An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland

by Edward Burke

This is the first such study of Operation Banner, the British Army's campaign in Northern Ireland. Drawing upon extensive interviews with former soldiers, primary archival sources including unpublished diaries and unit log-books, this book closely examines soldiers' behaviour at the small infantry-unit level (Battalion downwards), including the leadership, cohesion and training that sustained, restrained and occasionally misdirected soldiers during the most violent period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It contends that there are aspects of wider scholarly literatures - including from sociology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology - that can throw new light on our understanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland. It also offers fresh insights and analysis of incidents involving the British Army during the early years of Operation Banner, including the 1972 'Pitchfork murders' of Michael Naan and Andrew Murray in County Fermanagh, and that of Warrenpoint hotel owner Edmund Woolsey in South Armagh.

The central argument of this book is that British Army small infantry units enjoyed considerable autonomy during the early years of Operation Banner and could behave in a vengeful, highly aggressive or benign and conciliatory way as their local commanders saw fit. The strain of civil-military relations at a senior level was replicated operationally as soldiers came to resent the limitations of waging war in the UK. The unwillingness of the Army's senior leadership to thoroughly investigate and punish serious transgressions of standard operating procedures in Northern Ireland created uncertainty among soldiers over expected behaviour and desired outcomes. Overly aggressive groups of soldiers could also be mistaken for high-functioning units - with negative consequences for the Army's overall strategy in Northern Ireland.

Genres: History, Military History, Nonfiction

374 pages, Paperback

Published February 20, 2018

Reviews

[Ian · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fascinating sociological and anthropological look at the British Army in Northern Ireland in the early years of the Troubles, when its operations there had effectively shifted from supporting the civil power to counter-insurgency. The book looks at soldiers from the Scots Guards and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, both Scottish units but ones with very different organisational cultures, with the Scots Guards having a self-image as a highly disciplined force while the Argylls had developed a sense of themselves as "players" - hard nuts who were willing to bend or break the rules to get the job done (as they saw it) and show the enemy who was boss. The Argylls sense of themselves and developed over a series of late colonial deployments (Aden & Borneo) in particular, where the unit had seen a lot of action and, in Aden in particular, acquired a reputation for a no-nonsense approach shading into brutality and grossly abusive behaviour towards the local population. In contrast the Scots Guards had seen far less active service in the years before they arrived in Northern Ireland.

Most of the book is taken up with accounts of the soldiers patrolling the urban centres of Belfast and Derry and the countryside of South Armagh. The soldiers generally chafed at the restrictions operations within the United Kingdom imposed on them, but there is a notable sense of the higher-ups being happy to cover up for soldiers who step out of line so as not to discredit the regiment or provide succour to the Republicans.

The last chapter then takes an in-depth look at the murder of two men in Fermanagh by soldiers from the Argylls. One of the victims, local farmer Michael Naan, was a prominent civil rights activist in the area; members of the Ulster Defence Regiment (essentially a pro-Britsh militia) denounced him as a leading figure in the IRA, with the Argylls uncritically accepting this claim as gospel. Naan (and Andrew Murray, a farm labourer) were murdered by an Argyll patrol when one of their comrade had gone missing and was believed to have been captured by the IRA (he had in fact just got lost and showed up safe and sound). There is a real suggestion though that Naan and Murray died not because of a sudden rage by the lower ranking soldiers but rather because more senior officers, concerned by the apparent kidnapping of the lost soldier, wanted to send a message to the IRA. While the soldiers who stabbed Naan and Murray to death received life sentences, their immediate commander received a far more lenient and non-custodial sentence. And despite anomalies in their accounts of the incident, more senior officers were not seriously investigated (and in one case went on to have an illustrious military career).

Overall the book is a fascinating account of the soldiers' actions and experiences in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. And there are some fascinating titbits that I would like to learn more about - one thing mentioned is that there were some regiments that it was decided not to deploy to Northern Ireland. Irish regiments in particular were never sent there, for fear of divided loyalties, but it was also decided to keep the Gurkhas away from Northern Ireland. That in particular I found fascinating and I would love to know what the reasoning for this was, though I suspect racism of some sort played a big part.

Recommended to anyone interested in the sociology of army units in general or the British Army in the early years of the Troubles in particular.

[Phil · Rating 3 out of 5]

A blend of history and ethnography exposes the use of the military as a police force in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and the consequences of that decision.