguồn lực tài chính hùng mạnh từ các ngân hàng chính sách nội địa và thông qua các định chế tài chính quốc tế mới do Trung Quốc đứng sau, ví dụ như Ngân hàng Đầu tư Cơ sở hạ tầng ChâuÁ (AIIB).
Cuốn sách của Tom Miller được viết với lối kể hấp dẫn. Ông đã thu thập các dữ liệu như một thao tác nghiên cứu chuyên nghiệp, để tập hợp nên cuốn sách với các phần nghiên cứu đầy đủ tập trung vào quan hệ của Trung Quốc với Đông Nam Á, Nam Á, Trung Á. Tom cũng dành nhiều thời gian gặp gỡ các chính khách, chuyên gia nghiên cứu của các nước Campuchia, Việt Nam, Ấn Độ, Sri Lanka, Trung Quốc. Những cuộc gặp gỡ này đem thêm các dữ liệu ít được trao đổi công khai trên truyền thông vào cuốn sách. Vì thế, "Giấc Mộng Châu Á Của Trung Quốc" vừa có dáng dấp của một tập tư liệu đầy đặn, vừa có sự hấp dẫn của những phân tích chuyên sâu, thằng thắn...

Genres: China, Politics, Nonfiction, Asia, History, Economics, Business

332 pages, Paperback

Published March 1, 2018

Reviews

[L.A. Starks · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an interesting and detailed analysis of China's expansionist plans and actions toward its neighbors.
Recommended for China-watchers and those interested in global politics.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

China's Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road by Tom Miller, is a look at China's growing economic and political influence in key regions in Asia. China is seeking numerous advantages in Asia, and is looking to boost investment, infrastructure, and diplomatic ties to ensure these objectives are met. Miller breaks the book down into sections, focusing first on Central Asia, and China's growing connections to the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. China is seeking alternative trade routes to ensure its energy security is in tact. In a world where shipping lanes are largely controlled by the United States, China needs to ensure it is not vulnerable to economic blockades through the Malaysia Straits or the Horn of Africa. Building a land route, and importing more oil and gas from the 'Stans and Russia, is a good step toward reducing there reliance on vulnerable trading routes. China is also seeking to boost bilateral trade in other goods, opening up Central Asian markets to Chinese goods, businesses and infrastructure development. Miller examines the positives and negatives to each story; with increased trade engagement comes smuggling, racial tensions and the like.

Miller examines China's engagement in Southeast Asia as well, focusing on Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam in particular. China is seeking to expand its port of trade systems in this region, by building highways, railways, and infrastructure from Yunnan through to the Pacific/Indian Ocean. These ports and highway systems are seeking to reduce shipping times from mainland China to the sea, and to increase China's shipping security by cutting down its exposure to the Ocean. It also seeks to expand its influence in these countries to build strong markets for Chinese businesses, and increase its bilateral relations through its existing "good neighbour" policy. There have been mixed results so far. Laos and Cambodia both have a strong Chinese business presence, and there governments seem friendly, if weary, to increasing Chinese influence. Both nations are relatively poor, and Chinese infrastructure investment is welcome. Both are also relatively isolated in the international arena, with little friends and allies. Even so, Cambodia's membership in ASEAN makes them a valuable back door for China into that multilateral body. And improving Laos and Cambodia's market access to Chinese goods is often a valuable asset for both parties. Even so, both nations are increasingly concerned about there growing reliance on Chinese industry, and steps have been made to try and diversify to avoid total Chinese market control. In Myanmar, a similar story existed until the ruling Junta handed power over to "democratic" forces. China was a good friend to Myanmar's military regime, but this changed when the regime fell. Chinese mega projects like a large deep sea port, and a connecting highway, were delayed or postponed for reexamination by Myanmar's new government. Relations turned frosty, but both parties have tried to thaw them, and China seems willing to slow down the pace of its political pressure. In Vietnam, the complex history between both nations makes bilateral relations frosty. Even so, both nations have close political and cultural connections, and both have solid business ties. China is certainly seeking good bilateral relations with Vietnam, but this remains constrained due to both countries overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. These competing claims have led to violent confrontations between both nations, as well as large anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam in 2015. China's aggressive stance in the South China Sea has led Vietnam to seek alliances elsewhere, and it is building strong ties to Japan, the US and India in order to offset its relative political isolation.

This book was interesting to say the least. China's economic and political outreach in the Asian continent is changing the makeup of Asian business, politics, economics and trade, and altering established global trade routes and even alliance systems. China is building strong ties with many of its neighbours, and seeking to boost both its geostrategic position, while improving Asian development and building new markets for goods. China's economic policy is closely intertwined with its quest for greater external security, but the comparison should not be held too closely. China's businesses often act independently, and purely on a profit basis. Although some strategic ports and systems may operate at a loss for China, the vast majority of its projects in the region are profit seeking ventures, as China seeks new markets for its goods, low wage labour for its industries, and raw materials to boost production. Millers book is quite good, although it does suffer from some political bias and shallow accusations. Some of these are legitimate and well sourced and described, but some of his accusations seem shallow and overtly politically biased - not something I would look for in a good academic text on economic and political shifts in Asia. This is thankfully a minor issue, and Miller's book is a solid introduction to China's expanding economic and political sphere. This is an interesting read, and one not to be missed by those interested in Chinese or Asian geopolitics.

[James · Rating 3 out of 5]

A popular work that covers current economic and military aspects of Chinese foreign relations. I did find his countless touting of China as a 2,000+ year old nation a bit bizarre since during much of that period it was not unified or ruled by foreigners and the borders were quite fluid. As for not being traditionally aggressive, one can ask Tibet, Korea, Japan and other foreign countries attacked by China. This and other similar bits makes the book seem less than rigorous to me, a nice introduction to be taken with a grain of salt.

[Justus Bruns · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book gives better insights on what China wants and how their neighboring countries perceive China. Very helpful to understand how the world is changing.

[Juha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tom Miller, a former journalist and senior analyst at Gavekal Research, is a China expert who has spent years in the country and Asia more broadly, and can speak and read Chinese. This is his second book; the first one, China’s Urban Billion was published by Zed in 2012. He is in an excellent position for having written China’s Asian Dream, that focuses on China’s strategic vision and actions to reclaim what it sees as its rightful place as the undisputed leader in Asia. The book gives a systematic and lively treatise of China’s aspirations on the continent and in the world. It paints a picture that poses significant challenges not only to the neighboring countries in the region, but to the West and the United States in particular.

The first part of the book provides a broad historical and geopolitical context, including a brief overview of China’s long history and its humiliation by Britain and the British East Asia Company in the 1939 Opium War and the 1942 Treaty of Nanking that forced China to open its ports to foreign trade. Then in 1895 followed the defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, no less by a country that China regarded a little brother. Then in 1931 Japan invaded China’s northeast setting up Manchukuo, a puppet state. In 1937, a full-out war broke with Japanese domination for years to come. These were humiliations that China has never forgotten (although Mao later thanked Japan for the invasion, as it eventually enabled the successful Communist takeover in 1949).

Chapter 1 after this introduction tells about the ongoing effort by China to establish a ‘New Silk Road,’ what it calls ‘One Belt, One Road,’ connecting China to its neighbors through both a terrestrial and maritime route eventually leading to Europe. The initiative is tied to financing by the Silk Road Fund and the newly established Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. The aim is to tie Asian countries more tightly to China’s sphere of interest through extensive investment in infrastructure. This more proactive strategy, as Miller points out, is a clear departure from China’s earlier foreign policy established by Deng Xiaoping that “diplomacy must serve the greater goal of domestic development” (p. 26). The current President Xi Jingping has taken a much more aggressive stance in promoting Chinese interests abroad.

The rest of the book is divided into sections based on geography. Here Miller reports first-hand accounts from his travels often to remote local areas in the countries. The first such section focuses on Central Asia, including China’s western Islamic dominated province of Xinjiang (literally, ‘New territory’). The Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan used to belong to the Soviet Union and, while becoming independent after the breakup of the empire, have maintained close ties to Russia. Recently, however, China has made a concerted effort to muscle itself into Central Asia and its expansive oil fields. “Economically, China – not Russia – is now top dog in Central Asia,” writes Miller (p. 75). However, business for the Chinese traders is not always easy, given the need to routinely bribe border guards and the occasional troubles that break out. Tens of thousands of Chinese have settled into Central Asia, but most of them see them as temporary visitors making some money for a few years before returning home. While the Chinese investment is welcomed by the governments, local people fear they are being overtaken by the Chinese – a theme that is quite common throughout the book. Russia at the same time is concerned about losing its grip on Central Asia. Local people in the Stans are worried about Russia’s intentions, especially after Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia remains militarily dominant in the region and its cultural ties to Central Asia are definitely closer than those of China.

The next part deals with Laos and Cambodia, two of Southeast Asia’s poorest countries downstream in the Mekong basin from China’s Yunnan Province. Yunnan shares a 4,000 km long border with Southeast Asia and the Chinese planners have made it a priority to connect these two parts with extensive road and railway connections, as well as air links. China has designated Yunnan as ‘bridgehead’ for Southeast Asia’s development. As Miller notes, ‘bridgehead’ is a military term, which may have unfortunate connotations (p. 98). Laos is also one of the few remaining communist countries ruled by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. It is traditionally closely allied with Vietnam and was heavily bombed by the American air force during the Vietnam War, although Laos was not officially a party in the war. When I worked there a decade ago, the Vietnamese presence was still prevalent and Thailand also had a strong influence. In the northern parts of the country, however, you could see an increasing Chinese influence. Today the capital city, Vientiane, has been transformed by Chinese capital. Miller reports from Udomxai, the biggest town in northern Laos where the Chinese make up some 15% of the inhabitants. Even Chinese farmers are moving to Laos to take advantage of the country’s cheap and fertile land. Moving to the infamous opium growing Golden Triangle where Laos meets Thailand and Myanmar, Miller finds industrial scale agricultural plantations operated by the Chinese. Chinese-owned casinos have sprouted up there to cater to Chinese and Thai gamblers; and even the working girls are imported from China (p. 111). Further south, in Cambodia, the Chinese money and influence are equally important and eagerly received by the thuggish Hun Sen regime, which ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International. As a consequence, Cambodia has often been out of line with its fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regularly supporting China in its controversial and expansionist policies pertaining to Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang and, importantly, the South China Sea. While the elites in these countries are all too happy to receive China and its investments, the relationships between the regular people and the Chinese immigrants who are not known for their respect for other people’s cultures is not always equally friendly. Furthermore, as Miller points out, there is a fine balance to be achieved in foreign relations: for instance, China’s increasing influence in Cambodia is resented in Vietnam (p. 124).

Myanmar provides a cautionary tale as to the perils of associating with undemocratic and corrupt regimes. In the following chapter Miller reports on how China “lost” Myanmar, where it was the closest (in fact only) international ally to the notorious military regime. When the junta dissolved in 2012, anti-Chinese protests ensued, in particular against Chinese state-owned firms operating a giant dam, a copper mine, and oil and gas mines. The Chinese were accused of taking land with poor compensation from locals, as well as destroying the environment and ransacking natural resources (p. 127). Myanmar’s democratic transition coincided by the American government’s ‘pivot to Asia,’ which worried China. Anti-Chinese feelings are widespread in Myanmar and the democratization and consequent freedom of expression led quickly to popular protests against China. Public pressure even caused the new president to suspend work on the $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam that was a Chinese flagship project. The leaders in China were shocked about how popular opinion could lead to such a disastrous outcome – obviously, they were not used to the fact that people’s views mattered – and Chinese analysts started talking about the ‘loss’ or Myanmar (p. 128). Miller claims that in the recent years the Chinese firms have started to understand that they need to improve their relations with local populations (p. 134). The Chinese state has also taken unprecedented steps as a mediator between the government of Myanmar and the Kachin rebels up north. Despite the tensions China should not be counted out in Myanmar. Trade between China and Myanmar stands for a high share of Myanmar’s GDP – and this is not counting the highly significant illegal trade in timber, opium, meta-amphetamines and jade. The environmental watchdog Global Witness estimates that the jade trade in alone 2014 was worth a whopping $31 billion and a significant driver of the armed conflict with the Kachin (p. 141). In the late 1990s, when traveling in the border region of Yunnan and Myanmar, I could witness an incredibly buoyant trade in jade that was by no means under ground. Miller travels to Lashio, the largest town in northeastern Myanmar to seek evidence of a reported ‘Chinese invasion,’ but finds little by way of new arrivals. He concludes that Myanmar doesn’t need to worry about being overrun by Chinese people, but rather by Chinese money: “Myanmar’s problem is less one of outsiders arriving and taking over than one of outsiders taking what they want and then leaving” (p. 148).

One of the reasons why Myanmar is so important is because of China’s desire to gain access to the Bay of Bengal. Such a western seaboard for China would notably improve its energy supplies and reduce the risks of importing most of its oil through the narrow Straits of Malacca that could be blocked by US or other war ships during a time of conflict. Some years ago the Chinese national petroleum company constructed oil and gas pipelines from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan. These pipelines, which were subject to protests during their construction, started pumping natural gas from the Myanmar’s Shwe gas field in 2013 and two years later the first oil was pumped, bringing billions of dollars to the government of Myanmar as well as benefiting China. A Chinese port on the Bay of Bengal is also seen as important for facilitating exports to Bangladesh, India and beyond. Importantly, the economic corridor from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal allows Beijing to extend its sphere of influence to the Indian Ocean (p. 150). Miller concludes that much depends on how Myanmar’s new government, in effect led by Aung San Suu Kyi, receives China’s approaches and whether Chinese companies there behave responsibly.

In a chapter entitled “A String of Pearls” Miller turns his attention to the Indian Ocean where China has become increasingly active. Indian analysts believe that the Chinese are systematically building naval bases around Indian ocean establishing what they have called ‘a string of pearls’ in order to enhance their dominance of what India considers their backyard. India and China have a half century long history of mutual distrust. Latest this summer, the two countries’ armies were at loggerheads across their land border in the Himalayas. Indian concerns about the ‘string of pearls’ has further intensified since Xi Jinping announce the plan to build a Maritime Silk Road in 2013 (p. 167). Indian analysts that Miller has talked to see China’s advancement as a conscious step by Beijing to expand its dominance in the region. While India could benefit from cooperating with China on initiatives, such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, there are significant security-related concerns. In Miller’s judgment, these are exaggerated: “Beijing is far more interested in securing alternative routes for its energy imports and in protecting commercial sea lanes than it is in building a new empire” (p. 171). This despite the fact that Miller recognizes that China’s schemes have geostrategic as well as commercial motives. India is concerned about Sri Lank sliding into China’s sphere. However, a particular sore point is the long-standing friendship between China and Pakistan, an expression of which is the Chinese port development in Gwadar on the coast of Baluchistan and the associated plan to develop a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor running from Gwadar to the Chinese border and Kashgar in Xinjiang. Apart from opening up an alternative route for energy imports, according to Miller, China also wants to use this massive economic cooperation to persuade Pakistan’s government to rule in Islamic extremists whose tentacles reach across the border to Xinjiang (p. 176). Importantly, the Gwadar port provides a valuable permanent maritime base for China on Indian Ocean, near the shipping lanes from the Middle East and Africa.

China had a close relationship with the government of Mahenda Rajapaksa, former dictatorial and thuggish president of Sri Lanka, supplying the bulk of arms he used in the prolonged civil war against the Tamil population in the north of the island country. During that period, Chinese banks financed major projects in Sri Lanka constructed by Chinese firms. The banks loaned money at high interest rates so that these could be used to provide kickbacks to Rajapaksa and his cronies. After the civil war ended and Rajapaksa died, these high interest rate loans have been a major bone of contention between the new government and China. As Miller states: “For China, Sri Lanka offers a test case of how nimbly its leaders and enterprises can react to the vicissitudes of foreign politics” (p. 195). He quotes a Sri Lankan intellectual saying: “The Chinese do not quite understand how to deal with countries that are democracies, where you have political transitions as we have seen here .. They would rather deal with a corrupt dictatorship and not worry about it.”

The final chapter of the book deals with the fiery waters of South China Sea, an area where tensions have risen in recent years as China has aggressively pursued an expansionist policy. China has claimed sovereignty over most of South China Sea causing conflict with many of its neighbors. It claims the Paracel Islands southeast of Hainan. These are also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam, but China has controlled them since it wrested them from South Vietnam in a maritime battle in 1974. Much further away from the Chinese mainland and its exclusive economic zone as recognized by international law lie the Spratly Islands, which are also subject to disputes between China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan. Using its military power, China has in the past several years focused on creating ‘facts on the ground’ by carrying out massive reclamation works to create artificial islands and building garrisons on them. The Chinese government has, somewhat disingenuously, used both claims based on international law and, when they have been unsuccessful, historical claims to the ownership of the islands. Already in 1975, Deng Xiaoping told his Vietnamese counterpart that the islands of South China Sea had “belonged to China since ancient times” (p. 202). As demonstrated by Bill Hayton in his excellent book The South China Sea and summarized here by Miller, these historical claims are at best dubious. For most part of its 2000 years of history, the South China Sea was a trading area for the various peoples belonging to shifting kingdoms that occupied the littoral. The Chinese empire was not even active in maritime affairs for most of that period. The claims to the South China Sea started appearing in Chinese maps for the first time in 1914 and these were used as a basis for claims by the Nationalist government and the Communists after that. In 2009, China for the first time submitted a map to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in which appeared a nine-dash line (also known as the ‘cow’s lick’) and exerting “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters” (p. 206). The Southeast Asian nations were understandably furious. Since then, Chinese actions in the South China Sea have resulted in numerous conflicts with the neighbors. China has blocked oil exploration in the territorial waters of Vietnam, which it claims to itself. There have been naval standoffs and actual shooting incidents between Chinese and Vietnamese and Philippines forces. And China has harassed fishing vessels from other countries that have ventured into disputed waters.

One of the reasons for China claiming virtually all of South China Sea, including the EEZs of the adjacent Southeast Asian nations pertains to the hydrocarbons to be found in the seabed. However, Miller does not believe this to be a major motivation: it is believed that the region contains relatively little oil and gas, and what is there is hard to exploit due to difficult geology and powerful typhoons. The real reason he says is to gain strategic control of the shipping lanes (p. 210). Miller appears to have some sympathy for China’s position, although he recognizes that its position is weakened by its selective adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of which it is part, and its refusal to accept a ruling in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favor of the Philippines regarding the Scarborough Shoal, a triangular group of reefs and rocks off the coast of the Philippines. The events have also led to tensions with other countries, including Japan, Australia and the US. In fact, the American navy destroyer U.S.S. John McCain, which collided with a tanker off Singapore on August 21st, 2017, was returning from a ‘freedom of navigation’ mission in South China Sea sailing through international waters that China claims. This has led Beijing to believe that there is a US-led anti-Chinese coalition being built involving its Southeast Asian neighbors, as well as Japan, Australia and India.

Tom Miller ends his excellent book with a brief but powerful 10-page conclusion that both acknowledges China’s rightful concerns and its need to “start acting like a great power” (p. 239) given the size of its population and economy, as well as recognizes the challenges that the country itself and the region as a whole face. President Xi’s “proactive” foreign policy in Asia, he writes, “offers a straightforward deal: China will deliver trade, investment and other economic goodies to all partners that accommodate – or, at the very least, do not challenge – its core interests” (p. 240). China’s persuasive power comes from the economic incentives it can provide. It faces questions of trust with its Asian neighbors and partners, especially those that have disputes or historical reasons to distrust China. Also in newly democratic countries, like Myanmar and Sri Lanka, where China is associated with support to previous suppressive regimes, there will be challenges.

However, as Miller, states, “the reality is that China will become a much more visible presence in Asia in the coming decades” (p. 242). And as Chinese nationals and firms spread across the region and the world, President Xi has sworn to protect nationals abroad, using military force if necessary (p. 243). These factors risk blowing up in the future. Still, despite a certain militarization, China has thus far emphasized trade, commercial interests and economic growth, rather than political or geographical expansion (notwithstanding its occupation of Tibet and claims to Taiwan as a rogue province). In President Xi’s words: “We Chinese love peace … No matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion” (p. 245). Miller sees China’s determination to gain control of the region as quite rational and something that the US and regional powers must accept.

Tom Miller has written a very fine book on a topic that is one of the most important developments in the world today. His writing is smooth and entertaining, while he combines historical and political analysis with reporting from the front lines. Everyone interested in security and development in Asia and the world would benefit from reading this book.

[Alex O'Connor · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent look at China's economic policies. I learned a lot.

[Kusa A Nomad · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sách được dịch bởi TS. Phạm Sỹ Thành - người sáng lập của Chương trình nghiên cứu kinh tế Trung Quốc thuộc VEPR nên chất lượng về mặt nội dung lẫn dịch thuật là không bàn cãi.

Đọc cuốn sách này mình mới ngộ ra một điều, xin phép trích ý của TS Nguyễn Đức Thành: “Việt Nam nằm bên cạnh Trung Quốc nhưng thực tế là ở rất xa. Người Việt Nam nghĩ là biết rất nhiều về Trung Quốc nhưng thực tế không hiểu họ.” Tầm nhìn và sự thâm sâu của TQ thật đáng học hỏi, và dè chừng. “Giấc mộng Trung Quốc” đang trở thành hiện thực, đặc biệt dưới thời TCB.

Sách phân tích ý đồ phục hưng quốc gia & xoay trục thế giới về châu Á, nơi mà TQ là trung tâm chính trị - kinh tế. Dựa trên xương sống là sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường (BRI), được biết là con đường tơ lụa mới TK XXI, kết nối cơ sở hạ tầng gồm đường bộ, đường biển và đường không giữa Trung Quốc với thế giới, đặc biệt là vùng Trung Á, Nam Á và ĐNA. Thông qua việc liên kết & hỗ trợ các nước châu Á lân cận xây dựng hệ thống CSHT nối liền với TQ, TQ đang dần tạo tầm ảnh hưởng lớn trong khu vực châu Á, trong đó có VN (dự án metro HN là một phần của tham vọng này).

Sách có bố cục khá dễ theo dõi, với mỗi chương là chính sách đối ngoại của TQ với mỗi khu vực, không cần đọc theo thứ tự chương. Trong mỗi chương, tác giả sẽ giới thiệu background, tình hình kinh tế chính trị của mỗi khu vực >> cách tiếp cận của chính quyền Bắc Kinh >> lý do >>thái độ của chính quyền sở tại >> phản ứng của dân chúng >> đóng góp cho BRI và dự đoán tương lai gần thông qua nghiên cứu & các cuôc gặp gỡ, trao đổi với chuyên gia.

Cấu trúc được lặp lại qua các chương nên dễ gây nhàm chán. Tuy nhiên, nếu bạn quan tâm đến thông tin vĩ mô hay trò chơi chính trị của người hàng xóm TQ thì đây chắc chắn là một cuốn sách đáng đọc.

[Thành · Rating 4 out of 5]

Một cuấn sách dễ đọc.
2020 đọc sách chiến lược của 2015-2016, quá là dễ đọc và biết cái gì đang còn đúng và cái gì đã sai.
Tom Miller khá hiểu Trung Hoa, nhưng giống đa số người phương Tây, ông nhìn thẳng chứ không thấy cái tay bẩn của TH đang thọc dưới gầm bàn. Giấc Mộng Trung Hoa đang bị các nước châu Á lờ đi, Vành đai 1 con đường lay lắt. Bản thân TH đang bị Mỹ đánh kinh tế (kể cả quân sự để trả đũa vụ Wuhanvirus???) và cũng chật vật với kinh tế trong nước.
Liệu cuấn sách tiếp theo của Tom Miller sẽ viết về vấn đề gì? Cách nhìn ra sao? Sẽ đáng đọc lắm đấy.
(Cho được điểm thì 3.8 là hợp ý nhất, 4 hơi cao mà 3 thì quá thấp)

[Vairavel · Rating 2 out of 5]

Repetitive and not so insightful! While the author has done a lot of research, including travel to some of the locations he's written about, the book does not come across as an impactful one. It could be possibly due to the reason that the author pretty much turns repetitive after the first few chapters and also he just seems to be echoing whatever you've read in the media already.

[Knut · Rating 4 out of 5]

Book Review: China's Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road
by Tom Miller based on his talk at the SFCC on May 4, 2017

Tom Miller, the managing director of the China Economic Quarterly, presents his second book after China’s Urban Billion as a work which was inspired by Howard French’s China’s Second Continent. French wrote on China’s colonial ambitions in Africa through the eyes of about one million Chinese who have settled on the continent. Similar to French, Miller interviews dozens of people in 14 different Asian countries, both locals and Chinese colonizers. He arrives at the conclusion that there is no plan for the Silk Road; there is not even a map; it's a moving target. The NDRC did only define 6 economic corridors, which have little in common with the Silk Road, but are more about establishing connectivity between the Middle Kingdom and its neglected Eurasian neighborhood.

Miller provides several reasons why Xi Jinping wants to build these commercial corridors:
1. The slowing domestic economy: the one belt one road [read: one region of influence many roads] project is designed to enlarge the market for China’s global champions
2. Technological standards: closer connections with these countries will give China the possibility to lobby for the implementation of its domestic standards in areas like telecom, railway, pipelines, etc; thus effectively supporting objective #1, i.e. enlarging markets for commercial giants like Huawei, ZTE, COMAC, Sinopec, etc.
3. Manufacturing overcapacity: China imported entire factories from Germany and Taiwan in 80 and 90s, but now wants to dismantle its own manufacturing overcapacity and set it up in other countries, where pollution most likely does not affect Chinese citizens. Although this reason might be of minor relevance, it is driven by objective #1 = speeding up the slowing domestic economy and securing domestic power by moving toxic industry abroad.
4. Threat of Islamic terrorism: Miller argues that poverty turns people towards religion and sees therein yet another reason for Beijing to support the economic rise of neighboring countries.
5. Securing natural resources: this factor does not seem so plausible, because China secured its natural resources already in Australia, Africa, Russia and South America, but a strong partnership with e.g. Kazakhstan will prep up its stock significantly. Kazakhstan has the second largest uranium, chromium, lead, and zinc reserves, the third largest manganese reserves, the fifth largest copper reserves, and ranks in the top ten for coal, iron, and gold. It is also an exporter of diamonds. Perhaps most significant for economic development, Kazakhstan also currently has the 11th largest proven reserves of both petroleum and natural gas.

USD 30 billion outward investment in 2015/2016 is still limited compared to USD 100 billion in Africa, but USD 189 billion in contracts signed tell a story of significant commercial success and long term commitment. Let’s forget the numbers. China either shifts its foreign policy focus away from Africa to its own region of intimate impact and pledges to invest massive amounts through its own development banks, or it simply aspires for a new world order since a G2 does not seem anymore likely with a US that has regressed into an ethnocentric and self-protective development stage. Considering that the new Silk Road does encompass a corridor to Africa the latter is more likely.
The NYT writes that Xi Jinping positioned China at center of new economic order on May 14th when he opened the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. Miller mentioned in his book presentation that Beijing was covered with billboard posters prior to the forum and joked that the abbreviation of the forum, BARF, is a synonym for regurgitate in American English. That’s probably how many representatives of Western nations – a strong overlap with NATO member states to be assumed – felt, because most of them did not show up for this grandly executed event.

Chairman Xi gives the one belt one road project absolute priority. It seems to be his flagship project, the project with which he wants to write history; despite the connotations we might have with the Silk Road, it is in essence more about China re-building its network of vassal states, similar to what the US did after WWII under the NATO umbrella and with its semi-colonial dependencies in Central and South America; or the USSR with the Eastern Bloc. The international implications are already visible, because the world shows after four decades cold war from the late 1940s to the early 90s a new fault line between democratic and authoritarian political systems and their spheres of influence. This time not only the centers of power have changed, but the also the frame conditions, in particular the technologies applied by governments and within societies at large. China’s technocratic system and its advances in cyberleninism seem to have a cutting edge over outdated democratic opinion finding.

Historian Harari wrote recently that political scientists increasingly interpret human political structures as data-processing systems. Like capitalism and communism, so democracies and dictatorships are in essence competing mechanisms for gathering and analysing information. Dictatorships use centralised processing methods, whereas democracies prefer distributed processing. In the last decades democracy gained the upper hand because under the unique conditions of the late twentieth century, distributed processing worked better … as data-processing conditions change in the twenty-first century, democracy might decline and even disappear. As both the volume and speed of data increase, venerable institutions like elections, parties and parliaments might become obsolete – not because they are unethical, but because they don’t process data efficiently enough. These institutions evolved in an era when politics moved faster than technology.

Harari continues, that doesn’t mean we will go back to twentieth-century-style dictatorships. Authoritarian regimes seem to be equally overwhelmed by the pace of technological development and the speed and volume of the data flow. In the twentieth century, dictators had grand visions for the future. Communists and fascists alike sought to completely destroy the old world and build a new world in its place. Whatever you think about Lenin, Hitler or Mao, you cannot accuse them of lacking vision. Today it seems that leaders have a chance to pursue even grander visions. While communists and Nazis tried to create a new society and a new human with the help of steam engines and typewriters, today’s prophets could rely on biotechnology and super-computers.

The big question is therefore what vision president Xi has for China’s citizens and humanity at large. Are gargantuan projects like the One Belt One Road Initiative motivated by power or purpose? If power is the Middle Kingdom’s paramount leader’s paramount motivation, then the fears of neighboring countries which Miller describes in his book are justified. In Kirgizstan people have a perception that the Chinese are gobbling up the country. Sri Lanka thinks that Chinese will import even more corruption than the island nation already suffers from. Pakistani are outspoken belligerent and Beijing had to dispatch 15000 Chinese security staff to protect Chinese workers at infrastructure project sites. Chinese expansionism in the South Chinese sea and beyond nurtures India’s worries that a string of pearl harbors suffocates its own commercial and defense system. Laos experiences in its Golden Triangle SEZ, which is owned by a Heilongjiang businessman commercial annexation: clocks are set according to Beijing Time and China Mobile serves as main carrier. All Pacific nations are doubtful about the consequences of president Xi pressing ahead with APEC since president Trump declared TTP dead; regional trade organizations like ASEAN might suffer a gradual lethal blow from APEC, because they would be made redundant.

If chairman Xi’s vision is driven by power, then the world is likely to experience a scenario which is likely to what William Adams and Damien Ma tried to describe in their macroeconomic analysis In Line Behind a Billion People. Scarcity will define China’s ascent during the next decade, in particular for those who have to queue; and that is ROW: the rest of the world. Foreign participants of the BARF event on May 14 would then be political opportunists who want to secure themselves a place in second position, still behind China, but at least before others in the new global pecking order. If chairman Xi’s vision is driven by purpose, what I hope very much, we could indeed see a massive increase in living standards in regions which have till now not participated in the benefits of the industrial revolution and globalization. China’s initiative could henceforth facilitate more economic and social justice. The future will show which vision was at the heart of China’s helmsman, but there is reason to be suspicious, because apart from China’s Asia Dream, which is mostly communicated to a foreign audience, there is a second much more important domestic dream being broadcasted since years to the Chinese citizens: the China Dream | 中国梦. It is shown to the population on billboards all over the country and speaks with a wall in center position a well known symbolic language of exclusion which is the exact opposite of what president Xi pledges in the video of the state owned news agency Xinhua.

This review was first published on mycountryandmypeople.org

[Pham Tung · Rating 5 out of 5]

- Một cuốn sách hay của tác giả Tom Miller. Sống trong một đất nước láng giềng với Trung Quốc, có lẽ nên chịu tìm hiểu rõ hơn về "người bạn" này, từ góc nhìn của một người ngoài cuộc.

Trung Quốc đang manh nha mở rộng tầm ảnh hưởng của mình qua sáng kiến (?) “Vành đai và Con đường” (Nhất đới nhất lộ, hay BRI - Belt and Road Initiative) của Tập Cận Bình. Bằng cách xây dựng và phát triển các hệ thông giao thông qua nhiều nơi trên thế giới. Được hỗ trợ xây dựng cơ sở hạ tầng, tất nhiên các nước sẽ khó thoát khỏi lời mời gọi này, nhưng nó cũng là một sợi dây buộc các nước phụ thuộc nhiều hơn vào Trung Quốc.

Ngoài ra, TQ còn thành lập Ngân hàng Đầu tư cơ sở hạ tầng châu Á (AIIB - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Đây là một cách để tạo ra đối đầu với những cơ quan như IMF, Ngân hàng Phát triển châu Á (ADB) vốn được cho là bị chi phối với Mỹ.

Trung Quốc đã trải qua một thời gian dài ẩn nhẫn, và khi tích lũy đủ (bằng những phương pháp có lẽ không thiếu phần cực đoan), TQ đã lộ diện cho cả thế giới thấy sức mạnh của mình. Tham vọng của Putin hay Tập có lẽ cũng khó phân cao thấp, nhưng rõ ràng Putin khả năng lãnh đạo và tầm nhìn còn thua xa năng lực “giữ ghế” của ông.

Lào

Lào và Campuchia, theo tác giả là hai nước phụ thuộc nhiều nhất vào TQ ở Đông Nam Á. Lào tỏ ra là một nước với thái độ chính trị bạc nhược và nạn tham nhũng cao nhất thế giới. Người dân Lào cũng không hăng say lao động như những nơi khác (theo lời của một kĩ Trung Quốc làm việc tại Lào). Với sự đón nhận những khoản đầu tư của TQ, Lào có thể sẽ bị TQ chi phối nhiều mặt và cạn kiện tài nguyên, khoáng sản.

Campuchia

Nói đến Campuchia không thể không nhắc đến Pol Pot, kẻ được TQ giật dây và gây ra tội diệt chủng. Campuchia lệ thuộc nặng nề vào tiền của TQ, khi TQ là nhà đầu tư lớn nhất ở đây, và một phần ba số con đường được cho là do TQ xây. Không ai lạ gì Hun Sen, một kẻ độc tài kiểm soát truyền thông với tuyên bố “sẽ không từ chức cũng như không tổ chức một cuộc bầu cử mới” (theo Wikipedia), là một thân tín cuồng nhiệt của TQ.

Việt Nam

Mặc dù từng chiến tranh với Mỹ, Việt Nam là một trong những nước nước thân Mỹ nhất châu Á: 78% công dân Việt Nam có cái nhìn thiện chí với Mỹ năm 2015. Con số tương ứng cho TQ là 19% (mặc dù bị ảnh hưởng nhiều bởi văn hóa TQ). Xem cách người dân chào đón Obama so với Tập khi đến Việt Nam là thấy sự khác biệt.

Tranh chấp Biển Đông

“Năm 1975, Ðặng Tiểu Bình đơn phương cho rằng các hòn đảo ở vùng Biển Ðông đã “thuộc về Trung Quốc c từ thời thượng cổ […]”. Sự thật thì tuyên bố của TQ đều vô nghĩa về mặt lịch sử. Trong gần 2000 năm, các vùng biên giới đều mơ hồ và ranh giới trên biển là không tồn tại.
Năm 1843, soạn giả Uông Văn Đài của TQ còn viết về quần đảo Trường Sa là nơi “có nhiều bãi đá lớn, nhưng chúng tôi không biết gì về chúng”.

Cơ sở cho những ranh giới hiện tại của Biển Đông được thiết định bởi các cường quốc châu Âu, những nước chiếm phần lớn Đông Nam Á làm thuộc địa hồi thế kỉ 19. Các ranh giới chính trị hiện tại được thiết lập khi các nước phương Tây phân chia lãnh thổ.

Mục tiêu bành trướng của TQ ở Biển Đông không vì lí do dầu khí (trữ lượng rất ít ỏi), động lực thực sự của TQ là kiểm soát được tuyến đường vận tải biển ở Biển Đông, nơi TQ phụ thuộc nhiều vào nó.

TQ không chấp nhận phân xử của trọng tài LHQ về tranh chấp biển. Tuy nhiên, tòa án đã ra quyết định phủ nhận cơ sở pháp lý của TQ với “đường chín đoạn” năm 2016.

[The Uprightman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Part travel journalism, part geo-political analysis. Smatterings of local colour are interspersed between economic development observations.

History in introduction is remarkably similar to CCP narrative - global power for centuries, unified and continuous imperial history, humiliated by Western devils, decline from self-aggrandised greatness starts in 1842. I'm unsure if Miller believes this history or uses it as mental scaffolding to frame how China's leadership thinks of its region.

Nevertheless, Miller is on stronger footing when articulating Beijing's foreign policy designs, which are engaged in order to 'lubricate regional trade and investment'. Specific projects are discussed and the ramifications these have for China's neighbours. In South East Asia, China is attempting to challenge Japan; in Central Asia, Russia.

Miller goes on to discuss infrastructure financing. Multilateral development banks will occupy a comparatively small role in regional financing; authorised capital is substantially larger than paid-in capital (as is the case with all banks to reassure bondholders and credit rating agencies of their ample provisions), there is plenty of infrastructure funding to go around, and China's neighbours are wary of the strings attached to Chinese lending. The true economic statecraft lenders are the China Development Bank (although now focusing on internal disbursements in concert with commercial banks) and China ExIm Bank, a giant policy bank used exclusively for statecraft finance.

Miller enters travel journalist mode when he describes on the ground Chinese development.

Central Asia:

China is pushing into Central Asia by financing projects to access natural resources while simultaneously building connective infrastructure to facilitate alternate trade routes.

CNPC controls 1/4 of Kazakhstan's oil production. Similar story to other countries around the world: nations welcome Chinese investment but are plagued with citizen anxiety over open contract tendering, labour, and broader social impacts. Central Asian states, while currently economically closer to Beijing, remain wary about how they articulate their diplomatic relationships. Russian-China relations form the overlay, which Miller characterises similar to many analysts: a relationship of convenience with an undercurrent of distrust.

South East Asia:

Laos, rail and roads; Kunming rail, trading hub between China, Thailand and Vietnam. Resource abundance in gold, copper, bauxite, iron, lead, means China's mining firms are operating there.

In Cambodia, everything. Continuing to balance Chinese enterprise and individual profits with hostile local relations over resource exploitation and land grabs.

Myanmar's previous client state status had changed. Despite having welcomed China investment, Beijing is walking a delicate line. Porous border points, although facilitating trade, are superficial representations of deeper hostile sentiment. Local discontent has spilled over to halt large mining, gas, and rail projects. While the new government recognises it is too poor to rebuff Beijing's advances, it remains cautious about rolling out the red carpet.

South Asia:

India's relationship with China is economically transactional and militarily cautious. Miller discusses Indian concerns about China's 'string of pearls' ambitions to build or acquire port infrastructure as a springboard to Indian Ocean blue water navy operations.

Miller also explores Pakistan's bilateral relationship with China, including a commercial history of Gwadar port. Stalled by militia attacks and government recalcitrance, Singapore port authority sold its interests to a China State Construction Engineering Company subsidiary, which went on to expand its facilities to include an oil refinery, cargo terminals and grain facilities. Despite the seemingly close relationship at the top levels of government, privately Chinese policymakers believe they'll lose around 80% of their investment in Pakistan. Beijing considers it a worthwhile investment, however, if it means capacity to open new overland energy import routes.

South China Sea:

Miller dips his toes into strategic analysis by looking at rival SCS claimants and their respective interactions with China. The author writes a concise overview of how Beijing has reached its current regional maritime position and the CCP's inconsistent approach to international law and supranational institutions. This approach has unified the region in opposition to China, and has catalysed Vietnam's perception about China's ultimate regional ambition: to regain its hegemony.

Apart from greater Chinese enterprise's operations in various countries - certainly interesting in its own right - I didn't encounter anything ground breaking in China's Asian Dream. However, Miller's ethnographic wanderings do provide a first-hand account of infrastructure project progress, viability, and usage. When his observations are combined with anecdotal smatterings of specific projects and how the Chinese presence more broadly are received in greater Asia host countries his book becomes a worthwhile read.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

A superbly readable account of China’s ‘dream’ (and specifically Xi Jinping’s) to accord China with greater status and power through its Belt and Road initiative—both across land and maritime domains. This initiative, however, is being challenged by wary neighbors who in many instances are inextricably tied economically to China and resist their hegemonic overtures, but on the other hand have trade deficits with China and must comply or face collapse. These small countries look to balance against China while walking the fine line of not appearing to ally against it. Well written and documented!

[Haeyon]

[Not a review - notes for self]

China's lack of confidence in internal affairs means trying to appear very assertive abroad to unite the country around nationalism (Nationalist logic of the Chinese dream means projecting power overseas)

China is adamant it has never been an expansionary power, but: since PRC's founding in 1949, it occupied Tibet and colonized Xinjiang.

China's dream is restoring a Sino-centric order (ref: Liu Mingfu - The China Dream)
China's modern economic diplomacy is to recreate a modern tribute system with all roads leading to Beijing. Advocates have a rose tinted view of this Chinese neo-imperialism (but this rose tinted view informs the Government's win-win diplomacy today)

China portrays the BRI as an international project - but it has a significant domestic component. Every province in China has its own BRI plan.

Russia and China: Russia needs China more than China needs it. It signed a long delayed $400 billion US deal to deliver Russian gas to Chinese consumers in 2014 because it needed to find alternative markets to Europe

SEA: China's economic engagement with the Mekong area is in the process of disconnecting mainland SEA from maritime SEA. Railway plans can have signif impact on SEA geopolitics (connecting Laos to Thailand)

Cambodia: China has supported the Khmer Rouge government - this support has been reciprocated with Cambodia supporting Beijing's line over Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and the South China Sea. Cambodia echoes China's contention that territorial disputes be solved bilaterally instead of via international arbitration. Cambodia's actions =also influenced by long history of territorial disputes with Vietnam. CNRP (Cambodia National Rescue Party leader stated that Cambodia did not ally with the US because it supports Vietnam- Presence of China needed to counterbalance influence of Vietnam.)

Myanmar: China 'lost Myanmar' - rise of free media bought down China's large dam project. Up until 2011, China viewed Myanmar as a strategic corridor to the Indian ocean and as a puppet in ASEAN. Lot of grassroots anger towards China - Mytisone Dam and Copper Mine not beneficial to locals - Chinese companies also responded clumsily to the population due to little experience of civil society at home by setting up a website spewing self propaganda. Locals also resent that China has exported 'trash': fake drugs, contaminated food products, low quality items that fall apart - until Western sanctions were repealed, little else was available.

Since 1988, China worked closely with Mynamar's military leaders who made ordinary citizens' life miserable. Chinese companies threw local farmers off their land and plundered resources.
So far, multilateral umbrellas have shielded China from the scale of depth and outrage experienced in Myitsone (eg, China's gas is delivered by a Daewoo led consortium along with India - so it is not viewed as a purely Chinese project)

Myanmar strategically very important {p.136}

India: China's deepening cooperation with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, the MAldives and Pakistan feeds anxiety in India of being boxed into its subregion. It began with China's invasion of Tibet in 1950 (traditional buffer zone) and Beijing's refusal to support New Dehli in bid to become permanent member of the UN Sec Council.

[Pg 168-169 for more]

Ref: Raja Mohan - Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

China has always been a strong state with a weak society; India is opposite - a weak state with strong society. You need both - a strong state to get things done; strong society to hold it accountable

Sri Lanka: Colombo Port City Deal

South China Sea:
China has a decent claim over the Paracels but sovereignty of the spratly islands is extremely dubious. Beijing says that the JAmes Shoal is the southermost point of Chinese territory - but this is 80km from Malaysia while 1500km from China's Hainan Island (the most southern part of its territory).
Beijing says its historical claims trump geography. It even claims it needs more defensive presence in the Spratly islands because it is so far from the mainland.

In 1975- Deng Xiaoping said SCS (South China Sea) Islands belonged to China since ancient times. However, claims of ancient sovereignty have never explained its historical basis. For nearly 2000 years, the SCS was a polyglot place of trade and exchange. Maritime boundaries and land borders were not fixed and did not exist.

16th C - Chinese trading fleets began to outnumber SEA traders but did not mean the islands they sailed past belonged to China.

Naval expeditions to the SCS in the 15th century (Adminral Zheng He) only lasted 30 years as the Ming dynasty turned inwards. China didn't possess another naval ship capable of reaching the SCS until it was given one by the US 500 years later.

[Tariq Mahmood · Rating 3 out of 5]

China's huge investment in building a new silk route in Asia will have implications. Trade is followed by political power. How will China behave, no one is sure yet as we don't have enough examples. So far, China is happy to let America do the fighting as it follows up with the re-building activity. Will China be forced to send its army to back its investments in case of another Libya breaks up? In Libya, it didn't, because China does not rely on only defence contracts like America does. Therefore America and its western cronies will jump onto any war in an effort to showcase their latest military hardware. Maybe when China has caught up in the defence sector then it too will become as trigger happy as the Americans?

[Scottloar · Rating 4 out of 5]

China’s Asian Dream: The Silken Web

The subtitle, Empire Building Along the New Silk Road, is somewhat misnamed because the PRC is not creating an empire; it levies no troops, taxes or labor from countries near or far, nor garrisons forces to enforce authority, nor appoints governors or rulers by proxy, nor works to colonize or claim title to other territories (the South China Sea is an explainable exception); and although clearly favoring authoritarian governments answerable only to a few the PRC does not involve itself in local governance as long as China’s interests are respected. Surely empires are made of sterner stuff. Instead, China’s rise is seen as a return to its natural and historic state as the center of order and good in Asia, recognized by harmonious vassals within its orbit. Tom Miller defines this “empire” not by military action to expand territory nor conquer foreign lands, but “to recover what has been lost, which means restoring its historical status as Asia’s dominant power. China’s new ‘empire’ will be an informal and largely economic one, based on cash and held together by hard infrastructure” (p.17).

“The strategic goal of the Belt and Road Initiative is to promote China as an engine of development, weaving a web of interdependence across Asia and beyond. Beijing hopes the incentive of massive infrastructure investment will persuade Asian countries to put their economic interests above security concerns” (p. 240).

The book proceeds from the instruments financing this Belt and Road Initiative through to infrastructure projects in Central Asia, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, with consequences, fears and comments, and reactions by those in Russia, India and Vietnam. Often such projects cannot maintain the promise “if you build it they will come” and become empty, unused and decaying as the many overly invested or vanity projects in China; other times the project cost is highly inflated to serve corruption of local authority and fatten Chinese profits; but many projects do advance a country’s infrastructure especially through transport, seaports, power grids and pipelines, increase the GDP, and serve a country’s need for investment cash. And the PRC does throw out money: “Government officials working on the Belt and Road project privately admit they expect to lose 80% of their investment in Pakistan. They have made similar strategic calculations elsewhere: in Myanmar they expect to lose 50%, in Central Asia 30%. The logic is that it is worth throwing away money if it helps China to expand its geopolitical influence” (pp. 176-177).

The CCP launches the Belt and Road Initiative with the dual intent of protecting national security through “a network of economic dependency that will consolidate its regional leadership” (p.31) and a source of new market growth, “a lifeline for indebted firms suffering from weak demand at home and looking to export their overcapacity” (p.32). Enter the Chinese firms, some as transient traders, others as investors that locals fear “will suck the country dry - grabbing its minerals,wrecking its landscape and dominating its trade” (p.112). As one critic in Cambodia comments, the PRC is “willing to supply loans for roads, bridges and hydro dams, but they must go through Chinese companies, who multiply the real cost so they can make huge profits” (pp.122-123). This public resentment was new to the mainland Chinese unused to working in civil society, and they handled it badly through self-serving propaganda and willful ignorance of local sensibilities, seeing themselves and the CCP posing as welcomed agents of prosperity. In Myanmar, “most of the Burmese people hate the Chinese” (p. 133), and in my experience this is common to most peoples in Southeast Asia; even many ethnic Chinese dislike what they call “PRCs” . This is not invidious resentment but a real dislike of mainland Chinese’ perceived arrogant indifference to local sensibilities and manners as evidenced by their daily interactions.

The PRC’s claim to the entirety of the South China Sea is another matter. “China’s unbending assertion of its territorial claims is about two things: self-protection and national glory. The ability to defend itself and shape its own destiny is at the heart of ‘Chinese Dream’” (pp. 16-17). The PRC wants a cordon sanitaire around the homeland that protects its maritime and air routes freed of foreign military traffic. This is hard to argue against, but claiming the South China Sea as a Chinese lake is a tough swallow; not one of its neighbors agrees, and the PRC insists that “we are willing to listen to voices from our neighboring countries and respond to their doubts about China’s neighborhood policy” but “we will defend every inch of territory that belongs to us” (p.214). The PRC’s medieval (my word) attitude requires that every neighboring country disputing its claims to the South China Sea must approach China as a supplicant asking for extraordinary considerations, and not as an equal entity having legitimate and sovereign concerns. “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact” said the PRC’s then foreign minister Yang Jiechi at an ASEAN forum in July 2010 (p.207).

So, what must give way? Either China’s behaviour is moderated and it becomes a responsible stakeholder in the established world order, a dream which had been rudely awakened by the reality of China’s direction, or countries and the USA in particular must make accommodation, not only accepting the PRC as an established power but also accepting its right to act as it chooses in its region. Tom Miller concludes, “ I believe the most sensible course of action would be for the US to reach a “grand bargain” with Beijing. That means finding a way to acknowledge China’s global ambition and yielding to it a greater freedom of action in its own region, while keeping the US’s own strategic presence intact” (pp. 250-251).

This becomes ever more unlikely as China sees itself as a rising,unstoppable power claiming its hereditary place, and coming to any kind of bargain that maintains US presence or power is out of the question. Other analysts correctly see that the CCP needs the US as constant bogeyman to stir up nationalism and pose the Party as the sole remedy against hostile foreign forces active inside and outside China, and promote the CCP’s economic prosperity and authoritarian government as more successful than effete and disunified Western democracies.

Tom Miller has walked the lay of the land and presented a balanced review; of that there is no argument. I do find one nagging fault: the section breaks are the three characters亚洲梦 (Asian Dream), but neither in the text or footnotes are there explanatory Chinese characters, just romanization.

N.B. Tuesday, April 21, 2020: (Reuters) - “China’s Foreign Ministry says it has lodged stern representations in response to what it called Vietnam’s illegal claims in the South China Sea and that any attempt to deny China’s sovereignty there will be doomed to fail.

“Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang made the comments at a daily briefing Tuesday. Vietnam in recent days has protested against China’s efforts to expand in the disputed waters, including by submitting a claim to the United Nations.”

[Linh Do · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lâu lắm mới không ngần ngại cho 5 sao
Nội dung cập nhật, tác giả kỳ công phỏng vấn và chọn lọc thông đủ để người đọc có cái nhìn bao quát về China Dream, người dịch cẩn thẩn lại thêm hiệu đính rõ ràng nên mình ưng lắm.
Giáp Tết mình tính mua mấy quyển để gặm nhấm qua mấy ngày nghỉ, check bảng xếp hạng Sách hay là có cuốn này.
Chỉ cần người đọc quan tâm một chút kinh tếchính trị là có thể tiêu hóa cuốn này rồi, à, cần thêm một chút kiên nhẫn nữa, sách kha khá chữ đấy .
Nổi bật trong cuốn sách này là khẩu hiệu "Chủ động tích cực" của Chủ tịch Tập. Chiến lược của Trung Quốc là gây ảnh hưởng về mặt kinh tế sau đó kéo theo ảnh hưởng về chính trị, quân sự... phía sau. Trung Quốc thực hiện điều này với rất nhiều nước ở châu Á, đặc biệt là các nước kém phát triển hơn ở khu vực Trung Á, Đông Nam Á, Nam Á. Tom Miller, thông qua các cuộc gặp chính thức, các tài liệu thu thập được đã cho độc giả cái nhìn tổng quan về cách tác động cụ thể của Trung Quốc ở các nước này với chính sách "Nhất đới nhất lộ", tập trung chi tiết vào Pakistan, Lào, Campuchia, Thái Lan, Myanmar, Việt Nam, Sri Lanka. Tóm gọn lại, người đọc có thể hình dung ra nước nào ủng hộ hay không ủng hộ chính sách của Trung Quốc và lý do đằng sau đó gắn liền với quá trình lịch sử.
Điều mình thích nhất ở cuốn này là góc nhìn mới, từ quan sát viên nước ngoài. Không đâu xa, bài viết về mối quan hệ giữa Việt Nam và Trung Quốc qua những sự kiện ở Biển Đông là sự đánh giá xuyên suốt, logic với các số liệu, không đơn thuần chỉ tung hô cho bên nào đấy. Chương 6, Vùng biển sôi sục, là phần gần gũi với người Việt hơn cả, mình thấy rõ sự trái khoáy của người anh em phương Bắc trong quan hệ ngoại giao với các nước láng giền g có chung vùng biển. Một bức tranh sống động tổng quan của châu Á, mối quan hệ đối trọng giữa Trung Quốc và các nước này được trình bày cụ thể và gọn gàng trong Giấc mộng châu Á của Trung Quốc.

[Ellen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating current events read! This really brought me up to speed on China's strategic priorities in the 21st century. It was well organized, presented in a very straightforward manner, and genuinely kept fairly objective throughout. The author presented multiple sides to various arguments about China's rise/resurgence and ultimately left it up to the reader to evaluate those claims based on the evidence presented in the book.

The topic is broadly about the Belt Road Initiative, but it contains much more. From relating relevant history to discussing China's economic, domestic, and security priorities, this book provides a good beginner's glimpse into Chinese foreign affairs and goals. It is a good resource for understanding more about how China relates to Southeast Asia especially.

Some of it was dry and there's a lot on trade that can get fairly dense, particularly in the Central Asia chapter, but otherwise, this book was a good read and one that I would certainly recommend! The introduction's first few paragraphs were also quite innovative, as I do enjoy a good thought experiment.

[Nam KK · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book delves into the resurgence of China following a prolonged period of peaceful waiting. The author expresses understanding of China's desire for influence, drawing a parallel with historical efforts by the United States to eliminate European influence in the Caribbean. The central focus of the book is on less developed or vulnerable regions surrounding China, specifically Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. The author argues that these regions find China's economic appeal irresistible. At the same time, there is an implicit suggestion that concerns about China's expansionism may be exaggerated in these countries, as observed in Myanmar and other Central Asian nations. However, the author does not address a crucial aspect of China's aspirations in East Asia, particularly in relation to key allies of the United States such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.

[Ieva Bellomi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Initially was not convinced about the book - seemed to be another American values backed condemning China's rise. But - the book provides realistic overview of China and its neighbors in South East Asia and its counterbalance to other powers of the global power interplay. It is very fresh from the publishing house as well.
The book is a helpful tool understand why Riga is on the One Belt One Road map...

'Simply put, in order to protect its interests abroad China must interfere in other countries' affairs. That is what great powers do. '

[Minh Khue · Rating 4 out of 5]

40 năm đã qua kể từ khi nhà lãnh đạo Đặng Tiểu Bình phát động công cuộc cải cách. Trung Quốc ngày nay đạt được những bước phát triển thần kỳ trở thành nền kinh tế lớn thứ 2 thế giới và dẫn đầu châu Á. Khởi đầu từ quan điểm của Đặng Tiểu Bình qua Giang Trạch Dân cho tới Hồ Cẩm Đào, Trung Quốc kiên trì theo đuổi chính sách đối ngoại “ Thao quang dưỡng hối “ - “ Giấu mình chờ thời “. Sách lược này một mặt giúp cho Trung Quốc tập trung mọi nguồn lực cho phát triển kinh tế, ổn định nội bộ nhưng mặt khác địa vị trên trường quốc tế của Trung Quốc trở nên mờ nhạt không tương xứng với kích cỡ và tiềm năng của đất nước với 1.3 tỷ dân. Là một cường quốc và có vị trí chính thức trong hội đồng bảo an Liên Hợp Quốc nhưng Trung Quốc hầu như không can dự vào các điểm nóng chính trị trên thế giới kể cả tại châu Á nơi mà nhà nước Trung Hoa cổ xưa coi như khu vực phiên dậu của mình.
Tuy nhiên trong khoảng 7-8 năm trở lại đây đặc biệt kể từ khi nhà lãnh đạo Tập Cân Bình chính thức lên nắm quyền, chính sách đối ngoại của Trung Quốc đã có những thay đổi đáng kể đặc biệt là đối với khu vực Châu Á. Trung Quốc muốn đóng vai trò “tích cực chủ động “ ở Châu Á và bắt đầu có những bước đi chiến lược nhằm biến sức mạnh kinh tế thành vị thế lãnh đạo trong khu vực.
Với khối dữ liệu hết sức phong phú, kết hợp với những trải nghiệm thực tế khi rong ruổi khắp khu vực Châu Á, gặp gỡ phỏng vấn các học giả, người dân địa phương, Tom Miller đã phân tích thấu đáo về chiến lược chủ đạo trong tham vọng Châu Á của Trung Quốc đó là sáng kiến “Vành đai và con đường:”“ Nhất đới nhất lộ “, sử dụng sức mạnh kinh tế để gây ảnh hưởng đến hầu khắp các quốc gia lãnh thổ trong khu vực.
Liệu “ vận mệnh chung “ nào sẽ dành cho Trung quốc và các quốc gia châu Á, liệu một kịch bản tồi tệ nhất có xảy ra gây bất ổn đối với an ninh khu vực khi mà Trung Quốc cùng với việc trải rộng lợi ích kinh tế ra ngoài lãnh thổ tất yếu dẫn tới mở rộng sức mạnh chính trị và quân sự để bảo vệ các lợi ích cốt lõi, quyền công dân cũng như từ bỏ nguyên tắc bất can thiệp, thậm chí làm hồi sinh chủ nghĩa dân tộc, chủ nghĩa bá quyền. Và rằng để đối phó với tình huống trớ trêu này, liệu cộng đồng châu Á; châu Á – Thái Bình Dương đã sẵn sàng cả về năng lực nội tại, sức mạnh tổng hợp, chiến lược đối ngoại, sự đoàn kết thống nhất giữa các quốc gia ?... Đây là câu hỏi lớn đến nay theo tôi vẫn chưa có lời giải rõ ràng, Bản thân tác giả thì gợi ý theo một chiều kích khác “ khi Trung Quốc theo đuổi tầm nhìn phục hưng quốc gia của họ, một thứ gì đó cần phải được bỏ đi. Nếu không giấc mộng Trung Quốc có thể biến đổi một cách bi kịch thành cơn ác mộng Á châu “.
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[Mira · Rating 4 out of 5]

China’s Asian Dream by Tom Miller is an overview of China’s pursuit for geopolitical domination in Asia, through aggressive economic and trade deals. It details its economic activities across Central Asia, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the South China Sea (especially Vietnam). This is an essential book for anyone watching the rise of China in the geopolitical landscape. China is basically rebuilding New Silk Roads from Eurasia to the Indian Ocean and to the South China Sea, by providing financing for infrastructure and billions worth of trade deals.

Essentially, China is just doing what other powerful nations have done in the past. And being the world’s largest economy, its economic and political moves are not surprising. Unfortunately for China, most countries distrust them. They are considered a big bully, even though if we think about it, Western countries are bullies as well. At this day and age, with the predominance of democracy, freedom of speech and human rights, concern for the environment, and decline of violence, China’s activities are unwelcome. No matter how much they insist that its deals will be “win-win” for both sides, they will never fully gain the trust of another country’s government and its citizens. The book also highlights that China’s quest is also about the struggle against the United States for domination in Asia—with the other Asian countries trapped in between. For these Asian countries, the challenge is to achieve a balance between these two giants, to maintain peace, and to ensure continued economic growth.

[Maldifassi Giovanni · Rating 4 out of 5]

Se questo non è il migliore libro che ho letto sulla Cina contemporanea, è sicuramente il più completo.
Chi è l’autore? Ecco questa è una domanda che crea un po di imbarazzo perché l’autore impersona figure professionali diverse.
La presentazione che compare sul libro qualifica Tom Miller come giornalista che ha vissuto in Cina per 14 anni dove tra l’altro ha studiato e imparato il mandarino.
Appena prima però lo stesso Miller viene indicato come Senior Analist del Gavekal Research , un istituto di ricerca di geopolitica e direttore del periodico China Economic Quarterly.
Perchè ho esitato a definire la figura professionale dell’autore, perché definirlo prima di tutto come giornalista mi sembra francamente fuorviante e fortemente riduttivo per uno studioso che correda il suo lavoro con un apparato di riferimenti di quasi quaranta pagine, questo è il modo tipico di procedere degli accademici e questo libro è senza dubbio di livello accademico.
Nei precedenti libri sulla Cina contemporanea recensiti in questo blog abbiamo più volte parlato della nuova via della seta o più propriamente della Belt and Road Initiative.
Cos’è?
E’ una strategia anzitutto economica a lungo periodo tipica del modo di procedere della dirigenza cinese che a differenza dei gruppi dirigenti del resto del mondo è capace di pensare anzitutto al futuro e di programmare dettagliati piani di politica economica a lungo o addirittura lunghissima scadenza.
Leggi di più :
http://gmaldif-pantarei.blogspot.com/...

[Nassir · Rating 4 out of 5]

By reading this magnificent work of Tom Miller, I have gotten a comprehensive picture what China aims by its world class mega projects in Asia and beyond. As someone eager to understand China’s way, I was astonished by this book.
For a very brief introduction to this book I prefer to bring below what SOAS, University of London has written in their website:
“From the Mekong River Basin to the Central Asian steppe, China is flexing its economic muscles for strategic ends. By setting up new regional financial institutions, Beijing is challenging the post-World War II order established under the watchful eye of Washington. And by funding and building roads, railways, ports and power lines―a New Silk Road across Eurasia and through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean―China aims to draw its neighbours ever tighter into its embrace.

Combining a geopolitical overview with on-the-ground reportage from a dozen countries, China’s Asian Dream offers a fresh perspective on the rise of China’ and what it means for the future of Asia.”

If you are interested in Asian studies and the future of strategic games in the world, do read this book.

[Moses · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a solid book. It's informative, readable, clear, and reasonably interesting. For those reasons, I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in learning about Chinese expansionism/neo-colonialism in Asia. I chose to give it three stars not because of any serious flaws, but because there was nothing sufficiently special or spectacular to warrant a strong recommendation to a broader audience. I definitely learned a lot from this book about China's relations with other Asian nations and about the way China uses investments in infrastructure abroad to expand its influence (much like the US does with its foreign aid and influence over the IMF/World Bank).
If the topic of this book sounds interesting to you, you should read it! Otherwise, you're probably fine without it.

[Trung Ho · Rating 5 out of 5]

Tất nhiên đây không phải là sách văn học hay self-help gì. Cuốn sách này mang lại rất nhiều kiến thức bổ ích, tuy nhiên dưới góc nhìn của tác giả một số vấn đề sẽ bị tiêu cực hóa đi nhiều do thể chế chính trị và tư tưởng.
Qua Trung Quốc và giấc mộng châu Á ta sẽ hiểu được hoàn cảnh của Việt Nam và các nước láng giềng với TQ, hiểu được sự tài tình của lãnh đạo nước nhà cũng như những áp lực đang đè nặng lên vai của họ khi phải đánh đu lợi ích quốc gia giữa TQ và Mỹ. Hiểu được hơn tiếng nói của VN trên trường quốc tế. Và bớt đi sự ngu dốt vì những tin tức truyền thông thân phương tây ở trên mạng đang ngày đêm chống phá cách mạng.

[Denis Mcgrath · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a hard-hitting factual narrative of China’s current program in expanding its sphere of influence in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Central Asian Steppes. This endeavor is through loans, infrastructure building and maritime enforcement. The policy is part of President Xi’s “Belt and Road” which is to enhance China’s posture as a great nation and also to counterbalance the role the U.S. plays in this part of the hemisphere. Well worth reading to keep up to date on the ever-dynamic geopolitical tension with China and its neighbors.

[Les · Rating 4 out of 5]

A quick read that broadly outlines the dynamic changes in China's relationships with it neighbors as its economic reach and military power have vastly increased in the past 20 years. Miller provides both journalistic vignettes from China's borderlands as well as economic and strategic analysis. The work feels at times like a series of connected essays, but the themes of rising power, distrust by neighbors, and Beijing's reliance on authoritarian rulers run throughout the book.

[Cristian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Me encantó, era justo lo que estaba buscando. No le puse 5 estrellas porque sentí que repetía mucho la misma idea, pero hay cosas que rescato: (1) la claridad para exponer el rol y estrategia de China (2) el rol con otros países como Vietnam, Hong Kong, Japón etc. (3) los ejemplos, claros y bastante interesantes.

[Pratish Halady · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent and very relevant read for anyone working in infrastructure finance in Asia. It provides some great geopolitical context to what is happening on many infrastructure projects in Asian countries and also describes well the political motivations behind creation and actions of multilateral and bilateral development banks.