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Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises
Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free.This is an OCR edition with typos.Excerpt fromSeet. 2. SECT. II. Of Original or Abfolute Beauty. of I. Q INGE it is certain that we have Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what Quality in Objects excites thefe Ideas, or is the occafion of them. And let it be here obferv'd, that our Inquiry is only about the 6)ualitys which are beautiful to Men ; or about the Foundation of their Senfe of Beauty : for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the Senfe of fbmeMind; and when we afterwards fhew how generally the Objects which occur to us, are beautiful, we mean that fuch Objects are agreeable to the Senfe of Men : for as there are not a few Objects, which feem no way beautiful to Men, fb we fee a variety of other Animals who feem delighted with them ; they may have Senfes other- wife conftituted than thofe of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objedts of a quite different Form. We fee Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and ihapelefs, or loath- fom, may be to them a Taradife. k If. That we may more diftindtly difco- ver the general Foundation or Occafion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be Sect. 2- neceflary to confider it firft in its Jimpler vv-' Kinds, iiich as occurs to us in regular Figures ; and we may perhaps find that the lame Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it. III. The Figures which excite in Us the uniformly Ideas of Beauty, feem to be thofe in which Wlth v there is 'Uniformity amidjl Variety. There "'y' are many Conceptions of Objectswhich are agreeable upon other accounts, fuch as Gran- dew, Novelty', Santtity, and fome others, v which ihall be mention'd hereafter . But f what we cah1 Beautiful in Objedts, to fpeak l- in the Mathematical Style, feems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Va riety : ...
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First published January 1, 1725
About the author
Francis Hutcheson
133 books21 followersFrancis Hutcheson was an Irish philosopher born in Ulster to a family of Scottish Presbyterians who became known as one of the founding fathers of the Scottish Enlightenment. He is remembered for his book A System of Moral Philosophy.
Hutcheson took ideas from John Locke, and he was an important influence on the works of several significant Enlightenment thinkers, including David Hume and Adam Smith.
Hutcheson took ideas from John Locke, and he was an important influence on the works of several significant Enlightenment thinkers, including David Hume and Adam Smith.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
January 16, 2024
Hutcheson occupies an important but misunderstood place in the Scottish "moral sense" school. What everybody knows is that he defended the sentimentalist ideas of Shaftesbury against Mandeville and Hobbes and anticipated the works of Hume and Smith. In the process of doing so, he even accidentally half-invented utilitarianism - a century before Bentham! Beyond all that, however, his works are treasure troves of insights, thought experiments, tangents, and objections. Unfortunately, he is not frequently read today, although he should be. I believe that his works on ethics and aesthetics are among the greatest works in modern philosophy. Indeed, one is at a loss to find many contemporary authors who write (and think) with such grace and intuition.
Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson believes that human beings have certain in-built capacities or faculties with which to sense a) aesthetic harmony and beauty in nature and art, and b) moral goodness and virtue in human characters and actions. I will focus on his moral philosophy, but the first half of the book deals with (and starts with) aesthetics, and this is no accident. The faculties of moral perception and aesthetic perception operate on similar logic. When human beings come into contact with the harmonious, the beautiful, the orderly, the beneficent, or the virtuous (or their opposites!), they are naturally wired to feel and judge them on an emotional, intuitive level. Like Shaftesbury, although to a less extent, Hutcheson also believes that there is an intrinsic theological connection between the realms of natural, aesthetic, and moral harmony or goodness. (This theological dimension, however, stays in the background.)
Curiously, although I find Shaftesbury almost unreadable (because he is so maudlin and conceptually wishy-washy), Hutcheson seems to import only the good bits of Shaftesbury. Indeed, Hutcheson refines the moral sense doctrine into an unassailable bastion of philosophical argumentation. No wonder that Hume and Smith were so inspired by him. After Hutcheson, it is almost impossible to believe that human beings do not have a powerful natural tendency to value perceived moral qualities in others and their actions. And although I believe that Shaftesbury misses some of the key insights of Mandeville and Hobbes, he forces them into a conceptual retreat from the over-strong position that all of human morality is founded on self-love. This challenge has been very healthy for the refinement of modern moral philosophy. Cynicism needs to be moderated by a good understanding of our evolved moral psychology. Although I am generally very sympathetic to the Mandevillean and Hobbesian position, I feel that Hutcheson's arguments are extremely well-rounded, nuanced, and perceptive. So, even though Hutcheson (in my opinion) fails to shoot down the central insight of the self-love school, i.e., that much of society (including its laws and moral norms), are constructed on self-interest (or have evolved to serve it), he utterly destroys the incautious argument that ALL of human society is founded on it. He thus encourages us to accept a more nuanced position: that human psychology is a complex mixture of simple self-interest (hedonism), extended self-interest (instrumental concern for others), and genuine concern for others (which stems from our benevolent instincts and moral judgments). This complex position, not coincidentally, is also the position of Hume and Smith. The latter two further extended our understanding of human moral psychology through their studies of sympathy, which yielded a better understanding of the dynamics of social interaction, moral imitation, cultural learning, and social evolution. But Hutcheson was required to make it all work.
Hutcheson's genius was manifold: He perfected the foundations of the moral sense school. He stripped Shaftesbury's doctrine down to his bare essentials, developed it further, and thus made Hume and Smith possible. He rejected both simple altruism and simple egoism and made both into constituent parts of a complex human motivational structure. He wrote about human conduct and motivation with incredible perceptiveness. He invented (as far as I know) the idea of the philosophical moral calculus based on formal expressions and mathematical formulae. He also invented the crystalline concept of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" - NOT as a normative principle to ground maximizing utilitarianism (although he sometimes comes close to being a forerunner of Benthamism!), but more as as a descriptive principle of how reason can (and does) serve our passions by subjecting moral dilemmas to a kind of rational "balancing" test. Finally, he expressed his groundbreaking substantive arguments in beautiful prose. His philosophical penmanship is elegant, witty, smooth, analytical, perceptive, and to-the-point. It is to our own detriment that his books are unappreciated and mostly unassigned to students. Perhaps this is almost unavoidable for someone who is seen as a precursor to Hume and Smith. But he was far from than a good conduit from traditional virtue ethics (exemplified by Shaftesbury) to modern moral philosophy (exemplified by Hume); he was one of the best thinkers of the era.
Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson believes that human beings have certain in-built capacities or faculties with which to sense a) aesthetic harmony and beauty in nature and art, and b) moral goodness and virtue in human characters and actions. I will focus on his moral philosophy, but the first half of the book deals with (and starts with) aesthetics, and this is no accident. The faculties of moral perception and aesthetic perception operate on similar logic. When human beings come into contact with the harmonious, the beautiful, the orderly, the beneficent, or the virtuous (or their opposites!), they are naturally wired to feel and judge them on an emotional, intuitive level. Like Shaftesbury, although to a less extent, Hutcheson also believes that there is an intrinsic theological connection between the realms of natural, aesthetic, and moral harmony or goodness. (This theological dimension, however, stays in the background.)
Curiously, although I find Shaftesbury almost unreadable (because he is so maudlin and conceptually wishy-washy), Hutcheson seems to import only the good bits of Shaftesbury. Indeed, Hutcheson refines the moral sense doctrine into an unassailable bastion of philosophical argumentation. No wonder that Hume and Smith were so inspired by him. After Hutcheson, it is almost impossible to believe that human beings do not have a powerful natural tendency to value perceived moral qualities in others and their actions. And although I believe that Shaftesbury misses some of the key insights of Mandeville and Hobbes, he forces them into a conceptual retreat from the over-strong position that all of human morality is founded on self-love. This challenge has been very healthy for the refinement of modern moral philosophy. Cynicism needs to be moderated by a good understanding of our evolved moral psychology. Although I am generally very sympathetic to the Mandevillean and Hobbesian position, I feel that Hutcheson's arguments are extremely well-rounded, nuanced, and perceptive. So, even though Hutcheson (in my opinion) fails to shoot down the central insight of the self-love school, i.e., that much of society (including its laws and moral norms), are constructed on self-interest (or have evolved to serve it), he utterly destroys the incautious argument that ALL of human society is founded on it. He thus encourages us to accept a more nuanced position: that human psychology is a complex mixture of simple self-interest (hedonism), extended self-interest (instrumental concern for others), and genuine concern for others (which stems from our benevolent instincts and moral judgments). This complex position, not coincidentally, is also the position of Hume and Smith. The latter two further extended our understanding of human moral psychology through their studies of sympathy, which yielded a better understanding of the dynamics of social interaction, moral imitation, cultural learning, and social evolution. But Hutcheson was required to make it all work.
Hutcheson's genius was manifold: He perfected the foundations of the moral sense school. He stripped Shaftesbury's doctrine down to his bare essentials, developed it further, and thus made Hume and Smith possible. He rejected both simple altruism and simple egoism and made both into constituent parts of a complex human motivational structure. He wrote about human conduct and motivation with incredible perceptiveness. He invented (as far as I know) the idea of the philosophical moral calculus based on formal expressions and mathematical formulae. He also invented the crystalline concept of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" - NOT as a normative principle to ground maximizing utilitarianism (although he sometimes comes close to being a forerunner of Benthamism!), but more as as a descriptive principle of how reason can (and does) serve our passions by subjecting moral dilemmas to a kind of rational "balancing" test. Finally, he expressed his groundbreaking substantive arguments in beautiful prose. His philosophical penmanship is elegant, witty, smooth, analytical, perceptive, and to-the-point. It is to our own detriment that his books are unappreciated and mostly unassigned to students. Perhaps this is almost unavoidable for someone who is seen as a precursor to Hume and Smith. But he was far from than a good conduit from traditional virtue ethics (exemplified by Shaftesbury) to modern moral philosophy (exemplified by Hume); he was one of the best thinkers of the era.
January 18, 2022
Read for my university course. Fascinating tracts in dialogue with the works of Burke, Godwin, and other philosophical and political writers of this turbulent era.
June 4, 2024
A KEY FIGURE OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT LOOKS AT MANY TOPICS
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was an Ulster Scottish philosopher who was one of the founders of the Scottish Enlightenment. This book was published in 1728. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 258-page edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to this 1726 book, “the importance of any Truth is nothing else than its … Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance … to have distinct Conceptions of this End itself, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our reason… in trifling Pursuits… This Consideration [put] the Author… inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human nature is capable of receiving…
“In reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should… nor can we by our Will… procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain… By the very frame of our Nature the one is made the occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction… the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas of Color, or Sound, or mode of Extension separately considered. These Determinations to be pleased with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the Author chooses to call Senses… by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an Internal Sense, and that Determination to be pleased with the Contemplation of those Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a Moral Sense… The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous Conduct, than our Moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the preservation of our bodies.” (Pg. 7-9)
He observes, “the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony… are necessarily pleasant to us… so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deformed Object, or disapprove a beautiful one… our Perceptions would continue invariably the same. Hence if plainly appear, ‘that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it.” (Pg. 25)
He notes, “There is another Beauty in Propositions, which cannot be omitted, which is, When one Theorem contains a vast Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it… In the search of Nature there is the like Beauty in the Knowledge of some great Principles, or universal forces, from which innumerable Effects to flow.” (Pg. 38)
He summarizes, “All Beauty is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call relative is that which is apprehended in any Object, commonly considered as an Imitation of some Original; and this Beauty is founded on a Conformity, or a kind of Unity between the Original and the Copy… to obtain comparative Beauty alone, it is not necessary that there be any Beauty in the Original…” (Pg. 42)
He argues, “The Combinations of regular Forms… require such vast Powers of Infinite to effect them, and the Hazards of the contrary Forms are s infinitely numerous, that all Probability or Possibility of their being accomplished by Chance seems quite to vanish… What shall we say then of a Plant, a Tree, an Animal, a Man, with such multitudes of adapted Vessels, such Articulations, Insertions of Muscles, Diffusion of Veins, Arteries, Nerves? The Improbability that such machines should be the effect of Chance, must be near the infinitesimal Power of Infinite to Unity.” (Pg. 52-53) Later, he adds, “An intelligent Cause is surely at least as probable a notion as Chance, general Force… to account for any Effect whatsoever. And then all the Regularity, Combinations, Similarity of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was Design and Intelligence in the Cause of the Universe.” (Pg. 56)
He asserts, “That … Miracles may prove the Super-intendency of a voluntary Agent, and that the Universe is not guided by Necessity or Fate… that Mind must be weak and inadvertent, which needs them to confirm the Belief of a Wise and Good Deity; since the deviation from general Laws, unless upon very extraordinary Occasions, must be a presumption of Inconstancy and Weakness, rather than of steady Wisdom and Power.” (Pg. 60) Later, he concludes, “though the general Laws did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopped their Effects whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually, and justly superseded all human Providence and Care about Actions; since a superior Mind did thus relieve Men from their Charge.” (Pg. 81-82)
He states, “None of these Affections which we call virtuous, spring from Self-love, or Desire or private Interest; since all Virtue is either some such Affections, or Actions consequent upon them, it must necessarily follow, that Virtue is not pursued from the Interest of Self-love of the Pursuer, or any Motives of his own Advantage.” (Pg. 102) Later, he adds, “The Actions which flow slowly from Self-Love, and yet evidence Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral Sense, and neither raise the Love or Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which… every Mortal’s acting thus within these Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of the Whole.” (Pg. 122)
He comments, “we may see the reason, why we are not ashamed of any of the Methods of Grandeur, or high-Living. There is such a mixture of moral Ideas, of Benevolence, of Abilities kindly employed… that we are never ashamed, but rather boast of such things. We… desire that our State and Magnificence should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of moral Ideas, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of State, or abstain from laughing at those who did.” (Pg. 157)
He says, “There is another important Difference of Rights, according as they are Alienable, or Unalienable. To determine what Rights are alienable, and what not, we must take these two marks: 1st: If the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our Right; and if it be so, then, 2nd: It must appear, that to transfer such Rights may serve some valuable Purpose.” (Pg. 185) [Yes, Thomas Jefferson WAS influenced by Hutcheson in his writing of the Declaration of Independence.]
This book will be of great interest to those studying the history of philosophy.
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was an Ulster Scottish philosopher who was one of the founders of the Scottish Enlightenment. This book was published in 1728. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 258-page edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to this 1726 book, “the importance of any Truth is nothing else than its … Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance … to have distinct Conceptions of this End itself, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our reason… in trifling Pursuits… This Consideration [put] the Author… inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human nature is capable of receiving…
“In reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should… nor can we by our Will… procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain… By the very frame of our Nature the one is made the occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction… the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas of Color, or Sound, or mode of Extension separately considered. These Determinations to be pleased with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the Author chooses to call Senses… by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an Internal Sense, and that Determination to be pleased with the Contemplation of those Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a Moral Sense… The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous Conduct, than our Moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the preservation of our bodies.” (Pg. 7-9)
He observes, “the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony… are necessarily pleasant to us… so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deformed Object, or disapprove a beautiful one… our Perceptions would continue invariably the same. Hence if plainly appear, ‘that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it.” (Pg. 25)
He notes, “There is another Beauty in Propositions, which cannot be omitted, which is, When one Theorem contains a vast Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it… In the search of Nature there is the like Beauty in the Knowledge of some great Principles, or universal forces, from which innumerable Effects to flow.” (Pg. 38)
He summarizes, “All Beauty is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call relative is that which is apprehended in any Object, commonly considered as an Imitation of some Original; and this Beauty is founded on a Conformity, or a kind of Unity between the Original and the Copy… to obtain comparative Beauty alone, it is not necessary that there be any Beauty in the Original…” (Pg. 42)
He argues, “The Combinations of regular Forms… require such vast Powers of Infinite to effect them, and the Hazards of the contrary Forms are s infinitely numerous, that all Probability or Possibility of their being accomplished by Chance seems quite to vanish… What shall we say then of a Plant, a Tree, an Animal, a Man, with such multitudes of adapted Vessels, such Articulations, Insertions of Muscles, Diffusion of Veins, Arteries, Nerves? The Improbability that such machines should be the effect of Chance, must be near the infinitesimal Power of Infinite to Unity.” (Pg. 52-53) Later, he adds, “An intelligent Cause is surely at least as probable a notion as Chance, general Force… to account for any Effect whatsoever. And then all the Regularity, Combinations, Similarity of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was Design and Intelligence in the Cause of the Universe.” (Pg. 56)
He asserts, “That … Miracles may prove the Super-intendency of a voluntary Agent, and that the Universe is not guided by Necessity or Fate… that Mind must be weak and inadvertent, which needs them to confirm the Belief of a Wise and Good Deity; since the deviation from general Laws, unless upon very extraordinary Occasions, must be a presumption of Inconstancy and Weakness, rather than of steady Wisdom and Power.” (Pg. 60) Later, he concludes, “though the general Laws did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopped their Effects whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually, and justly superseded all human Providence and Care about Actions; since a superior Mind did thus relieve Men from their Charge.” (Pg. 81-82)
He states, “None of these Affections which we call virtuous, spring from Self-love, or Desire or private Interest; since all Virtue is either some such Affections, or Actions consequent upon them, it must necessarily follow, that Virtue is not pursued from the Interest of Self-love of the Pursuer, or any Motives of his own Advantage.” (Pg. 102) Later, he adds, “The Actions which flow slowly from Self-Love, and yet evidence Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral Sense, and neither raise the Love or Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which… every Mortal’s acting thus within these Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of the Whole.” (Pg. 122)
He comments, “we may see the reason, why we are not ashamed of any of the Methods of Grandeur, or high-Living. There is such a mixture of moral Ideas, of Benevolence, of Abilities kindly employed… that we are never ashamed, but rather boast of such things. We… desire that our State and Magnificence should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of moral Ideas, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of State, or abstain from laughing at those who did.” (Pg. 157)
He says, “There is another important Difference of Rights, according as they are Alienable, or Unalienable. To determine what Rights are alienable, and what not, we must take these two marks: 1st: If the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our Right; and if it be so, then, 2nd: It must appear, that to transfer such Rights may serve some valuable Purpose.” (Pg. 185) [Yes, Thomas Jefferson WAS influenced by Hutcheson in his writing of the Declaration of Independence.]
This book will be of great interest to those studying the history of philosophy.
March 21, 2023
Hutcheson gets credit for coining moral sense, the greatest good for the greatest number, and inalienable or here “unalienable” rights which can be found earlier in Spinoza’s Tractatatus. I wouldn’t say the book is that fun to read or that original but puts contemporary ideas together in a way that was very influential on the Scottish enlightenment and American founding but reads like a textbook. Hutcheson and others like Cumberland and Pufendorf critiqued Hobbes and Mandeville’s egoistic theory of human nature but couldn’t go back to scholasticism and so developed moral sense and utilitarian philosophy from essentially hedonistic psychology but one more in line with common morality, derived from human sociability found in the passions and the universal benevolence of god as opposed to divine commands or natural hierarchy. Hutcheson’s conception of natural rights is in accordance with the public good in terms of a duty to respect others’ inalienable rights or to alienate certain rights for public purposes.
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November 21, 2009None
read-partially
September 15, 2010Treatise I: An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design
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