What do you think?
Rate this book
The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State
In The Third Revolution, eminent China scholar Elizabeth C. Economy provides an incisive look at the transformative changes underway in China today. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has unleashed a powerful set of political and economic reforms: the centralization of power under Xi, himself, the expansion of the Communist Party's role in Chinese political, social, and economic life, and the construction of a virtual wall of regulations to control more closely the exchange of ideas and capital between China and the outside world. Beyond its borders, Beijing has recast itself as a great power, seeking to reclaim its past glory and to create a system of international norms that better serves its more ambitious geostrategic objectives. In so doing, the Chinese leadership is reversing the trends toward greater political and economic opening, as well as the low-profile foreign policy, that had been put in motion by Deng Xiaoping's "Second Revolution" thirty years earlier.
Through a wide-ranging exploration of Xi Jinping's top political, economic and foreign policy priorities-fighting corruption, managing the Internet, reforming the state-owned enterprise sector, improving the country's innovation capacity, enhancing air quality, and elevating China's presence on the global stage-Economy identifies the tensions, shortcomings, and successes of Xi's reform efforts over the course of his first five years in office. She also assesses their implications for the rest of the world, and provides recommendations for how the United States and others should navigate their relationship with this vast nation in the coming years.
Through a wide-ranging exploration of Xi Jinping's top political, economic and foreign policy priorities-fighting corruption, managing the Internet, reforming the state-owned enterprise sector, improving the country's innovation capacity, enhancing air quality, and elevating China's presence on the global stage-Economy identifies the tensions, shortcomings, and successes of Xi's reform efforts over the course of his first five years in office. She also assesses their implications for the rest of the world, and provides recommendations for how the United States and others should navigate their relationship with this vast nation in the coming years.
360 pages, Hardcover
First published April 4, 2018
424 people are currently reading
2707 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 138 reviews
November 12, 2020
2.5 stars
Read this for my uni honours course.
In The Third Revolution, Elizabeth Economy - a senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (which is a think tank) - analyses the major societal, political, and economic developments that can be discerned in today's China. The book covers all sorts of issues, from internet regulation to corruption, and from innovation to air pollution. Economy essentially examines the main politics of Xi Jinping and explains the rationale behind the actions of the Chinese government: from the perspective of an American scholar.
And so, the main audience for this book is, well, specifically American. And with American I mean Americans such as Economy, who work in the field of foreign relations.
When I was about to start the book, I was quite optimistic and I felt like I was going to learn a lot of new things. And though I can't say that I didn't, I can also not say it was anything mind blowing. The main problem I have with this book is that it talks about everything but in reality, it says nothing. There was no main thesis provided by the author, or at least none I could actually discern, but the main trend within the book is this: 'China has potential, China is growing stronger and stronger, but there are inherent problems within China's political system and I [the author] have spoken to insiders I cannot cite who all think the system can be quite a joke, and we're very critical.'
And about the latter: the sourcing, or rather the lack thereof, was quite concerning and irritating to me. This is an academic book, but there were some times where no source was mentioned while there was quite an argument put forth. And as for the sources that were there: first, I dislike endnotes, but that is my personal opinion (as everything here is, of course), and second, the majority of sources are news articles. This is mainly because there's a lot of fact sharing in this book, and no actual academic analysis that provides the reader with new insights.
So, this book felt all over the place, and it has a huge bias. In explaining China, the main point of reference was the US: the main argument is basically "China is everything the US is not, and this is problematic for China." No one is completely objective, but when you're an academic, not a politician, there has got to be a bit more of a balance.
Whatever it is Economy was trying to sell, it's very hard to buy. It just makes no sense. There are so many contradictions within the actual developments that are only pointed out by the author, but not delved into. This book is basically a summary with a US bias. Only read it if it was an assigned reading, or if you like a bone dry read that leaves you with more questions than answers.
Read this for my uni honours course.
In The Third Revolution, Elizabeth Economy - a senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (which is a think tank) - analyses the major societal, political, and economic developments that can be discerned in today's China. The book covers all sorts of issues, from internet regulation to corruption, and from innovation to air pollution. Economy essentially examines the main politics of Xi Jinping and explains the rationale behind the actions of the Chinese government: from the perspective of an American scholar.
And so, the main audience for this book is, well, specifically American. And with American I mean Americans such as Economy, who work in the field of foreign relations.
When I was about to start the book, I was quite optimistic and I felt like I was going to learn a lot of new things. And though I can't say that I didn't, I can also not say it was anything mind blowing. The main problem I have with this book is that it talks about everything but in reality, it says nothing. There was no main thesis provided by the author, or at least none I could actually discern, but the main trend within the book is this: 'China has potential, China is growing stronger and stronger, but there are inherent problems within China's political system and I [the author] have spoken to insiders I cannot cite who all think the system can be quite a joke, and we're very critical.'
And about the latter: the sourcing, or rather the lack thereof, was quite concerning and irritating to me. This is an academic book, but there were some times where no source was mentioned while there was quite an argument put forth. And as for the sources that were there: first, I dislike endnotes, but that is my personal opinion (as everything here is, of course), and second, the majority of sources are news articles. This is mainly because there's a lot of fact sharing in this book, and no actual academic analysis that provides the reader with new insights.
So, this book felt all over the place, and it has a huge bias. In explaining China, the main point of reference was the US: the main argument is basically "China is everything the US is not, and this is problematic for China." No one is completely objective, but when you're an academic, not a politician, there has got to be a bit more of a balance.
Whatever it is Economy was trying to sell, it's very hard to buy. It just makes no sense. There are so many contradictions within the actual developments that are only pointed out by the author, but not delved into. This book is basically a summary with a US bias. Only read it if it was an assigned reading, or if you like a bone dry read that leaves you with more questions than answers.
May 6, 2019
Useful to learn how the US establishment sees contemporary China and its claims. The "book" (or rather, the US Secretary of State policy paper proposal) has this familiar American diplomatic style and makes it very obvious that it was carefully crafted to form an anti-China and pro-West opinion in the reader's mind. Its underlying capitalist and imperialistic assumptions such as the countries' need to adopt inegalitarian policies if they want to promote "motivation, productivity and creativity of farmers, workers" (p. 102) and the US' right to intervene in North Korean nuclear program gave me nausea.
This way of reasoning is the enemy of all the peoples of the globe.
This way of reasoning is the enemy of all the peoples of the globe.
September 17, 2019
The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State by Elizabeth C. Economy is an interesting book about China in recent years under Xi Jinping - focusing on a few areas of China study, and ending in policy advise for the United States. The book focuses on Chinese internal politics, the Internet, innovation, the economy, the Environment, and foreign policy. China's internal politics are certainly different from those in the West, and Economy criticizes China heavily for its human rights record, looking at the detention of dissidents, and Party control over the media. Economy also looks at the expanding field of governance in this section. China is critical and wary of foreign NGO's and their political agenda (not wholly unfounded), and has taken steps to curb foreign influence in internal politics. China has also instituted a wide range of reforms targeting corruption, tax evasion, and the attitudes of party bureaucrats and officials. Some reforms Economy sees as positive; the rule of law is expanding, a court system has been set up in recent years that is not fully subordinate to the party, but to the Chinese constitution. Chinese efforts to reduce corruption have targeted both "Big Fish and Small Minnows" in its quest to end corruption in the party - a huge source of social discontent. Economy is largely skeptical of gains in the positive changes in recent years, criticizing corruption efforts as political crackdown, and bemoaning CCP oversight over multinational companies trying to operate in China.
On the Internet front, this section covers China's construction of its Great Firewall - a term used to describe China's increasingly sophisticated control over its internet realm. Activism in China often comes in the form of popular bloggers, videos, and chat rooms where people collectively complain, shame, and post scathing photos of wrongdoings. China sometimes utilizes these areas to crack down on real issues, but oftentimes will instead close down discussion. China is closely partnered with Internet companies in the country, as requirements to operate specify CCP oversight of internet policies. Therefore, China can easily monitor discussion, shut down dissent, and arrest those responsible for speaking out of turn. As with many initiatives in China, massive improvements have been made to internet speed, cost and technological prowess, but freedom of speech is closely controlled by the Party.
The innovation section charts the meteoric rise of business in China. One of China's main goals of this decade is to increase the ease of doing business in China, and to encourage the growth of high tech industries and services. This has been largely successful in many ways. Chinese phones, infrastructure development and consumer goods were once known for their poor quality, but are increasingly catching up, and in some cases overtaking, Western and Japanese competitors. China's focus on innovation has seen the easing of bureaucratic restrictions on small businesses, government support for numerous initiatives, and a focus on increasing the quantity and quality of independent think tanks and Universities. Economy notes, however, that while China is succeeding in its innovation drive, their is little invention at hand. China is not usually the source of new inventions, and this is due to the restrictive government policies in place on education. Universities need to teach certain courses, textbooks are censored for content critical of state initiatives, and businesses and think tanks are closely monitored and controlled by oversight bodies. All of this discourages individual and critical thinking, and discourages new ideas and concepts.
In the economy, Economy notes the massive rise in income levels in China, as well as the huge decrease in numbers of those living under the poverty line. China is prioritizing a shift away from primary and secondary industries, moving into high tech production and services, as well as trying to build a strong consumer market. China's ambition is to see its currency, the Renminbi, become a choice currency for global reserves. This requires China to liberalize its trading policies, and continue to promote ease of business, tax reform, and financial stability and oversight. These are all initiatives that are in the works, but with that particular Chinese policy flair of state oversight, cautious exploration of reform, and top down control. Even so, China has been largely successful in moving forward on its economic objectives, boosting domestic income, increasing its standing in global economic metrics, and improving the quality of lives, businesses and consumption. However, numerous negative externalizes are present. Corruption, of course, is one of them. The environment, however, is the big one.
The Environment in China is in dire straits in many ways. Particulate matter in the atmosphere is extreme, rivers are polluted to the point of being untouchable, and smog and pollution are common in all major Chinese cities. This is because China continues to be heavily reliant on coal as a source of energy, due to its lack of oil reserves. Shale exists, but usually in arid areas, meaning water has to be brought in from afar - and of course this sector is not clean itself. China is beginning to embrace environmental technology and policy to counter these issue - considered by domestic Chinese citizens to be one of the biggest issues they face. This public unrest over environmental concerns means the party is taking it seriously. Policies have been put in place to increase the accuracy and stringency of EIA (environmental impact assessments). Inspectors are being hired in droves to ensure compliance from Chinese manufacturers. And of course, massive amounts of money are being poured on to update Chinese power infrastructure away from coal, and toward natural gas and renewables. Although China remains polluted, particulate levels in the atmosphere have dropped by a significant percentage. Hurdles do remain, however. Corruption, ignoring policy, and cheating all remain huge issues for the CCP to tackle in terms of environmental compliance.
In foreign policy, Economy discusses China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the conflicting viewpoints on China's ambitions. Some say China seeks to upend the global order to shape the world in its own image, and some say China just seeks regional stability and the ability to develop both its own state, and those of its regional neighbours. Both sides probably have a point. China is increasingly assertive. It has built a naval base in Djibouti, and rumors abound of potential bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Cambodia. The BRI seeks to expand China's market reach into Central Asia, ensure market accessibility in its neighbours, and protect its supply lines from potential blockades. The BRI is often seen as a signal for shifting geopolitical control - moving from the US, to a multipolar world. This is further compounded by China's creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and China's growing influence in global institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank (ADB). China is increasingly assertive in its own backyard as well - its movements in the South China Sea to militarize its claims and deny access to competitors and threats, is a massive step away from China's old Peaceful Rise motto. This has rightly put both neighbours and competitors on edge, and blunted China's ability to engage in soft power politics. China seemingly seeks to export its political model elsewhere - for example, thousands of African government workers are trained in Chinese schools every year. China has also opened Confucius Institutes across the globe, seeking to expand cultural connections and improve its image. Economy argues China needs to improve its image by cleaning up its domestic political situation - becoming more open, allowing freedom of expression, and building positive relations with its neighbours.
Economy's book is interesting, if a bit blunted. Economy often offers information by stating that "..some people in China express that..." without attributions, or even sourcing. This makes it difficult to determine whether information is being withheld for the safety of the source, or if the source has been flubbed up a bit. Clearly Economy does not agree wholly with the Chinese development model, and cautions the US to check its rise by allying with Asian partners (India, Vietnam, Australia etc.), constraining Chinese assertiveness, encouraging liberal economic and social ideals, and so on. While these are good points, and often offered concisely, the lack of sourcing on facts detracts from the authority of the recommendations. Further, I believe the book is often bent on a negative track to fit into the bias. Oftentimes, successes are overlooked or downplayed (fighting corruption hurts businesses is a point in this book?). Even so, these two criticisms are slight. The policy perspective is excellent here, and Economy's voice is authoritative on the subject. This book was interesting, and a good read for China watchers and those looking for perspective on China's modern politics.
On the Internet front, this section covers China's construction of its Great Firewall - a term used to describe China's increasingly sophisticated control over its internet realm. Activism in China often comes in the form of popular bloggers, videos, and chat rooms where people collectively complain, shame, and post scathing photos of wrongdoings. China sometimes utilizes these areas to crack down on real issues, but oftentimes will instead close down discussion. China is closely partnered with Internet companies in the country, as requirements to operate specify CCP oversight of internet policies. Therefore, China can easily monitor discussion, shut down dissent, and arrest those responsible for speaking out of turn. As with many initiatives in China, massive improvements have been made to internet speed, cost and technological prowess, but freedom of speech is closely controlled by the Party.
The innovation section charts the meteoric rise of business in China. One of China's main goals of this decade is to increase the ease of doing business in China, and to encourage the growth of high tech industries and services. This has been largely successful in many ways. Chinese phones, infrastructure development and consumer goods were once known for their poor quality, but are increasingly catching up, and in some cases overtaking, Western and Japanese competitors. China's focus on innovation has seen the easing of bureaucratic restrictions on small businesses, government support for numerous initiatives, and a focus on increasing the quantity and quality of independent think tanks and Universities. Economy notes, however, that while China is succeeding in its innovation drive, their is little invention at hand. China is not usually the source of new inventions, and this is due to the restrictive government policies in place on education. Universities need to teach certain courses, textbooks are censored for content critical of state initiatives, and businesses and think tanks are closely monitored and controlled by oversight bodies. All of this discourages individual and critical thinking, and discourages new ideas and concepts.
In the economy, Economy notes the massive rise in income levels in China, as well as the huge decrease in numbers of those living under the poverty line. China is prioritizing a shift away from primary and secondary industries, moving into high tech production and services, as well as trying to build a strong consumer market. China's ambition is to see its currency, the Renminbi, become a choice currency for global reserves. This requires China to liberalize its trading policies, and continue to promote ease of business, tax reform, and financial stability and oversight. These are all initiatives that are in the works, but with that particular Chinese policy flair of state oversight, cautious exploration of reform, and top down control. Even so, China has been largely successful in moving forward on its economic objectives, boosting domestic income, increasing its standing in global economic metrics, and improving the quality of lives, businesses and consumption. However, numerous negative externalizes are present. Corruption, of course, is one of them. The environment, however, is the big one.
The Environment in China is in dire straits in many ways. Particulate matter in the atmosphere is extreme, rivers are polluted to the point of being untouchable, and smog and pollution are common in all major Chinese cities. This is because China continues to be heavily reliant on coal as a source of energy, due to its lack of oil reserves. Shale exists, but usually in arid areas, meaning water has to be brought in from afar - and of course this sector is not clean itself. China is beginning to embrace environmental technology and policy to counter these issue - considered by domestic Chinese citizens to be one of the biggest issues they face. This public unrest over environmental concerns means the party is taking it seriously. Policies have been put in place to increase the accuracy and stringency of EIA (environmental impact assessments). Inspectors are being hired in droves to ensure compliance from Chinese manufacturers. And of course, massive amounts of money are being poured on to update Chinese power infrastructure away from coal, and toward natural gas and renewables. Although China remains polluted, particulate levels in the atmosphere have dropped by a significant percentage. Hurdles do remain, however. Corruption, ignoring policy, and cheating all remain huge issues for the CCP to tackle in terms of environmental compliance.
In foreign policy, Economy discusses China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the conflicting viewpoints on China's ambitions. Some say China seeks to upend the global order to shape the world in its own image, and some say China just seeks regional stability and the ability to develop both its own state, and those of its regional neighbours. Both sides probably have a point. China is increasingly assertive. It has built a naval base in Djibouti, and rumors abound of potential bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Cambodia. The BRI seeks to expand China's market reach into Central Asia, ensure market accessibility in its neighbours, and protect its supply lines from potential blockades. The BRI is often seen as a signal for shifting geopolitical control - moving from the US, to a multipolar world. This is further compounded by China's creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and China's growing influence in global institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank (ADB). China is increasingly assertive in its own backyard as well - its movements in the South China Sea to militarize its claims and deny access to competitors and threats, is a massive step away from China's old Peaceful Rise motto. This has rightly put both neighbours and competitors on edge, and blunted China's ability to engage in soft power politics. China seemingly seeks to export its political model elsewhere - for example, thousands of African government workers are trained in Chinese schools every year. China has also opened Confucius Institutes across the globe, seeking to expand cultural connections and improve its image. Economy argues China needs to improve its image by cleaning up its domestic political situation - becoming more open, allowing freedom of expression, and building positive relations with its neighbours.
Economy's book is interesting, if a bit blunted. Economy often offers information by stating that "..some people in China express that..." without attributions, or even sourcing. This makes it difficult to determine whether information is being withheld for the safety of the source, or if the source has been flubbed up a bit. Clearly Economy does not agree wholly with the Chinese development model, and cautions the US to check its rise by allying with Asian partners (India, Vietnam, Australia etc.), constraining Chinese assertiveness, encouraging liberal economic and social ideals, and so on. While these are good points, and often offered concisely, the lack of sourcing on facts detracts from the authority of the recommendations. Further, I believe the book is often bent on a negative track to fit into the bias. Oftentimes, successes are overlooked or downplayed (fighting corruption hurts businesses is a point in this book?). Even so, these two criticisms are slight. The policy perspective is excellent here, and Economy's voice is authoritative on the subject. This book was interesting, and a good read for China watchers and those looking for perspective on China's modern politics.
April 16, 2020
Born and raised in China, I came to the U.S. in 2015 as a study abroad student and have been living in U.S. for almost 5 years now. In the past few years, I've seen more and more unfriendly comments and opinions in Newspapers and on TV regarding China's development and behaviors home and abroad. Luckily, I didn't experience any discrimination personally. But it strikes me that a lot of conclusions and viewpoints were based on misunderstandings of the people and the Chinese society. So this book attracts me naturally because I would love to know how scholars, especially those that have expertise in Asia studies, think about China. The author is a senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a distinguished visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.
Overall, this book is very objective. 60-70% of it lists facts, describes the summarize the trajectory of Chinese development regarding Economy, Politics as well as Environment and Human Rights issues. I have to admit that I was unaware of most of the regulations and policies mentioned in the book even though I lived through them. For me, those reform and plans are either too long, spanning over 5 years and even decades, for me to notice in my everyday life, or changing too fast for me as a student to fully understand. And this book really helps me to recall my memories of a lot of significant events in the past decade or so and thus enables me to have a more systematic way of interpreting the government's actions and plans. As I dig deeper into some of the cases mentioned through searching other reports and covers from various sources, I realized that I know little about what have happened not because I was too young then but because there was no news available in China to reveal the truths. Cases like the Tianjin warehouse explosion and the illegal detention of human rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng was reported but not in an honest and transparent way. The government is to blame for undermining our rights to know the truth. And the government or the party is trying to protect those of senior positions in the party that were involved in the illegal transactions.
The other thing that I noticed and that I think should be improved was that even though the author provides an objective narrative of what the government and the party have done, she didn't provide the whole picture of how the other participants of those events reacted. She did talk about some individuals who spoke out against the party and the government as public figures, such as Pan Shiyi, Chai Jing, and Han Han. But she forgot how the internet has empowered young people to express their hopes and opinions. "ME TOO" in China has been very popular, I've seen more and more articles online talking about how woman should stand out to ask for their rights. The most recent event is the death of the COVID-19 Whistleblower, Li WenLiang. Even a lot of articles in Wechat and Weibo have been forbidden, people ask for a thorough and complete investigation of the case in a peaceful and rational way with persistence. And now the investigation is ongoing, and everyone is waiting for a response from the government and the party. What I am trying to say is that a lot of people online didn’t understand that the party, the government, and the people can be different groups and can hold different opinions. And they also simply conclude that everyone in the party and in the government is corrupted and with no interest in the welfare of the people. They should ask their Chinese friend how they think about human rights, equality, and etc, and I can assure you that we are not any less concerned about those universal values than any other country does. It's just we are still fighting for a more democratic way to express ourselves. We don’t want unrest, and political conflict because they can drag down the economy and people's living standards.
And as a Finance major student, I am most interested in Chap 4, the not-so-new normal. This chapter revolves around SOEs, the state-owned-enterprise. It's a curse and also an antidote. It supports China's long term economic goals to gain competitive advantages in major industries but it can also hinder market efficiency and squeeze out mid-small business. There are corruption and rent-seeking associated with those too big to fails and yet they are the ones that represents the advanced and strong technology power of the country. There have been 2 rounds of SOE reforms and they were, according to the author, not successful. The most recent round started in 2015, coupled with new bankruptcy and debt default reforms. It opted to reform through M&A and partial privatization, leading to even stronger monitoring from the communist party in the new SOEs. Enterprises are allowed to go bankrupt, but the mid-small business is more vulnerable to crisis as they can't get money easily, not from the credit market and not from banks that favors the SOEs who are backed by their mother government.
The last chapter talks about what the U.S. should do with China's rising power and ambition. She pointed out that President Trump's current inconsistent foreign policy does no good to the US-China relationship and will undermine US reputation as a leader in various international issues around human rights, regional security, and economic development.
I rate this book as 4 stars because it offers people an objective view of China's development in the last few decades. What I don't like about this book is that it didn’t cover the rising power of the middle class, who are educated, open-minded and want to use their ways to change the society. The role of the people is missing and thus the book can't provide people with a whole picture of the country. (less)
January 5, 2019
Over the past two decades, we have had a number of books on the meteoric rise of China, its economic miracle and what it portends for the world. There are books on the US as a declining power and China as the new emerging power to displace it. There are others on China’s technological leap, its focus on innovation and invention and how China plans to be the pre-eminent leader in the key areas of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, super computers, self-driving cars etc.. Yet other ones talk about how a lead in these technologies will make China the top military superpower, leading to a China-centered world. However, not everyone buys into this future. Scholars like Graham Allison speculate about whether China and the US could be drawn into war as a result of the challenge of an emerging power against a status-quo power. He terms this conundrum the ‘Thucydides trap’, in honor of the 5th century (BCE) Athenian General who formulated this question. Other scholars like Minxin Pei and David Shambaugh are also somewhat underwhelmed and show the many weaknesses of China and paint a different scenario. They feel that it is possible that China’s leaders may fight shy of making the many drastic and sustained changes necessary to realize this rosy future. Instead, the totalitarian system could opt for stability of the regime and its survival,` which could result in continued stagnation, leading to eventual regime collapse. Or alternatively, the regime may survive as an authoritarian military power, oppressing its people and projecting an aggressive posture outside.
This book by Elizabeth Economy also belongs in the somewhat skeptical group of analysts on the question of China’s unimpeded rise. The author is not a cheerleader of those who proclaim that we are already living in a world that ‘belongs’ to China. Not that she discounts the stunning economic growth of China over the past three decades or the position of power that China holds in world affairs at present. The author raises questions as to whether the rise is sustainable and lasting, going forward. The reason for this is that China, in its headlong rush towards development and modernization in the past forty years, has not paid enough attention to their negative fall-outs on the social, environmental, cultural, and political aspects of society.
The thesis of the book is that the current reign of Xi Jinping is the ‘Third Revolution’, following the ones by Mao Ze Dong and Deng Xiao Bing. Xi believes that China has ’arrived’ on the world stage now and that it is time that she reclaimed her purported historic pre-eminent position in the world, a sort of rejuvenetion of the Chinese nation and its people. This would be accomplished through a set of strategies externally and a set of policies internally. On the strategic side, China would offer the grandiose plan of the Belt and Road Initiave which would link Europe, Africa, the Middle-east and the near Asia through a land-based as well as a Maritime Silk road. This would enable Chinese goods, services, culture and influence to spread across Europe, Asia and Africa. It will also export Chinese labor and environmental practices through this investment. China would also actively seek to shape global norms and institutions and export its political values through a growing media presence and Confucian cultural institutes. Militarily, China would assertively pursue its foreign policy by reclaiming its ‘lost’ regions, as we have seen in its actions in the South China sea and the Senkakou isles in the Pacific. It goes without saying that annexation of Taiwan would have to be part of this vision. Internally, China would endeavour to become the leading nation in innovation, invention and in emerging technologies such as AI, Quantum computing, self-driving automobiles etc.
Grand as this vision is, the way Xi is going about it raises serious misgivings on scholars like the author. Xi’s internal strategy is to centralize more authority in the state with special emphasis on his personal oversight as leader. There are more regulations and restrictions now on exchanging ideas and information with the West, on access to the internet within China, on the role of NGOs and other civil society organizations. The Communist party is again at the vanguard of all activity and there is renewed emphasis on the importance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The internet has been replaced with ChinaNet that prohibits access to the open internet. Repression is unleashed on political enemies of Xi through the use of the ‘anti-corruption’ campaign. At least a million Uighur Muslims have been herded into Gulags in Xinjiang in a re-education campaign, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. While China wants free access to the world markets, Xi continues to restrict access to its market by foreign companies. From all accounts, it looks as though Xi is rolling back the practice of ‘collective leadership’ that has taken root in the post-Mao era and replacing it with his personal undisputed leadership as in Maoist times.
Scholars and even laymen, brought up in a market-economy in open-societies could easily see glaring contradictions in this approach. How can innovation in hi-tech flourish in an atmosphere of constraints, restrictions and lack of exchange of ideas between working scholars across the world? How can an economy blossom in a communist state under large, public-sector enterprises at the vanguard? Aren’t they well-known to be short on creativity, energy and dynamism and long on wastefulness, lethargy and stagnation? How can a society and state correct its excesses without the power of oversight from civil society? Finally, is it not a terrible blow to aspiring youth, artists and scientists if the state replaces the Internet with a China-specific intranet?
Economy discusses all the above questions in great detail and provides policy suggestions for how the US must engage China in future. However, she does not advocate aggressive containment of China. Instead, she suggests a ‘detente’-like engagement. This is something that seems like a contradiction to what she herself argues in the earlier chapters. The book does give the impression that she believes that China, under Xi Jinping, is acting to reset the global economic, geo-political and military order away from a US-centric one to a more China-centric one. Ideologically, China is also trying to wean the world away from a democratic, liberal order. If this is so, then isn’t it in the US interests to seriously challenge it instead of pursuing accommodation? Why allow China to have it both ways - that of taking advantage of open societies and its liberalism and access to its markets and IP, but at the same time letting it close itself off when it comes to the world’s access to its markets and society? Shouldn’t China be called to account when it comes to respecting intellectual property rights? Possibly, the author has no other option but to suggest ‘detente’ because of possible widespread destabilization across the world due to the deep mutual dependency of trade between the superpowers. (The book was written before the current tariff war). Nuclear weapons on both sides is also an obvious reason.
There has been much hand-wringing in the US about China getting ahead in innovation and leap-frogging the US in the key fields of AI and Quantum Computing. One is reminded of similar alarms about Japan in the 1980s. The author has some key observations on this subject. She says that Innovation, as understood in the US, is science-based research that delivers a new product to the world that might even create a whole new industry. On the other hand, Invention is the type of breakthrough idea that revolutionizes a product line or industry which requires IPR protection, a long timeframe for investment, an appetite for risk and a willingness to fail. Applying these definitions, the author says that Invention is not yet well developed in China. Whereas on the innovation side, China has been successful in taking Western IPR and bringing products to markets where the West is reluctant to go, such as Africa. She quotes Daniel Breznitz, professor at Georgia Tech, as saying that Chinese technology companies shine by developing quickly enough to remain at the cusp of the global technology frontier without actually advancing the frontier itself. Facts on the ground bear it out as well because China’s patents have been mostly on incremental improvements to previous innovative work of others, by making something work faster, better or cheaper. China’s strategy to close the innovation gap is to spend on talent, infrastructure, R&D and on others’ technology. Taken as a whole, what the author says about China on innovation and invention is largely true of other emerging economies like India and Brazil as well, even though these countries do not have the deep pockets of China. Seen in this light, it is difficult to conclude that China could steal a big march over the US in the near term in frontier areas like AI or Quantum Computing.
Putting all this together, I find it hard to see Xi Jinping’s reign as a revolution. At the moment, it does not seem much different from the Maoist-era doctrine of pervasive state control with the Party at the center of power, led by one supreme leader. It can only be called a revolution if it accomplishes Xi’s dream of making China the pre-eminent power in the world - a sort of Middle kingdom of the 21st century. The book does not touch much upon China’s demographic crisis due to its one-child policy or the prognosis that China will grow old long before it becomes rich. Nor does it talk much about the mounting debt and slowing of economic growth.
This book is well researched and thought provoking. However, we have had books foretelling the implosion of China due to its internal contradictions for nearly fifteen years now. China, however, seems to be marching on without even visible hiccups, leave alone any upheavals. But then, we saw the USSR and Eastern Europe implode without so much as even a flicker of a signal. It would be fascinating to watch what happens in China and wait to see which set of analysts are right about its future.
This book by Elizabeth Economy also belongs in the somewhat skeptical group of analysts on the question of China’s unimpeded rise. The author is not a cheerleader of those who proclaim that we are already living in a world that ‘belongs’ to China. Not that she discounts the stunning economic growth of China over the past three decades or the position of power that China holds in world affairs at present. The author raises questions as to whether the rise is sustainable and lasting, going forward. The reason for this is that China, in its headlong rush towards development and modernization in the past forty years, has not paid enough attention to their negative fall-outs on the social, environmental, cultural, and political aspects of society.
The thesis of the book is that the current reign of Xi Jinping is the ‘Third Revolution’, following the ones by Mao Ze Dong and Deng Xiao Bing. Xi believes that China has ’arrived’ on the world stage now and that it is time that she reclaimed her purported historic pre-eminent position in the world, a sort of rejuvenetion of the Chinese nation and its people. This would be accomplished through a set of strategies externally and a set of policies internally. On the strategic side, China would offer the grandiose plan of the Belt and Road Initiave which would link Europe, Africa, the Middle-east and the near Asia through a land-based as well as a Maritime Silk road. This would enable Chinese goods, services, culture and influence to spread across Europe, Asia and Africa. It will also export Chinese labor and environmental practices through this investment. China would also actively seek to shape global norms and institutions and export its political values through a growing media presence and Confucian cultural institutes. Militarily, China would assertively pursue its foreign policy by reclaiming its ‘lost’ regions, as we have seen in its actions in the South China sea and the Senkakou isles in the Pacific. It goes without saying that annexation of Taiwan would have to be part of this vision. Internally, China would endeavour to become the leading nation in innovation, invention and in emerging technologies such as AI, Quantum computing, self-driving automobiles etc.
Grand as this vision is, the way Xi is going about it raises serious misgivings on scholars like the author. Xi’s internal strategy is to centralize more authority in the state with special emphasis on his personal oversight as leader. There are more regulations and restrictions now on exchanging ideas and information with the West, on access to the internet within China, on the role of NGOs and other civil society organizations. The Communist party is again at the vanguard of all activity and there is renewed emphasis on the importance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The internet has been replaced with ChinaNet that prohibits access to the open internet. Repression is unleashed on political enemies of Xi through the use of the ‘anti-corruption’ campaign. At least a million Uighur Muslims have been herded into Gulags in Xinjiang in a re-education campaign, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. While China wants free access to the world markets, Xi continues to restrict access to its market by foreign companies. From all accounts, it looks as though Xi is rolling back the practice of ‘collective leadership’ that has taken root in the post-Mao era and replacing it with his personal undisputed leadership as in Maoist times.
Scholars and even laymen, brought up in a market-economy in open-societies could easily see glaring contradictions in this approach. How can innovation in hi-tech flourish in an atmosphere of constraints, restrictions and lack of exchange of ideas between working scholars across the world? How can an economy blossom in a communist state under large, public-sector enterprises at the vanguard? Aren’t they well-known to be short on creativity, energy and dynamism and long on wastefulness, lethargy and stagnation? How can a society and state correct its excesses without the power of oversight from civil society? Finally, is it not a terrible blow to aspiring youth, artists and scientists if the state replaces the Internet with a China-specific intranet?
Economy discusses all the above questions in great detail and provides policy suggestions for how the US must engage China in future. However, she does not advocate aggressive containment of China. Instead, she suggests a ‘detente’-like engagement. This is something that seems like a contradiction to what she herself argues in the earlier chapters. The book does give the impression that she believes that China, under Xi Jinping, is acting to reset the global economic, geo-political and military order away from a US-centric one to a more China-centric one. Ideologically, China is also trying to wean the world away from a democratic, liberal order. If this is so, then isn’t it in the US interests to seriously challenge it instead of pursuing accommodation? Why allow China to have it both ways - that of taking advantage of open societies and its liberalism and access to its markets and IP, but at the same time letting it close itself off when it comes to the world’s access to its markets and society? Shouldn’t China be called to account when it comes to respecting intellectual property rights? Possibly, the author has no other option but to suggest ‘detente’ because of possible widespread destabilization across the world due to the deep mutual dependency of trade between the superpowers. (The book was written before the current tariff war). Nuclear weapons on both sides is also an obvious reason.
There has been much hand-wringing in the US about China getting ahead in innovation and leap-frogging the US in the key fields of AI and Quantum Computing. One is reminded of similar alarms about Japan in the 1980s. The author has some key observations on this subject. She says that Innovation, as understood in the US, is science-based research that delivers a new product to the world that might even create a whole new industry. On the other hand, Invention is the type of breakthrough idea that revolutionizes a product line or industry which requires IPR protection, a long timeframe for investment, an appetite for risk and a willingness to fail. Applying these definitions, the author says that Invention is not yet well developed in China. Whereas on the innovation side, China has been successful in taking Western IPR and bringing products to markets where the West is reluctant to go, such as Africa. She quotes Daniel Breznitz, professor at Georgia Tech, as saying that Chinese technology companies shine by developing quickly enough to remain at the cusp of the global technology frontier without actually advancing the frontier itself. Facts on the ground bear it out as well because China’s patents have been mostly on incremental improvements to previous innovative work of others, by making something work faster, better or cheaper. China’s strategy to close the innovation gap is to spend on talent, infrastructure, R&D and on others’ technology. Taken as a whole, what the author says about China on innovation and invention is largely true of other emerging economies like India and Brazil as well, even though these countries do not have the deep pockets of China. Seen in this light, it is difficult to conclude that China could steal a big march over the US in the near term in frontier areas like AI or Quantum Computing.
Putting all this together, I find it hard to see Xi Jinping’s reign as a revolution. At the moment, it does not seem much different from the Maoist-era doctrine of pervasive state control with the Party at the center of power, led by one supreme leader. It can only be called a revolution if it accomplishes Xi’s dream of making China the pre-eminent power in the world - a sort of Middle kingdom of the 21st century. The book does not touch much upon China’s demographic crisis due to its one-child policy or the prognosis that China will grow old long before it becomes rich. Nor does it talk much about the mounting debt and slowing of economic growth.
This book is well researched and thought provoking. However, we have had books foretelling the implosion of China due to its internal contradictions for nearly fifteen years now. China, however, seems to be marching on without even visible hiccups, leave alone any upheavals. But then, we saw the USSR and Eastern Europe implode without so much as even a flicker of a signal. It would be fascinating to watch what happens in China and wait to see which set of analysts are right about its future.
February 27, 2020
This is a book with a large reputation. Is it wholly deserved? I think perhaps not. It is a subjective appraisal of the policies of China under Xi Jinping and represents the American case against China. As an example of American thinking on China, it stands out. To an uncertain European observer, it is not a shining example of why the US might prevail over the course of this century. The reader is left asking two questions. What is the 'Third Revolution'? And what is the case against China?
The main thesis for the first question is that China has undergone three revolutions since 1949. The first - Mao's Revolution - sought to establish the state of China under the rule of the Communist Party. Tick that box. The second - Deng's Revolution - sought to craft China into a functioning economy and society under a centralised autocratic political framework. Tick that box. The third revolution - Xi's Revolution - seeks to establish the position of China in the world. This revolution is currently under way. As such, the hypothesis is correct and quite interesting. I find myself with great sympathy towards the argument. Had the book stopped there, it would have been very interesting. However, the book then goes on to suggest that Xi's Revolution is doomed.
The case against China is that it is a corrupt society, that it operates a surveillance state, that it stumbles at innovation, and that the Chinese system creates inordinate amounts of pollution. It is worth looking at these charges one by one. It is hard to argue against the levels of corruption in China. They have to be accepted. However, the US is not without a degree of corruption also. Both societies offer levels of corruption to a greater and lesser degree. China tries to root out corruption whilst the US appears to be more tolerant towards it.
The Chinese system is one in which mass surveillance is operated by the state. However, this happens to a lesser degree in the US, which, to a greater degree, farms out its mass surveillance to private corporations. From the perspective of the individual, privacy is compromised in both cases. On the third count, China is alleged to be a laggard in innovation. It is hard to gauge this claim because the evidence is both scant and flimsy. There are some areas in which China is a world leader - such as high speed rail technology - which call into question this conclusion. The allegation may have some merit, but it really depends upon where you place China in the innovation chain. At the manufacturing end, the claim is far fetched. At the blue sky end, it might have some merit.
Finally, China has produced large amounts of pollution and environmental degradation. But the, at this stage in their development, so have American and European societies. The jury is out on this matter because the Chinese story has yet to fully unfold. However, China has embraced the cause of climate mitigation more readily than the US, and we could wonder if the outcomes would be broadly comparable at broadly comparable states of development?
Looking at the case as a whole, it seems to me that that it can be summed up as China not being America. The author needs to do better than this. I found the argument rather unconvincing. The whole point of Xi's Revolution is that it represents development with Chinese characteristics. That last point is the important one. Looking at the breadth of Chinese history, current developments readily fit into an established dynastic pattern. In many regards the developmental path is not too dissimilar to that of the Ming Dynasty - a mercantilist commercial policy allied to a tributary foreign policy.
The book is written by an American academic in an American academic style. It is dry and humourless, rather unengaging and really hard to read. The book itself is quite bloated. It would have made a really good article, which makes the work about 200 words too long. It is not an enjoyable read. This is definitely a book for work, and it is hard work reading it. It does contain the germ of a good idea, but you really struggle with it after that. I would recommend that anyone other than the really dedicated limits themselves to the first, seventh, and eighth chapters only. In between is unengaging prejudice dressed as fluff.
The main thesis for the first question is that China has undergone three revolutions since 1949. The first - Mao's Revolution - sought to establish the state of China under the rule of the Communist Party. Tick that box. The second - Deng's Revolution - sought to craft China into a functioning economy and society under a centralised autocratic political framework. Tick that box. The third revolution - Xi's Revolution - seeks to establish the position of China in the world. This revolution is currently under way. As such, the hypothesis is correct and quite interesting. I find myself with great sympathy towards the argument. Had the book stopped there, it would have been very interesting. However, the book then goes on to suggest that Xi's Revolution is doomed.
The case against China is that it is a corrupt society, that it operates a surveillance state, that it stumbles at innovation, and that the Chinese system creates inordinate amounts of pollution. It is worth looking at these charges one by one. It is hard to argue against the levels of corruption in China. They have to be accepted. However, the US is not without a degree of corruption also. Both societies offer levels of corruption to a greater and lesser degree. China tries to root out corruption whilst the US appears to be more tolerant towards it.
The Chinese system is one in which mass surveillance is operated by the state. However, this happens to a lesser degree in the US, which, to a greater degree, farms out its mass surveillance to private corporations. From the perspective of the individual, privacy is compromised in both cases. On the third count, China is alleged to be a laggard in innovation. It is hard to gauge this claim because the evidence is both scant and flimsy. There are some areas in which China is a world leader - such as high speed rail technology - which call into question this conclusion. The allegation may have some merit, but it really depends upon where you place China in the innovation chain. At the manufacturing end, the claim is far fetched. At the blue sky end, it might have some merit.
Finally, China has produced large amounts of pollution and environmental degradation. But the, at this stage in their development, so have American and European societies. The jury is out on this matter because the Chinese story has yet to fully unfold. However, China has embraced the cause of climate mitigation more readily than the US, and we could wonder if the outcomes would be broadly comparable at broadly comparable states of development?
Looking at the case as a whole, it seems to me that that it can be summed up as China not being America. The author needs to do better than this. I found the argument rather unconvincing. The whole point of Xi's Revolution is that it represents development with Chinese characteristics. That last point is the important one. Looking at the breadth of Chinese history, current developments readily fit into an established dynastic pattern. In many regards the developmental path is not too dissimilar to that of the Ming Dynasty - a mercantilist commercial policy allied to a tributary foreign policy.
The book is written by an American academic in an American academic style. It is dry and humourless, rather unengaging and really hard to read. The book itself is quite bloated. It would have made a really good article, which makes the work about 200 words too long. It is not an enjoyable read. This is definitely a book for work, and it is hard work reading it. It does contain the germ of a good idea, but you really struggle with it after that. I would recommend that anyone other than the really dedicated limits themselves to the first, seventh, and eighth chapters only. In between is unengaging prejudice dressed as fluff.
August 17, 2019
Her writing is dry, but if you want to know everything you need to know about China under Xi, this is your source.
Economy's Third Revolution is an excellent attempt to try to describe Xi Jinping's China. The book covers a wide range of the changes the country has experienced since 2012, focusing on the political and economic systems of the country while also touching on related topics, like the military, the internet and foreign affairs. Economy is a clear writer though her prose was sometimes too dry for my taste, leaving me a little bored at times by the narrative-less factiness of the whole enterprise. Still, for a political scientist, she qualifies as a good writer, not talking down to the reader while also not dumbing anything down. If you want to know everything you need to know about China's current political situation, this is the book where you should start.
One other complaint, beside the dry prose, is that, if you already know a great deal about China, if you're a 中国通 who has passed out drunk on the streets of Beijing reading Jonathan Spence and eating 烧烤, you might not find this book very illuminating. A lot of the material Economy offers can be found discussed in newspaper articles. This is not her fault, it is just something you might want to keep in mind if you read every article about China in the New York Times, as many of her readers, no doubt, do. What Economy does which is a real service is pull together a lot of well-known facts into a single source.
She begins the first steps to connect those dots, but she does not go far. This might seem like a criticism, but it is not really. Political scientists get into trouble when they try to connect the dots...when they make predictions. Since they believe themselves to really be a science, many often times try to predict things, as a scientist should. Economy avoids this mistake and just offers lots of observations. She is an astute observer, and the one prediction she hints at at the end of the book, that there is a real possibility of China and the US having a trade war, appears to be coming to fruition.
Economy's Third Revolution is an excellent attempt to try to describe Xi Jinping's China. The book covers a wide range of the changes the country has experienced since 2012, focusing on the political and economic systems of the country while also touching on related topics, like the military, the internet and foreign affairs. Economy is a clear writer though her prose was sometimes too dry for my taste, leaving me a little bored at times by the narrative-less factiness of the whole enterprise. Still, for a political scientist, she qualifies as a good writer, not talking down to the reader while also not dumbing anything down. If you want to know everything you need to know about China's current political situation, this is the book where you should start.
One other complaint, beside the dry prose, is that, if you already know a great deal about China, if you're a 中国通 who has passed out drunk on the streets of Beijing reading Jonathan Spence and eating 烧烤, you might not find this book very illuminating. A lot of the material Economy offers can be found discussed in newspaper articles. This is not her fault, it is just something you might want to keep in mind if you read every article about China in the New York Times, as many of her readers, no doubt, do. What Economy does which is a real service is pull together a lot of well-known facts into a single source.
She begins the first steps to connect those dots, but she does not go far. This might seem like a criticism, but it is not really. Political scientists get into trouble when they try to connect the dots...when they make predictions. Since they believe themselves to really be a science, many often times try to predict things, as a scientist should. Economy avoids this mistake and just offers lots of observations. She is an astute observer, and the one prediction she hints at at the end of the book, that there is a real possibility of China and the US having a trade war, appears to be coming to fruition.
February 1, 2021
This is a book about Xi Jinping's China circa 2018-2019. It touches on a few key topics like State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), pollution / the environment, and foreign policy and highlights how China has evolved in these areas since the 80s.
Third Revolution starts by describing how Xi is far more powerful than say Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin ever was. Economy talks about how Xi has stacked the Politburo Standing Committee and other key state and party organs with allies, and on the flip side purged many rivals as part of a broad anticorruption campaign starting in 2013.
My observation is that Economy is fairly light on the details on precisely how power flows in modern China on a granular level. Where is our Machiavelli for modern China? I suspect there is something to say about how various roles in the party and state interact to make decisions.
Rather than summarize the features of Xi's China according to Economy, I'll offer two observations:
(1) If you travel to China today, you'll see the hammer and sickle everywhere. In 2018, the CCP very visibly celebrated Karl Marx's 200th birthday (it's pretty weird, see for yourself). But nothing about China today seems distinctly socialist or Marxist. When you think of China do you think of robust social welfare, collective ownership, and proletariat revolution? I don't.
China in 2021 looks like Mussolini's Italy to me. An autocrat who crushes his enemies with violence, tramples human rights, and an economy that blends market forces with state control and a strong emphasis on autarky.
Xi still pays lip service to socialism. He notably promulgated "社会主义核心价值观" as guiding principles for the party shortly after taking power 2013 [43]. But in reality there is some serious dissonance between what China is, from an ideological perspective, and what it purports to be.
(2) I think the Belt and Road Initiative should be thought of as an act of "war" if interpreted thru the lens of Unrestricted Warfare. China does not want to fight hot wars. China does want to exert force through other means. If you are responsible for the dams, ports, rail systems, and more -- it stands to reason that you gain significant ability to advance your interests abroad.
I don't think anyone will ever give the Trump Administration credit because Trump, but the US DFC, instantiated in 2019 is a very important counterweight to BRI and their work to date has been admirable.
Third Revolution starts by describing how Xi is far more powerful than say Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin ever was. Economy talks about how Xi has stacked the Politburo Standing Committee and other key state and party organs with allies, and on the flip side purged many rivals as part of a broad anticorruption campaign starting in 2013.
My observation is that Economy is fairly light on the details on precisely how power flows in modern China on a granular level. Where is our Machiavelli for modern China? I suspect there is something to say about how various roles in the party and state interact to make decisions.
Rather than summarize the features of Xi's China according to Economy, I'll offer two observations:
(1) If you travel to China today, you'll see the hammer and sickle everywhere. In 2018, the CCP very visibly celebrated Karl Marx's 200th birthday (it's pretty weird, see for yourself). But nothing about China today seems distinctly socialist or Marxist. When you think of China do you think of robust social welfare, collective ownership, and proletariat revolution? I don't.
China in 2021 looks like Mussolini's Italy to me. An autocrat who crushes his enemies with violence, tramples human rights, and an economy that blends market forces with state control and a strong emphasis on autarky.
Xi still pays lip service to socialism. He notably promulgated "社会主义核心价值观" as guiding principles for the party shortly after taking power 2013 [43]. But in reality there is some serious dissonance between what China is, from an ideological perspective, and what it purports to be.
(2) I think the Belt and Road Initiative should be thought of as an act of "war" if interpreted thru the lens of Unrestricted Warfare. China does not want to fight hot wars. China does want to exert force through other means. If you are responsible for the dams, ports, rail systems, and more -- it stands to reason that you gain significant ability to advance your interests abroad.
I don't think anyone will ever give the Trump Administration credit because Trump, but the US DFC, instantiated in 2019 is a very important counterweight to BRI and their work to date has been admirable.
Read
January 6, 2025I FINISHED IT! Finally!
This was definitely really dryyyy and I had to push myself through the last half.
I am not an expert of Modern China, and this was my attempt to learn more, and from that perspective it felt good for a relative beginner (I have taken classes that talked about China, but not a China specific course ever). A lot of similar themes from Leta Hong Fisher's "Betraying Big Brother", emphasizing on the internet censorship and oppression of peoples. I was feeling conflicted, as I was reading the reviews and saw a lot of people disliking the book for being anti-China, and I wish I knew more so that I could understand more. I can understand the perspective of Economy being critical, especially of the CCP, but I did feel a real love for the Chinese people and hope for the future. All I think is that it's silly to write off criticism of China as sinophobic, when there are real threats to Chinese citizens autonomy that we ARE openly told about. What's happening that we don't know?
I'm not a conspiracy theorist- I love China and chinese culture, and desperately want to visit. I am, however, understanding of the fact that governments like power, and with my little knowledge of China I can see some of these themes.
I don't know if I'd recommend it to anyone- I really had a hard time staying engaged, when I normally love audiobooks. Sorry this review sucks!
This was definitely really dryyyy and I had to push myself through the last half.
I am not an expert of Modern China, and this was my attempt to learn more, and from that perspective it felt good for a relative beginner (I have taken classes that talked about China, but not a China specific course ever). A lot of similar themes from Leta Hong Fisher's "Betraying Big Brother", emphasizing on the internet censorship and oppression of peoples. I was feeling conflicted, as I was reading the reviews and saw a lot of people disliking the book for being anti-China, and I wish I knew more so that I could understand more. I can understand the perspective of Economy being critical, especially of the CCP, but I did feel a real love for the Chinese people and hope for the future. All I think is that it's silly to write off criticism of China as sinophobic, when there are real threats to Chinese citizens autonomy that we ARE openly told about. What's happening that we don't know?
I'm not a conspiracy theorist- I love China and chinese culture, and desperately want to visit. I am, however, understanding of the fact that governments like power, and with my little knowledge of China I can see some of these themes.
I don't know if I'd recommend it to anyone- I really had a hard time staying engaged, when I normally love audiobooks. Sorry this review sucks!
March 17, 2022
Mostly enjoyed with a few caveats. This is a good US centric overview of China in the past 20 years or so. I think the information contained is basically what most of the intelligent people in the US probably believe.
However, it reads the way I imagine eating sawdust tastes. It’s dry, like textbook or US policy paper dry, which it basically is. I think there’s a lot of good background information here but I’m not sure I would be able, or frankly want to make any sort of predictive statements using this information. It's a collection of takes that I think are mostly accurate given the sort of generalizations we like to make about China. It's a bit reductionist while presenting good information.
The core problem with a book like this that goes around saying "China is..." is that China is a HUGE country. The book at times seems way too simplistic. China is full of contradictions and competing factions. It's a bit like saying "the Ocean is..." or "the US is..." What part are you describing? Northern currents, Southern squalls, DC RINOs, or SF School Board Progressives?
So read this to get the generally acceptable take from a smart US perspective, knowing that each chapter (each page even) could contain another full length book if we wanted to be thorough.
However, it reads the way I imagine eating sawdust tastes. It’s dry, like textbook or US policy paper dry, which it basically is. I think there’s a lot of good background information here but I’m not sure I would be able, or frankly want to make any sort of predictive statements using this information. It's a collection of takes that I think are mostly accurate given the sort of generalizations we like to make about China. It's a bit reductionist while presenting good information.
The core problem with a book like this that goes around saying "China is..." is that China is a HUGE country. The book at times seems way too simplistic. China is full of contradictions and competing factions. It's a bit like saying "the Ocean is..." or "the US is..." What part are you describing? Northern currents, Southern squalls, DC RINOs, or SF School Board Progressives?
So read this to get the generally acceptable take from a smart US perspective, knowing that each chapter (each page even) could contain another full length book if we wanted to be thorough.
June 18, 2018
Overall, a well written and comprehensive overview of Xi Jinping’s tenure so far and the road ahead, but unlikely to contain any earth shattering revelations for those who have been watching Xi since his ascendancy in late 2012.
A notable strength of the book is the comprehensive approach, covering areas as diverse as the environment to China’s exercise of sharp power, with a variety of cases to illustrate the overall points. A notable defect is a lack of concentration on economic reform, which could be the key factor that will ultimately demark Xi from any of his predecessors, however, this is covered in comparatively smaller detail.
Overall, worth reading if one is unfamiliar with Xi Jinping’s tenure, as the book is an excellent primer and very comprehensive, though not perhaps as satisfying for the more keen and experienced China watchers. However, ably done overall and very comprehensive.
A notable strength of the book is the comprehensive approach, covering areas as diverse as the environment to China’s exercise of sharp power, with a variety of cases to illustrate the overall points. A notable defect is a lack of concentration on economic reform, which could be the key factor that will ultimately demark Xi from any of his predecessors, however, this is covered in comparatively smaller detail.
Overall, worth reading if one is unfamiliar with Xi Jinping’s tenure, as the book is an excellent primer and very comprehensive, though not perhaps as satisfying for the more keen and experienced China watchers. However, ably done overall and very comprehensive.
September 24, 2021
this book is not well written. besides the american propaganda that borders on Racism and Orientalism (yes I said it.. the prominence of white Western experts on nonwhite studies is very insidious and voyeuristic overall, but that's another topic), economy simply writes redundantly. getting through the chapters feels like eating chalk because of how often she re-summarizes what she was saying and attempts to segway it into her next point... sounds like she was just trying to hit word/page count.... just say your facts and leave Please
March 12, 2022
有繁体中国版。还是不错的，看了政治，维稳，国企改革。
September 7, 2019
At a recent lunch with a senior policymaker, I remarked that I didn't see how anyone could be 'surprised' by the rise of China. It is extraordinarily big and has been 'rising' for 40 years by this point. The official pushed back - what was happening under Xi was very different, and this was the challenge they were grappling with.
In 'The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State' Elizabeth Economy offers an impressive view of China from 10'000 feet which helps to explain the official's concern. She argues that Xi Jinping's changes to China are as profound as those ushered in during the second revolution of Deng Xioping in the late 1970s.
To do this, Economy focuses on Xi Jinping and his China Dream (Doubling GDP by 2020, a military able to 'fight and win wars', and meeting the social welfare needs of the people). This is then traced through six areas of priority for Xi: Restoring the ideological and political centrality of the CCP, cyberspace, State-Owned-Enterprises, Innovation, Air Quality, and Foreign Policy. Far from the usual 'the west is doomed' pessimism that litters the bookshops, Economy shows in detail just how many serious and substantial problems the Chinese government faces, and the importance for them, and all people that it makes serious progress in solving its challenges.
There's a care and diligence to this work. Economy goes as far as the sources will allow her, without pushing the case, and the narrative of the chapters often shifts focus in line with the available source material, rather than trying to patch over the gaps with suppositions. It is both broad and deep, while a quick 250 pages. A credit to both the author and the publisher (As an aside, OUP has been putting out an increasing stream of excellent and accessible books in this vein recently).
I still have some caution about the significance of the change we have witnessed in the last few years - to what degree it is simply the realisation of the broad systemic shifts of decades ago now realised, as against specific and deliberate changes in attitudes is a distinction impossible to perfectly clarify. Such an antagonistic turn without those same resources behind them would not be nearly so meaningful. A different leader, a different China would still present many of the same concerns. Yet clearly, something important has changed.
For those wanting a well researched, smart and sober analysis of how China and its government see their many many internal challenges and perhaps begin to identify a few insights about how we can respond to the 'new' Chines state, this is a valuable read.
In 'The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State' Elizabeth Economy offers an impressive view of China from 10'000 feet which helps to explain the official's concern. She argues that Xi Jinping's changes to China are as profound as those ushered in during the second revolution of Deng Xioping in the late 1970s.
To do this, Economy focuses on Xi Jinping and his China Dream (Doubling GDP by 2020, a military able to 'fight and win wars', and meeting the social welfare needs of the people). This is then traced through six areas of priority for Xi: Restoring the ideological and political centrality of the CCP, cyberspace, State-Owned-Enterprises, Innovation, Air Quality, and Foreign Policy. Far from the usual 'the west is doomed' pessimism that litters the bookshops, Economy shows in detail just how many serious and substantial problems the Chinese government faces, and the importance for them, and all people that it makes serious progress in solving its challenges.
There's a care and diligence to this work. Economy goes as far as the sources will allow her, without pushing the case, and the narrative of the chapters often shifts focus in line with the available source material, rather than trying to patch over the gaps with suppositions. It is both broad and deep, while a quick 250 pages. A credit to both the author and the publisher (As an aside, OUP has been putting out an increasing stream of excellent and accessible books in this vein recently).
I still have some caution about the significance of the change we have witnessed in the last few years - to what degree it is simply the realisation of the broad systemic shifts of decades ago now realised, as against specific and deliberate changes in attitudes is a distinction impossible to perfectly clarify. Such an antagonistic turn without those same resources behind them would not be nearly so meaningful. A different leader, a different China would still present many of the same concerns. Yet clearly, something important has changed.
For those wanting a well researched, smart and sober analysis of how China and its government see their many many internal challenges and perhaps begin to identify a few insights about how we can respond to the 'new' Chines state, this is a valuable read.
October 9, 2019
While Jonathan's 'China's Vision of Victory' greatly raises awareness of China's intention and rise toward global domination, providing detailed explanations of China's motives and potentials and emphasises that the international community, particularly the United States, should act to preserve the international rule-based order, Elizabeth's 'The Third Revolution' not only points out the challenges of China's grand strategy and possibilities for the international community, especially the United States to constructively engage with China, including proposing reasonable responsive measures in necessary circumstances, which would lead to the peaceful coexistence of the two rival power, thus avoiding the 'Thucydides Trap'.
The two book from the two brilliant authors are compatible complementary to each other, that they could be read altogether in any desirable order.
I grabbed the translated version in Thai of the book, a compliment to the daring attempt to translate a book with such challenging topic, which contains enormous amount of information and specific glossaries.
This book is by far one of the most comprehensive and compact work to understand contemporary China's foreign policy, a few such works could be found in Thai version nowadays despite such topic being critical to Thailand's and global politics.
Therefore, I hold high regards to the translator(s).
However, numerous spelling mistakes could be found in the Thai version of the book, I suggest Thai readers who might be interested in the book to be cautious and keep sharp eyes reading the Thai version, minus one star for that.
The two book from the two brilliant authors are compatible complementary to each other, that they could be read altogether in any desirable order.
I grabbed the translated version in Thai of the book, a compliment to the daring attempt to translate a book with such challenging topic, which contains enormous amount of information and specific glossaries.
This book is by far one of the most comprehensive and compact work to understand contemporary China's foreign policy, a few such works could be found in Thai version nowadays despite such topic being critical to Thailand's and global politics.
Therefore, I hold high regards to the translator(s).
However, numerous spelling mistakes could be found in the Thai version of the book, I suggest Thai readers who might be interested in the book to be cautious and keep sharp eyes reading the Thai version, minus one star for that.
October 29, 2018
This is the second book that I've read about Xi Jinping, the first being "CEO China: The Rise of Xi Jinping". I found this to be far more readable than the first one, and far more clear in its thesis.
The title of the book is a reference to China's period of reform and opening up under Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao - a period sometimes referred to as "China's Second Revolution". Deng Xiaoping famously said, “Hide your strength, bide your time" and took a non-aggressive approach to foreign policy. The author argues that while the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao largely followed Deng Xiaoping's mantra, China under Xi Jinping is done biding its time - a "Third Revolution" has begun.
Xi Jinping's goal, according to this book, is to realize the "Chinese Dream", and here it makes sense to refer back to another book I reviewed recently - "Twilight in the Heavenly Kingdom" - which pointed out near the end that because Britain helped the Qing dynasty defeat the Taiping rebels in the 1860s and in doing so delayed the fall of the Qing by 50 years, when the Qing finally did fall China was so far behind the rest of the world that catching up seemed "all but impossible until recently". This is precisely Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" - to complete the process of "catching up" begun with the fall of the Qing Dynasty and in doing so to restore China to its rightful position as a dominant world power. Xi Jinping feels that China has grown strong enough that Deng Xiaoping's cautious approach is no longer necessary - with the result that China has become increasingly assertive and aggressive since Xi took over in 2012.
Xi Jinping is widely considered to be the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao, and it's also widely known that China has been more aggressive in recent years (e.g. the famous artificial islands in the south China sea). But I didn't understand the full extent of the personality cult around Xi until reading this book. Consider this paragraph:
In late October 2016, at the Fifth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, the most notable announcement was that, moving forward, Xi Jinping would be recognized as the core of the Communist Party. The enshirement of "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" at the 19th Party Congress one year later further enhanced Xi's standing by granting his ideas the same status as those of Mao in the party constitution.
The book talks at length about Xi's personality cult, China's new aggressiveness towards its neighbours, and the increasing sophistication of the CCP's control of the Chinese internet. There were some details in here I was not aware of, but none of it was particularly surprising. The most shocking chapter to me was the one on the environment. I had heard - I don't remember exactly where - that China was starting to do something about its environmental problems and had become a world leader in Green Energy. However, the book says that China is solving its pollution problems - at least in part - simply by moving its most polluting factories to the poor western part of the country (Xinjiang, home to a Muslim minority and a virtual police state- see e.g. https://www.economist.com/briefing/20...) or to nearby poor countries.
"The Chinese leadership demonstrates little interest in considering the impact of its development on air quality outside its borders. As it looks to clean the air to meet the demands of the middle class, it is also encouraging firms - often the most polluting enterprises including coal-fired plants - to base production out of the country. Hebei Province plans to move 20 million tons of steel, 30 million tons of cement, as well as significant glass production outside of the country by 2023. It already has inked an agreement to export roughly 11 percent of its annual steel output to a new plant in South Africa. And large Chinese-funded cement plants have been flooding into Tajikistan, increasing Tajik production fivefold between 2013 and 2015.
An investigation by the online environmental site China Dialogue and the CEE Bankwatch Network, moreover, revealed that Chinese banks and companies are supporting at least seventy-nine coal-fired generation projects outside the country with a total capacity of more than 52 gigawatts. This exceeds the 46 gigawatts of planned closures in the United States by 2020. Energy giant Huaneng has announced significant expansion plans for coal plants in South and Southeast Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe. Importantly, China does not apply the same stringent standards for efficiency on its overseas plants that it does at home. In Kenya, a consortium of Kenyan, South African, and Chinese energy firms is planning to build a large coal-fired power plant fifteen miles north of a UNESCO world heritage site. It is estimated that the new plant will be the country's largest source of pollution. Thus, as China's leaders seek to ensure that wealthy coastal provinces and municipalities rein in their coal production and consumption to improve air quality, the are enabling the development of new coal capacity in both the western part of China and abroad.
These types of structural shifts suggest that Beijing's commitment is, in the first instance, to reduce air pollution in the wealthy areas, while relegating many of the poorer interior provinces, as well as other developing countries, to decades more of worsening air quality."
Of course, it is possible that the CCP is doing this while also pursuing Green Energy in a serious way.
The title of the book is a reference to China's period of reform and opening up under Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao - a period sometimes referred to as "China's Second Revolution". Deng Xiaoping famously said, “Hide your strength, bide your time" and took a non-aggressive approach to foreign policy. The author argues that while the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao largely followed Deng Xiaoping's mantra, China under Xi Jinping is done biding its time - a "Third Revolution" has begun.
Xi Jinping's goal, according to this book, is to realize the "Chinese Dream", and here it makes sense to refer back to another book I reviewed recently - "Twilight in the Heavenly Kingdom" - which pointed out near the end that because Britain helped the Qing dynasty defeat the Taiping rebels in the 1860s and in doing so delayed the fall of the Qing by 50 years, when the Qing finally did fall China was so far behind the rest of the world that catching up seemed "all but impossible until recently". This is precisely Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" - to complete the process of "catching up" begun with the fall of the Qing Dynasty and in doing so to restore China to its rightful position as a dominant world power. Xi Jinping feels that China has grown strong enough that Deng Xiaoping's cautious approach is no longer necessary - with the result that China has become increasingly assertive and aggressive since Xi took over in 2012.
Xi Jinping is widely considered to be the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao, and it's also widely known that China has been more aggressive in recent years (e.g. the famous artificial islands in the south China sea). But I didn't understand the full extent of the personality cult around Xi until reading this book. Consider this paragraph:
In late October 2016, at the Fifth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, the most notable announcement was that, moving forward, Xi Jinping would be recognized as the core of the Communist Party. The enshirement of "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" at the 19th Party Congress one year later further enhanced Xi's standing by granting his ideas the same status as those of Mao in the party constitution.
The book talks at length about Xi's personality cult, China's new aggressiveness towards its neighbours, and the increasing sophistication of the CCP's control of the Chinese internet. There were some details in here I was not aware of, but none of it was particularly surprising. The most shocking chapter to me was the one on the environment. I had heard - I don't remember exactly where - that China was starting to do something about its environmental problems and had become a world leader in Green Energy. However, the book says that China is solving its pollution problems - at least in part - simply by moving its most polluting factories to the poor western part of the country (Xinjiang, home to a Muslim minority and a virtual police state- see e.g. https://www.economist.com/briefing/20...) or to nearby poor countries.
"The Chinese leadership demonstrates little interest in considering the impact of its development on air quality outside its borders. As it looks to clean the air to meet the demands of the middle class, it is also encouraging firms - often the most polluting enterprises including coal-fired plants - to base production out of the country. Hebei Province plans to move 20 million tons of steel, 30 million tons of cement, as well as significant glass production outside of the country by 2023. It already has inked an agreement to export roughly 11 percent of its annual steel output to a new plant in South Africa. And large Chinese-funded cement plants have been flooding into Tajikistan, increasing Tajik production fivefold between 2013 and 2015.
An investigation by the online environmental site China Dialogue and the CEE Bankwatch Network, moreover, revealed that Chinese banks and companies are supporting at least seventy-nine coal-fired generation projects outside the country with a total capacity of more than 52 gigawatts. This exceeds the 46 gigawatts of planned closures in the United States by 2020. Energy giant Huaneng has announced significant expansion plans for coal plants in South and Southeast Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe. Importantly, China does not apply the same stringent standards for efficiency on its overseas plants that it does at home. In Kenya, a consortium of Kenyan, South African, and Chinese energy firms is planning to build a large coal-fired power plant fifteen miles north of a UNESCO world heritage site. It is estimated that the new plant will be the country's largest source of pollution. Thus, as China's leaders seek to ensure that wealthy coastal provinces and municipalities rein in their coal production and consumption to improve air quality, the are enabling the development of new coal capacity in both the western part of China and abroad.
These types of structural shifts suggest that Beijing's commitment is, in the first instance, to reduce air pollution in the wealthy areas, while relegating many of the poorer interior provinces, as well as other developing countries, to decades more of worsening air quality."
Of course, it is possible that the CCP is doing this while also pursuing Green Energy in a serious way.
April 9, 2021
3.5/5
Interessant boek over welke rol China in de wereld in gaat en kan nemen, en op welke manier dat effectiever en beter is t.o.v. de westerse wereld. Geeft ook meteen een goed beeld van op welke manier we ons hier op kunnen/moeten voorbereiden. Verders wel te veel vanuit pro-Amerikaans perspectief, dus dat was :(
Interessant boek over welke rol China in de wereld in gaat en kan nemen, en op welke manier dat effectiever en beter is t.o.v. de westerse wereld. Geeft ook meteen een goed beeld van op welke manier we ons hier op kunnen/moeten voorbereiden. Verders wel te veel vanuit pro-Amerikaans perspectief, dus dat was :(
May 24, 2021
This is an essential read if you have any amount of interest in China in the 21st Century. I like the way Economy writes and presents all of this information in a clear and relatively factual way. Though I hate to think that this information is already outdated (the book covers mainly 2012-2017). The content is certainly still relevant and important, but I hope she will write another book to catch us up to today.
April 6, 2022
I found this book interesting as a view of China from an American perspective. I also really enjoyed the reviews here and learned a lot about the Hoover Institution. I’m always skeptical of partisan affiliated research funding. Three stars because I have no idea the legitimacy of this research and if it was truly conducted objectively. Interesting nonetheless.
October 7, 2021
Read for a class I am taking. China is looking to become a "returning" power, rather than simply a "rising" one. This, and similar books are a must read for those interested in our future world in which China will play more and more of key role in the world which will affect us all greatly.
Read
December 5, 2023didn’t realise this was from the council on foreign relations, gave up reading bcos it’s a bit too pro the US for me and also outdated now
June 26, 2019
951.0612 ECO
eAudio
Summary: With Xi as leader, 30 years of reform is no more. When China's dream, the dream of constitutionalism 中国梦，宪政梦 will happen? unyielding commitment to one-Party rule. 共产党太坚持一党专政，这是它的结症。 legitimacy of the communist party.
Best summarized by 邓聿文 Deng YuWen 给习近平的七个忠告
第一，在经济上，放弃国企做大做强想法，实行以民营经济为主导、国有经济为辅，让市场真正起决定作用的自由经济体制. 习近平做大做优做强国企的想法，是基于所谓国企乃中共执政支柱的定位。公有制和计划经济是死路一条，通过国企干预市场的做法是错误的。但国家大力扶持国企，不仅浪费民脂民膏，而且侵蚀民企。尽管党国未必有遏制民营经济的念头，然而客观上起到了不利民企发展的后果。这就是前一阶段社会对民企忧心忡忡的背景. 国企 are viewed as unfair competitors - receiving large government subsidies. In addition, their links to the Chinese government raise concerns over the transfer of sensitive technology and corporate governance. Potential censorship or control over American culture content surround Chinese firms' purchase such as Getty Photos and Legend Entertainment. Alibaba's acquisition of the South China Morning Post supported by Beijing. Overcapacity, 亏损国有企业 (However, Xi wants to make even big to 40 mega SOEs)
第二，牢记历史教训，反对个人崇拜，恢复国家主席任期制，回归集体领导体制。 Xi's power grab, unprecedented centralization of power
第三，取消在民企、外企、社会和民间组织建立党组织，在国家机构和团体建立党组的做法，党的领导只表现为政治领导。
第四，取消言禁，实行“三宽”，放松对民间维权组织的监控和打压，使民间有一个自我循环和发展的空间，释放社会活力。
第五，建立宪法法院，实行最低限度的司法独立。
Xi's against 西方價值觀，經濟觀和政治觀 普世價值觀、自由市場經濟外加三權分立多黨輪產執政 (Democracy, human rights, market economy, free trade). Lead to severe corruption. Should build good governance through rule of law, development of property rights, institutions that promote transparency, such as open media. Xi exports the Chinese model of authoritarian-led development
--低姿态到大国外交，One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 一带一路, later renamed Belt and Road initiative.
Sovereignty on South China Sea based on ill-defined nine-dash line based on 1947 or 1930 maps. Most Spratlys and Parcels Island.
--Internet Sovereignty; Human rights. China can't be a leader while at the same time closing its borders to ideas, capitals, and influence from the outside world.
--Pollution ( PM2.5) without efficient 人民监督
第六，以官员财产公示制代替运动式选择性反腐���由上而下公示官员财产，将反腐导入法治轨道。习近平的反腐是一种运动式选择型反腐 ，已经沦为清除政治异己和政治效忠的工具，广受社会诟病。
--The reality in China is: the wealthier the country, the more money the rules control, the more severe the poverty of thought, hence the more civilizations declines.
--(虎苍蝇一起打
第七，对历史冤案进行平反和赔偿，特赦政治犯，开启和解进程。
习近平绑架了中共，而中共绑架了中国. 不能为了一党一己之私绑架整个国家和民族。
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by Joseph S. Nye Jr.
A country is built upon individuals. she is constructed and determined by them. It is only if a country has people who seek truth, who are capable of independent thinking, who can record the truth, who build but do not take advantage of the land, who protect their constitutional rights, who know the world is imperfect but who do not slacken or give up- ti is only if a country has this kind of mind and spirit that we can we are proud of our country.
People's democratic dictatorship (人民民主专政; 人民民主專政) is a phrase incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China by Mao Zedong, the then leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
North Korea
Leader of DPPK Kim Jong-un 金正恩, rattle China by executing his uncle Jang Song-thaek 張成澤 considered as reform-oriented, a source of stability and maturity.
==================================
Xi centralized power (xi at the core)
1. 《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》是现行《中华人民共和国宪法》（八二宪法）的第五个修正案，由中国共产党中央委员会提出，并在吸收第十三届全国人大代表补充提案下，于2018年3月11日经第十三届全国人民代表大会第一次会议表决通过，同日公布施行。其中的第十四項修宪建议刪除国家主席、副主席「连续任职不得超过两届」的限制. Xi's period should be 2012-2o22.
2. Weaken PLA (People's Liberation Army) and CYL(Communist Youth League) by setting up groups chaired by him, bypass its legal bureaucracy.
3. Xi's purge
Sun Zhengcai (孙政才 25/9/1963). Sun was abruptly removed from office in July 2017 and put under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). sentenced to life imprisonment in 2018. Sun was the youngest member of the 18th Politburo of the Communist Party of China, and the fourth sitting Politburo member to be expelled from the party since 1990. Prior to his fall from grace, Sun was once considered to be a leading candidate for a top leadership position in the "6th Generation of Chinese leadership". and many more
4. anti-corruption or/and political purge
习近平把新一届党中央的反腐思路，概括为“苍蝇、老虎一起打”。比喻大小贪腐一起打击.
雷政富 刘志军 （原铁道部部长） 杨达才
Operation fox hunt china
The Chinese government officially dubbed the overseas operation “Operation Skynet,” a phrase taken from a Taoist saying: “The mesh of Heaven’s net is vast, but it lets nothing through.”
5. Xi's dream: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aka. One Belt One Road (OBOR) (一带一路)
Export Xi's totalitarian socialism dream to all over the world.
党领导一切 Augment the party's role in political, social, and economic life. Party and its ideals are fully and deeply embedded in the Chinese political and economic life.
==================================
Civil life:
1. Crack down in 2013
南方周末 Southern Weekly
Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), aka China Through the Ages, was a monthly journal commonly identified as liberal and reformist, due to its ability to publish on highly sensitive political topics. It was started in 1991; operations ceased in 2016 despite the journal's deputy publisher, Hu Dehua, son of Hu Yaobang.
2. 中国709维权律师大抓捕事件 is known as the "709 crackdown" as it started in 9 July 2015
2. Chinanet: censorship 黨媒姓黨
--9/7/2019 群主连坐制 九不发
1、政治敏感话题不发。2、不信谣不传谣。3、所谓的内部资料不发。4、涉黄、涉毒、涉爆等不发。5、有关港澳台新闻在官方网站未发布前不发。6、军事资料不发。7、有关涉及国家机密文件不发。8、来源不明的疑似伪造的黑警辱警的小视频不发。 9、其他违反相关法律法规的信息不发。
--2 million The 50 Cent Party, or 50 Cent Army ( 五毛党), is the colloquial term for Internet commentators (Chinese: 网络评论员)
--The great firewall China
--golden shield project 金盾工程
--The Great Cannon of China is an attack tool that is used to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks on websites by intercepting massive amounts of web traffic and redirecting them to targeted websites
--In October 2017, government announced that that it planned to acquire special management shares equivalent to 1% stake in companies such as Tencent and Youku Tudo in exchange for a position on the companies' boards. Ministry of Public Security (MPS) further ensures compliance by Internet companies by placing "network security offices" at important Internet sites and firms. The deputy minister of MPS has stated that the practice, which was implemented in August 2015, was designed to "catch criminal behavior online at the earliest possible point." p83
Lu Wei 鲁炜, served as the deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China, was named by Time magazine as one of the world's 100 most influential people in 2015 before he was investigated in 2017
--p74
躲猫猫事件
Feminist Five in March, 2015 arrested While Xi co-hosting a meeting at the United notation on women's' rights p85
Fang Binxing 方滨兴 "Father of China's Great Fire Wall"
National Credit Information Sharing Platform" (全国信用信息共享平台)
Wang Liming 王立铭 better known under the pseudonym Rebel Pepper (变态辣椒)
Dong Rubin 董如彬
Ren Zhiqiang任志强
Jing Zhao 赵静, better known by his pen name Michael Anti
Charles Bi-chuen Xue 薛必群; pinyin: Xuē Bìqún) better known by his screen name Xue Manzi (薛蠻子)
3. Hikvision 海康威视 surveillance (Trump's blacklist)
4. Document Number Nine
----------------
Document Number Nine (or Document No. 9), more properly the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere 关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报(also translated as the Briefing on the Current Situation in the Ideological Realm[2]), is a confidential internal document widely circulated within the Communist Party of China in 2013. The document was first circulated in July 2012. The document warns of seven dangerous Western values, allegedly including media freedom and judicial independence. Teaching on any of the seven topics is forbidden. but in July 2013 was allegedly leaked by Chinese dissident journalist Gao Yu 高瑜, who was in turn sentenced to a seven-year imprisonment for "leaking state secrets"
aka. Seven no's 七不讲 or seven perils. 七大危险
指出“当前意识形态领域值得注意的突出问题”，提出七大危险
1. 宣扬西方宪政民主，企图否定党的领导，否定中国特色社会主义政治制度；
2. 宣扬“普世价值”，企图动摇党执政的思想理论基础；
3. 宣扬公民社会，企图瓦解党执政的社会基础；
4. 宣扬新自由主义，企图改变中国基本经济制度；
5. 宣扬西方新闻观，挑战中国党管媒体原则和新闻出版管理制度；
6. 宣扬历史虚无主义，企图否定中国共产党历史和新中国历史；
7. 质疑改革开放，质疑中国特色社会主义的社会主义性质。
The Seven Noteworthy Problems
1. Promoting Western Constitutional Democracy: An attempt to undermine the current leadership and the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" system of governance. (Including the separation of powers, the multi-party system, general elections, and independent judiciaries.)
2. Promoting “universal values” in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership. (That “the West’s values are the prevailing norm for all human civilization”, that “only when China accepts Western values will it have a future”.)
3. Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party’s social foundation. (i.e. that individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by the state.)
4. Promoting Neoliberalism, attempting to change China’s Basic Economic System. (i.e. unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and total marketization.)
5. Promoting the West’s idea of journalism, challenging China’s principle that the media and publishing system should be subject to Party discipline.
6. Promoting historical nihilism, trying to undermine the history of the CPC and of New China. (For example to deny the scientific and guiding value of Mao Zedong thought.)
7. Questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. (For example, saying “We have deviated from our Socialist orientation.”
七不讲
普世价值不要讲
新闻自由不要讲
公民社会不要讲
公民权利不要讲
中国共产党的历史错误不要讲
权贵资产阶级不要讲
司法独立不要讲
“四项基本原则”、“五不搞”、 “三个自信” "兩個凡是"
=====================
党领导一切，国有体制的弊端
p 150 The experience of Chinas electric car sector represents yet another facet of China's innovation culture. It underscores the downside of China's refusal to reform and of the continued dominance of the Chinese state in the country's larger innovation ecosystem. Beijing identifies promising sectors and technologies for government investment, works through several different ministries and localities to promote the development and deployment of these technologies, and may constrain opportunities for competitive multinationals in the development of the country's domestic market, unless they are willing to part with their technologies. The costs are consequential. Even in the face of poor initial performance of Chinese indigenous technology and weak acceptance of it in the Chinese market, the government persists. Beijing's willingness to accept suboptimal technological in order for Chinese firms to capture the market-as in the case of battery technologies technologies-leads to significant waste of resources and inefficiencies.
After more than a decade in development with billions of dollars of state funding, Chinese electric cars still compete only on a cost, not a quality, basis with the top international brands.
The government at all levels is eager to be a significant player in the investment arena. The result is a tech sector shaped onto only by the quality of the innovation and broader fortunes of the Chinese economy but also by the same inefficiencies and wast that infect state-driven innovation in sectors such as electric cars. It will only be harder for good companies to thrive in a world in which bad companies are not allowed to fail.
Underpinning much of the challenge in both China's SOE reform and the innovation sector, therefore, is a reluctance on the part of the Chinese leadership to relax the reins of state control and to allow the market to serve as a disciplining agent -helping to separate the best ideas from the weaker ones and the better companies from the poorer ones. The government is willing to tolerate a higher level of waste and inefficiency in the cause of capturing market share and fulfilling other developmental and strategic objectives. As the next chapter reveals, a similar pattern can also be found in China's efforts to address its air quality problem, where market forces-both economic and in the political realm of civil society-are taking a back scat to state-directed initiatives.
----------------
Chapter of 4
Problem with SOE ( state-owned enterprise)
1. first economic reform in 1978 by Zhao Zi Yang
2. SOE overburden the state and underperforming relative to private firms, such as profit margins, cash flows, return on asset. Despite this, private firms have a much more difficult time accessing capital and pay, in 2016, average 9.9 interest rate, 6% above the rate for SOE.
SOE is 120% of GDP (China), in contrast, in Japan and South Korea at 30%. Moreover, SOE represented 75% of all china's overall corporate debt.
Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (中国铝业股份有限公司, known as Chalco) is only one-seventh of its private China Hongqiao Group 中国宏桥集团有限公司
3. In 2016, 90% new urban jobs created by private firms.
4. SOE are major contributors to overcapacity. in 2015, China had 336 million tons of overcapacity in seteel, contribute 46% of the world's overcapacity. p107
5. SOE waste significant funds through misappropriation and fraud.
6. However, SOE is agents of the China state.
SOE current reform will not lead to layoffs experienced to in 199os round of SOE reform through merges and acquisition instead of bankruptcies.
--SOE serve Beijing's broader political and strategic objectives in BRI
--SOE becomes bigger and bigger.
--The party in the State
p111 one senior SASAC official indicated that the number of central government-controlled SOEs would eventually be consolidated into forty mega SOEs
1 Walmart $482,130
2 State Grid $329,601 国家电网公司
3 China National Petroleum $299,271
4 Sinopec Group $294,344 中国石化
7. 党领导一切
Deepen party role in the management of SOE, and expand SOE in economy, it is reverse reform of previous years in Zhu Rongji's reform.
SOE monopolistic power, free and low-cost use of state assets, not handling over profits; no internal restrictions on allocation; limits opportunities for efficiency gains through privatization, competition, or bankruptcy.
Far from enhancing market-driven decision-making within SOEs, the party has enhanced its role in driving SOE's decisions.
p115 Xi in 2016, speak 'Party leadership and building the role of the part are root and soul for state-own enterprises.... The party's leadership in state-owned enterprised is a major political principle, and that principle must be insisted on. "
8. 贸易保护 贸易壁垒
example: electrical car
higher subsidaries: government offer of 50,000-60,000 yuan ($8000-9000) to consumers buying a electrical car.
p128 a mandate that foreign automakers who wanted to manufacture cars in China transfer their core electrical battery or high-power electric motor technology.
19% tax elimination, but not for foreign cars.
p128 Rather than produce a healthy competition, instead of 地方保护主义, it is a zero-sum game.
=====================
Foreign firms in China
1. p74 Must allow access to their data, along with "technical support" to Chinese security officials upon the latter's request. One of the most onerous requirements was a measure that permits Beijing to access computer program source code, which is considered highly sensitive intellectual property.
2. Forced transfer technology for accessing China domestic market. 强制技术转让
=====================
Chapter 5
Advantage: How American Innovation Can Overcome the Asian Challenge by Adam Segal
Innovation U. S style: science-based research that delivers a new product to the world and might even create a new industry. Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future by Peter Thiel
Chinese innovation: innovation through commercialization.
Western style is more than invention, Chinese style is not.
Lee Kai-Fu 李開復 in 2009 found Innovation Works, Sinovation Ventures 创新工场
p147 When askedby one audience member about the imparcgt of the increasly challenging Internet restrictions in China under Xi JinPing, Les simply shrugged and said that now it is clearer what is alloed and what isn't
=============================================
In September, Chinese vice president and the man about to assume a 10-year term as China's leader, Xi Jinping, disappeared mysteriously for two weeks in 2012.
Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji
Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao (2002-2012)
第十九届 2017年10月召开的十九届一中全会
总书记 习近平（会议召集人）
政治局常委（7）习近平 李克强 栗战书 汪 洋 王沪宁 赵乐际 韩正
政治局委员（18）丁薛祥 王晨 刘鹤 许其亮 孙春兰（女） 李希 李强 李鸿忠 杨洁篪 杨晓渡 张又侠 陈希 陈全国 陈敏尔 胡春华 郭声琨 黄坤明 蔡奇
赵乐际 Zhao Leji , 栗战书 Li Zhanshu, 王沪宁 Wang Huing is Xi's allies ( 4 of 7 PBSC), 18 of 25 Polituro Xi's allies. 刘鹤 Liu He, 李强Li Qiang 陈敏尔 Chen Miner 黄坤明 Huang Kunming ( a lot from his associates from his days as party secretary in Zhejiang.
政治局常委 Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
中共在十九大一中全会后宣布了新一届政治局常委名单，除上一任中共总书记习近平和政治局常委、国务院总理李克强之外，其余五人均为新晋常委，分别为栗战书、汪洋、王沪宁、赵乐际和韩正。
这也意味着中共十八届中央的五名常委遭到了替换，分别为王岐山、张德江、俞正声、刘云山和张高丽。这5人以及在十八大后罕见地以政治局委员身份兼任中国国家副主席的李源潮均未出现在十九届中央委员会名单中。此外，会前呼声颇高的胡春华和陈敏尔也未能进入常委名单，只是担任政治局委员。
汪洋 李克强 came from CYL (Communist Youth League: as a training 胡锦涛
团派，又称「共青团派」、「共青帮」，指被推测为是以2002年中共十六大上台之原任中共中央总书记胡锦涛为首、自中国共产主义青年团出身的中华人民共和国官员与中国共产党领导阶层、伴隨著胡锦涛的崛起而形成的非正式派系。2012年中共十八大以后，在中共中央政治局委员之中曾有共青团中央书记处任职经历者有李克强、汪洋、李源潮、刘延东、刘奇葆和胡春华
=====================
vocabulary:
中央政治局常委 （7）the Poliburo Standing Committee (PBSC)
or 中央政治局常委 Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
Poliburo 政治局
政治局委员（18）
CCP: Chinese Communist PartyThe Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会
eAudio
Summary: With Xi as leader, 30 years of reform is no more. When China's dream, the dream of constitutionalism 中国梦，宪政梦 will happen? unyielding commitment to one-Party rule. 共产党太坚持一党专政，这是它的结症。 legitimacy of the communist party.
Best summarized by 邓聿文 Deng YuWen 给习近平的七个忠告
第一，在经济上，放弃国企做大做强想法，实行以民营经济为主导、国有经济为辅，让市场真正起决定作用的自由经济体制. 习近平做大做优做强国企的想法，是基于所谓国企乃中共执政支柱的定位。公有制和计划经济是死路一条，通过国企干预市场的做法是错误的。但国家大力扶持国企，不仅浪费民脂民膏，而且侵蚀民企。尽管党国未必有遏制民营经济的念头，然而客观上起到了不利民企发展的后果。这就是前一阶段社会对民企忧心忡忡的背景. 国企 are viewed as unfair competitors - receiving large government subsidies. In addition, their links to the Chinese government raise concerns over the transfer of sensitive technology and corporate governance. Potential censorship or control over American culture content surround Chinese firms' purchase such as Getty Photos and Legend Entertainment. Alibaba's acquisition of the South China Morning Post supported by Beijing. Overcapacity, 亏损国有企业 (However, Xi wants to make even big to 40 mega SOEs)
第二，牢记历史教训，反对个人崇拜，恢复国家主席任期制，回归集体领导体制。 Xi's power grab, unprecedented centralization of power
第三，取消在民企、外企、社会和民间组织建立党组织，在国家机构和团体建立党组的做法，党的领导只表现为政治领导。
第四，取消言禁，实行“三宽”，放松对民间维权组织的监控和打压，使民间有一个自我循环和发展的空间，释放社会活力。
第五，建立宪法法院，实行最低限度的司法独立。
Xi's against 西方價值觀，經濟觀和政治觀 普世價值觀、自由市場經濟外加三權分立多黨輪產執政 (Democracy, human rights, market economy, free trade). Lead to severe corruption. Should build good governance through rule of law, development of property rights, institutions that promote transparency, such as open media. Xi exports the Chinese model of authoritarian-led development
--低姿态到大国外交，One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 一带一路, later renamed Belt and Road initiative.
Sovereignty on South China Sea based on ill-defined nine-dash line based on 1947 or 1930 maps. Most Spratlys and Parcels Island.
--Internet Sovereignty; Human rights. China can't be a leader while at the same time closing its borders to ideas, capitals, and influence from the outside world.
--Pollution ( PM2.5) without efficient 人民监督
第六，以官员财产公示制代替运动式选择性反腐���由上而下公示官员财产，将反腐导入法治轨道。习近平的反腐是一种运动式选择型反腐 ，已经沦为清除政治异己和政治效忠的工具，广受社会诟病。
--The reality in China is: the wealthier the country, the more money the rules control, the more severe the poverty of thought, hence the more civilizations declines.
--(虎苍蝇一起打
第七，对历史冤案进行平反和赔偿，特赦政治犯，开启和解进程。
习近平绑架了中共，而中共绑架了中国. 不能为了一党一己之私绑架整个国家和民族。
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by Joseph S. Nye Jr.
A country is built upon individuals. she is constructed and determined by them. It is only if a country has people who seek truth, who are capable of independent thinking, who can record the truth, who build but do not take advantage of the land, who protect their constitutional rights, who know the world is imperfect but who do not slacken or give up- ti is only if a country has this kind of mind and spirit that we can we are proud of our country.
People's democratic dictatorship (人民民主专政; 人民民主專政) is a phrase incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China by Mao Zedong, the then leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
North Korea
Leader of DPPK Kim Jong-un 金正恩, rattle China by executing his uncle Jang Song-thaek 張成澤 considered as reform-oriented, a source of stability and maturity.
==================================
Xi centralized power (xi at the core)
1. 《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》是现行《中华人民共和国宪法》（八二宪法）的第五个修正案，由中国共产党中央委员会提出，并在吸收第十三届全国人大代表补充提案下，于2018年3月11日经第十三届全国人民代表大会第一次会议表决通过，同日公布施行。其中的第十四項修宪建议刪除国家主席、副主席「连续任职不得超过两届」的限制. Xi's period should be 2012-2o22.
2. Weaken PLA (People's Liberation Army) and CYL(Communist Youth League) by setting up groups chaired by him, bypass its legal bureaucracy.
3. Xi's purge
Sun Zhengcai (孙政才 25/9/1963). Sun was abruptly removed from office in July 2017 and put under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). sentenced to life imprisonment in 2018. Sun was the youngest member of the 18th Politburo of the Communist Party of China, and the fourth sitting Politburo member to be expelled from the party since 1990. Prior to his fall from grace, Sun was once considered to be a leading candidate for a top leadership position in the "6th Generation of Chinese leadership". and many more
4. anti-corruption or/and political purge
习近平把新一届党中央的反腐思路，概括为“苍蝇、老虎一起打”。比喻大小贪腐一起打击.
雷政富 刘志军 （原铁道部部长） 杨达才
Operation fox hunt china
The Chinese government officially dubbed the overseas operation “Operation Skynet,” a phrase taken from a Taoist saying: “The mesh of Heaven’s net is vast, but it lets nothing through.”
5. Xi's dream: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aka. One Belt One Road (OBOR) (一带一路)
Export Xi's totalitarian socialism dream to all over the world.
党领导一切 Augment the party's role in political, social, and economic life. Party and its ideals are fully and deeply embedded in the Chinese political and economic life.
==================================
Civil life:
1. Crack down in 2013
南方周末 Southern Weekly
Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), aka China Through the Ages, was a monthly journal commonly identified as liberal and reformist, due to its ability to publish on highly sensitive political topics. It was started in 1991; operations ceased in 2016 despite the journal's deputy publisher, Hu Dehua, son of Hu Yaobang.
2. 中国709维权律师大抓捕事件 is known as the "709 crackdown" as it started in 9 July 2015
2. Chinanet: censorship 黨媒姓黨
--9/7/2019 群主连坐制 九不发
1、政治敏感话题不发。2、不信谣不传谣。3、所谓的内部资料不发。4、涉黄、涉毒、涉爆等不发。5、有关港澳台新闻在官方网站未发布前不发。6、军事资料不发。7、有关涉及国家机密文件不发。8、来源不明的疑似伪造的黑警辱警的小视频不发。 9、其他违反相关法律法规的信息不发。
--2 million The 50 Cent Party, or 50 Cent Army ( 五毛党), is the colloquial term for Internet commentators (Chinese: 网络评论员)
--The great firewall China
--golden shield project 金盾工程
--The Great Cannon of China is an attack tool that is used to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks on websites by intercepting massive amounts of web traffic and redirecting them to targeted websites
--In October 2017, government announced that that it planned to acquire special management shares equivalent to 1% stake in companies such as Tencent and Youku Tudo in exchange for a position on the companies' boards. Ministry of Public Security (MPS) further ensures compliance by Internet companies by placing "network security offices" at important Internet sites and firms. The deputy minister of MPS has stated that the practice, which was implemented in August 2015, was designed to "catch criminal behavior online at the earliest possible point." p83
Lu Wei 鲁炜, served as the deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China, was named by Time magazine as one of the world's 100 most influential people in 2015 before he was investigated in 2017
--p74
躲猫猫事件
Feminist Five in March, 2015 arrested While Xi co-hosting a meeting at the United notation on women's' rights p85
Fang Binxing 方滨兴 "Father of China's Great Fire Wall"
National Credit Information Sharing Platform" (全国信用信息共享平台)
Wang Liming 王立铭 better known under the pseudonym Rebel Pepper (变态辣椒)
Dong Rubin 董如彬
Ren Zhiqiang任志强
Jing Zhao 赵静, better known by his pen name Michael Anti
Charles Bi-chuen Xue 薛必群; pinyin: Xuē Bìqún) better known by his screen name Xue Manzi (薛蠻子)
3. Hikvision 海康威视 surveillance (Trump's blacklist)
4. Document Number Nine
----------------
Document Number Nine (or Document No. 9), more properly the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere 关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报(also translated as the Briefing on the Current Situation in the Ideological Realm[2]), is a confidential internal document widely circulated within the Communist Party of China in 2013. The document was first circulated in July 2012. The document warns of seven dangerous Western values, allegedly including media freedom and judicial independence. Teaching on any of the seven topics is forbidden. but in July 2013 was allegedly leaked by Chinese dissident journalist Gao Yu 高瑜, who was in turn sentenced to a seven-year imprisonment for "leaking state secrets"
aka. Seven no's 七不讲 or seven perils. 七大危险
指出“当前意识形态领域值得注意的突出问题”，提出七大危险
1. 宣扬西方宪政民主，企图否定党的领导，否定中国特色社会主义政治制度；
2. 宣扬“普世价值”，企图动摇党执政的思想理论基础；
3. 宣扬公民社会，企图瓦解党执政的社会基础；
4. 宣扬新自由主义，企图改变中国基本经济制度；
5. 宣扬西方新闻观，挑战中国党管媒体原则和新闻出版管理制度；
6. 宣扬历史虚无主义，企图否定中国共产党历史和新中国历史；
7. 质疑改革开放，质疑中国特色社会主义的社会主义性质。
The Seven Noteworthy Problems
1. Promoting Western Constitutional Democracy: An attempt to undermine the current leadership and the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" system of governance. (Including the separation of powers, the multi-party system, general elections, and independent judiciaries.)
2. Promoting “universal values” in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership. (That “the West’s values are the prevailing norm for all human civilization”, that “only when China accepts Western values will it have a future”.)
3. Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party’s social foundation. (i.e. that individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by the state.)
4. Promoting Neoliberalism, attempting to change China’s Basic Economic System. (i.e. unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and total marketization.)
5. Promoting the West’s idea of journalism, challenging China’s principle that the media and publishing system should be subject to Party discipline.
6. Promoting historical nihilism, trying to undermine the history of the CPC and of New China. (For example to deny the scientific and guiding value of Mao Zedong thought.)
7. Questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. (For example, saying “We have deviated from our Socialist orientation.”
七不讲
普世价值不要讲
新闻自由不要讲
公民社会不要讲
公民权利不要讲
中国共产党的历史错误不要讲
权贵资产阶级不要讲
司法独立不要讲
“四项基本原则”、“五不搞”、 “三个自信” "兩個凡是"
=====================
党领导一切，国有体制的弊端
p 150 The experience of Chinas electric car sector represents yet another facet of China's innovation culture. It underscores the downside of China's refusal to reform and of the continued dominance of the Chinese state in the country's larger innovation ecosystem. Beijing identifies promising sectors and technologies for government investment, works through several different ministries and localities to promote the development and deployment of these technologies, and may constrain opportunities for competitive multinationals in the development of the country's domestic market, unless they are willing to part with their technologies. The costs are consequential. Even in the face of poor initial performance of Chinese indigenous technology and weak acceptance of it in the Chinese market, the government persists. Beijing's willingness to accept suboptimal technological in order for Chinese firms to capture the market-as in the case of battery technologies technologies-leads to significant waste of resources and inefficiencies.
After more than a decade in development with billions of dollars of state funding, Chinese electric cars still compete only on a cost, not a quality, basis with the top international brands.
The government at all levels is eager to be a significant player in the investment arena. The result is a tech sector shaped onto only by the quality of the innovation and broader fortunes of the Chinese economy but also by the same inefficiencies and wast that infect state-driven innovation in sectors such as electric cars. It will only be harder for good companies to thrive in a world in which bad companies are not allowed to fail.
Underpinning much of the challenge in both China's SOE reform and the innovation sector, therefore, is a reluctance on the part of the Chinese leadership to relax the reins of state control and to allow the market to serve as a disciplining agent -helping to separate the best ideas from the weaker ones and the better companies from the poorer ones. The government is willing to tolerate a higher level of waste and inefficiency in the cause of capturing market share and fulfilling other developmental and strategic objectives. As the next chapter reveals, a similar pattern can also be found in China's efforts to address its air quality problem, where market forces-both economic and in the political realm of civil society-are taking a back scat to state-directed initiatives.
----------------
Chapter of 4
Problem with SOE ( state-owned enterprise)
1. first economic reform in 1978 by Zhao Zi Yang
2. SOE overburden the state and underperforming relative to private firms, such as profit margins, cash flows, return on asset. Despite this, private firms have a much more difficult time accessing capital and pay, in 2016, average 9.9 interest rate, 6% above the rate for SOE.
SOE is 120% of GDP (China), in contrast, in Japan and South Korea at 30%. Moreover, SOE represented 75% of all china's overall corporate debt.
Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (中国铝业股份有限公司, known as Chalco) is only one-seventh of its private China Hongqiao Group 中国宏桥集团有限公司
3. In 2016, 90% new urban jobs created by private firms.
4. SOE are major contributors to overcapacity. in 2015, China had 336 million tons of overcapacity in seteel, contribute 46% of the world's overcapacity. p107
5. SOE waste significant funds through misappropriation and fraud.
6. However, SOE is agents of the China state.
SOE current reform will not lead to layoffs experienced to in 199os round of SOE reform through merges and acquisition instead of bankruptcies.
--SOE serve Beijing's broader political and strategic objectives in BRI
--SOE becomes bigger and bigger.
--The party in the State
p111 one senior SASAC official indicated that the number of central government-controlled SOEs would eventually be consolidated into forty mega SOEs
1 Walmart $482,130
2 State Grid $329,601 国家电网公司
3 China National Petroleum $299,271
4 Sinopec Group $294,344 中国石化
7. 党领导一切
Deepen party role in the management of SOE, and expand SOE in economy, it is reverse reform of previous years in Zhu Rongji's reform.
SOE monopolistic power, free and low-cost use of state assets, not handling over profits; no internal restrictions on allocation; limits opportunities for efficiency gains through privatization, competition, or bankruptcy.
Far from enhancing market-driven decision-making within SOEs, the party has enhanced its role in driving SOE's decisions.
p115 Xi in 2016, speak 'Party leadership and building the role of the part are root and soul for state-own enterprises.... The party's leadership in state-owned enterprised is a major political principle, and that principle must be insisted on. "
8. 贸易保护 贸易壁垒
example: electrical car
higher subsidaries: government offer of 50,000-60,000 yuan ($8000-9000) to consumers buying a electrical car.
p128 a mandate that foreign automakers who wanted to manufacture cars in China transfer their core electrical battery or high-power electric motor technology.
19% tax elimination, but not for foreign cars.
p128 Rather than produce a healthy competition, instead of 地方保护主义, it is a zero-sum game.
=====================
Foreign firms in China
1. p74 Must allow access to their data, along with "technical support" to Chinese security officials upon the latter's request. One of the most onerous requirements was a measure that permits Beijing to access computer program source code, which is considered highly sensitive intellectual property.
2. Forced transfer technology for accessing China domestic market. 强制技术转让
=====================
Chapter 5
Advantage: How American Innovation Can Overcome the Asian Challenge by Adam Segal
Innovation U. S style: science-based research that delivers a new product to the world and might even create a new industry. Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future by Peter Thiel
Chinese innovation: innovation through commercialization.
Western style is more than invention, Chinese style is not.
Lee Kai-Fu 李開復 in 2009 found Innovation Works, Sinovation Ventures 创新工场
p147 When askedby one audience member about the imparcgt of the increasly challenging Internet restrictions in China under Xi JinPing, Les simply shrugged and said that now it is clearer what is alloed and what isn't
=============================================
In September, Chinese vice president and the man about to assume a 10-year term as China's leader, Xi Jinping, disappeared mysteriously for two weeks in 2012.
Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji
Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao (2002-2012)
第十九届 2017年10月召开的十九届一中全会
总书记 习近平（会议召集人）
政治局常委（7）习近平 李克强 栗战书 汪 洋 王沪宁 赵乐际 韩正
政治局委员（18）丁薛祥 王晨 刘鹤 许其亮 孙春兰（女） 李希 李强 李鸿忠 杨洁篪 杨晓渡 张又侠 陈希 陈全国 陈敏尔 胡春华 郭声琨 黄坤明 蔡奇
赵乐际 Zhao Leji , 栗战书 Li Zhanshu, 王沪宁 Wang Huing is Xi's allies ( 4 of 7 PBSC), 18 of 25 Polituro Xi's allies. 刘鹤 Liu He, 李强Li Qiang 陈敏尔 Chen Miner 黄坤明 Huang Kunming ( a lot from his associates from his days as party secretary in Zhejiang.
政治局常委 Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
中共在十九大一中全会后宣布了新一届政治局常委名单，除上一任中共总书记习近平和政治局常委、国务院总理李克强之外，其余五人均为新晋常委，分别为栗战书、汪洋、王沪宁、赵乐际和韩正。
这也意味着中共十八届中央的五名常委遭到了替换，分别为王岐山、张德江、俞正声、刘云山和张高丽。这5人以及在十八大后罕见地以政治局委员身份兼任中国国家副主席的李源潮均未出现在十九届中央委员会名单中。此外，会前呼声颇高的胡春华和陈敏尔也未能进入常委名单，只是担任政治局委员。
汪洋 李克强 came from CYL (Communist Youth League: as a training 胡锦涛
团派，又称「共青团派」、「共青帮」，指被推测为是以2002年中共十六大上台之原任中共中央总书记胡锦涛为首、自中国共产主义青年团出身的中华人民共和国官员与中国共产党领导阶层、伴隨著胡锦涛的崛起而形成的非正式派系。2012年中共十八大以后，在中共中央政治局委员之中曾有共青团中央书记处任职经历者有李克强、汪洋、李源潮、刘延东、刘奇葆和胡春华
=====================
vocabulary:
中央政治局常委 （7）the Poliburo Standing Committee (PBSC)
or 中央政治局常委 Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee
Poliburo 政治局
政治局委员（18）
CCP: Chinese Communist PartyThe Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会
December 31, 2018
The author, Elizabeth Economy, provides an in-depth look at the bio of Chinese President Xi Jingping along with his change in the direction of the country to a more centrally-controlled economy and society—what she calls the Third Revolution.
The First Revolution was by Chinese President Mao Zedong with his central planning and poor economic performance and societal ills. The Second Revolution was started by President Deng Xiaoping in 1978 with his more market-oriented economic approach that contributed to vast economic gains and innovation in China, making solid gains on the global stage.
The current Third Revolution has the potential to take China in the wrong direction as the Chinese Communist Party gains power economically and politically. This has led to less freedom of speech by the media and individuals. There is also a populist movement whereby a China First mentality is at the forefront.
The author takes a look at different approaches to how the US could deal with China. This is on military and economy bases.
Ultimately, diplomacy is important between the two largest superpowers in the world while pressuring China to liberalize trade and their economy. But this should not come at the expense of Americans through tariffs but rather through engagements with their trading partners like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and similar measures.
I give this book 5 stars as it provides a great look at the history, insight in outlook, and possible policies to the Chinese political and economic situation. Check it out at this pivotal time in world history.
The First Revolution was by Chinese President Mao Zedong with his central planning and poor economic performance and societal ills. The Second Revolution was started by President Deng Xiaoping in 1978 with his more market-oriented economic approach that contributed to vast economic gains and innovation in China, making solid gains on the global stage.
The current Third Revolution has the potential to take China in the wrong direction as the Chinese Communist Party gains power economically and politically. This has led to less freedom of speech by the media and individuals. There is also a populist movement whereby a China First mentality is at the forefront.
The author takes a look at different approaches to how the US could deal with China. This is on military and economy bases.
Ultimately, diplomacy is important between the two largest superpowers in the world while pressuring China to liberalize trade and their economy. But this should not come at the expense of Americans through tariffs but rather through engagements with their trading partners like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and similar measures.
I give this book 5 stars as it provides a great look at the history, insight in outlook, and possible policies to the Chinese political and economic situation. Check it out at this pivotal time in world history.
March 5, 2022
This book is mostly useful as a view into the typical American think tank scholar’s view of China and not any sort of objective or deeply insightful analysis. One of my biggest complaints of this book is that the author always takes the US’s policy pronouncements on face value while assigning nefarious ulterior motives to the Chinese counterparts. This leads to frequent passages that compare the intrinsically good goals of the US (“freedom”, “democracy”, and “free-trade”) with not the stated values of China but the West’s assertions of their values (mostly “authoritarianism”). This frequently devolves into racism on the levels of phrenology. The author quotes a Chinese dissident and artist as saying that Chinese people are intrinsically uncreative without challenging it in the slightest! I really hoped this book would have the nuanced view it promised, but never does the author detail any motives of China below surface level “oh they say this, but clearly they want this awful thing”. There’s no historical analysis of the relationship between China and the west, no summarization of Chinese leaders’ Marxist philosophy, no setting aside typical western narratives in the slightest. This book might be informative if you’ve never heard of Xi Jinping or the BRI, but if you’re looking for anything more challenging to a western bias than CNN, you’re in for a disappointing time.
October 4, 2020
This book is a short and concise overview of how Xi’s ascension has altered both China’s domestic politics and its foreign policy to some extent. As a Council on Foreign Relations book it has a good amount also dedicated to US foreign policy responses and relations to China. I’ve read several criticisms about this book and I don’t feel that they really hold an validity. This book was written by an American think tank, for American foreign policy observers and leaders. Criticisms of the Chinese system in this book may come off as biased, but at the same time is it really biased when Chinese politicians often have the same criticisms? If you’re going to read it then read it for what it is. This book is a very easy to read and concise work that should bring most people up to speed on China issues pre-COVID.
January 15, 2019
The era of Xi Jinping, which began at the end of 2012, has been identified by the leader’s Chinese dream as it was in the past. Unlike his immediate predecessors, the new Chinese leader has pursued more comprehensive and oppressive strategy to achieve this ultimate objective. Senior China policy expert Elizabeth Economy calls this transformation as China’s “third revolution” and attempts to outline the general framework of Xi’s vision—and its contradictions in the political, economic, and social trajectories of China.
Merely I'd like to point out that there is a mismatch between the book title and its main argument. If I were the author, I would choose a more original and consistent title like "Chinese Dream 3.0"
Merely I'd like to point out that there is a mismatch between the book title and its main argument. If I were the author, I would choose a more original and consistent title like "Chinese Dream 3.0"
December 22, 2019
For a person of the author's status, granted a bit too easily for reasons I've never ascertained, this strikes me as both late to the party and disappointing in its scholarship and analysis. Certainly, her thesis could play out entirely as described, but there are far too many unknown variables for me to feel she should relish in her confidence so readily. Overrated author, overrated book, granted title of Expert Supreme a little too cavalierly, in my opinion. I think there are many other contemporary analysts who could be accorded that title with perhaps more justification. Frankly, I have come to find myself perpetually underwhelmed by this author's recent work, this one included.
August 15, 2018
Standard exposition, nothing new
One of hundreds of books that explain the current US-China state of affairs. No insight into what motivates Xi, no examination of the ‘core socialist values’ that he follows, or any revelations other than the standard narratives found daily in the media. Disappointing for that reason, the book is nevertheless well-researched for its content and overall well-written.
One of hundreds of books that explain the current US-China state of affairs. No insight into what motivates Xi, no examination of the ‘core socialist values’ that he follows, or any revelations other than the standard narratives found daily in the media. Disappointing for that reason, the book is nevertheless well-researched for its content and overall well-written.
August 22, 2022
A good overview of modern Chinese politics and issues it faces, but far too heavy handed on the pro-US narrative.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 138 reviews