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A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science
If we are to solve the central problems in the philosophy of science, Paul Churchland argues, we must draw heavily on the resources of the emerging sciences of the mind-brain. A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the brain. These concepts bring unexpected coherence to scattered issues in the philosophy of science, new solutions to old philosophical problems, and new possibilities for the enterprise of science itself. Paul M. Churchland is Professor of Philosophy and a member of the Cognitive Science Faculty at the University of California at San Diego.
341 pages, Paperback
First published April 22, 1992
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About the author
Paul M. Churchland
17 books65 followersPaul Churchland is a philosopher noted for his studies in neurophilosophy and the philosophy of mind. He is currently a Professor at the University of California, San Diego, where he holds the Valtz Chair of Philosophy. Churchland holds a joint appointment with the Cognitive Science Faculty and the Institute for Neural Computation. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh in 1969 under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. Churchland is the husband of philosopher Patricia Churchland, and the father of two children.
Churchland began his professional career as an instructor at the University of Pittsburgh in 1969; he also lectured at the University of Toronto from 1967-69. In 1969, Churchland took a position at the University of Manitoba, where he would teach for fifteen years: as an assistant professor (69 - 74) and associate professor (74 - 79), and then as a full professor from 1979 - 1984. Professor Churchland joined the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University in 1982, staying as a member until 1983. He joined the faculty at the University of California, San Diego in 1983, serving as Department Chair from 1986 - 1990.
Churchland has supervised a number of PhD students, including P.D. Magnus (now at the University at Albany) and Philip Brey (now at the University of Twente).
Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, which claims that everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings and desires are theoretical constructs without coherent definition; hence we should not expect such concepts to be a necessary part of a scientific understanding of the brain. Just as a modern understanding of science has no need for concepts such as luck or witchcraft to explain the world, Churchland argues that a future neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" or "feelings" to explain the mind. Instead, the use of objective phenomena such as neurons and their interaction should suffice. He points out that the history of science has seen many previous concepts discarded, such as phlogiston, caloric, the luminiferous ether, and vital forces.
Churchland began his professional career as an instructor at the University of Pittsburgh in 1969; he also lectured at the University of Toronto from 1967-69. In 1969, Churchland took a position at the University of Manitoba, where he would teach for fifteen years: as an assistant professor (69 - 74) and associate professor (74 - 79), and then as a full professor from 1979 - 1984. Professor Churchland joined the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University in 1982, staying as a member until 1983. He joined the faculty at the University of California, San Diego in 1983, serving as Department Chair from 1986 - 1990.
Churchland has supervised a number of PhD students, including P.D. Magnus (now at the University at Albany) and Philip Brey (now at the University of Twente).
Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, which claims that everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings and desires are theoretical constructs without coherent definition; hence we should not expect such concepts to be a necessary part of a scientific understanding of the brain. Just as a modern understanding of science has no need for concepts such as luck or witchcraft to explain the world, Churchland argues that a future neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" or "feelings" to explain the mind. Instead, the use of objective phenomena such as neurons and their interaction should suffice. He points out that the history of science has seen many previous concepts discarded, such as phlogiston, caloric, the luminiferous ether, and vital forces.
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June 4, 2013
I'm a big fan of collections of essays, especially among professional philosophers where there are often a lot of views that hang together in interesting ways. These sorts of collections allow us to get a look from a few different angles at a variety of useful topics, instead of trying to be a unified account, which is often difficult and tedious.
Churchland covers a lot of ground in this book, and doesn't pull it off quite as elegantly as some of his other books, which I'm rather fond of, but he does give a number of difficult topics a good swing. The book primarily ties together Churchland's view of science [his scientific realism] with epistemology and philosophy of mind. The book follows a general psychology first model of epistemology, where the structure of mind is the primary force in informing a theory of justification. This makes for a pretty interesting read, and there are very few philosophers competent in the neurology and psychology to take this sort of approach; it does wind us up with a number of fairly radically different conclusions than other mainstream philosophers, and that should lead to some concern and some sense of a need for thorough analysis.
The book responds to a number of prominent critics, particular Bas van Fraassen and Jerry Fodor, and so it does require some familiarity with the source literature. This is a book that is written by a philosopher for other philosophers; it isn't trying hard to be accessible and so it won't wait for you if you're new to theoretical epistemology. Because van Fraassen and Fodor are both strongly situated philosophers, Paul wastes no time just jumping on the implications of their views, and if you're not familiar at least peripherally with where they are in the literature, those sections will be totally useless. That is less strongly true for Churchland's discussion of some other historical figures in philosophy. I don't recommend this book to folks who are new to the philosophical literature. It'll be frustration and unhelpful.
There are some parts of the commentary that are a little underdeveloped; the last chapter dealing with moral psychology feels lazy and rushed, and I found it unrewarding. There's something to be said about the role of the neurocomputational approach to philosophy of mind when it comes to moral psychology, but it isn't clear that Paul has done that lifting; it certainly isn't in this book. In that sense, the book really is about philosophy of science more than a general survey of how the philosophy of mind of Paul Churchland fits into his other philosophical views. Anyway, the book is well written, antagonistic where it needs to be, and will be useful for those who are trying to figure out how Churchland's theories about mind fit into epistemology and philosophy of science, especially in contrast to many of his critics.
Churchland covers a lot of ground in this book, and doesn't pull it off quite as elegantly as some of his other books, which I'm rather fond of, but he does give a number of difficult topics a good swing. The book primarily ties together Churchland's view of science [his scientific realism] with epistemology and philosophy of mind. The book follows a general psychology first model of epistemology, where the structure of mind is the primary force in informing a theory of justification. This makes for a pretty interesting read, and there are very few philosophers competent in the neurology and psychology to take this sort of approach; it does wind us up with a number of fairly radically different conclusions than other mainstream philosophers, and that should lead to some concern and some sense of a need for thorough analysis.
The book responds to a number of prominent critics, particular Bas van Fraassen and Jerry Fodor, and so it does require some familiarity with the source literature. This is a book that is written by a philosopher for other philosophers; it isn't trying hard to be accessible and so it won't wait for you if you're new to theoretical epistemology. Because van Fraassen and Fodor are both strongly situated philosophers, Paul wastes no time just jumping on the implications of their views, and if you're not familiar at least peripherally with where they are in the literature, those sections will be totally useless. That is less strongly true for Churchland's discussion of some other historical figures in philosophy. I don't recommend this book to folks who are new to the philosophical literature. It'll be frustration and unhelpful.
There are some parts of the commentary that are a little underdeveloped; the last chapter dealing with moral psychology feels lazy and rushed, and I found it unrewarding. There's something to be said about the role of the neurocomputational approach to philosophy of mind when it comes to moral psychology, but it isn't clear that Paul has done that lifting; it certainly isn't in this book. In that sense, the book really is about philosophy of science more than a general survey of how the philosophy of mind of Paul Churchland fits into his other philosophical views. Anyway, the book is well written, antagonistic where it needs to be, and will be useful for those who are trying to figure out how Churchland's theories about mind fit into epistemology and philosophy of science, especially in contrast to many of his critics.
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