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Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War
A major omission of almost all military histories of the Second World War has been the failure to emphasize the economic dimension of the conflict, and to establish beyond question the importance of the Allies’ superior industrial capacity and reserves of raw material to the outcome of the war.
In this provocative and ground-breaking study, John Ellis finally sets the record straight. Skillfully analyzing a mass of previously inaccessible and often quite astonishing data, he demonstrates conclusively that Allied victory—against both the Axis and Japan—finally owed for more to the endless stream of tanks, artillery and military aircraft rolling off Allied production lines than it did to the ability of their commanders.
Drawing from his masterly analysis of production statistics, Ellis reviews the entire course of the war and demonstrates how American, British and Russian commanders continually mismanaged the resources at their deposal and how serious mistakes were made in almost every theater of war—land, sea and air. Time and again, Allied generals proved incapable of deploying their numerical advantage in the most effective way, instead falling back on crude, attritional tactics that prolonged the war unnecessarily: appalling armored tactics in Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe; Bomber Command’s wrongheaded targeting policies; Russian acceptance of enormous casualty bills; the American navy’s failure to recognize that Japan’s economy and lines of imperial communication should have been the prime target—all of these issues and many more are thoroughly aired in this authoritative and stimulating work.
In this provocative and ground-breaking study, John Ellis finally sets the record straight. Skillfully analyzing a mass of previously inaccessible and often quite astonishing data, he demonstrates conclusively that Allied victory—against both the Axis and Japan—finally owed for more to the endless stream of tanks, artillery and military aircraft rolling off Allied production lines than it did to the ability of their commanders.
Drawing from his masterly analysis of production statistics, Ellis reviews the entire course of the war and demonstrates how American, British and Russian commanders continually mismanaged the resources at their deposal and how serious mistakes were made in almost every theater of war—land, sea and air. Time and again, Allied generals proved incapable of deploying their numerical advantage in the most effective way, instead falling back on crude, attritional tactics that prolonged the war unnecessarily: appalling armored tactics in Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe; Bomber Command’s wrongheaded targeting policies; Russian acceptance of enormous casualty bills; the American navy’s failure to recognize that Japan’s economy and lines of imperial communication should have been the prime target—all of these issues and many more are thoroughly aired in this authoritative and stimulating work.
544 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1990
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About the author
John Ellis
129 books21 followersJohn Ellis was born in Bradford and educated at the Universities of Sussex and Manchester. He was a lecturer in the latter's department of Military Studies. His books include The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II; The Social History of the Machine Gun, Eye-Deep in Hell, an account of trench life in the Great War; Cassino: The Hollow Victory; and Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
July 1, 2009
This book demonstrates two under-examined sides of World War 2. It demonstrates how the Axis powers went to war woefully unprepared for an extended conflict. More importantly it highlights how they completely under-estimated the economic might of the United States and to a less degree the Soviet Union. The book shows how the initial spectacular early victories of the Axis powers could never hope last and the facilicy of defending against the growing material strength of the Allied powers.
For the Allies the book graphically shows how the dominant tactic was simply over whelming force. In many cases, a huge advantage in material assests overcame any need for focused tactics or exploitation of enemy weakness. Many commanders (and Montgomery is singled out for special attention) simply reverted to the tactics of the previous war utilizing massed artillery and frontal 'grinding' attacks against a far weaker force. In the end these tactics prevailed, moreover by sheer weight of numbers than an tactical insight.
The book is very detailed and is backed up by extensive facts and figures. It covers both theatres of the way (Europe and the Pacific) and potentially exposes the myth in the belief of superior machinery, tactics and will of the Allies. It gives the reader the sobering realization that many situations were victories at the unnecessary cost of many lives, including civilians. It bring into question many of these 'budgeoning' tactics and provides alternatives that may have significantly shorten the war and saved many lives.
If you want to examine the real failure of the Axis and what factors truely won the Second World then this book is a must read.
For the Allies the book graphically shows how the dominant tactic was simply over whelming force. In many cases, a huge advantage in material assests overcame any need for focused tactics or exploitation of enemy weakness. Many commanders (and Montgomery is singled out for special attention) simply reverted to the tactics of the previous war utilizing massed artillery and frontal 'grinding' attacks against a far weaker force. In the end these tactics prevailed, moreover by sheer weight of numbers than an tactical insight.
The book is very detailed and is backed up by extensive facts and figures. It covers both theatres of the way (Europe and the Pacific) and potentially exposes the myth in the belief of superior machinery, tactics and will of the Allies. It gives the reader the sobering realization that many situations were victories at the unnecessary cost of many lives, including civilians. It bring into question many of these 'budgeoning' tactics and provides alternatives that may have significantly shorten the war and saved many lives.
If you want to examine the real failure of the Axis and what factors truely won the Second World then this book is a must read.
December 18, 2008
World War II is a difficult and complex conflict to explain. Each nation had its reason for fighting. Each theater of war demanded troops and resources that could not be used elsewhere. Every decision made by leaders impacted the war in unexpected ways. John Ellis is not bothered by all this complexity. "Brute Force" is a simple book, listing tons of data in acres of charts to show how the Allies out-produced the Axis, made many strategic and tactical mistakes, but still won the war.
If only real history could be that simple!
Actually, "Brute Force" would make a decent narrative companion with Ellis master work, "World War II--A Statistical Survey." The latter book provides all the charts, but spares the reader Ellis' repetition of past work done by others. "Brute Force" relies on many of the same WWII anecdotes, some apocryphal, to fill paragraphs. At times the book reads like a cut-and-paste job. Oh tell me something new for a change!
Were it not for the massive chart work in the book's appendices, the reader would lose nothing giving this book a pass.
If only real history could be that simple!
Actually, "Brute Force" would make a decent narrative companion with Ellis master work, "World War II--A Statistical Survey." The latter book provides all the charts, but spares the reader Ellis' repetition of past work done by others. "Brute Force" relies on many of the same WWII anecdotes, some apocryphal, to fill paragraphs. At times the book reads like a cut-and-paste job. Oh tell me something new for a change!
Were it not for the massive chart work in the book's appendices, the reader would lose nothing giving this book a pass.
May 18, 2012
One of the best books about world war two for the simple reason that the author utilizes an excellent use of statistical data as well as excellent operational histories and tactical histories of the armies in world war two. Ellis drives home the inferiority, in terms of skill of, of the allied armies opposing the axis. This one of the best books to read about the second world war. I would add "A world at Arms," "The Wages of Destruction." something by robert citino and perhaps "Why the Allies Won" to round out ones knowledge. Although this book is a joy to the expert as well. Wildly recommended.
December 15, 2019
The praise this book gets is really based on the author's somewhat unique-for-its-time premise here - that is, that the allied war effort squandered resources and won merely through bashing the enemy repeatedly with a far bigger stick, rather than through intelligent, well planned operations.
This premise may have been unique and controversial when this book was written (1990), but since the end of the cold war the allied war effort has surely experienced greater scrutiny. In fact, the revised figures many scholars have produced suggest that even Ellis is quite generous to the allied war effort. That said, the premise may still be of interest to American and British readers who are often miseducated on the realities of the war in secondary and post-secondary level history classes.
There are certain other issues I have with the book. Most importantly-the lack of focus. Ellis spends the first fifth of the book discussing the German military successes of 1939-1941. This section apparently was to serve as a favorable juxtaposition of German military strategies vs the Allies, but Ellis spends half of this section criticizing German military strategies, and seems to suggest that German victories were based on luck and.. well, its unclear. Since he spends the rest of the book criticizing Allied strategies, the reader is left with the impression that the entire war was commanded by a group of fools. But other than failing to drive home his point, the lack of focus also make the book a slog to get through. Ellis often repeats himself, and meanders on tangents.
My final criticism of this book might seem quite harsh, but it must be said. The figures Ellis uses to analyze the war and produce his conclusions have come under significant scrutiny since then, and some figures have been dismissed entirely. These figures paint the German army as a titan, the Western Allies as well equipped, well directed troops ready to take the titan on, and the Red Army as a horde of untrained soldiers thrown into battle without thought. Ellis does dispute the former two myths, and admittedly does recognize the Red Army's fundamental role in defeating the Germans (rare for the time this was written.) However, Ellis still relies on German army figures for losses during the war, which have since been shown to be a vast underestimate. One can hardly fault Ellis for asserting the massive inferiority of the Red Army when the figures show 2.3 million German deaths compared to 13.5 million Red Army deaths. But the revised figures of 4.5 million Axis deaths on the Eastern front against 9 million Soviet KIA paint a somewhat different story. Indeed, more praise should certainly be given to the Red Army's ability to conduct operations on a wide front such as in Operation Uranus or Bagration.
Finally, the Pacific war effort of the United States is not granted nearly the amount of attention that the front deserves. Both the successes and the mistakes of the United States on this front deserved to be thoroughly incorporated in his thesis, but here they merely served as a perfunctory tailpiece.
This premise may have been unique and controversial when this book was written (1990), but since the end of the cold war the allied war effort has surely experienced greater scrutiny. In fact, the revised figures many scholars have produced suggest that even Ellis is quite generous to the allied war effort. That said, the premise may still be of interest to American and British readers who are often miseducated on the realities of the war in secondary and post-secondary level history classes.
There are certain other issues I have with the book. Most importantly-the lack of focus. Ellis spends the first fifth of the book discussing the German military successes of 1939-1941. This section apparently was to serve as a favorable juxtaposition of German military strategies vs the Allies, but Ellis spends half of this section criticizing German military strategies, and seems to suggest that German victories were based on luck and.. well, its unclear. Since he spends the rest of the book criticizing Allied strategies, the reader is left with the impression that the entire war was commanded by a group of fools. But other than failing to drive home his point, the lack of focus also make the book a slog to get through. Ellis often repeats himself, and meanders on tangents.
My final criticism of this book might seem quite harsh, but it must be said. The figures Ellis uses to analyze the war and produce his conclusions have come under significant scrutiny since then, and some figures have been dismissed entirely. These figures paint the German army as a titan, the Western Allies as well equipped, well directed troops ready to take the titan on, and the Red Army as a horde of untrained soldiers thrown into battle without thought. Ellis does dispute the former two myths, and admittedly does recognize the Red Army's fundamental role in defeating the Germans (rare for the time this was written.) However, Ellis still relies on German army figures for losses during the war, which have since been shown to be a vast underestimate. One can hardly fault Ellis for asserting the massive inferiority of the Red Army when the figures show 2.3 million German deaths compared to 13.5 million Red Army deaths. But the revised figures of 4.5 million Axis deaths on the Eastern front against 9 million Soviet KIA paint a somewhat different story. Indeed, more praise should certainly be given to the Red Army's ability to conduct operations on a wide front such as in Operation Uranus or Bagration.
Finally, the Pacific war effort of the United States is not granted nearly the amount of attention that the front deserves. Both the successes and the mistakes of the United States on this front deserved to be thoroughly incorporated in his thesis, but here they merely served as a perfunctory tailpiece.
February 7, 2024
This book has largely been ignored or dismissed for 20 years. Everyone now loves Overy's contention that the Axis were idiots, and the Allies better at absolutely everything. The new conventional wisdom (save perhaps Citino) is that the Germans weren't even tactically adept, just fanatical fighters all-in on Nazism and Hitler. However, I still think, as an historian of the period, that Ellis is largely correct. They had a bludgeon, and they used it. This doesn't make the Allies stupid, but it does belie the notion that they were very clever and the Germans and Japanese inept. The Germans and the Japanese (and the French and British) were stuck fighting a war to preserve or enhance their Great Power status in a world moving inexorably in the direction of two superpowers and no one else counting for much on the global chessboard. The British elite understood this, and that a world war would only usher in their own irrelevance. That's why they adopted Appeasement and fought tooth and nail to avoid a second world war. The Germans and the Japanese knew they were running out of time, and needed to grab the resources necessary to play in the new system. They flopped, because it was already too late. This book points out just how late it had become.
March 7, 2019
My only complaint is that the author overuses the word "wilst."
Other than that, he makes a good case for the Allies winning World War II mostly because they developed overwhelming superiority in numbers and equipment over the Germans and Japanese, making up for bad tactics.
Other than that, he makes a good case for the Allies winning World War II mostly because they developed overwhelming superiority in numbers and equipment over the Germans and Japanese, making up for bad tactics.
July 11, 2017
Highly readable, reasoned and should be understood that this sets the maximum possible dimension to WWII conflict when the war was really settled by the finesse in the Allied use of Ultra.
April 17, 2024
Sharp study of allies’ reliance on material advantages in WWII and the cost of neglecting better strategies and tactics. Not a fan of Montgomery, MacArthur or even Patton.
February 25, 2009
Premise that overwhelming material force by the United States was the primary reason that the Allies won WWII. A bit too much focus on material, while having a tendency to downplay any acomplishments of American Generals, Patton in particular. Good for graphs on material production.
July 19, 2008
Industrial Production made up for any number of general incompentance.
January 26, 2014
Excellent and the truth as far as I'm concerned.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews