In the introduction, Gareth Stedman Jones recounts his intellectual development and explains how and why he has come to see the limits of social explanation, particularly as applied to politics. Based primarily on his work on Chartism, the author believes that politics produce consciousness, not vice versa. Specifically, Stedman Jones argues that Chartism — the movement in support of the People’s Charter of 1838, which advocated manhood suffrage (among other things) — is best understood as a result of politics, not economics or social theory.
Focusing on the language used by the Chartists (104), Stedman Jones shows continuity with earlier Radicalism and explains how the movement emerged in response to perceived political abuses, notably the Whig measures of the 1830s (175). Chartism failed, according to the author, for several reasons. First, it was never able to secure the middle class support it needed to become a broader movement; in that, the granting of suffrage to the middle class in the Reform Act of 1832 short-circuited the Chartist push. A secondary reason for Chartism’s failure was that it was a multi-issue platform and was not nimble enough to respond to single-issue initiatives. This point, coupled with the fact that the state itself — the manifestation of the political entity that the Chartists were fighting against — changed tack and adopted less objectionable policies in the 1840s and 1850s, sealed Chartism’s decline. (177-178) Chartism remained believable only as long as economic problems could be “convincingly assigned political causes.” (106)
The author goes to great lengths to rescue the history of Chartism from the clutches of social theorists. He does this primarily by focusing on the language used by the Chartists themselves, showing that it was not something fundamentally new as the Engles/Marx crowd asserted, but instead a continuation of the Radicalism, slightly adapted, of Tom Paine. (171) Chartism, according to Stedman Jones, became a movement of workers because, after 1832, the workers were the ones still disenfranchised: “In radical discourse, the dividing line between classes was not that between employer and employed, but that between the represented and the unrepresented.” (106)