The Russians were wrong-footed from the start, fighting in Manchuria at the end of a 5,000 mile single track railway; the Japanese were a week or so from their bases. The Russian command structure was hopelessly confused, their generals old and incompetent, the Tsar cautious and uncertain. The Russian naval defeat at Tsushima was as farcical as it was complete. The Japanese had defeated a big European power, and the lessons for the West were there for all to see, had they cared to do so. From this curious war, so unsafely ignored for the most part by the military minds of the day, Richard Connaughton has woven a fascinating narrative to appeal to readers at all levels.
Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear is a conventional military history of divisions and generals covering the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. This war was a fascinating transition, the last display of Napoleonic close order and the first recognizably modern war with bolt-action rifles, machine guns, and quick-firing artillery.
The two empires came to blows over competing claims in Korea and Manchuria, with leadership on both sides believing that a 'short victorious war' would be just the thing for public consumption. Both sides were wrong, as the campaign degenerated into a bloody and expensive shambles, but by that time the war had its own logic.
On the naval side, Japan had a major stroke of luck when the Russian battleship Poltava hit a mine in the early days of the war, taking with it the active Admiral Makarov. The Russian fleet did not seriously threaten Japanese supply lines for the rest of the war. The Pacific Fleet was sunk in harbor once Japanese siege line closed in on Port Arthur, and the Baltic Fleet was sunk in the Battle of Tsushima after sailing around the world.
The land campaign also saw repeated reversals for the Russians, as they were outflanked and outfought. Defense had a tactical advantage over attack in this time, but the Russians squandered their advantage by anxiously shuffling brigades across their entire front, rather than properly digging in on key terrain. Japanese attacks tended to commit everything, providing a razor thin margin of victory that prevent them from following up and smashing the Russian army, but Russia lost battles with entire divisions uncommitted, an elementary error.
Russian senior commanders were defeatist, uncooperative, and often both elderly and inexperienced. While Connaughton punctures some myths of Japanese brilliance, the Japanese held to basic Clausewitzian doctrine of identifying the key objective of the battle and fully committing their forces to taking it. While this lead to bloody assaults on the siege lines of Port Arthur, it also gave them victories. In what was a pattern, while winning all the battles the Japanese lost the peace, coming off worse in treaty negotiations. This diplomatic defeat would inspire an ideology of total victory that lead to Pearl Harbor, and the eventual destruction of Imperial Japan.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 should be considered as a turning point for both the Russian Empire, the Empire of Japan and world history in general. Russia, at this time was a an established old imperial power, perhaps nation in decline, but was desperate for reform. Face change and modernisation of face oblivion. Japan on the other hand was a new nation released from the shackles of shogunate feudalism and isolation. Meiji Japan was a young and confident country, modernising, industrialising and finding it’s place in the world.
As a result, perhaps the result was inevitable. But as all students of history know, lesson one, page one, nothing in history is inevitable. Richard Connaughton in this book seeks to provide a military history of this conflict and answer the key questions ‘why did Russia loose?’ And ‘why didn’t anyone learnt from it before the First World War?’
For me these questions are tackled with satisfactory conclusions, Port Arthur and the theatre of war were thousands of miles away from St Petersburg, the Russian Fleet was old, obsolete and ill suited to the faster moving, newer and better suited Japanese vessels. Japanese tactics worked, artillery bombardments on points rather than people worked, using every last man to secure an objective paid off and the sophisticated use of intelligence gathering was priceless. Connaughton states that the Russians didn’t particularly perform badly, but the Japanese simply performed better. This could be true, with competent Russian withdrawals and defences of forts.
However, the Russians made a number of key errors. Surrendering Port Arthur early being the major one. Internal collapse and lack of support at home being central to Russia’s defeat, as without the 1905 revolution Russia could have continued and held out with her resources, in a long war. Japan could not and was bankrupt.
The lessons were not committed to memory, as many military historians could not agree on what these lessons were. Old stuffy generals could not get over the fact that the age of calvary has gone, machine guns were now the face of war and weapons massively favoured defenders. Ironically due to the British alliance with Japan, their tactics and manoeuvres were censored to protect their ally, meaning how they won wasn’t widely known. There has also to something to be said about the racist attitudes to the non-white nation as the Europeans felt nothing could be learnt from them. Big mistake. It’s also worth stating here this is a reason why Russia threw herself in to this conflict, thinking that the Japanese were inferior. They provided otherwise.
Ultimately the war was a disaster for Russia and could and should have been avoided. Dominic Lieven has supported this view in his excellent Towards the Flame. It sent Russia into a tailspin concluding with the 1917 revulsion, civil war and rise of the Bolsheviks. Japan’s fortunes seem more positive, but the story still ends in defeat albeit 28 years later at the end of the Second World War. Ironically allowing the USSR to regain Port Arthur.
I have given three stars mainly to the writing style which I found difficult to follow and not clear of concise in its format or editing. I often had to go back and read passages or full pages a couple to times to understand what he had said. I was left feeling that a full rounded history is not delivered, not a bad one, but not one that satisfied all my questions. This caused me to do further research. Having said that this is not a bad book and will remain on my book shelf.
A rich and vivid history of the war, although it is mainly focused on the battles.
The author is appreciative of the Japanese war effort and he is surprisingly lenient toward the Russian side. The narrative is chronological,and he does a great job describing the war’s origins, course and aftermath. He argues that Russia’s main weakness was that it had too many unqualified commanders, and was not helped by an intelligence apparatus vastly inferior to Japan’s.
Russia’s performance is often lambasted as a total disaster. Connaughton argues that Russian strategy was sound but poorly executed, and notes that the Russians fought with outdated tactics. The Russians did have superior logistics and defensive capabilities, and the Japanese could not always follow up on their victories.
The maps are merely adequate, though, and at one point the author writes that a night march and dawn attack was “a new phenomenon of warfare” (it was?) He also hypes the appearance "for the first time in modern warfare [of] the construction of opposing lines of trenches” (huh?) Connaughton’s coverage of Japanese troop strengths also seems confused at times, and there is little on politics or diplomacy. The book also seems to be based mostly on other English-language works.
There is, still, a lesson to be learned from this war. Possibly more than one. Russia: an aging Imperial power, abundant with decadent, idle nobility, power and space as well as a simmering ocean of discontent amongst the underclasses, and worst of all, a military that was strong on the outside, rotten on the inside. The Russian armed forces were, in most senses, an anachronism. Their last successful military outing, against Turkey twenty five years prior to their war with Japan, while successful, has been won against an even more doddering, corrupt, decaying and elderly empire than was their own. And the Turks military might was more outdated and anachronistic than was the Russian. And, for Russia, worse of all was the absolute void in any intellectual endeavor devoted to military/strategic affairs. Russia, at least her leaders, were perfectly accepting of simply resting upon their power, wealth and past glories. A frightening allegory to the modern United States could easily be made here...lesson number one. Japan: A young, vibrant, recently united people, exuberantly racing into modernity full steam ahead, embracing industrialization and eagerly absorbing any bit of military and strategic knowledge she can get her hands on. Looked at from this perspective, one can be forgiven for viewing this wars outcome as being pre-ordained. Author Connaughton describes the background, strategies, and narrates the combat of the war itself in a workmanlike fashion. While, as one reviewer relates, he does not put any passion into his writing (it is perfectly acceptable for an academic military historian to write in such a way that the reader actually looks forward to cracking open the book rather than feeling as though one must punch the clock, roll up their sleeves and count the minutes till it is over...just a friendly reminder to any military historians who might be reading), I found that this was more true of his descriptions of land combat. His narrations of the naval battles were actually quite good. The Japanese Army and Navy, united in purpose under their Emperor, fought the war far better than did the Russians. Simple as that. While the Russians, especially the soldiers in Manchuria and northern Korea, fought well, they did not fight as well as did the Japanese. True, as Connaughton points out, the Japanese Army never could win a decisive victory against the Russian Army (in fact, in some of their victories, their own losses were greater than were those of the vanquished), still they displayed something that is lesson number 2 for this war: the value of moral (battlefield) superiority over the enemy. In other words, the values that can best be described as spiritual-elan, morale, esprit de corps, aggression, the killer instinct (the emphasis on fighting a battle to actually win it, and then crush the enemy in the process, no great army is bereft of it)- all of these things, which cannot be measured scientifically, gave the Japanese the edge in this war. Modern Western (especially American) war doctrine is almost exclusively scientific. Logistics, materiel, firepower, maneuver, intelligence, etc... While all of these things are important, vital even, they leave something out. When your focus is on the scientific you fail to understand how Washington's Continentals stayed the fight when faced with almost consistent whippings, or how Lee's Rebels performed the feats they did in the face of overwhelming materiel inferiority and a broken logistical system, or how the Wehrmacht fought the entire industrialized world in WWII (and the Imperial German Army did the same in WWI) and punched way above their weight class the entire time. All of these things cannot be, in total, explained unless one realizes that their is, indeed, a spiritual element to warfare. Something the Japanese took for granted. Something Connaughton points out gave the Japanese the edge in this war, something American warfighters should never forget now. All in all this was a good little book. While I would have preferred something with a bit more meat, it was still a satisfying learning experience and a decently enjoyable read. This is the war that raised the curtain on the modern world, lighting the fuse on the bomb that was the device by which the entire world was changed in the 20th Century. You simply cannot understand WWI, WWII in Asia, or even modern Asia (or Russia's continuing strategic draw to Asia) without understanding this war. This book would be a good starting point. Recommended.
This book’s title about the Russo-japanese war (1904-05) advances the viewpoint of the author on Russia´s effort, mainly as a story of incompetence, one blunder after another, when facing off a humble, yet ambitious, rising and underrated Japan. The story of the war depicted here is a story of the fight and constant retreat in southern Manchuria, a hard highland foreign to both contestants, but within their assumed and therefore clashing area of influence. Russian expansion had to cope with a general state of unpreparedness to confront a resolute foe, less doubtfull to exploite pre-emption, coordinated leadership, initial numerical advantage, morale, training and overall technological edge. This is the conclusion to be extracted from the movements in the theater of war: in each battle the Russians are unable to stop the Japanese, and thereafter retreat to the next defensible point along the Manchurian railway line, that is, a transsiberian branch, from where all slow but steady Russian supplies and reinforcements came from. Eventually all Japanese forces converge in the final and climatic battle of Mukden, which, despite the victory, proves once again ineffective to pocket and destroy the Russian army, in the persued style of Sedan. Naval engagements also favour Japan, but only the final battle of Tsushima proves decisive. The fleet Russians put against it finds itself in dire straits to cover the 20.000 miles journey from the Baltic Sea, another almost comical chapter of Russian despair, a self fulfilling prophecy. I enjoyed the chapter on the Siege of Port Arthur and the grisly description on the realities of modern warfare, like the high toll paid in human cost and destruction for objectives of high political value but little military importance, as symbolized in the 203-metre hill. This is a war of many clichés (the asian underdog beats the European favourite; the war that triggers the 1905 uprising in Russia; the war that represents the beginning of Japanese expansionism, etc.) but chiefly among them, is, that European military observers didin´t take proper note on how modern technology and tactics would play out 10 years on in Europe. The author devotes much attention to this “lessons not learned” factor through the narrative and the accounts of correspondents and foreign military observers.
A book that desperately needed to pass through a hard nosed editor's hands.
I used to roll my eyes whenever I read a review of a book complaining about the lackluster quality or quantity of maps. "After all", I wonder, "Just Google it and you'll get by. No biggie."
I was wrong, and I apologise.
Connaughton loves to describe to us about the battles of the Russo-Japanese War at a regimental level. And that's fine, if perhaps a little granular for a book that runs better at the operational rather than the tactical level. However, the smattering of maps generally show divisional and corps dispositions at the beginning of the battle. After that, you're on you're own, effectively blind and reliant on your imagination to feel your way through each assault and counter assault. It's really wearying and drags down the middle third of the book. It's Connaughton's right to highlight these mini-actions, but it's an unfamiliar conflict in an unfamiliar location, and he can't fall back on particularly compelling writing when describing them. Without maps, they are simply... ...boring.
The shame of this is that at the strategic and operational level, along with dalliances into politics, command and control, and diplomacy, Connaughton is excellent. If he'd dropped virtually every detailed account of the battles and made it a tight 300 page book, I would consider it an outstanding introduction to the conflict. I get that probably runs counter to his motivations for writing the book (demonstrating how the Japanese won each battle on land and at sea), and he does do well with the details on the naval aspects, but from a readers perspective it is what it is. What I enjoyed wasn't the tactical stuff - make an edition with more maps, otherwise I recommend the reader skip past any part where a land battle starts to warm up.
4.5 stars. Superb military history. This was was part of my O Level History syllabus, but because no exam question ever came up about it, pretty much all you were told was that Russia's defeat was a major contributing factor to the outbreak of revolution. Apparently some other things happened too and the war was interesting in its own right. It was arguably the first modern war, and offered warnings (unfortunately mostly only seen in retrospect) of the carnage to be expected in WWI. This book is hugely-informative and extremely well-written. The author was a soldier himself, and, significantly for a war in which very long supply lines were a vital factor, a logistics specialist. And, unlike so many modern military history writers, he offers expert opinion, not just a list of facts. He also writes in admirably clear, readable English, leavened with the odd joke and epigram to provide a little relief from the horror, mud and blood. Faults ? The book (at least this edition) needed a clearer map of the vital theatre of the land war. To the anglophone reader, many of the place names are very similar - I imagine a Japanese or Russian reader would have equal difficulty with a campaign conducted around Chipping Norton, Chipping Campden, and Chipping Sodbury with only a small scale sketch map of England to refer to. The author repeats the long-exploded myth about Russian Generals Rennenkampf and Samsonov coming to blows at Mukden Railway Station. This was originally based on a rumour, embroidered by a German military observer (with the Japanese, not even the Russian, Army !) at the time. When Col. Hoffmann later opposed those same two generals in 1914, he embroidered the story still further after the fact to make it the key to his brilliant coup at the Battle of Tannenberg. Sadly, it's nonsense. Rennenkampf was at the time of the "incident" on crutches after a severe leg wound, making fisticuffs a little unlikely. The actual argument, if it occurred at all, was between Samsonov and his corps commander. And the Battle of Tannenberg was won because a German general called von Francois disobeyed orders and attacked rather than retreating as he had been ordered. There's also an irrelevant passage about Japanese soldiers cremating their mates and sending their Adam's Apples home to grieving families. A mistranslation. The Japanese word in this context refers to a neck vertebra (the second, if you're interested) which resembles a seated Buddha. Unlike the Adam's Apple, this bone survives cremation and IS part of traditional Japanese funeral rites. But there are far more pithy, informed opinions than errors. This is a very good book. If a question had ever come up on this war at O Level, the author would have got an 'A' for sure.
This is a good overview of the Russo-Japanese War. It is heavily focused on the military operations, so if you are looking for a wider scope, I would not recommend this book. It touches on the reasons and consequences in a wider political/economic scope but it's main focus is military history.
If you are unfamiliar with this war, this will provide an introduction into the dysfunction of the Russian navy and army at the time, the large casualties in situations that presage WWI, and rise of a confident Japanese army and navy.
Overall, I thought it conveys the story of the war well. It was not entirely gripping (other than reading about the fate of the Russian Baltic fleet as it made its way to its demise at the Tsushima Strait, which is a tragicomedy), but neither was it boring. If you're a fan of military history and don't know anything about this conflict, I think this would be a pretty good choice.
Comprehensive look at Russo-Japanese War that highlights the importance of leadership in morale in wars outcomes.
Author provides strategic context, addresses participants strategies, and examines battlefield tactics and outcomes. The author concludes by addressing two major questions: 1) why were the Japanese able to consistently beat the Russians on land (leadership and morale) and 2) why were the lessons of the war not fully appreciated prior to WWI (institutional bias and organizational interest).
This is a solid read for those looking to understand this conflict though the absence of footnotes limits the readers ability to explore the historical reasoning despite the inclusion of a lengthy bibliography.
"Rising and Tumbling Bear" by Richard M. Connaughton was a very good read on the Russo-Japanese War. Whenever people discuss this war, they often portray Japan as having utterly annihilated Russia. However, reading this book revealed just how fortunate Japan was and how well the Russians fought as well. This war was arguably the first modern war, and it was fascinating to read about the outdated tactics used by both Russia and Japan. There are significant lessons to be learned from this conflict regarding modernization, and many military leaders dismissed these lessons, only to repeat the same mistakes a mere ten years later in the Great War. This book is a must-read for military history enthusiasts. I would rate it 8/10.
I did not get very far with this. The style does not appeal to me. The language is a little clumsy in places - `lumps of coal covered the town like confetti` - `In many respects this occupation resembled what we now expect of the stereotype Japanese package tour`. There is a lack of sensitivity. Judging by the first sixty pages or so that I read, the book would seem to be populated with a plethora of researched information but it is scattered over the page in a kind of splatter effect, similar to the descriptions of the effects of high explosives on the human body which the author has recreated for us. As I have not read the book in its entirety I will not rate it.
The Russo Japanese War is a lesser known war, but foreshadowed some of what was to come not just in World War I but in World War II as well. Connaughton's book is a narrative of the war which at times gets a bit bogged down and tedious, but it is very informative. I don't know about the print version, but the Kindle version's maps are rudimentary and could be made more easily read and understood, especially considering that the war took place in an area most people aren't familiar with. Connaughton also does a good job of placing the war in the context of Russia's slide toward revolution and Japan's rise as an Asian power. He also looks at lessons that could have been learned by European powers ahead of the first World War and looks at whey they didn't learn them. It may not be a compelling page turner, but Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear is very much worth reading to get a better understanding of what the war and its resolution meant in the region, what it meant on a larger stage, and the lessons Western powers should have learned from it.
A war that is now forgotten. But one that the world also forgot to learn the lessons from. The book is relevant to what is happening now in the Ukraine, with the Russian invasion. The book tells us clearly about the causes and the course of this modern war. Japan v Russia over territorial ambitions both had in Korea and Manchuria. The author writes well although you can not avoid the inevitability of the Russian defeat. Worth a read.
Incredible book documenting a little known campaign that defined the early 1900s and helped to create the conditions for the First World War. The history of 1900-1991 I think can be argued was defined by the results of the conflict and the collapse of imperial Russia (and its subsequent rise of communism in the void left by the national impact to prestige) and the rises of imperial Japan as a international rather than regional power.
This book deserves mixed a review. I picked it up when I went to the library searching for The Fleet That Had To Die, another work on the Russo-Japanese War. However, when I found that the book I was searching for was written in the 1950s—the quality of historical writings prior to the 1960s is a little suspect in my experience—I decided to read Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear instead. Chapters One and Two were extremely interesting. However, the authors often allowed the story to become bogged down in the tactical minutia—Regiment X advanced on Hill Y to attack Brigade Z. Connaughton demonstrated very little ability to convey the wider importance of individual engagements or make the reader care. Despite maps included at the beginning of almost every chapter, I rarely understood who a particular engagement fit into a larger battle. In this way, chapters five through nine and parts of nine and ten were painfully dull and I ended up skimming portions of them. If Connaughton was intent on writing a comprehensive tactical history of the Russo-Japanese War, it needed to several times longer to adequately explain events. Given how well this book started, I was very disappointed with the final product.
This a good book in its own right, although it's not as good as The Tide at Sunrise by Dennis Warner. This is the second book I've read on this war. It's solid as a companion book to The Tide at Sunrise.
My biggest problem with the book is the total absence of footnotes. There is an extensive bibliography where presumably all of the interesting facts and anecdotes come from. The anecdotes make for the best part of this book. The writer's style at times seems a bit too casual at times for my comfort. Like Tide, there are also too many allusions made to future wars, specifically world war I & II. To a certain extent I can understand the inferences made to the First World War as many of the lessons learned in the Russo-Japanese War were relearned at a much higher cost in the latter war, especially on the western front.
This book has a lot of maps which helps in following the narrative. I would have also liked some economic comparative charts or charts on comparative strengths in machine guns, men, cavalry leading up to a battle or at specific points in time.
I don't know anything about military tactics, logistics, battle formations etc. and since this book describes a war, I was expecting to have to plough through boring chapters of incomprehensible material. Contrary to my pre-conception, "Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear" turned out to be a surprisingly readable and engaging book. There are descriptions of battle formations and armaments but they are meaningful even to a non-specialist, and interspersed among portrays of the opposing armies' morale, the practicalities of the battle, the characters of the leaders, excerpts from contemporary newspapers, and the greater geo-political background of the unfolding events. Overall, I think it is a page-turner, and a very informative book.
Features some strong historical evidence/facts on the conflict, but isn't the most analytical source you could find. Somewhat descriptive. Some of the minutia can be tedious, especially without more graphics. For those looking to research the Russo-Japanese War, I'd suggest reading the intro and skimming the rest. There are better sources out there. Giving three stars based upon use in an academic setting.
Connaughton is a military historian so he uses a lot of military terminology. Also, he often gets bogged down in the units involved. In every battle, he mentions which regiment, battalion, division, and corps was involved. It was a little too technical, but I bought it for $2 on clearance so no harm no foul.
Good, only disappointing is the lack of footnotes. It was interesting to find out how much circumstances eventually seemed to favour the Japanese. Even battles like Tsushima were aided primarily by both luck (the Russian fleet could have gone East past Japan and avoided the Japanese) and incomprehensible Russian incompetence.
Velice podrobná kniha, která zaznamenává snad každý střet války, v tom je velmi věrná. Žel, autor mě zcela znechutil už na začátku, kdy carské Rusko 19. století v podstatě vykládá jako věrného předchůdce Sovětského svazu a tím to celé vyloženě zabíjí. Pro military fanoušky určitě dobré.
Incredibly interesting subject matter but just a very hard book to read. I found myself wanting to put it down and do anything else but read even though I wanted to have a better understanding of the subject matter.
Dry beyond belief, and my eyes squinted so much trying to make out the little font that the book employed. I guess I am just not cut out for military history stuffs.
A fairly well-written account of the "First Modern War", but hampered by a lack of legible maps and explanation of the composition of both militaries (how many battalions in a division again?).
Probably better suited to those with a strong grounding in military history.