My desire to read this book was sparked by several overwhelmingly positive reviews in defense outlets After reading the book itself, my suspicion that defense publications should employ actual literary critics was confirmed. This book, a memoir of sorts from a former SECNAV, fails to live up to its great promise. It is both poorly written and not nearly as fulfilling as it could have been. If it had been written in bullet points it would not have been much different to read. Paragraphs follow in sequence with little transition or cohesion. The events described are written in such a staccato manner that I'm amazed this book made it past an editor. Naval exercise follows exercise with no description of plans, analysis, or review in between. Lehman seems to believe that it is these naval exercises that are the most exciting aspects of his book. In this he is extremely mistaken. Military exercises do not exist in a vacuum. They follow changes in both national strategic thought and operational modes of warfare. The exercises themselves are less interesting than the decisions that guided those exercises. The Navy's choice to reorient their forces to the north Atlantic with offensive battle doctrines was a lightening bolt to the Soviet navy, but not enough is written about the political and military choices that brought this strategic shift to the forefront of naval doctrine. Lehman had a unique opportunity to describe the decision-making, planning, and review process for changes in both doctrine and procurement policy. His book almost totally misses the opportunity.
This is unfortunate. The 1980s are a rich environment. The shift in defense policy writ large and naval policy especially forced the USSR to operate in ways that it was both militarily and economically unable to sustain. The shift in naval doctrine from the Carter administration to the Reagan and Bush administrations was titanic. The service became less rick averse, and began to train as it would have fought: in hazardous environments at consistently high readiness states. The growth in the number of warships and in manpower allowed for armadas not seen since the Second World War. As developments in propulsion, armaments, construction, and early-warning spread throughout the fleet, her sailors became more confident in not only holding back the larger Soviet fleet, but in also defeating them before they reached critical areas and then counterattacking. The financial strain of keeping up with American shipbuilding was instrumental in the rapid deterioration in Soviet state finances during the decade. This deterioration was vital in the final implosion of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. These events could have easily filled a 300-page book, but Lehman's is not the landmark work it both could have been and should have been. We must continue to wait for the work of nonfiction that matches Tom Clancy's fictional examinations of this era with such mastery.