Germany and the Causes of the First World War

Legacy of the Great War

by Mark Hewitson

How can we understand what caused World War I? What role did Germany play? This book encourages us to re-think the events that led to global conflict in 1914.Historians in recent years have argued that German leaders acted defensively or pre-emptively in 1914, conscious of the Reich's deteriorating military and diplomatic position. Germany and the Causes of the First World War challenges such interpretations, placing new emphasis on the idea that the Reich Chancellor, the German Foreign Office and the Great General Staff were confident that they could win a continental war. This belief in Germany's superiority derived primarily from an assumption of French decline and Russian weakness throughout the period between the turn of the century and the eve of the First World War. Accordingly, Wilhelmine policy-makers pursued offensive policies - at the risk of war at important junctures during the 1900s and 1910s. The author analyses the stereotyping of enemy states, representations of war in peacetime, and conceptualizations of international relations. He uncovers the complex role of ruling elites, political parties, big business and the press, and contends that the decade before the First World War witnessed some critical changes in German foreign policy. By the time of the July crisis of 1914, for example, the perception of enemies had altered, with Russia - the traditional bugbear of the German centre and left - becoming the principal opponent of the Reich. Under these changed conditions, German leaders could now pursue their strategy of brinkmanship, using war as an instrument of policy, to its logical conclusion.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War I

280 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2005

Reviews

[Justin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Let's cut right down to the bone, shall we?

The governments of other states, although they did little to defuse tensions, acted in defence of allies which had been attacked. Thus, despite the Serbian government’s suspected complicity in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, few – if any – contemporaries concluded that such involvement constituted a de facto commencement of hostilities justifying Austria–Hungary’s declaration of war. Indeed, one of the main reasons for issuing an ultimatum was to give Vienna more defensible grounds for an armed intervention, once the note had been rejected by Belgrade. However, the ultimatum was so harsh, contravening accepted principles of national sovereignty, that even supporters of the German government such as Bülow and Eulenburg saw Serbia as the injured party. ‘I was for so many years ambassador in Vienna, in close contact with the statesmen there, that I can assert with confidence that in all the crown lands of Austria there is not a single statesman who could have written a note with that content, form and manner of expression’, wrote the latter in 1919. ‘[T]hey are one and all too soft – quite apart from the fact that there would have been immense difficulties in gaining the aged Emperor Franz Josef’s assent, had he not already been convinced of the necessity of war after firm agreements with Kaiser Wilhelm and the murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The note was Prussian to
the marrow.’

[Bill38silver · Rating 4 out of 5]

I admit this was a challenging read but, with persistence, proved worth the effort. Having recently read "The Lost History of 1914" by Jack Beatty, which had 6 chapters on each of the belligerents in the run up to World War 1, including Germany, this assessment by Hewitson runs counter to Beatty's line of argument that the murderous conflagration was not inevitable. Rather, that Germany had for many years pursued a key policy of 'brinkmanship' to bolster its domestic and military ambitions to be a 'world power' and France, Russia and, much less so, Britain were in a weakening position to counter progress by the German state. Result: 1914 (it could have been earlier) became the time where many influential people in positions of power were nudged and lurched into national postures and decisions which led to disaster for millions.

For me, this is was academic work to be read slowly. It is a book, drawing mostly on German sources, to be tackled by readers with some background or detailed knowledge of the events of 1900 to the outbreak of World War 1.

[Piker7977 · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hewitson creates an interesting counter to the Hamburg school of thought concerning Germany's role in causing the First World War. Brinkmanship (threat of using force) is one of the most interesting themes he brings into the fold. Germany's faith in their land army and their new navy led them to believe a continental war would end in their favor. A shallow outlook on Russia and an undermining view of France were at the base of this view. This brinkmanship is what would keep Europe in line or fold under Germany's military might.

The challenges to World War I historiography are interesting as well.