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Psicologia y Epistemologia
Como es posible el conocimiento? Esta cuestion fundamental del pensamiento kantiano esta tambien en el origen de los trabajos de Jean Piaget.Para aportar una respuesta al problema se creo la psicologia genetica, mediante la cual el autor llega a demostrar las falencias de la filosofia. Y al mismo tiempo que condena las viejas verdades del empirismo, propone las bases cientificas de una nueva epistemologia.
141 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1970
6 people are currently reading
185 people want to read
About the author
Jean Piaget
275 books694 followersJean Piaget (1896 - 1980) was a Swiss philosopher, natural scientist and developmental theorist, well known for his work studying children, his theory of cognitive development, and his epistemological view called "genetic epistemology." In 1955, he created the International Centre for Genetic Epistemology in Geneva and directed it until his death in 1980. According to Ernst von Glasersfeld, Jean Piaget was "the great pioneer of the constructivist theory of knowing."
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
January 2, 2019
I borrowed this book from the Feldenkrais Interest Group library because it was thin at around 100 pages and I though would be an easy read.
This turned out not to be the case. I am not sure if some clarity was lost in translation from the original French, whether French is just naturally a more ornate language, or whether Piaget is just too damn clever for me to easily understand.
I suspect this book is above my pay grade. I struggled through and there were moments in chapters 2, 3 and 4 where things seemed to come together like an epiphany in an orchestral arrangement - I would think 'shit yeah, this guy knows what he is talking about'. But overall, I felt a bit disinterested, skeptical and inadequate. Sometimes Piaget seemed to be making points just for the sake of making himself sound clever. He no doubt is extremely clever, but I not an idiot, and know enough to recognise he sometimes distorts or omits significant features of central concepts - I am thinking in particular of his interpretation of the failure of the creations of symbolic logic to achieve their aims, which Piaget read as the triumphant initiation of new forms of logic.
There are certain features of Piaget's concepts which I think hold much promise, regarding the developmental features of cognitive formation and their potential to reflect aspects of the history of thought. He has been criticised for conducting experiments (albeit quite innocuous) on his own children, and then using this extremely small sample to draw grand conclusions from.
I am intrigued about notions in the final chapter concerning set theory and sequence as being the foundation of mathematical concepts of whole numbers.
This is at times a tantalising and appealing book, but in the end I forced myself to finish the last 15 pages (as I had to, to push through the first 20) without much pleasure.
This turned out not to be the case. I am not sure if some clarity was lost in translation from the original French, whether French is just naturally a more ornate language, or whether Piaget is just too damn clever for me to easily understand.
I suspect this book is above my pay grade. I struggled through and there were moments in chapters 2, 3 and 4 where things seemed to come together like an epiphany in an orchestral arrangement - I would think 'shit yeah, this guy knows what he is talking about'. But overall, I felt a bit disinterested, skeptical and inadequate. Sometimes Piaget seemed to be making points just for the sake of making himself sound clever. He no doubt is extremely clever, but I not an idiot, and know enough to recognise he sometimes distorts or omits significant features of central concepts - I am thinking in particular of his interpretation of the failure of the creations of symbolic logic to achieve their aims, which Piaget read as the triumphant initiation of new forms of logic.
There are certain features of Piaget's concepts which I think hold much promise, regarding the developmental features of cognitive formation and their potential to reflect aspects of the history of thought. He has been criticised for conducting experiments (albeit quite innocuous) on his own children, and then using this extremely small sample to draw grand conclusions from.
I am intrigued about notions in the final chapter concerning set theory and sequence as being the foundation of mathematical concepts of whole numbers.
This is at times a tantalising and appealing book, but in the end I forced myself to finish the last 15 pages (as I had to, to push through the first 20) without much pleasure.
October 23, 2025
PIAGET TURNS TO MORE SPECIFIC ‘THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE’ QUESTIONS
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology."
He wrote in Chapter 1 of this 1970 book, “every epistemology, even antiempirical, raises questions of fact and thus adopts implicit psychological positions, but without effective verification, whereas the latter is imposed as a good method…. The first aim of genetic epistemology is, therefore, if one can say so, to take psychology seriously and to furnish verifications to any question which each epistemology necessarily raises, yet replacing the generally satisfying speculative of implicit psychology with controllable analyses… To repeat: if this obligation should always have been respected, it has today become more and more urgent. It is indeed striking to note that that most spectacular transformations of notions or structures in the development of contemporary sciences correspond, when we study the psychogenesis of these very notions or structures, to circumstances or characteristics which consider the possibility of their eventual transformations.” (Pg. 7)
He explains, “Epistemology is the theory of valid knowledge, and even if this knowledge is never in a state and always forms a process, this process is essentially the passage of a lesser to a greater validity. As a result, epistemology is necessarily of an interdisciplinary nature, since such a process raises questions of both fact and validity.” (Pg. 7-8)
He continues, “We know… that Whitehead and Russell tried to reduce ordinal entities to categories of equivalent categories by biunivocal correspondence, whereas Poincaré believed that number is based on an irreducible intuition of n + 1. Since that time, Goedel’s theorems have, in a way, shown Poincaré to be correct in regard to deductionism difficulties in general; but psychologically the intuition of n + 1 is not original, and in its operative form… is constituted only from ages seven to eight and in connection with category structuration and asymmetrical relations. We must therefore attempt to discover a solution beyond both the reduction of the ‘Principia’ and the proposition of an entire specificity of natural number.” (Pg. 11)
He suggests, “Instead of asking ourselves what knowledge in general is or how scientific knowledge … is possible which naturally entails the constitution of an entire philosophy, we can limit ourselves by method to the following ‘positive’ problem: how is knowledge increased? By what process does a science pass from a specific knowledge, later judged insufficient, to another specific knowledge, later judged superior by the common consciousness of adepts of this discipline? Every epistemological problem is found again, but in the historico-critical perspective and no longer in the perspective of philosophy. It is this genetic or scientific epistemology that we will mention here to show how child psychology might offer help of some importance.” (Pg. 26-27)
He asserts, “our first epistemological problem receives from child psychology if not a beginning at least an enlightenment. It is not because it begins experimentally that mathematical knowledge can be assimilated to physical knowledge. Instead of abstracting its contents from the object itself, from the very beginning it enriches the object with connections stemming from the subject. Before forming laws of thought, these connections proceed from general coordinations of action, but neither this active nature nor the fact that a certain form of experiment is necessary to the subject before he can deduct operationally, prevents these connections from expressing the subject’s powers of construction in opposition to the physical characteristics of the object.” (Pg. 31-32)
He asks, “Can we therefore not say that genetic psychology verifies Russell’s doctrine on the logical nature of the number since each component finally takes its roots from a purely logical structure? In sense, yes. Things become complicated, however, when it is a question of determining the nature of this correspondence operation which assures equivalence among categories. (Pg. 40-41)
He states, “Genetic epistemology is the study of the development of mental functions, in so far as this development can offer an explanation or at least a complement of information concerning their mechanism at the finished state. In other words, genetic epistemology consists of using child psychology to find the solution of general psychological problems.” (Pg. 45)
He notes, “whether it concerns actions done individually or those done in common with exchanges, collaboration, opposition, and so forth, we find the same laws of coordination and regulation which result in the same final structures of operations or cooperations as co-operations. We could thus consider logic, as the final form of equilibrations, simultaneously individual and social, individual in so far as it is general or common to every individual, and likewise social in so far as it is general or common to every society.” (Pg. 51)
He argues, “When I perceive a house, I do not at first see the color of a tile, the height of a chimney and the rest, and finally the house! I immediately see the house as ‘gestalt’ and then analyze it in detail. To be more exact, we would have to speak of the perceptive and not of the sensorial origin of scientific knowledge, since perception is not composed of sensations but is an immediate composition of them.” (Pg. 65-66)
He suggests, “There is therefore a possible solution to Planck’s paradox. If, appearing to be based on sensation, physical knowledge is constantly withdrawn more and more, the reason is that it never proceeds from sensation nor even from pure perception but, at the very outset, it implies a logico-mathematical schematization of perceptions as well as action exercised on the objects. Beginning by such schematization, it is natural therefore that these logico-mathematical additions become more and more important with the development of physical knowledge and that, consequently, physical knowledge is constantly withdrawn more and more from perception as such.” (Pg. 73)
He summarizes, “On the one hand, knowledge is never derived exclusively from sensation or perception but also from schemes of action or from operatory scheme of various levels, both irreducible to perception alone. On the other hand, perception itself does not consist in a mere recording of sensorial data but includes an active organization in which decisions and preinferences intervene and which is due to the influence on perception as such of this schematism of actions or of operations.” (Pg. 86-87)
He concludes, “Thus the circle of science finally reveals what the analysis of each individual knowledge emphasizes immediately, but in varying degrees: the close interdependence of subject and object. According to whether it is situated at one or the other pole, science consequently speaks a more idealistic or more realistic language. Which of these is the true one? The day when biology will be entirely mathematized, if ever such is possible, we will certainly see the equations of protoplasm, and consequently protoplasm itself, result from our mind, or if our mind with its equations results from protoplasm. Perhaps on that day psychology will be sufficiently advanced to show mathematicians supporting the first of these propositions and biologists supporting the second… they say almost the same thing… but only psychologists will truly know why!” (Pg. 120)
He suggest, “The first goal for research therefore would be to free the possible elements of comparison from the tendencies and currents of the human sciences in their contemporary development in order to promote exchanges and interdisciplinary collaboration, or simply increase the research of each discipline under the influence of comparisons furnished.” (Pg. 123)
This book will interest those studying Piaget.
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology."
He wrote in Chapter 1 of this 1970 book, “every epistemology, even antiempirical, raises questions of fact and thus adopts implicit psychological positions, but without effective verification, whereas the latter is imposed as a good method…. The first aim of genetic epistemology is, therefore, if one can say so, to take psychology seriously and to furnish verifications to any question which each epistemology necessarily raises, yet replacing the generally satisfying speculative of implicit psychology with controllable analyses… To repeat: if this obligation should always have been respected, it has today become more and more urgent. It is indeed striking to note that that most spectacular transformations of notions or structures in the development of contemporary sciences correspond, when we study the psychogenesis of these very notions or structures, to circumstances or characteristics which consider the possibility of their eventual transformations.” (Pg. 7)
He explains, “Epistemology is the theory of valid knowledge, and even if this knowledge is never in a state and always forms a process, this process is essentially the passage of a lesser to a greater validity. As a result, epistemology is necessarily of an interdisciplinary nature, since such a process raises questions of both fact and validity.” (Pg. 7-8)
He continues, “We know… that Whitehead and Russell tried to reduce ordinal entities to categories of equivalent categories by biunivocal correspondence, whereas Poincaré believed that number is based on an irreducible intuition of n + 1. Since that time, Goedel’s theorems have, in a way, shown Poincaré to be correct in regard to deductionism difficulties in general; but psychologically the intuition of n + 1 is not original, and in its operative form… is constituted only from ages seven to eight and in connection with category structuration and asymmetrical relations. We must therefore attempt to discover a solution beyond both the reduction of the ‘Principia’ and the proposition of an entire specificity of natural number.” (Pg. 11)
He suggests, “Instead of asking ourselves what knowledge in general is or how scientific knowledge … is possible which naturally entails the constitution of an entire philosophy, we can limit ourselves by method to the following ‘positive’ problem: how is knowledge increased? By what process does a science pass from a specific knowledge, later judged insufficient, to another specific knowledge, later judged superior by the common consciousness of adepts of this discipline? Every epistemological problem is found again, but in the historico-critical perspective and no longer in the perspective of philosophy. It is this genetic or scientific epistemology that we will mention here to show how child psychology might offer help of some importance.” (Pg. 26-27)
He asserts, “our first epistemological problem receives from child psychology if not a beginning at least an enlightenment. It is not because it begins experimentally that mathematical knowledge can be assimilated to physical knowledge. Instead of abstracting its contents from the object itself, from the very beginning it enriches the object with connections stemming from the subject. Before forming laws of thought, these connections proceed from general coordinations of action, but neither this active nature nor the fact that a certain form of experiment is necessary to the subject before he can deduct operationally, prevents these connections from expressing the subject’s powers of construction in opposition to the physical characteristics of the object.” (Pg. 31-32)
He asks, “Can we therefore not say that genetic psychology verifies Russell’s doctrine on the logical nature of the number since each component finally takes its roots from a purely logical structure? In sense, yes. Things become complicated, however, when it is a question of determining the nature of this correspondence operation which assures equivalence among categories. (Pg. 40-41)
He states, “Genetic epistemology is the study of the development of mental functions, in so far as this development can offer an explanation or at least a complement of information concerning their mechanism at the finished state. In other words, genetic epistemology consists of using child psychology to find the solution of general psychological problems.” (Pg. 45)
He notes, “whether it concerns actions done individually or those done in common with exchanges, collaboration, opposition, and so forth, we find the same laws of coordination and regulation which result in the same final structures of operations or cooperations as co-operations. We could thus consider logic, as the final form of equilibrations, simultaneously individual and social, individual in so far as it is general or common to every individual, and likewise social in so far as it is general or common to every society.” (Pg. 51)
He argues, “When I perceive a house, I do not at first see the color of a tile, the height of a chimney and the rest, and finally the house! I immediately see the house as ‘gestalt’ and then analyze it in detail. To be more exact, we would have to speak of the perceptive and not of the sensorial origin of scientific knowledge, since perception is not composed of sensations but is an immediate composition of them.” (Pg. 65-66)
He suggests, “There is therefore a possible solution to Planck’s paradox. If, appearing to be based on sensation, physical knowledge is constantly withdrawn more and more, the reason is that it never proceeds from sensation nor even from pure perception but, at the very outset, it implies a logico-mathematical schematization of perceptions as well as action exercised on the objects. Beginning by such schematization, it is natural therefore that these logico-mathematical additions become more and more important with the development of physical knowledge and that, consequently, physical knowledge is constantly withdrawn more and more from perception as such.” (Pg. 73)
He summarizes, “On the one hand, knowledge is never derived exclusively from sensation or perception but also from schemes of action or from operatory scheme of various levels, both irreducible to perception alone. On the other hand, perception itself does not consist in a mere recording of sensorial data but includes an active organization in which decisions and preinferences intervene and which is due to the influence on perception as such of this schematism of actions or of operations.” (Pg. 86-87)
He concludes, “Thus the circle of science finally reveals what the analysis of each individual knowledge emphasizes immediately, but in varying degrees: the close interdependence of subject and object. According to whether it is situated at one or the other pole, science consequently speaks a more idealistic or more realistic language. Which of these is the true one? The day when biology will be entirely mathematized, if ever such is possible, we will certainly see the equations of protoplasm, and consequently protoplasm itself, result from our mind, or if our mind with its equations results from protoplasm. Perhaps on that day psychology will be sufficiently advanced to show mathematicians supporting the first of these propositions and biologists supporting the second… they say almost the same thing… but only psychologists will truly know why!” (Pg. 120)
He suggest, “The first goal for research therefore would be to free the possible elements of comparison from the tendencies and currents of the human sciences in their contemporary development in order to promote exchanges and interdisciplinary collaboration, or simply increase the research of each discipline under the influence of comparisons furnished.” (Pg. 123)
This book will interest those studying Piaget.
Want to Read
June 19, 2021In het Nederlands: Psychologie en kennisleer, Aula 492, Het Spectrum 1973
Currently Reading
June 12, 2008Doesn't the "psychology" referred to here imply a positivist account of knowledge? i.e., can a so-called scientifically-based explanation of the production(s) of knowledge successfully do so within constructivist boundaries? OR, does any scientifically-based explanation of the origin(s) of knowledge necessarily re-inforce a solipsistic and/or a priori standpoint? I'm not convinced that even psychology can communicate outside its (Kuhnian) paradigm in a true constructivist model, but I'm hoping Piaget will convince me otherwise.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews