Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam

Modern War Studies

by John F. Sullivan

Any serious study of the Vietnam War would be less than complete without accounting for the CIA's role in that conflict-a role that increased dramatically after the Tet offensive in 1968. We know most of the details of military engagement in Vietnam, given its greater visibility, but until recently clandestine operations have remained shrouded in secrecy.

John Sullivan was one of the CIA's top polygraph examiners during the final four years of the war in Vietnam, where he served longer and conducted more lie detector tests than any other examiner and worked with more agents than most of his colleagues. His job was to evaluate the reliability of the agency's information sources, an assignment that gave him a more intimate view of the war than was afforded most other participants. In the first book to be written by such an operative, he tells what it was like to be an agency officer working in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos during those chaotic years, putting a human face on covert operations that helps us better understand why we lost the war.

Of Spies and Lies traces Sullivan's journey from dedication to disillusionment while serving in Southeast Asia. Although many CIA personnel lived better in Vietnam and made more money than ever before, their actual working conditions hindered effective intelligence gathering. A much larger and far more distressing obstacle, however, was the agency's failure to send its "best and brightest" agents to Southeast Asia. On the contrary, as Sullivan notes, Vietnam became a kind of dumping ground for poor performers, alcoholics, refugees from bad marriages, and other "problem agents."

Through anecdotes and inside stories Sullivan provides new insights into CIA culture that debunk the "James Bond" image of clandestine operations and show how in Vietnam the seamier aspects of that culture were allowed to grow even worse. He discusses the roles of the CIA's three most significant players—Ted Shackley, General Charles Timmes, and Tom Polgar—from a more personal perspective than previously available and candidly portrays a rogues' gallery of cheats, scoundrels, and libertines, while also giving due credit to those who fought hard to maintain professional standards.

One of the most frank and intimate looks at CIA operations in Vietnam ever published, Of Spies and Lies reveals why the CIA's efforts there were such a failure and allows a more complete assessment of its poor performance in a losing cause.

Genres: Nonfiction, History

264 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 2002

About the author

Librarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.

Reviews

[Stingray · Rating 3 out of 5]

With „Of Spies and Lies – A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam“ John F. Sullivan delivers a very detailed, scathing and personal but sometimes dull account of his years of service with the CIA during the Vietnam War.
As a prologue to the actual account the author provides a short biographical introduction of himself and his years of Army service and training with the CIA to clarify his background and initial perception of the Vietnam War. He then goes on to give his very personal insight story of his service in Vietnam from April 1971 up to the very end in April 1975. This insider’s account mainly provides personal insights on the people the author worked with in Vietnam nearly all identified with pseudonyms. While he relates stories about colorful personalities presenting an important aspect of the effectiveness of the CIA in Vietnam his description of encounters, working relationships, overtime payment and working habits becomes quite dull at times.
Sullivan is a good observer and provides detailed descriptions, which are as scathing as they are realistic and thus quite authentic and truthful. Nevertheless the reader gets the impression that the author is a technical expert, performing his function dispassionately, writing reports and notices for the files, documenting his overtime and travel expenditures and not caring about the war around him too much. Readers in search of an insider’s account what the CIA did, may be disappointed, as his assessments of the overall effort are scattered in-between descriptions of persons, safe houses and journeys. Sadly the author does not go into much detail concerning his very own trade of polygraph examinations and investigations, only mentioning few anecdotes.
The author is appalled by the unprofessional way operations are run in Vietnam, as officers generally lack the cultural knowledge, language skills and foremost Asian appearance to effectively blend with the population and run agents. The significant personnel demands of the war also lead to the field service of untrained, unqualified and sometimes unreliable officers, as the CIA was unable to fill so many posts with trained personnel. In addition to this, the equally unqualified and corrupt South Vietnamese Special Police tried to extort money from the CIA with phony penetration agents, which doomed any chance of successful covert operations or penetrations of the NLF. Although the author deems the PRU and Phung Hoang programs to have been effective, they came too late to make much difference. The overall impression Sullivan conveys of the CIA is of a very mixed group of people knowing to work on a lost cause and for a leadership determined to stay positive and cover up bad reports. Although the country around them was doomed they were getting paid to be there and more or less made an effort to go with the program.
In summary Sullivan’s description provides a unique insight into the organization and personnel of the CIA during the Vietnam War but only slightly touches on the subject of operations. As with any personal account the reader need to trust the opinion of the author on persons and situations, but Sullivan’s account appears to be very truthful and authentic.

[Mark · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting subject but poorly written.