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Liberalism: The Life of an Idea
Despite playing a decisive role in shaping the past two hundred years of American and European politics, liberalism is no longer the dominant force it once was. In this expanded and updated edition of what has become a classic history of liberalism, Edmund Fawcett traces its ideals, successes, and failures through the lives and ideas of exemplary thinkers and politicians from the early nineteenth century to today. Significant revisions--including a new conclusion--reflect recent changes affecting the world political order that many see as presenting new and very potent threats to the survival of liberal democracy as we know it. A richly detailed account of a vulnerable but critically important political creed, this book reminds us that to defend liberalism it is vital to understand its character and history.
532 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2014
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About the author
Edmund Fawcett
7 books29 followersEdmund Fawcett is a British political journalist. Formerly chief correspondent of The Economist, he now writes for The New York Times, The Guardian and New Statesman. His latest book is Liberalism: The Life of an Idea
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November 22, 2016
I thoroughly enjoyed Edmund Fawcett’s systematic and wide-ranging Liberalism: The Life of an Idea. He takes on an impressive challenge: the evolution of liberalism, both in theory and in practice, from 1830 to 1989. For Fawcett, liberalism has rested on four broad ideas: (1) “acknowledgement of inescapable ethical and material conflict within society,” (2) “distrust of power,” (3) “faith in human progress, “and (4) “respect for people whatever they think and whoever they are.” It was “a search for an ethically acceptable order of human progress among civic equals without recourse to undue power.” Liberalism was and will continue to be a very broad church because people can interpret, weigh, and apply these principles in different ways.
Liberalism is not the same as republicanism—leading to the seemingly strange phenomena of liberals who are content with monarchy. (If a monarch can be constrained via constitutionalism, many liberals, particularly right-wing liberals, seem to be fine.) And liberalism is not the same as democracy, although the case for democracy can and has been made on liberal principles (namely, the inherent egalitarianism of the fourth principle noted above).
Fawcett divides the book into four parts. The first, “The Confidence of Youth,” focuses on the early years of liberalism in 1830-1880. The second, “Liberalism in Maturity and the Struggle with Democracy,” focuses on 1880 to 1945. The third, “Second Chance and Success,” focuses on 1945 to 1989. And the brief last section, “After 1989,” focuses on the post-Cold War era.
Fawcett focuses on the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, analyzing how liberalism evolved in similar phases across these countries. (One might more aptly say “co-evolved,” given that many of the individuals discussed were in contact with liberal peers from other countries, something that isn’t really explored in this book). He carefully chooses which politicians or public intellectuals to feature from each country and at each stage, but this—inevitably—leads to some unfortunate omissions. I would have liked to see more attention given to the role of John Dewey in early twentieth century left-wing liberalism in the US or on Max Weber in German liberalism (he was quite involved with the social-liberal Weimar-era German Democratic Party, and his belief in “value-free social science” and general sociological framework had a strong impact on sociology in liberal democracies during the Cold War, as an alternative to Marxist sociology). In addition, the book can seem unbalanced at times, e.g., when Fawcett focuses disproportionately on one or two countries as opposed to others.
Fawcett is open about the conflicts within liberal thought and notes about how seeming contradictions (e.g, “liberal imperialism”) may not really be so. And he devotes a section to how liberals reacted to semiliberal regimes, focusing on the French Second Empire and Bismarckian Germany. Such regimes forced a tension between liberals’ economic and political concerns. I would have liked him to explore this tension more in later cases as well, and two in particular come to mind. First is the role of German liberals in “enabling” Hitler. Although the left-liberal German Democratic Party no longer existed in 1933 (its successor the “German State Party” wasn’t particularly liberal, and a number of DDP’s left-wing members bolted—one of many liberal schisms—for the Social Democrats), the business liberals of the German People’s Party as well as any other small remaining liberal parties in the Reichstag voted for Hitler’s Enabling Act, neutering the power of the parliament and facilitating the consolidation of the Nazi regime. The Social Democrats at the time were the only true defenders of political liberty—those who were not prevented from attending voted against it. Another good example, alluded to briefly by Fawcett but not given sufficient attention, arises again with the likes of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who were strong supporters of Pinochet in Chile despite the disregard for political liberty in his repressive regime.
I would have also liked more attention to the relationship between liberalism and socialism. Fawcett acknowledges how, post-WWII, many “socialist” parties are more social-liberal than socialist in any Marxist sense. But the influence of socialism on liberalism was not always just a “reluctant compromise.” The UK stands out particularly here, as some socialists (e.g., the Fabians) saw socialism as the highest form of liberalism, the next step in its evolution, drawing on the greater receptiveness to collectivism in Mill’s later writings. To left-wing liberals and liberal socialists, the blending of liberalism and socialism was a productive harmony, not a reluctant compromise. As I noted above in the German case, Social Democrats were strong defenders of political liberty, and the UK’s Labour Party also grew in strength when left-wing liberals bolted from the Liberal Party during/after World War I.
Lastly, I found Fawcett’s conclusion, focusing on the future of liberalism, to be wanting. Given that climate change is perhaps the most pressing global challenge right now, how could he ignore the question of how liberalism will have to adapt to it? Fawcett also comes out as a strong austerian, believing that “liberalism’s historic compromise with democracy is at risk of fiscal overstretch.” But fiscal overstretch in the US is largely a function of war spending and tax cuts, and in the EU, today’s fiscal problems have to do with huge bank bailouts and a misguided effort to cut the way out of the recession. Austerity, as it damages both economic growth and tends to weaken social toleration, threatens liberal goals. He also seems overly sanguine about the European Union, when the concentration of power in Brussels—and the corresponding willingness to undermine or indirectly overthrow elected governments in member states—runs solidly against liberal distrust of the concentration of power. In the face of the environmental, economic, and cultural challenges of the twenty-first century, the “turn to the center” Fawcett promotes represents a failure to evolve with the times. The productive harmony between liberalism and socialism (and with democracy) must be fused with a concern for environmental sustainability/resilience to survive (and to help humanity survive) in the twenty-first century.
Liberalism is not the same as republicanism—leading to the seemingly strange phenomena of liberals who are content with monarchy. (If a monarch can be constrained via constitutionalism, many liberals, particularly right-wing liberals, seem to be fine.) And liberalism is not the same as democracy, although the case for democracy can and has been made on liberal principles (namely, the inherent egalitarianism of the fourth principle noted above).
Fawcett divides the book into four parts. The first, “The Confidence of Youth,” focuses on the early years of liberalism in 1830-1880. The second, “Liberalism in Maturity and the Struggle with Democracy,” focuses on 1880 to 1945. The third, “Second Chance and Success,” focuses on 1945 to 1989. And the brief last section, “After 1989,” focuses on the post-Cold War era.
Fawcett focuses on the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, analyzing how liberalism evolved in similar phases across these countries. (One might more aptly say “co-evolved,” given that many of the individuals discussed were in contact with liberal peers from other countries, something that isn’t really explored in this book). He carefully chooses which politicians or public intellectuals to feature from each country and at each stage, but this—inevitably—leads to some unfortunate omissions. I would have liked to see more attention given to the role of John Dewey in early twentieth century left-wing liberalism in the US or on Max Weber in German liberalism (he was quite involved with the social-liberal Weimar-era German Democratic Party, and his belief in “value-free social science” and general sociological framework had a strong impact on sociology in liberal democracies during the Cold War, as an alternative to Marxist sociology). In addition, the book can seem unbalanced at times, e.g., when Fawcett focuses disproportionately on one or two countries as opposed to others.
Fawcett is open about the conflicts within liberal thought and notes about how seeming contradictions (e.g, “liberal imperialism”) may not really be so. And he devotes a section to how liberals reacted to semiliberal regimes, focusing on the French Second Empire and Bismarckian Germany. Such regimes forced a tension between liberals’ economic and political concerns. I would have liked him to explore this tension more in later cases as well, and two in particular come to mind. First is the role of German liberals in “enabling” Hitler. Although the left-liberal German Democratic Party no longer existed in 1933 (its successor the “German State Party” wasn’t particularly liberal, and a number of DDP’s left-wing members bolted—one of many liberal schisms—for the Social Democrats), the business liberals of the German People’s Party as well as any other small remaining liberal parties in the Reichstag voted for Hitler’s Enabling Act, neutering the power of the parliament and facilitating the consolidation of the Nazi regime. The Social Democrats at the time were the only true defenders of political liberty—those who were not prevented from attending voted against it. Another good example, alluded to briefly by Fawcett but not given sufficient attention, arises again with the likes of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who were strong supporters of Pinochet in Chile despite the disregard for political liberty in his repressive regime.
I would have also liked more attention to the relationship between liberalism and socialism. Fawcett acknowledges how, post-WWII, many “socialist” parties are more social-liberal than socialist in any Marxist sense. But the influence of socialism on liberalism was not always just a “reluctant compromise.” The UK stands out particularly here, as some socialists (e.g., the Fabians) saw socialism as the highest form of liberalism, the next step in its evolution, drawing on the greater receptiveness to collectivism in Mill’s later writings. To left-wing liberals and liberal socialists, the blending of liberalism and socialism was a productive harmony, not a reluctant compromise. As I noted above in the German case, Social Democrats were strong defenders of political liberty, and the UK’s Labour Party also grew in strength when left-wing liberals bolted from the Liberal Party during/after World War I.
Lastly, I found Fawcett’s conclusion, focusing on the future of liberalism, to be wanting. Given that climate change is perhaps the most pressing global challenge right now, how could he ignore the question of how liberalism will have to adapt to it? Fawcett also comes out as a strong austerian, believing that “liberalism’s historic compromise with democracy is at risk of fiscal overstretch.” But fiscal overstretch in the US is largely a function of war spending and tax cuts, and in the EU, today’s fiscal problems have to do with huge bank bailouts and a misguided effort to cut the way out of the recession. Austerity, as it damages both economic growth and tends to weaken social toleration, threatens liberal goals. He also seems overly sanguine about the European Union, when the concentration of power in Brussels—and the corresponding willingness to undermine or indirectly overthrow elected governments in member states—runs solidly against liberal distrust of the concentration of power. In the face of the environmental, economic, and cultural challenges of the twenty-first century, the “turn to the center” Fawcett promotes represents a failure to evolve with the times. The productive harmony between liberalism and socialism (and with democracy) must be fused with a concern for environmental sustainability/resilience to survive (and to help humanity survive) in the twenty-first century.
February 24, 2021
"Liberal" é um termo que pode significar tanta coisa que tem o risco de não significar nada sem a adição de um outro adjetivo. Social-liberal, left-lib e, no Brasil, o oxímoro liberal-conservador. Em larga medida, foi essa confusão de termos - e o fato de pessoas que parecem pertencer a grupos ideológicos díspares entre si se identificarem como "liberais" - que fez com que eu pegasse o livro do Fawcett para ler.
O livro acaba tendo uma abordagem histórica porque para o autor é melhor entender o que é liberalismo a partir da descrição de correntes de pensamento e movimentos que tomaram forma ao longo da história que foram reconhecidos como liberais do que por uma definição. Por essa razão, o livro é dividido em quatro partes que buscam, cada uma, apresentar um sub-período da história do liberalismo. Esses sub-períodos vão da ascensão liberal como movimento oposição ao conservadorismo no período posterior à Revolução Francesa, ao período recente de aparente debaclê do liberalismo com o esvaziamento do centro político e o crescimento da direita nacionalista e de novas formas de socialismo.
Ao construir um conceito a partir da história, a ideia de liberalismo que Fawcett apresenta é, por construção, ampla e acaba por abarcar uma série de tradições de pensamento que possuem algumas divergências entre si. De todo modo, o autor argumenta que 4 características são distinvamente liberais, quais sejam:
1) Crença na inevitabilidade do conflito
2) Respeito cívico
3) Defesa do progresso
4) Desconfiança do poder
Você pode pensar agora: "ora, o que então não é liberal?". Bom, acho que esse é o ponto do Fawcett no livro: defender um sistema liberal, e não conjunto de políticas públicas específicas ou uma orientação idelógica de um úncio partido em uma democracia. Ao modo de Popper em "Open society and its enemies", o livro de Fawcett é sobretudo uma defesa da democracia liberal em si.
O livro apresentou o que considero uma resposta satisfatória para meus questionamentos e se revelou uma leitura prazerosa. Apesar de ser inglês, o autor conhece muito bem a história do pensamento liberal na Alemanha e na França o que fez com que ele conseguisse cumprir com êxito a promessa de apresentar uma história do liberalismo focando em quatro países: USA, UK, França e Alemanha. Isso é muito interessante porque o liberalismo que aparece nas páginas do livro do Fawcett não é um liberalismo de matriz exclusivamente anglo-saxônica como eu estava acostumado a ver em outras publicações. Talvez por essa razão houve mais espaço para social-minded liberals
O livro acaba tendo uma abordagem histórica porque para o autor é melhor entender o que é liberalismo a partir da descrição de correntes de pensamento e movimentos que tomaram forma ao longo da história que foram reconhecidos como liberais do que por uma definição. Por essa razão, o livro é dividido em quatro partes que buscam, cada uma, apresentar um sub-período da história do liberalismo. Esses sub-períodos vão da ascensão liberal como movimento oposição ao conservadorismo no período posterior à Revolução Francesa, ao período recente de aparente debaclê do liberalismo com o esvaziamento do centro político e o crescimento da direita nacionalista e de novas formas de socialismo.
Ao construir um conceito a partir da história, a ideia de liberalismo que Fawcett apresenta é, por construção, ampla e acaba por abarcar uma série de tradições de pensamento que possuem algumas divergências entre si. De todo modo, o autor argumenta que 4 características são distinvamente liberais, quais sejam:
1) Crença na inevitabilidade do conflito
2) Respeito cívico
3) Defesa do progresso
4) Desconfiança do poder
Você pode pensar agora: "ora, o que então não é liberal?". Bom, acho que esse é o ponto do Fawcett no livro: defender um sistema liberal, e não conjunto de políticas públicas específicas ou uma orientação idelógica de um úncio partido em uma democracia. Ao modo de Popper em "Open society and its enemies", o livro de Fawcett é sobretudo uma defesa da democracia liberal em si.
O livro apresentou o que considero uma resposta satisfatória para meus questionamentos e se revelou uma leitura prazerosa. Apesar de ser inglês, o autor conhece muito bem a história do pensamento liberal na Alemanha e na França o que fez com que ele conseguisse cumprir com êxito a promessa de apresentar uma história do liberalismo focando em quatro países: USA, UK, França e Alemanha. Isso é muito interessante porque o liberalismo que aparece nas páginas do livro do Fawcett não é um liberalismo de matriz exclusivamente anglo-saxônica como eu estava acostumado a ver em outras publicações. Talvez por essa razão houve mais espaço para social-minded liberals
July 29, 2019
What an incredible, electrifying read! This is an ambitious work, and it succeeds. It is written in the tone of a (very) long special feature from the Economist--anyone who has read that magazine will recognize the distinct editorial voice in Fawcett's prose. It is sympathetic but clear-eyed toward its subject. Fawcett writes as a friend of liberalism, but he does not shy away from liberalism's failures and the errors of individual liberal actors.
The book focuses on liberal traditions within four countries (England, France, Germany, and the United States). It includes brief profiles of individual liberal figures that situate them in their political moment, as well as more conceptual sections on various political and social challenges actors faced at different periods in liberalism's history. Fawcett (rightly) takes a fairly capacious view of who counts as a liberal--for example, Margaret Thatcher has a section in the book. It's organized, reasonably I think, into four periods: 1830-1880, 1880-1945, and 1945-1989, and the 21st century. The fourth is quite brief, but I think the second edition has a more extensive discussion on post-1989.
Some observations/limitations of the book: Three of the countries considered are in Europe, and the figures discussed are mostly figures from "high" politics, academics, public intellectuals, and journalists. This is not a book about liberals in creative fields such as the arts, for example, and its discussion of liberal political actors outside of high politics is limited. It also left me hungry for a discussion of liberal traditions in countries outside Europe and America. Fawcett's attention to the French and German liberal traditions is especially welcome, and a corrective to the mistaken view of liberalism as a uniquely "Anglo-American" political tradition, but the book's focus is still delimited to these four countries. Given that Fawcett himself calls for a more global liberal conversation in his coda, however, it seems only appropriate to note the need for histories of liberalism outside Europe and the USA. There's a "why-didn't-you-talk-about-x" problem for everything of finite length ever written, and the above observations are not so much criticism of the work so much as a point about its focus.
The book focuses on liberal traditions within four countries (England, France, Germany, and the United States). It includes brief profiles of individual liberal figures that situate them in their political moment, as well as more conceptual sections on various political and social challenges actors faced at different periods in liberalism's history. Fawcett (rightly) takes a fairly capacious view of who counts as a liberal--for example, Margaret Thatcher has a section in the book. It's organized, reasonably I think, into four periods: 1830-1880, 1880-1945, and 1945-1989, and the 21st century. The fourth is quite brief, but I think the second edition has a more extensive discussion on post-1989.
Some observations/limitations of the book: Three of the countries considered are in Europe, and the figures discussed are mostly figures from "high" politics, academics, public intellectuals, and journalists. This is not a book about liberals in creative fields such as the arts, for example, and its discussion of liberal political actors outside of high politics is limited. It also left me hungry for a discussion of liberal traditions in countries outside Europe and America. Fawcett's attention to the French and German liberal traditions is especially welcome, and a corrective to the mistaken view of liberalism as a uniquely "Anglo-American" political tradition, but the book's focus is still delimited to these four countries. Given that Fawcett himself calls for a more global liberal conversation in his coda, however, it seems only appropriate to note the need for histories of liberalism outside Europe and the USA. There's a "why-didn't-you-talk-about-x" problem for everything of finite length ever written, and the above observations are not so much criticism of the work so much as a point about its focus.
January 1, 2021
The real innovation of this book is to widen the scope of what and who we think of when we think of “liberalism.” Fawcett focuses this history of liberalism in two senses very narrowly, examining liberal thought and practice from the beginning of the 19th century in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. There are of course the major liberal philosophers, politicians, and economists. But Fawcett smartly includes figures like Samuel Smiles, someone totally recognizable today as a “self-help guru.” He doesn’t rise to the historical reputation of Lincoln or Gladstone, but Fawcett shows how his ideas in human “perfectibility” echoed a strain in liberal political thought. Fawcett also makes a strong case to include many figures who are not usually considered liberals, like Sartre and Thatcher, who nevertheless display some elements of liberalism in their thinking. If you have some grounding in the political history of Europe and the United States, but like me are not so familiar with the thinking of the major liberal philosophers, this is a great introduction.
The most confusing part of the book is the very end, where Fawcett focuses on liberal self-doubt in the 21st century. He neatly identifies the “neoliberal turn” in the 1970s and 1980s, but then skips immediately to a post-2008 world. With no discussion of Blair, Schroder, Clinton, or Obama, there is only minimal discussion of how parties of the center-left responded to the Regan/Thatcher era. When the backlash to liberalism does come after the global financial crisis, it is hard to tell where criticisms of liberalism end and support for a real alternative begin. That might be a broader issue critics of liberalism have to contend with.
The most confusing part of the book is the very end, where Fawcett focuses on liberal self-doubt in the 21st century. He neatly identifies the “neoliberal turn” in the 1970s and 1980s, but then skips immediately to a post-2008 world. With no discussion of Blair, Schroder, Clinton, or Obama, there is only minimal discussion of how parties of the center-left responded to the Regan/Thatcher era. When the backlash to liberalism does come after the global financial crisis, it is hard to tell where criticisms of liberalism end and support for a real alternative begin. That might be a broader issue critics of liberalism have to contend with.
October 13, 2019
Great book on the history of what is perhaps the central theme of Western culture for the past 300-400 years - the slow emergence of liberalism and it's many cultural institutions and instantiations.
However, it's increasingly clear that liberalism in the 21st century is in deep trouble both here in the United States and abroad in other liberal democracies. The current constitutional crisis in the United States in fall of 2019 is an outcome of a massive cultural shift away from liberalism and towards autocracy by a sizable portion of the American public and the institutions they've built up - the right-wing media complex and the republican party whose wholesale embrace of Donald Trump and his destructive administration amounts to a complete shift away from liberal democratic values and institutions. As NY Times writer Paul Krugman recently wrote, all indications are that the republican party has become an autocratic regime in the waiting. Trump republicans and their conservative-white-Christian supporters have given up on liberal democracy and see it as the problem. Their answer is autocratic take-over and the demolition of the liberal democratic institutions that have brought this country to where it is today.
Exacerbated by global climate change and populist challenges, liberalism as described in this book is currently undergoing an epic struggle for its very existence into the future. What are you doing to help save it from disappearing?
However, it's increasingly clear that liberalism in the 21st century is in deep trouble both here in the United States and abroad in other liberal democracies. The current constitutional crisis in the United States in fall of 2019 is an outcome of a massive cultural shift away from liberalism and towards autocracy by a sizable portion of the American public and the institutions they've built up - the right-wing media complex and the republican party whose wholesale embrace of Donald Trump and his destructive administration amounts to a complete shift away from liberal democratic values and institutions. As NY Times writer Paul Krugman recently wrote, all indications are that the republican party has become an autocratic regime in the waiting. Trump republicans and their conservative-white-Christian supporters have given up on liberal democracy and see it as the problem. Their answer is autocratic take-over and the demolition of the liberal democratic institutions that have brought this country to where it is today.
Exacerbated by global climate change and populist challenges, liberalism as described in this book is currently undergoing an epic struggle for its very existence into the future. What are you doing to help save it from disappearing?
May 8, 2020
Heavy boek, tanden in zetten en doorbijten
February 10, 2018
Een boeiend boek, maar - letterlijk en figuurlijk - zwaar om lezen. Het duurde 5 maanden om me door het boek te worstelen. Het boek lijkt heel vaak een 'samenraapsel', 'knip-en-plakwerk' uit vele andere boeken over (het) liberalisme. Dat geeft de auteur in het woord van dank - op pagina 505 ook zelf toe: "Voor deze kroniek van het liberalisme heb ik vrijelijk gebruikgemaakt van het werk van een groot aantal auteurs en wetenschappers."
Ik kocht onlangs 'De geschiedenis van het liberalisme' van Dirk Verhofstadt. Dat boek - over hetzelfde onderwerp - lijkt me veel vlotter leesbaar en 'verteerbaar' dan dit boek, waarvoor Dirk Verhofstadt ook het nawoord schreef.
Ik kocht onlangs 'De geschiedenis van het liberalisme' van Dirk Verhofstadt. Dat boek - over hetzelfde onderwerp - lijkt me veel vlotter leesbaar en 'verteerbaar' dan dit boek, waarvoor Dirk Verhofstadt ook het nawoord schreef.
June 30, 2016
Well, it takes a while to read through all these pages, densely packed with information and opinion. But it is worth the effort. Liberalism in the broad term, as understood by Edmund Fawcett, is not confined to the parties, with the word in their name, but it rather applies to the whole mid-stream of political movements between the conservatives on the right and the socialists on the left. Hence this book covers a major part of European and US politics throughout the last 2 centuries.
October 17, 2017
“Our liberalism of melancholy.” That’s how Edmund Fawcett, journalist and writer summed up his sweeping tale of ‘liberalism’ as an idea and its impact on the west. Liberalism, in the historical sense of the word, “Liberalism is a political philosophy or worldview founded on ideas of liberty and equality” as Wikipedia says (the source of all knowledge, I know…).
Liberty and equality. The story of liberalism is the story of humanity’s struggle between these two mutually desired, and often exclusive, outcomes. Liberty – to live an uncoerced life responsible only to ourselves, our consciences and our God. Equality – to not cling desperately on a hillside, naked babies playing at our feet while the rain pours through; squatting in squalor inside a self-engineered brick house, raw sewage running down the makeshift cement steps all the while gazing longingly below into the country clubs and garden parties of our betters.
This is what Edmund Fawcett’s audacious march through modern western history is about. Modern, not pre-modern, not post-modern. Liberalism is an idea that rests squarely in the realm of modernity; nation states and separate but equal powers and taxes; government programs and central banks and courts. All the systems that are fraying in our post-modern world.
It is very clear that Fawcett did his homework, and it would be despicable to throw rocks at so great a work of scholarship, so important a tome. He is in every sense a ‘liberal’, and does not use the word to paper over a multitude of sins as does the political variety of that tribe; and for that I am grateful. Nevertheless, there does remain some concern in my mind on issues of tone and focus, issues that I often debate with myself and others. Because, despite the extraordinary research presented in this tome, the question remains: Is liberalism a happy little nut to be found at the center of increasingly illiberal layers continuing out right and left until they arrive at totalitarianism of one or another extreme – or is in fact a continuum of degrees with totalitarian collectivism at one end of the spectrum and genuine ‘liberty’ at the other?
Edmund Fawcett is most obviously a ‘social democrat’, saving his most merciless contempt for what he calls the ‘hard right’, a term without definition but linked to certain conservative parties and movements in the United States. Given the tendency of ‘social democracy’ to slip easily these days out of the, oh let’s call it ‘consent of the governed’ – and into famine and death (modern Venezuela as only the most recent example) – I wonder if his criticism is not perhaps misplaced. Certainly any serious study of ‘liberalism’ that reduces Ayn Rand to ‘adolescent cult’ status and Ronald Reagan’s historic successes to ‘pushing at an open door’ risks a-priori alienating those liberals who see the philosophy of individualism and government restraint as central to their exercise of liberty; and conversely the social democratic philosophy of altruism and government overreach as too easily manipulated, especially in a post-modern world where the principles of ‘liberalism’ are not well grounded anymore in society. A world where, “After the collective highs of 1989, many liberals now worry whether liberal democracy can continue to work. They worry whether its inner tensions, once a strength, are not threatening to become a weakness. They worry whether liberal democracy is not losing its appeal.”
I have two main comments on this excellently researched and eloquently presented treatise. The first is that it focuses too much on individuals; and too many of those politicians or economists. Politicians follow philosophers and philosophers generally both create and then channel changing ideas in society; while many economists are notoriously deluded (Krugman, cough… cough…). Liberalism in the west was a result of ideological advances brought about by philosophical changes which have their roots in the renaissance, the industrial revolution, the mass-production of reading material and the dramatic increase in well-being and literacy following the end of the dark ages. This rebirth of philosophy set man, not nature nor God at the center of the human experience. Fawcett did not outline how this moved through art and literature and religion in a way that couched the advance of liberalism in its historical context. He could take as an example of how to do this from “The Cause of Hitler’s Germany.”
My second concern, related to the first, was that it was less a story about liberalism and more a chronological Rolodex of ‘liberals’; and again mostly politicians. Individuals who did feats great and small to advance the cause of liberal ideology; but not why, never outlining what was changing in the minds of men which allowed their work to have withstood the test of time. Taking this fact, along with the aforementioned concern that Fawcett leaned more on ‘social democrat’ politicians than others, means this book would best be read in tandem with “The Triumph of Liberty.” The ‘other side’ of the story, as it were.
All that to say, I am grateful for Fawcett for what must have been a herculean effort to deliver this awe-inspiring dissertation to print. He is obviously quite well-read and informed; and now so am I for having read his wonderful book. I highly recommend it, for those of you who love your liberty – who wonder where it came from – and who fear that we are losing it.
Liberty and equality. The story of liberalism is the story of humanity’s struggle between these two mutually desired, and often exclusive, outcomes. Liberty – to live an uncoerced life responsible only to ourselves, our consciences and our God. Equality – to not cling desperately on a hillside, naked babies playing at our feet while the rain pours through; squatting in squalor inside a self-engineered brick house, raw sewage running down the makeshift cement steps all the while gazing longingly below into the country clubs and garden parties of our betters.
This is what Edmund Fawcett’s audacious march through modern western history is about. Modern, not pre-modern, not post-modern. Liberalism is an idea that rests squarely in the realm of modernity; nation states and separate but equal powers and taxes; government programs and central banks and courts. All the systems that are fraying in our post-modern world.
It is very clear that Fawcett did his homework, and it would be despicable to throw rocks at so great a work of scholarship, so important a tome. He is in every sense a ‘liberal’, and does not use the word to paper over a multitude of sins as does the political variety of that tribe; and for that I am grateful. Nevertheless, there does remain some concern in my mind on issues of tone and focus, issues that I often debate with myself and others. Because, despite the extraordinary research presented in this tome, the question remains: Is liberalism a happy little nut to be found at the center of increasingly illiberal layers continuing out right and left until they arrive at totalitarianism of one or another extreme – or is in fact a continuum of degrees with totalitarian collectivism at one end of the spectrum and genuine ‘liberty’ at the other?
Edmund Fawcett is most obviously a ‘social democrat’, saving his most merciless contempt for what he calls the ‘hard right’, a term without definition but linked to certain conservative parties and movements in the United States. Given the tendency of ‘social democracy’ to slip easily these days out of the, oh let’s call it ‘consent of the governed’ – and into famine and death (modern Venezuela as only the most recent example) – I wonder if his criticism is not perhaps misplaced. Certainly any serious study of ‘liberalism’ that reduces Ayn Rand to ‘adolescent cult’ status and Ronald Reagan’s historic successes to ‘pushing at an open door’ risks a-priori alienating those liberals who see the philosophy of individualism and government restraint as central to their exercise of liberty; and conversely the social democratic philosophy of altruism and government overreach as too easily manipulated, especially in a post-modern world where the principles of ‘liberalism’ are not well grounded anymore in society. A world where, “After the collective highs of 1989, many liberals now worry whether liberal democracy can continue to work. They worry whether its inner tensions, once a strength, are not threatening to become a weakness. They worry whether liberal democracy is not losing its appeal.”
I have two main comments on this excellently researched and eloquently presented treatise. The first is that it focuses too much on individuals; and too many of those politicians or economists. Politicians follow philosophers and philosophers generally both create and then channel changing ideas in society; while many economists are notoriously deluded (Krugman, cough… cough…). Liberalism in the west was a result of ideological advances brought about by philosophical changes which have their roots in the renaissance, the industrial revolution, the mass-production of reading material and the dramatic increase in well-being and literacy following the end of the dark ages. This rebirth of philosophy set man, not nature nor God at the center of the human experience. Fawcett did not outline how this moved through art and literature and religion in a way that couched the advance of liberalism in its historical context. He could take as an example of how to do this from “The Cause of Hitler’s Germany.”
My second concern, related to the first, was that it was less a story about liberalism and more a chronological Rolodex of ‘liberals’; and again mostly politicians. Individuals who did feats great and small to advance the cause of liberal ideology; but not why, never outlining what was changing in the minds of men which allowed their work to have withstood the test of time. Taking this fact, along with the aforementioned concern that Fawcett leaned more on ‘social democrat’ politicians than others, means this book would best be read in tandem with “The Triumph of Liberty.” The ‘other side’ of the story, as it were.
All that to say, I am grateful for Fawcett for what must have been a herculean effort to deliver this awe-inspiring dissertation to print. He is obviously quite well-read and informed; and now so am I for having read his wonderful book. I highly recommend it, for those of you who love your liberty – who wonder where it came from – and who fear that we are losing it.
March 16, 2021
I did not know that the idea of liberalism didn’t come about until around 1815.
Liberalism is distinct from socialism. Liberalism is not socialism-lite.
FDR and Hoover were both acolytes of liberalism but just adhered to different strains of liberalism.
This book was a worthwhile but difficult read. I could read about 10 pages in a sitting before my brain went numb from all the information. I had to take notes because there was just too much information for my brain to absorb and retain.
Liberalism is distinct from socialism. Liberalism is not socialism-lite.
FDR and Hoover were both acolytes of liberalism but just adhered to different strains of liberalism.
This book was a worthwhile but difficult read. I could read about 10 pages in a sitting before my brain went numb from all the information. I had to take notes because there was just too much information for my brain to absorb and retain.
July 9, 2025
This was a very nicely structured work that dissected the history of liberal governance, and did so by dividing into four periods. Especially in the second section, the author visited the works of prominent philosophers and thinkers, citing their ideas, criticisms, and contributions to liberalism. As the work covered liberal governance essentially through the present day, it was refreshing to see the author dismiss those aspects of American and British politics as nonsense when appropriate - too many words and too much time elsewhere have been devoted to entertaining stupid ideas.
August 6, 2021
A brief comment on the style of the prose of the book itself. While certainly encyclopaedic in breadth and depth, I personally think that there's lack of distinct continuity from chapter to chapter. The author elaborated liberalism by unpacking each of the liberal thinkers' thoughts according to historical timeline. As liberalism is a congerie of mutually exclusive thoughts and interpretations, this method would be very hard to read and to be understood. Perhaps its an ingenious method by the author to accurately describe the crisis of identity of liberalism, their extreme individualism that prevents any of its figures to be analysed in a group or in a larger sphere of framework.
The watchword for liberalism would be reform. The fourfold of its roots are conflict, progress, resistance to power and respect. One could even generalise the liberal movement as an ambivalent response and understanding towards power. These would be, if possible at all, the single defining character of liberal thinking.
Initially liberalism took root in political reform, not in the sense of universal suffrage or other noble visions modern liberals are associated with, but the kind of reform that pushed the liberalisation of participation of law and deterrence of dominance. The earlier liberals then conceived freedom in a negative way, that is people's sovereignty lies in the non-dominance of nobody, a germinal idea that would progress later into relativism of moral values, the notion of equality and dissent. But then as the time goes on, especially with the rise of Marxian deterministic interpretation of the political world via economic platform, the liberals had to response with their own brand of answer against Marxist collectivism: free-trade and minimal government.
This is the first break between what we moderns thought as the monolithic left. The first generation of liberals, focused in political reform and free-trade economic interpretation started to distance themselves from the socialist right. And a fact often forgotten is that the earlier generation of liberals did not fight for universal suffrage, some even opposed interventionist state policies like universal healthcare or even state-sponsored schools. All this is due to the liberal’s skepticism towards any effort of centralisation lest they lapsed into a totalitarian regime.
It is only at the end of the 19th century, liberals started to embrace democratic (as in populist: celebrating of the many) values, as in incorporating elements that allow them to keep in touch with the issues and concerns of the masses: more political participation, interventionist policies etc. A new brand of liberals thus born, should be more accurately known as democratic liberalism. The earlier brand of liberalism, or known as doctrinaire liberalism or classical liberalism excised itself from this neo-liberalism and emerged in its modern form of libertarianism.
Due to the very nature of democracy, the new synthetical entity always remained an affinity with the left rather than the right. The libertarianism remained in their centre-right position. More and more doctrines are further adapted, inching their way towards a social or moralistic brand of liberalism. Where the classical liberals took extra care to preserve the respect of persons in a negative way (as in deterrence rather than proactive), the neoliberals crafted their policies from a moralistic pulpit. Somehow the moralistic high hid the liberals from the hypocrisy, to the level of audacity of declaring a set of imposed human rights while for the past 150 years, it was these liberal empires that played the role of an antagonist.
Thus the summary of the movement of liberal ideas across historical timeline. The liberals are the people who are extremely sensitive in regards of power. They moved from a purely elitist political exclusivist group in the 19th century to a chimaera of moral exclusivist and political dissent. The lack of unpacking of the modern liberal thoughts of inclusivity, equality, social justice, LGBTQ-ism in this book is deafening. Perhaps it is not something noteworthy to be unpacked in a sober discussion here in the book. The moralistic trumpeting of modern liberals, in my opinion, is a long plateau phase of reaction from the liberals in response to rejuvenation of conservative values over the 1980's onwards. A phase of reaction which necessarily comprises of bubbling emotion could be all heat and steam, but no tangible form. I am not reducing the entire modern liberalism in a patrician way, but the position of moralistic universalism is a walking contradiction at all levels: aesthetic, ethical and spiritual/anthropological. It is best to wait this phase out.
The current political situation really captured what I think the perplexity of modern liberal thoughts. Disappointment over current government's poor handling of the pandemic led a few thousands of youngsters parading under a lockdown order. Things getting complicated when the opposition MP's also broke the lockdown order by congregating urging for the Parliament to reconvene after a week of bickering inside the hallowed halls. Promises to delegate the wishes of the people in the Parliament were forgotten, every MP's, government and opposition took the precious chance to hurl towards each other insults.
A photo displaying the line of the Opposition MP's holding a banner with red characters urging the Prime Minister to step down, with Mahathir in the center, breaking the lockdown order indeed stirred not mild degrees of revulsion. It was the same person who unleashed the riot police and tear gas to the protestors who opposed his premiership 20 years ago. The circle has completed its complete cycle. But the blatant display of hypocrisy and endangering the people in the time of pandemic was sanctified by the young denizens of Malaysia, especially of Twitter extractions under the name of political dissent and right of congregation really showed a nastier side of liberalism: anything goes as long they achieved their overarching moralistic crusade.
The watchword for liberalism would be reform. The fourfold of its roots are conflict, progress, resistance to power and respect. One could even generalise the liberal movement as an ambivalent response and understanding towards power. These would be, if possible at all, the single defining character of liberal thinking.
Initially liberalism took root in political reform, not in the sense of universal suffrage or other noble visions modern liberals are associated with, but the kind of reform that pushed the liberalisation of participation of law and deterrence of dominance. The earlier liberals then conceived freedom in a negative way, that is people's sovereignty lies in the non-dominance of nobody, a germinal idea that would progress later into relativism of moral values, the notion of equality and dissent. But then as the time goes on, especially with the rise of Marxian deterministic interpretation of the political world via economic platform, the liberals had to response with their own brand of answer against Marxist collectivism: free-trade and minimal government.
This is the first break between what we moderns thought as the monolithic left. The first generation of liberals, focused in political reform and free-trade economic interpretation started to distance themselves from the socialist right. And a fact often forgotten is that the earlier generation of liberals did not fight for universal suffrage, some even opposed interventionist state policies like universal healthcare or even state-sponsored schools. All this is due to the liberal’s skepticism towards any effort of centralisation lest they lapsed into a totalitarian regime.
It is only at the end of the 19th century, liberals started to embrace democratic (as in populist: celebrating of the many) values, as in incorporating elements that allow them to keep in touch with the issues and concerns of the masses: more political participation, interventionist policies etc. A new brand of liberals thus born, should be more accurately known as democratic liberalism. The earlier brand of liberalism, or known as doctrinaire liberalism or classical liberalism excised itself from this neo-liberalism and emerged in its modern form of libertarianism.
Due to the very nature of democracy, the new synthetical entity always remained an affinity with the left rather than the right. The libertarianism remained in their centre-right position. More and more doctrines are further adapted, inching their way towards a social or moralistic brand of liberalism. Where the classical liberals took extra care to preserve the respect of persons in a negative way (as in deterrence rather than proactive), the neoliberals crafted their policies from a moralistic pulpit. Somehow the moralistic high hid the liberals from the hypocrisy, to the level of audacity of declaring a set of imposed human rights while for the past 150 years, it was these liberal empires that played the role of an antagonist.
Thus the summary of the movement of liberal ideas across historical timeline. The liberals are the people who are extremely sensitive in regards of power. They moved from a purely elitist political exclusivist group in the 19th century to a chimaera of moral exclusivist and political dissent. The lack of unpacking of the modern liberal thoughts of inclusivity, equality, social justice, LGBTQ-ism in this book is deafening. Perhaps it is not something noteworthy to be unpacked in a sober discussion here in the book. The moralistic trumpeting of modern liberals, in my opinion, is a long plateau phase of reaction from the liberals in response to rejuvenation of conservative values over the 1980's onwards. A phase of reaction which necessarily comprises of bubbling emotion could be all heat and steam, but no tangible form. I am not reducing the entire modern liberalism in a patrician way, but the position of moralistic universalism is a walking contradiction at all levels: aesthetic, ethical and spiritual/anthropological. It is best to wait this phase out.
The current political situation really captured what I think the perplexity of modern liberal thoughts. Disappointment over current government's poor handling of the pandemic led a few thousands of youngsters parading under a lockdown order. Things getting complicated when the opposition MP's also broke the lockdown order by congregating urging for the Parliament to reconvene after a week of bickering inside the hallowed halls. Promises to delegate the wishes of the people in the Parliament were forgotten, every MP's, government and opposition took the precious chance to hurl towards each other insults.
A photo displaying the line of the Opposition MP's holding a banner with red characters urging the Prime Minister to step down, with Mahathir in the center, breaking the lockdown order indeed stirred not mild degrees of revulsion. It was the same person who unleashed the riot police and tear gas to the protestors who opposed his premiership 20 years ago. The circle has completed its complete cycle. But the blatant display of hypocrisy and endangering the people in the time of pandemic was sanctified by the young denizens of Malaysia, especially of Twitter extractions under the name of political dissent and right of congregation really showed a nastier side of liberalism: anything goes as long they achieved their overarching moralistic crusade.
June 10, 2023
An excellent and worthwhile study of liberalism in Western thought and politics, albeit with some quirks I'll get into later. Fawcett is a great writer and perfectly situated for this book, having worked for the Economist magazine for decades. EF argues that while liberalism's traits, focal points, and moods have changed throughout history, 4 characteristics define the broad liberal family:
The first is civic respect, or equal citizenship and a certain level of mutual respect or tolerance for all members of society. The second is the inevitability of conflict in society: in a Madisonian sense, people will always have competing interests and interpretations of a good and moral life, so gov't must provide a structure and society itself a set of norms to enable co-existence and cooperation. Third is a belief in progress, or that education, moral uplift, and material prosperity can elevate the quality of life and the humanity of society over time. Fourth is distrust of concentrated power in any segment of society, whether than be a class, race, gender, branch of gov't, clique, and so on.
I think this is a great list, although I might stress individual rights and the social contract as two other core tenets. Fawcett traces the evolution of these ideas throughout European and US history, focusing on France, GB, US, and Germany. The German sections are especially good, as he shows the co-existence of liberalism and autocracy in Germany in the late 1800s and early 1900s and that Germany was in no way more illiberal than its neighbors, as teleological versions of German history might suggest. He covers both thinkers and politicians, showing the crossover of ideas between these groups.
Historically, EF starts just after the Enlightenment, which he treats as sort of liberal but ultimately a little too pre-modern. Enlightenment thinkers, or people like the American revolutionaries, didn't call themselves liberals and were missing many traits thereof. EF argues that liberalism really emerged in the early-mid 19th century as a response to the massive social and economic upheaval of industrialization, the Napoleonic Wars and restoration period, urbanization, the growth of a literate middle class, and other major disruptions. Liberal thinkers like Constant, Tocqueville, Shulze-Delich, Cobden, and others then took a variety of ideas generated in the classical Enlightenment and applied/adapted them to this new set of challenges. Their ultimate goal was to recreate order without hierarchy, to enable individual human flourishing and expression and economic advancement without throwing all of society into chaos. This is the balancing act that liberalism in many ways still tries to create, and EF is brilliant at showing its evolution.
The biggest point of evolution, according to EF, was liberalism's great compromise with democracy. This point cannot be stressed enough: liberalism and democracy are related, but far from the same thing. Yes, they both emphasize gov't by consent, the rule of law, and liberalism has within it egalitarian ideas that tend toward widening the circle of political participation and equal citizenship. However, in historical terms, most 19th century liberals were skeptical of democracy and wanted it to come in controlled phases (if at all) rather than rapid surges. They had been chastened by the chaos of the French Revolution, and as educated middle to upper class people they feared the ignorant masses, if empowered to the franchise and equal citizenship, would vote for demagogues, ruin the state's finances, and crush unpopular minorities. Reading JS Mill's On Liberty, it is hard to avoid his fear that the greater threat to individual liberty was the crushing force of popular bigotry and ignorance. But these pressures were hard to resist, and most liberals supported gradual expansion of the electorate while emphasizing the importance of having the educated actually run the government and most of its major institutions. A lot of this change took place within autocratic governments, including France and Germany. Liberals were not necessarily averse to autocracy as long as it was "enlightened," but they eventually came around to robust democratization while never losing their suspicion of the masses.
The next phase of this story is the great crisis of liberalism in the early 20th century, where world wars, depressions, and other calamities prompted a crisis of faith in liberalism as well as the rise of totalitarian challengers. Liberalism emerged, however, triumphant and spread over much of the globe, especially in its consumer-capitalist variant. Whether ideas of individualism, civic respect, toleration, etc, spread as widely is up for debate. Fawcett ends with a little coda on the pushback against liberalism after the Cold War, but given that the book was published in 2014, he was just before the massive populist/nationalist backlash of Brexit, Trump, etc. So the real strength of the book is understanding the 19th and 20th centuries and the broad flow of liberal ideas and politics (all in 400 pages, not too bad) rather than how this all applies to the present.
A few small critiques: I don't think there's a single woman or person of color profiled in this book. EF's grasp of major thinkers is liberalism is outstanding, but I think he downplays feminism and civil rights as the children of liberal ideas like equality, civic respect, and fear of unchecked power. I would have liked to have seen more than just passing references to these issues, and profiles of figures like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Bayard Rustin, or Harvey Milk might have added to the breadth of this book. Finally, as a historian, I would have liked to see Fawcett paraphrase less and directly quote his sources more.
But these are small quibbles for what might be the most complete and engaging history of liberalism I have read. I highly recommend reading it if you are into the history of ideas and their applications in politics, and I also recommend his big book on conservatism as well, although as a liberal I found this book simply more enjoyable given that most people in it gel with my beliefs.
The first is civic respect, or equal citizenship and a certain level of mutual respect or tolerance for all members of society. The second is the inevitability of conflict in society: in a Madisonian sense, people will always have competing interests and interpretations of a good and moral life, so gov't must provide a structure and society itself a set of norms to enable co-existence and cooperation. Third is a belief in progress, or that education, moral uplift, and material prosperity can elevate the quality of life and the humanity of society over time. Fourth is distrust of concentrated power in any segment of society, whether than be a class, race, gender, branch of gov't, clique, and so on.
I think this is a great list, although I might stress individual rights and the social contract as two other core tenets. Fawcett traces the evolution of these ideas throughout European and US history, focusing on France, GB, US, and Germany. The German sections are especially good, as he shows the co-existence of liberalism and autocracy in Germany in the late 1800s and early 1900s and that Germany was in no way more illiberal than its neighbors, as teleological versions of German history might suggest. He covers both thinkers and politicians, showing the crossover of ideas between these groups.
Historically, EF starts just after the Enlightenment, which he treats as sort of liberal but ultimately a little too pre-modern. Enlightenment thinkers, or people like the American revolutionaries, didn't call themselves liberals and were missing many traits thereof. EF argues that liberalism really emerged in the early-mid 19th century as a response to the massive social and economic upheaval of industrialization, the Napoleonic Wars and restoration period, urbanization, the growth of a literate middle class, and other major disruptions. Liberal thinkers like Constant, Tocqueville, Shulze-Delich, Cobden, and others then took a variety of ideas generated in the classical Enlightenment and applied/adapted them to this new set of challenges. Their ultimate goal was to recreate order without hierarchy, to enable individual human flourishing and expression and economic advancement without throwing all of society into chaos. This is the balancing act that liberalism in many ways still tries to create, and EF is brilliant at showing its evolution.
The biggest point of evolution, according to EF, was liberalism's great compromise with democracy. This point cannot be stressed enough: liberalism and democracy are related, but far from the same thing. Yes, they both emphasize gov't by consent, the rule of law, and liberalism has within it egalitarian ideas that tend toward widening the circle of political participation and equal citizenship. However, in historical terms, most 19th century liberals were skeptical of democracy and wanted it to come in controlled phases (if at all) rather than rapid surges. They had been chastened by the chaos of the French Revolution, and as educated middle to upper class people they feared the ignorant masses, if empowered to the franchise and equal citizenship, would vote for demagogues, ruin the state's finances, and crush unpopular minorities. Reading JS Mill's On Liberty, it is hard to avoid his fear that the greater threat to individual liberty was the crushing force of popular bigotry and ignorance. But these pressures were hard to resist, and most liberals supported gradual expansion of the electorate while emphasizing the importance of having the educated actually run the government and most of its major institutions. A lot of this change took place within autocratic governments, including France and Germany. Liberals were not necessarily averse to autocracy as long as it was "enlightened," but they eventually came around to robust democratization while never losing their suspicion of the masses.
The next phase of this story is the great crisis of liberalism in the early 20th century, where world wars, depressions, and other calamities prompted a crisis of faith in liberalism as well as the rise of totalitarian challengers. Liberalism emerged, however, triumphant and spread over much of the globe, especially in its consumer-capitalist variant. Whether ideas of individualism, civic respect, toleration, etc, spread as widely is up for debate. Fawcett ends with a little coda on the pushback against liberalism after the Cold War, but given that the book was published in 2014, he was just before the massive populist/nationalist backlash of Brexit, Trump, etc. So the real strength of the book is understanding the 19th and 20th centuries and the broad flow of liberal ideas and politics (all in 400 pages, not too bad) rather than how this all applies to the present.
A few small critiques: I don't think there's a single woman or person of color profiled in this book. EF's grasp of major thinkers is liberalism is outstanding, but I think he downplays feminism and civil rights as the children of liberal ideas like equality, civic respect, and fear of unchecked power. I would have liked to have seen more than just passing references to these issues, and profiles of figures like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Bayard Rustin, or Harvey Milk might have added to the breadth of this book. Finally, as a historian, I would have liked to see Fawcett paraphrase less and directly quote his sources more.
But these are small quibbles for what might be the most complete and engaging history of liberalism I have read. I highly recommend reading it if you are into the history of ideas and their applications in politics, and I also recommend his big book on conservatism as well, although as a liberal I found this book simply more enjoyable given that most people in it gel with my beliefs.
June 11, 2018
I would give this book 4 stars if it were not for the way the author writes. I found his sentence construction to be unnecessarily verbose and circular.
The information in this book is excellent. Fawcett gives a very good understanding of what Liberalism is, the ideas within, the tensions that exist within those ideas, and the important figures within the tradition. A large part of the book deals with economics and so it may be beneficial to have a decent grasp on macroeconomic concepts (I wish I did).
Overall, I recommend this book to anyone who wants to understand the ideological foundations of the modern world, not just to illuminate how our way of life came into being, but to also understand the current populist, illiberal attacks, that we are currently facing.
The information in this book is excellent. Fawcett gives a very good understanding of what Liberalism is, the ideas within, the tensions that exist within those ideas, and the important figures within the tradition. A large part of the book deals with economics and so it may be beneficial to have a decent grasp on macroeconomic concepts (I wish I did).
Overall, I recommend this book to anyone who wants to understand the ideological foundations of the modern world, not just to illuminate how our way of life came into being, but to also understand the current populist, illiberal attacks, that we are currently facing.
January 17, 2016
Good topic, and informative. But the book was sprawling, disorganized, and with no clear message. I also disagree with some of the thinkers and thoughts he includes in the "liberal" tent.
June 11, 2021
Must read history of liberalism regardless of your political stance. Compelling argument that if we stop paying attention to the principles that brought the Western world freedom and pluralism and economic liberty we leave ourselves vulnerable to other forms of government.
Primary principles of liberal thought: conflict in society is expected, power must be resisted, humans can progress, we must pay attention to civic respect.
"Liberalism laid out the feast, and democracy drew up the guest list."
Early liberals feared both riotous mobs and powerful states/monarchs/churches - their aim was to a find a balance that could provide order, but with the 4 basic liberal principles maintained
Even with the seeming defeat of fascism, then communism, the liberal victories were short-lived and soon challenged by "one-party authoritarianism, state capitalism, democratic nationalism, theocratic Islamism and illiberal populist movements of left and right."
Liberalism, touting gradual progress, seemed to try to differentiate itself from conservatism (no or slow progress), and socialism (rapid and revolutionary class progress).
The liberal quandary, balancing freedom and control, was stated by Lord Acton, "My liberalism admits to everyone the right to his own opinion and imposes on me the duty of teaching him what is best."
Side note - the overwhelming focus of the book is on 19th century and beyond developments, which is strange given that the principles of liberalism, and many of the ideas presented as 19th century creations, were present in the U.S. founding and Constitution
Liberals wanted structures where power was never absolute, where there was no "final say," and disputes and questioning would continue on with flexible and adaptable structures to change as needed (liberals hoped for many sides to the argument, whereas, for example, socialists saw 2 sides)
Fawcett sees the first American liberals as the Whigs, formed to challenge Jacksonian populism.
"Gladstone's ideal of a virtuous liberal commonwealth was a Christian state, not imposed by law but arisen in spirit, and peopled by latter-day Hectors."
"In between premodern unity and modern diversity came a bridge of toleration. The crossing was slow, with much backing up."
"In liberal thought, the dominant problem became less principle than cost: could liberalism afford democracy? Murmured in Mill, voiced by Schumpeter and Hayek, that troubling query anchored liberalism's economic anxiety about democracy."
Liberalism concern with democracy was that mass participation could lead to anarchy, which would end in order via despotism, In addition, the concern (perhaps being proven today), was that the masses would demand government expenditure that eventually would be infeasible.
The risk with liberalism became a shift from fearing and restricting the power of the state, to using that power to achieve their ends.
"Popper in effect divided the world into open, liberal-minded spirits who accepted change, uncertainty, and the provisional character of life and knowledge, and closed-up, illiberal spirits who craved sameness, fixity, and security. Good societies came from the first, bad from the second."
Liberals faced the question, in pushing for progress, or "is this enough?" for example with levels of shelter, food and schooling. How much should the state do?
Negative liberty - free to not be held back, vs. Positive Liberty - must be given the way to progress
Hayek: rule of law and limitations on democratic choice are needed - made order was not as beneficial as spontaneous order
Hayek claimed he was not a conservative, and listed the faults of conservatism: fear of change and uncontrolled social forces, fond of authority, no grasp of economics, did not engage well with people of different outlooks, too cozy with elites, jingoistic, suspicious of democracy
John Rawls moved past the Utilitarian liberal approach with the structure asking people to choose social arrangements that were reasonable, setting aside that person's own talents, interest, aims and ideals. He shifted the liberal focus from liberty to rights.
Friedman - governments should enforce contracts, promote competition, protect the most vulnerable, and ensure stable money
Populism should be thought of as either a phenomenon of the left or right, where one side claims to speak for "the people"
Conclusion: "If twenty-first century liberals can avoid aping their critics in piling all their difficulties into one insurmountable heap, if like earlier liberals they can rethink their aims of resistance, progress, and respect to suit new challenges, if they can find the political will to begin fixing even some of the many flaws in liberal democratic societies, then it may yet be too early to bury liberalism under a statue of hope."
Primary principles of liberal thought: conflict in society is expected, power must be resisted, humans can progress, we must pay attention to civic respect.
"Liberalism laid out the feast, and democracy drew up the guest list."
Early liberals feared both riotous mobs and powerful states/monarchs/churches - their aim was to a find a balance that could provide order, but with the 4 basic liberal principles maintained
Even with the seeming defeat of fascism, then communism, the liberal victories were short-lived and soon challenged by "one-party authoritarianism, state capitalism, democratic nationalism, theocratic Islamism and illiberal populist movements of left and right."
Liberalism, touting gradual progress, seemed to try to differentiate itself from conservatism (no or slow progress), and socialism (rapid and revolutionary class progress).
The liberal quandary, balancing freedom and control, was stated by Lord Acton, "My liberalism admits to everyone the right to his own opinion and imposes on me the duty of teaching him what is best."
Side note - the overwhelming focus of the book is on 19th century and beyond developments, which is strange given that the principles of liberalism, and many of the ideas presented as 19th century creations, were present in the U.S. founding and Constitution
Liberals wanted structures where power was never absolute, where there was no "final say," and disputes and questioning would continue on with flexible and adaptable structures to change as needed (liberals hoped for many sides to the argument, whereas, for example, socialists saw 2 sides)
Fawcett sees the first American liberals as the Whigs, formed to challenge Jacksonian populism.
"Gladstone's ideal of a virtuous liberal commonwealth was a Christian state, not imposed by law but arisen in spirit, and peopled by latter-day Hectors."
"In between premodern unity and modern diversity came a bridge of toleration. The crossing was slow, with much backing up."
"In liberal thought, the dominant problem became less principle than cost: could liberalism afford democracy? Murmured in Mill, voiced by Schumpeter and Hayek, that troubling query anchored liberalism's economic anxiety about democracy."
Liberalism concern with democracy was that mass participation could lead to anarchy, which would end in order via despotism, In addition, the concern (perhaps being proven today), was that the masses would demand government expenditure that eventually would be infeasible.
The risk with liberalism became a shift from fearing and restricting the power of the state, to using that power to achieve their ends.
"Popper in effect divided the world into open, liberal-minded spirits who accepted change, uncertainty, and the provisional character of life and knowledge, and closed-up, illiberal spirits who craved sameness, fixity, and security. Good societies came from the first, bad from the second."
Liberals faced the question, in pushing for progress, or "is this enough?" for example with levels of shelter, food and schooling. How much should the state do?
Negative liberty - free to not be held back, vs. Positive Liberty - must be given the way to progress
Hayek: rule of law and limitations on democratic choice are needed - made order was not as beneficial as spontaneous order
Hayek claimed he was not a conservative, and listed the faults of conservatism: fear of change and uncontrolled social forces, fond of authority, no grasp of economics, did not engage well with people of different outlooks, too cozy with elites, jingoistic, suspicious of democracy
John Rawls moved past the Utilitarian liberal approach with the structure asking people to choose social arrangements that were reasonable, setting aside that person's own talents, interest, aims and ideals. He shifted the liberal focus from liberty to rights.
Friedman - governments should enforce contracts, promote competition, protect the most vulnerable, and ensure stable money
Populism should be thought of as either a phenomenon of the left or right, where one side claims to speak for "the people"
Conclusion: "If twenty-first century liberals can avoid aping their critics in piling all their difficulties into one insurmountable heap, if like earlier liberals they can rethink their aims of resistance, progress, and respect to suit new challenges, if they can find the political will to begin fixing even some of the many flaws in liberal democratic societies, then it may yet be too early to bury liberalism under a statue of hope."
March 10, 2025
When this book appeared in 2014, the crisis of liberal democracy was already palpable, and the decade since has only magnified it. Interestingly, Edmund Fawcett wrote this only a quarter-century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a fitting climax to the triumph of liberalism in the half-century after the devastation of World War Two.
Yet all is not lost. Fawcett ends his book on a hopeful note. If the current loss of confidence in liberalism leads to a renewed cherishing of what had been taken for granted, it could bring about renewal.
It’s important to understand what the author means by liberalism, which—as he notes—is a red flag word for many, especially in the United States. Fawcett identifies four commitments shared by liberals. They are resistance to power, faith in social progress, respect for people’s chosen enterprises and beliefs, and acceptance that interests and faiths always conflict. Except for faith in social progress, I had thought of these as conservative values. Fawcett makes the case, though, that this constellation of shared commitments suffices to define liberals and set liberalism apart from conservatism and socialism, liberalism’s chief nineteenth-century rivals.
The four shared commitments do not mean that liberalism is homogenous. Fawcett casts a wide net and discerns wings both on the right (more concerned with free markets) and on the left (more concerned with broader democracy), allowing him to include as liberals some that might surprise many readers, such as Herbert Hoover, Richard Nixon, and Milton Friedman.
Fawcett contends that although liberalism has economic and moral aspects, it “has won broadest understanding and support when insisting on the primacy of politics—endless public argument and compromise.”
One often speaks of liberal democracy, but Fawcett points out that democracy and liberalism are distinct. “Liberalism is about how authority is to be restrained and talked back to. It is about how people, their beliefs, and their property are to be shielded from the intrusive powers of state, market, and society. It is about how the core respect owed to people and their chosen enterprises can be given practical cash value in custom and law. It is about how the general conditions of moral and material life are to be improved. Democracy, by contrast, is about who belongs in that happy circle of voice, protection, and progress.”
Fawcett divides the history of liberalism into three periods: the confidence of youth (1830–1880), maturity and the struggle with democracy (1880–1945), and second chance and success (1945–1989).
Overall, this book covered personalities I was already familiar with but whom I was happy to get to know better, as well as many others new to me. In general, the biographical sketches of politicians, economists, and philosophers were easier for me to follow than the sections on economics. I found Fawcett’s discussion of liberal imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century very good. Given the current rejection of the idea of universal human rights, I was interested to read that the group that drafted the 1948 declaration included representatives from Lebanon, India, and other non-Western countries.
Above all, the four defining commitments gave me much to think about. I was struck by the third, respect for people’s chosen beliefs and enterprises. Fawcett explicates this as civic tolerance. This is a matter of legal protection and freedom from discrimination. Whereas personal respect might be lost or withdrawn, “civic respect was due to people unconditionally. It was also due blindly or anonymously. State, market, and society could not pick and choose whom to respect.”
So am I a liberal? I can tick three of the boxes whole-heartedly. Only one gives me difficulty, the faith in social progress. I’ll admit I wish it were so, but that’s not the same as faith.
Yet all is not lost. Fawcett ends his book on a hopeful note. If the current loss of confidence in liberalism leads to a renewed cherishing of what had been taken for granted, it could bring about renewal.
It’s important to understand what the author means by liberalism, which—as he notes—is a red flag word for many, especially in the United States. Fawcett identifies four commitments shared by liberals. They are resistance to power, faith in social progress, respect for people’s chosen enterprises and beliefs, and acceptance that interests and faiths always conflict. Except for faith in social progress, I had thought of these as conservative values. Fawcett makes the case, though, that this constellation of shared commitments suffices to define liberals and set liberalism apart from conservatism and socialism, liberalism’s chief nineteenth-century rivals.
The four shared commitments do not mean that liberalism is homogenous. Fawcett casts a wide net and discerns wings both on the right (more concerned with free markets) and on the left (more concerned with broader democracy), allowing him to include as liberals some that might surprise many readers, such as Herbert Hoover, Richard Nixon, and Milton Friedman.
Fawcett contends that although liberalism has economic and moral aspects, it “has won broadest understanding and support when insisting on the primacy of politics—endless public argument and compromise.”
One often speaks of liberal democracy, but Fawcett points out that democracy and liberalism are distinct. “Liberalism is about how authority is to be restrained and talked back to. It is about how people, their beliefs, and their property are to be shielded from the intrusive powers of state, market, and society. It is about how the core respect owed to people and their chosen enterprises can be given practical cash value in custom and law. It is about how the general conditions of moral and material life are to be improved. Democracy, by contrast, is about who belongs in that happy circle of voice, protection, and progress.”
Fawcett divides the history of liberalism into three periods: the confidence of youth (1830–1880), maturity and the struggle with democracy (1880–1945), and second chance and success (1945–1989).
Overall, this book covered personalities I was already familiar with but whom I was happy to get to know better, as well as many others new to me. In general, the biographical sketches of politicians, economists, and philosophers were easier for me to follow than the sections on economics. I found Fawcett’s discussion of liberal imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century very good. Given the current rejection of the idea of universal human rights, I was interested to read that the group that drafted the 1948 declaration included representatives from Lebanon, India, and other non-Western countries.
Above all, the four defining commitments gave me much to think about. I was struck by the third, respect for people’s chosen beliefs and enterprises. Fawcett explicates this as civic tolerance. This is a matter of legal protection and freedom from discrimination. Whereas personal respect might be lost or withdrawn, “civic respect was due to people unconditionally. It was also due blindly or anonymously. State, market, and society could not pick and choose whom to respect.”
So am I a liberal? I can tick three of the boxes whole-heartedly. Only one gives me difficulty, the faith in social progress. I’ll admit I wish it were so, but that’s not the same as faith.
December 13, 2021
Edmund Fawcett gives a unique and refreshing spin on liberalism. From the outset, he gives ample room for a "social liberalism" on the left side of the spectrum, and one that defies the popular caricature of liberalism as atomic individualism or bougie moderation. Indeed, if I recall correctly, the first liberal Fawcett begins his tale with is Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose liberalism takes a distinctively developmentalist flavor.
Fawcett focuses on four geographical theaters: France, Germany, the United Kindom, and the United States, thus avoiding parochial liberal perversities. Insisting that liberalism is a political *practice* first and set of theoretical commitments only ex post, Fawcett weaves a tapestry of not just philosophers and economists, but also politicians and activists.
Fawcett identifies four impulses animating liberalism: agonistic pluralism, or ineradicable conflict; resistance to power, be it political, economic, or social; faith in the possibility of progress; and civic respect or civic equality. These are curious choices for two reasons. First, there are old liberal arguments that suggest laissez-faire economic policies tend to reduce conflict, leveraging a "natural harmony of interests". Second, it is a famously common barb against liberals is that they ignore disparities power entirely, and while Fawcett's book itself provides ample evidence that this charge is unjust for the liberal tradition as a whole, it hits the mark for much of the "classical liberal" wing. Thus Fawcett's tale leans in favor of social liberalism, despite providing ample and fair coverage of classical liberal thinkers like Hayek and Friedman. As a social liberal myself I welcome the greater emphasis on the left wing of the tradition, so this is more of an observation than a criticism.
The one significant criticism I have of the book is that racial justice and feminism are largely absent. There are early red flags, as when the only comment he makes on Reconstruction in America is that its end may have spurred capital accumulation in the South. He does catch up somewhat in the end with discussions of campaigns to end racial discrimination in the second half of the 20th century, and he does mostly avoid the caricatures of identity politics that are popular with centrist liberals.
I could see Fawcett avoiding these topics if he were writing a liberal hagiography, or if he wanted to keep his discussion to self-identifying liberals. But Fawcett is admirably forthright about liberalism's historical shortcomings, like its long resistance to democracy and its culpable entanglement with imperialism. And Fawcett annexes all kinds of non-liberals for his story throughout the book, from liberal-adjacent thinkers like Oakeshott (really a conservative) and Sartre (really a socialist) to activists like ACLU cofounder Roger Baldwin (he was a Wobbly!). He only off-handedly mentions Frederick Douglass, a 19th century liberal practitioner of the first order—he counseled Presidents!—and is generally regarded as a liberal. It may have taken another hundred pages, but exploring the ways antiracist and feminist thought has influenced and been influenced by liberalism, and indeed annexing several social justice thinkers into the liberal fold, is a necessary and critical part of the story Fawcett wishes to tell. The book is incomplete without this engagement.
Overall, Liberalism: the Life of an Idea is essential reading for any liberal who is interested in the history of liberalism, its many currents, and its ongoing evolution.
Fawcett focuses on four geographical theaters: France, Germany, the United Kindom, and the United States, thus avoiding parochial liberal perversities. Insisting that liberalism is a political *practice* first and set of theoretical commitments only ex post, Fawcett weaves a tapestry of not just philosophers and economists, but also politicians and activists.
Fawcett identifies four impulses animating liberalism: agonistic pluralism, or ineradicable conflict; resistance to power, be it political, economic, or social; faith in the possibility of progress; and civic respect or civic equality. These are curious choices for two reasons. First, there are old liberal arguments that suggest laissez-faire economic policies tend to reduce conflict, leveraging a "natural harmony of interests". Second, it is a famously common barb against liberals is that they ignore disparities power entirely, and while Fawcett's book itself provides ample evidence that this charge is unjust for the liberal tradition as a whole, it hits the mark for much of the "classical liberal" wing. Thus Fawcett's tale leans in favor of social liberalism, despite providing ample and fair coverage of classical liberal thinkers like Hayek and Friedman. As a social liberal myself I welcome the greater emphasis on the left wing of the tradition, so this is more of an observation than a criticism.
The one significant criticism I have of the book is that racial justice and feminism are largely absent. There are early red flags, as when the only comment he makes on Reconstruction in America is that its end may have spurred capital accumulation in the South. He does catch up somewhat in the end with discussions of campaigns to end racial discrimination in the second half of the 20th century, and he does mostly avoid the caricatures of identity politics that are popular with centrist liberals.
I could see Fawcett avoiding these topics if he were writing a liberal hagiography, or if he wanted to keep his discussion to self-identifying liberals. But Fawcett is admirably forthright about liberalism's historical shortcomings, like its long resistance to democracy and its culpable entanglement with imperialism. And Fawcett annexes all kinds of non-liberals for his story throughout the book, from liberal-adjacent thinkers like Oakeshott (really a conservative) and Sartre (really a socialist) to activists like ACLU cofounder Roger Baldwin (he was a Wobbly!). He only off-handedly mentions Frederick Douglass, a 19th century liberal practitioner of the first order—he counseled Presidents!—and is generally regarded as a liberal. It may have taken another hundred pages, but exploring the ways antiracist and feminist thought has influenced and been influenced by liberalism, and indeed annexing several social justice thinkers into the liberal fold, is a necessary and critical part of the story Fawcett wishes to tell. The book is incomplete without this engagement.
Overall, Liberalism: the Life of an Idea is essential reading for any liberal who is interested in the history of liberalism, its many currents, and its ongoing evolution.
March 16, 2025
I got this book to understand what liberalism is and how it came about, and I was not disappointed.
The book defines liberalism as a practice of politics that has evolved and grown over the past 200 years or so. It is presented as a big tent, in which left and right liberals can (indeed, will permanently) disagree about most issues beyond a handful of key principles. The four principles are: acceptance that conflict is inevitable in society, resistance to power (in particular, to any interest that wants to dominate over all others), the belief in progress of human character and society, and civic respect (power should not obstruct people pursuing their interests, not intrude in their personal sphere, and not exclude anyone from these rights).
These principles are illustrated throughout the book through the lives of key figures like politicians, economists, and philosophers across the UK, France, Germany, and the US. Since liberalism is a practice (rather than a well-rounded political theory formulated by a key intellectual), it is through the actions of many liberals that liberalism takes shape. The author does a great job in telling the stories of these key figures and how they shaped the evolution of liberalism in a way that is engaging and entertaining.
Although the author is openly sympathetic to liberal ideas, he does not miss the opportunity to remind readers of the uglier sides of liberalism's history (e.g., it's relation with slavery, democracy, women's rights, etc). Still, I missed more women as main characters (the only one is Margaret Thatcher) and also some key figures who helped liberalism overcome some of its worse impulses (like Martin Luther King Jr).
Overall, it was a very enjoyable read that will give you a better understanding of liberalism and its historical evolution through the lives of some key figures. It is an ambitious book, but not an academic one, so it felt both accessible and sometimes lacking depth and a sharper critical view.
The book defines liberalism as a practice of politics that has evolved and grown over the past 200 years or so. It is presented as a big tent, in which left and right liberals can (indeed, will permanently) disagree about most issues beyond a handful of key principles. The four principles are: acceptance that conflict is inevitable in society, resistance to power (in particular, to any interest that wants to dominate over all others), the belief in progress of human character and society, and civic respect (power should not obstruct people pursuing their interests, not intrude in their personal sphere, and not exclude anyone from these rights).
These principles are illustrated throughout the book through the lives of key figures like politicians, economists, and philosophers across the UK, France, Germany, and the US. Since liberalism is a practice (rather than a well-rounded political theory formulated by a key intellectual), it is through the actions of many liberals that liberalism takes shape. The author does a great job in telling the stories of these key figures and how they shaped the evolution of liberalism in a way that is engaging and entertaining.
Although the author is openly sympathetic to liberal ideas, he does not miss the opportunity to remind readers of the uglier sides of liberalism's history (e.g., it's relation with slavery, democracy, women's rights, etc). Still, I missed more women as main characters (the only one is Margaret Thatcher) and also some key figures who helped liberalism overcome some of its worse impulses (like Martin Luther King Jr).
Overall, it was a very enjoyable read that will give you a better understanding of liberalism and its historical evolution through the lives of some key figures. It is an ambitious book, but not an academic one, so it felt both accessible and sometimes lacking depth and a sharper critical view.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 22, 2019
Very good overview. In the meantime already available in an expanded, second edition.
It gave me a much better idea of who is responding to who. I would read this for example after Liberalism - A Very Short Introduction. After that, you could read some more specialized works that deal with particular area's, or plunge right in and read the works Fawcett is discussing throughout.
Personally, I already read many works that were discussed in this book, but I certainly will pick up a few that I haven't read in a while and at the same time plunge into anything unfamiliar that I came across in this book.
Not only a book to read from cover to cover (in order to understand anything of the background and complexities of today's liberal position) but also to keep on referring to and to pick up time and time again just to read a specific chapter or to jog your memory.
One point of critique might be that the book starts with Humboldt and Constant through the ideas that came to be known as liberal are much older. Fawcett is touching upon this shortly by tossing up a few names, but the real intellectual origins are not really discussed. This last is particularly regretful as books on the entire history or a part of it as unfortunately few and far in between. So I guess we will have to wait till someone will connect this so-called 'early ideas of liberalism' with the one that are now regarded as liberalism.
Apart from this, this book is highly recommended.
It gave me a much better idea of who is responding to who. I would read this for example after Liberalism - A Very Short Introduction. After that, you could read some more specialized works that deal with particular area's, or plunge right in and read the works Fawcett is discussing throughout.
Personally, I already read many works that were discussed in this book, but I certainly will pick up a few that I haven't read in a while and at the same time plunge into anything unfamiliar that I came across in this book.
Not only a book to read from cover to cover (in order to understand anything of the background and complexities of today's liberal position) but also to keep on referring to and to pick up time and time again just to read a specific chapter or to jog your memory.
One point of critique might be that the book starts with Humboldt and Constant through the ideas that came to be known as liberal are much older. Fawcett is touching upon this shortly by tossing up a few names, but the real intellectual origins are not really discussed. This last is particularly regretful as books on the entire history or a part of it as unfortunately few and far in between. So I guess we will have to wait till someone will connect this so-called 'early ideas of liberalism' with the one that are now regarded as liberalism.
Apart from this, this book is highly recommended.
August 20, 2023
Mr. Fawcett has written a sterile intellectual history of Liberalism in the intellectual history of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. Fawcett's definition of "Liberalism" is so broad that he can include many thinkers who I am certain would be surprised to find themselves lumped together. The sketches of the ideas and lives of key thinkers are briefly outlined (think of the first paragraph of a Wikipedia page). Interestingly, while Mr. Fawcett does discuss James Madison in passing, the Federalist Papers do not rate much focus, even though they seem to illustrate Mr. Fawcett's idea of Liberalism really well.
Mr. Fawcett thinks Liberalism has four key components: (i) acceptance that moral and material conflict can't be eliminated, only channeled into less violent and more productive means of resolution; (ii) hostility to any unlimited power; (iii) a belief in social progress; and (iv) government and society should have respect for individuals. I found this definition in the introduction to be very useful. However, the rest of the book was really just a listing of folks who held some version of these beliefs and a summary of their writing. There was no real linkage to real people's lives and I found it hard to find a coherent thread in the book. I think a better illustration of Liberal thought in action and its critics was Tara Zahara's Against the World. Mr. Fawcett's work felt more like a reference volume.
Mr. Fawcett thinks Liberalism has four key components: (i) acceptance that moral and material conflict can't be eliminated, only channeled into less violent and more productive means of resolution; (ii) hostility to any unlimited power; (iii) a belief in social progress; and (iv) government and society should have respect for individuals. I found this definition in the introduction to be very useful. However, the rest of the book was really just a listing of folks who held some version of these beliefs and a summary of their writing. There was no real linkage to real people's lives and I found it hard to find a coherent thread in the book. I think a better illustration of Liberal thought in action and its critics was Tara Zahara's Against the World. Mr. Fawcett's work felt more like a reference volume.
October 30, 2025
Ik schrok een beetje toen deze baksteen werd afgeleverd maar zo tussen andere boeken door was het lezen prima te doen.
Ofschoon het een beetje stroef is vertaald, biedt ‘Liberalisme, het verhaal van een idee’ een boeiend, breed én diep overzicht van de geschiedenis van het liberalisme in Duitsland, Engeland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten.
Veel werken definiëren het liberalisme vrij strak, terwijl Fawcett eigenlijk de hele liberale democratie en economie tot het erfgoed van de liberalen rekent. Uitgebracht in 2015 komt het helaas net niet toe aan de huidige uitdaging van het populisme: zijn we als liberale wachters van onze maatschappij en rechtstaat daar tegen bestand en hoe wordt daarover gedacht en (aan de hand daarvan) gehandeld? Terugbladeren naar onder meer de passages over de Weimarrepubliek en de perioden daarvoor met hun fragiele politieke stelsels biedt wel wat aanknopingspunten.
En dat is ook de waarde van dit boek: een geschiedenisboek dat je uit de kast trekt om een interessante historische parallel of denker te (her)ontdekken. Handzaam, in figuurlijke zin ;-)
Ofschoon het een beetje stroef is vertaald, biedt ‘Liberalisme, het verhaal van een idee’ een boeiend, breed én diep overzicht van de geschiedenis van het liberalisme in Duitsland, Engeland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten.
Veel werken definiëren het liberalisme vrij strak, terwijl Fawcett eigenlijk de hele liberale democratie en economie tot het erfgoed van de liberalen rekent. Uitgebracht in 2015 komt het helaas net niet toe aan de huidige uitdaging van het populisme: zijn we als liberale wachters van onze maatschappij en rechtstaat daar tegen bestand en hoe wordt daarover gedacht en (aan de hand daarvan) gehandeld? Terugbladeren naar onder meer de passages over de Weimarrepubliek en de perioden daarvoor met hun fragiele politieke stelsels biedt wel wat aanknopingspunten.
En dat is ook de waarde van dit boek: een geschiedenisboek dat je uit de kast trekt om een interessante historische parallel of denker te (her)ontdekken. Handzaam, in figuurlijke zin ;-)
November 8, 2022
Very enjoyable, if perhaps a little more puzzling than his 'Conservatism.' I'm afraid we'll wait in vain for 'Socialism' and 'Fascism.' Fawcett is refreshingly willing to just give definitions, and to include in or out whomever he wants; the second edition includes a particularly odd and defensive reaction to critics who complained about his including Sartre in--like, did they ever read *any* existentialism?
The book suffers a bit from Fawcett's unwillingness to include anything on proto-liberals--no Madison in here, for instance; it also suffers from Fawcett's tendency to bury things in the middle of paragraphs, which shouldn't happen to anyone who writes such nice sentences.
Failing all else, he gets four stars for describing 'The Road to Serfdom' as a 'noir classic,' which pretty much nails how seriously anyone should take that book intellectually, but also how effective it is emotionally.
The book suffers a bit from Fawcett's unwillingness to include anything on proto-liberals--no Madison in here, for instance; it also suffers from Fawcett's tendency to bury things in the middle of paragraphs, which shouldn't happen to anyone who writes such nice sentences.
Failing all else, he gets four stars for describing 'The Road to Serfdom' as a 'noir classic,' which pretty much nails how seriously anyone should take that book intellectually, but also how effective it is emotionally.
December 29, 2020
History of Liberalism is the history of modern society. Amazingly detailed, perhaps a little confusing at times due to this; Fawcett is too detailed and knowledgeable for his own good. He jumps from one country to the next, from one philosopher/politician to the next (even obscure ones), and back and forth between years. Not enough attention is paid to the origins of liberalism in the enlightenment and John Locke (the focus mainly on 19th century onwards), and Fawcett's view of who can be viewed as "liberal" is mightily inclusive. However, this is the go-to book to understand the main ideias, and players involved, in what the idea of progress means in the modern world.
June 19, 2021
Fawcett follows liberal thinkers and practitioners in France, UK, Germany, and US in an impressive tour de force. It's not an academic work, but it's not an easy reading also -- perhaps because the history of Liberalism is not one of uncontested defining characters, but a mishmash of wins and losses, a perennial battle against its many enemies. It deserves a coda about the Trump years.
December 15, 2017
This is one seriously deep dive into the political theory and practice of liberalism. It's a case where I'm not sure how much I learned that's instantly recallable. It's more like learning the way one does through an experience.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 5, 2018
Not as well-written as one might expect from a life-long journalist. But immensely informative.
January 30, 2019
此書講述自由主義的歷史，它與我們現在身處的社會息息相關。由十八世紀以來，自由主義不停的演化到今天，我們今天能夠擁有的東西例如人權、自由市場是得來不易。而原來自由主義涉及到的範圍相當廣，像是經濟自由主義、自由民主主義、社會自由主義等等。從廣義的角度來說，自由主義的四大原則：反權威、進步、衝突中尋求秩序以及尊重。
March 8, 2021
A tome of enlightenment (lower case "e" ).
July 7, 2024
A good primer on the topic.
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