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Valley of the Shadow: The Siege Of Dien Bien Phu
Following the end of World War II, France attempted to reassert control over its colonies in Indochina. In Vietnam, this was resisted by the Viet Minh leading to the First Indochina War. By 1954, the French army was on the defensive and determined to force the Viet Minh into a decisive set-piece battle at Dien Bien Phu.
Over the past five decades, Western authors have generally followed a standard narrative of the siege of Dien Bien Phu, depicting the Viet Minh besiegers as a faceless horde which overwhelmed the intrepid garrison by sheer weight of numbers, superior firepower, and logistics. However, a wealth of new Vietnamese-language sources tell a very different story, revealing for the first time the true Viet Minh order of battle and the details of the severe logistical constraints within which the besiegers had to operate.
Using these sources, complemented by interviews with French veterans, and research in the French Army and French Foreign Legion archives, this is a new telling of the climactic battle in the Indo-China War, the conflict that set the stage for the Vietnam War a decade later.
Over the past five decades, Western authors have generally followed a standard narrative of the siege of Dien Bien Phu, depicting the Viet Minh besiegers as a faceless horde which overwhelmed the intrepid garrison by sheer weight of numbers, superior firepower, and logistics. However, a wealth of new Vietnamese-language sources tell a very different story, revealing for the first time the true Viet Minh order of battle and the details of the severe logistical constraints within which the besiegers had to operate.
Using these sources, complemented by interviews with French veterans, and research in the French Army and French Foreign Legion archives, this is a new telling of the climactic battle in the Indo-China War, the conflict that set the stage for the Vietnam War a decade later.
356 pages, Hardcover
First published July 24, 2018
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October 16, 2021
The defeat of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu by the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) lead by General Vo Nguyen Giap was as monumental an event for the second half of the twentieth century as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was to the first half. As much as any other event, it signaled the death knell of colonialism and coalesced the proponents of Marxism/Leninism with the first military defeat of the Truman Doctrine.
Unfortunately, “Valley of the Shadow” by Kevin Boylan and Luc Olivier cannot be recommended either as an unbiased presentation of the events or as a clear narrative of what took place during the battle.
The authors rely heavily on Vietnamese publications and online sources that have become recently available. General Giap’s memoirs and writings are also freely sourced. While much of the sourcing is interesting, there is little presented that dispels the conventional wisdom that the battle was lost not by the French troopers on the ground nor won by the unflinching valor of the VPA troops and Giap’s brilliant leadership. The battle was lost due to mistaken assumptions by the French leadership, including their inability, much like the Germans at Stalingrad, to continue to supply the garrison by air through bad weather conditions and constant harassment. This leadership blunder thesis was essentially unchanged from Bernard Fall’s “Hell in a Very Small Place” published in 1966.
Many of the online references given in the notes were not accessible for examination.
The presentation in the book is very confusing. The Order of Battle is not well defined and the French units are presented in acronyms along with unit numerical designations, e.g. V/7 RTA or 8/2 BEP. There is no convenient table listing what all the acronyms stand for and there are at least eleven different types of battalions/regiments/companies. When the VPA acronyms were cited in the same paragraph, it is easy to confuse who is who. It would have been helpful to, say, the first time a unit is cited in a chapter to designate what the composition of the unit was, e.g. V/7 RTA (Algerian Rifle Regiment) or 8/2 BEP (Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion). Half-way through the book the authors stop referring to the VPA and begin referring to them as bo doi without giving any explanation. Why?
The ostensible commander of the ground troops, Col. Pierre Langlais, is addressed only anecdotally. While General de Castries was the CinC, the day to day strategy and tactics fell upon the shoulders of Col. Langlais. By all accounts, Langlais was a difficult and abrupt officer who had no qualms dressing down a subordinate in public. But he was also an extremely competent tactician and officer dealing with a nearly untenable situation while receiving less and less support from his superiors in Hanoi. He first and foremost believed in the honor of his profession. His portrayal in this book is more like a hot-head of limited mental capacity. It is an unfair portrait.
Similarly, at the very beginning and at the end of the book, General Giap is presented as a near genius. This, again, is puzzling as throughout the book he is presented as making decisions that could have gone completely against him had slight variables gone differently. This battle was a very close run thing that could have gone in either direction but for small, uncontrollable occurrences (weather, French command decisions, etc.). However, one must concede that, in warfare, being lucky is better than being good.
The authors claim that the present volume is not intended to be a comprehensive study but a correction of previous accounts by having access to previously unavailable material. Early on reveal their leanings, calling the battle “a triumph for Marxist Revolutionary Warfare theory.” They also present the dan cong, the civilians who were conscripted to help transport food and munitions through the jungle terrain, as willing, even cheerful, volunteers. This seems an exaggeration; even years later, US forces found much of the countryside ambivalent at best to the political machinations of the outside world. Giap, in true Marxist fashion, had little regard for the situation of the individual as it related to the Revolutionary cause.
Short shrift (perhaps a page) is given to the prisoners and the truly horrible treatment at the hands of their communist captors. Much greater attention is paid to comments by the French leadership that the authors purport are evidence of racism. In the context of the day there was nothing untoward in these comments. A more detailed study reveal that most of the French leadership gave credit where it was due and where African or Laotian troops faltered, it was noted. Mostly this happened when officers or NCOs were killed or otherwise incapacitated. This did not generally happen within the elite paratrooper units.
One last, galling and unnecessary comment comes in the last chapter of the book in which the authors state unequivocally that the claim “that the US actually won its Vietnam War militarily, only to throw the victory away on account of a loss of political will on the home front” is a false assuagement. I would refer the authors to numerous articles and publications over the years, e.g. “Abandoning Vietnam, How America Left and South Vietnam Lost its War” by James H. Willbanks, University Press of Kansas, 2004.
A much better, much more accurate and unbiased account of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu is presented in “The Last Valley” by Martin Windrow, Da Capo Press, 2004.
Of course there is the classic “Hell in a Very Small Place, the Siege of Dien Bien Phu” by Bernard Fall, Lippincott, 1966.
Unfortunately, “Valley of the Shadow” by Kevin Boylan and Luc Olivier cannot be recommended either as an unbiased presentation of the events or as a clear narrative of what took place during the battle.
The authors rely heavily on Vietnamese publications and online sources that have become recently available. General Giap’s memoirs and writings are also freely sourced. While much of the sourcing is interesting, there is little presented that dispels the conventional wisdom that the battle was lost not by the French troopers on the ground nor won by the unflinching valor of the VPA troops and Giap’s brilliant leadership. The battle was lost due to mistaken assumptions by the French leadership, including their inability, much like the Germans at Stalingrad, to continue to supply the garrison by air through bad weather conditions and constant harassment. This leadership blunder thesis was essentially unchanged from Bernard Fall’s “Hell in a Very Small Place” published in 1966.
Many of the online references given in the notes were not accessible for examination.
The presentation in the book is very confusing. The Order of Battle is not well defined and the French units are presented in acronyms along with unit numerical designations, e.g. V/7 RTA or 8/2 BEP. There is no convenient table listing what all the acronyms stand for and there are at least eleven different types of battalions/regiments/companies. When the VPA acronyms were cited in the same paragraph, it is easy to confuse who is who. It would have been helpful to, say, the first time a unit is cited in a chapter to designate what the composition of the unit was, e.g. V/7 RTA (Algerian Rifle Regiment) or 8/2 BEP (Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion). Half-way through the book the authors stop referring to the VPA and begin referring to them as bo doi without giving any explanation. Why?
The ostensible commander of the ground troops, Col. Pierre Langlais, is addressed only anecdotally. While General de Castries was the CinC, the day to day strategy and tactics fell upon the shoulders of Col. Langlais. By all accounts, Langlais was a difficult and abrupt officer who had no qualms dressing down a subordinate in public. But he was also an extremely competent tactician and officer dealing with a nearly untenable situation while receiving less and less support from his superiors in Hanoi. He first and foremost believed in the honor of his profession. His portrayal in this book is more like a hot-head of limited mental capacity. It is an unfair portrait.
Similarly, at the very beginning and at the end of the book, General Giap is presented as a near genius. This, again, is puzzling as throughout the book he is presented as making decisions that could have gone completely against him had slight variables gone differently. This battle was a very close run thing that could have gone in either direction but for small, uncontrollable occurrences (weather, French command decisions, etc.). However, one must concede that, in warfare, being lucky is better than being good.
The authors claim that the present volume is not intended to be a comprehensive study but a correction of previous accounts by having access to previously unavailable material. Early on reveal their leanings, calling the battle “a triumph for Marxist Revolutionary Warfare theory.” They also present the dan cong, the civilians who were conscripted to help transport food and munitions through the jungle terrain, as willing, even cheerful, volunteers. This seems an exaggeration; even years later, US forces found much of the countryside ambivalent at best to the political machinations of the outside world. Giap, in true Marxist fashion, had little regard for the situation of the individual as it related to the Revolutionary cause.
Short shrift (perhaps a page) is given to the prisoners and the truly horrible treatment at the hands of their communist captors. Much greater attention is paid to comments by the French leadership that the authors purport are evidence of racism. In the context of the day there was nothing untoward in these comments. A more detailed study reveal that most of the French leadership gave credit where it was due and where African or Laotian troops faltered, it was noted. Mostly this happened when officers or NCOs were killed or otherwise incapacitated. This did not generally happen within the elite paratrooper units.
One last, galling and unnecessary comment comes in the last chapter of the book in which the authors state unequivocally that the claim “that the US actually won its Vietnam War militarily, only to throw the victory away on account of a loss of political will on the home front” is a false assuagement. I would refer the authors to numerous articles and publications over the years, e.g. “Abandoning Vietnam, How America Left and South Vietnam Lost its War” by James H. Willbanks, University Press of Kansas, 2004.
A much better, much more accurate and unbiased account of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu is presented in “The Last Valley” by Martin Windrow, Da Capo Press, 2004.
Of course there is the classic “Hell in a Very Small Place, the Siege of Dien Bien Phu” by Bernard Fall, Lippincott, 1966.
January 29, 2019
This may seem like just another book on Dien Bien Phu but its more important contribution to the literature, aside from recounting operational aspects of the French and Viet Minh experiences in the valley, is its refutation of some of Bernard Fall's more speculative assertions regarding certain events during the battle. One example of this is Kevin Boylan's dismissal of Fall's claim of Christian de Castries' supposed requisition of command to Pierre Langlais. While this may seem like academic nitpicking, the honest and competent recounting of history should be as close the truth as possible. Boylan shows Fall respect where it is due while challenging claims he believe to be problematic and unsupported by historical evidence. In short, this book presents the reader a different possibility of a reality which is different from Fall's recounting of battlefield events in Hell in a Very Small Place, which has generally been considered to be conventional wisdom.
September 24, 2021
This is very much a missed opportunity by the authors who had a lot more sources available to them than previous authors on this event. I found that the throughout the book the authors are playing a game of one-upmanship against other authors, notably Bernard Fall. This kind of pettiness upsets the run of the book and comes across as arrogant.
The authors claim that in other books on Dien Bien Phu the topography has been of a poor standard, I generally found that while the authors were describing the various offensives, they could have at least added a visual during each passage to let the reader know the type of position that was being attacked/defended, the result leaves the reader flipping through pas pages trying to find the relevant map.
This is also the first military book I have read, that doesn't have an ending. The authors could have at least added a chapter on the aftermath of this battle, instead they go from the surrender to the conclusion. Leading the reader to believe that the captured French soldiers and commanders marched happily to their POW camp and upon release where welcomed back to France in open arms. The lack of such a chapter is quite frankly ridiculous.
Overall, both authors had a wealth of new information and sources to decipher but ultimately could have done a better job with it. If you have a special interest in this iconic battle, do add this to your reading list, because as stated there much new material included in this book. But in terms of being the definitive account of Dien Bien Phu, this book is well wide of target.
The authors claim that in other books on Dien Bien Phu the topography has been of a poor standard, I generally found that while the authors were describing the various offensives, they could have at least added a visual during each passage to let the reader know the type of position that was being attacked/defended, the result leaves the reader flipping through pas pages trying to find the relevant map.
This is also the first military book I have read, that doesn't have an ending. The authors could have at least added a chapter on the aftermath of this battle, instead they go from the surrender to the conclusion. Leading the reader to believe that the captured French soldiers and commanders marched happily to their POW camp and upon release where welcomed back to France in open arms. The lack of such a chapter is quite frankly ridiculous.
Overall, both authors had a wealth of new information and sources to decipher but ultimately could have done a better job with it. If you have a special interest in this iconic battle, do add this to your reading list, because as stated there much new material included in this book. But in terms of being the definitive account of Dien Bien Phu, this book is well wide of target.
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September 6, 2019This review is based on the unabridged version of the audio book. This new book updates many items from other authors that were written closer to the battle. It brings in many Vietnamese sources that were not available at the time of the other writings. While it does update several items, it is a much shorter book than "Hell in a Very Small Place" and covers many things in less details. While the authors talk about the improvements over Bernard Fall's work, I think they were very dependent on it.
July 16, 2025
A well-researched and good look at a battle that the French Foreign Legion was going to lose from the beginning. This battle and the way the French government handled everything after WWII set the stage for a final confrontation, which would ultimately lead to the same outcome, albeit in a different context. All because our leaders chose not to look at the whole picture of who they would be fighting against. A very good book.
May 12, 2020
Great read, especially on the Viet Minh
The authors have taken advantage of the Vietnamese published books and papers not available to previous authors. Little known fact like ammo consumption, actual units involved, etc fill the picture of such great times as Last Valley, which is the best available history on the French war.
The authors have taken advantage of the Vietnamese published books and papers not available to previous authors. Little known fact like ammo consumption, actual units involved, etc fill the picture of such great times as Last Valley, which is the best available history on the French war.
April 2, 2019
I think most contemporary historians are overly critical of Bernard Fall, it's only in retrospect with newly revealed documents (that were not available to Fall) that we can now clear the record. Nevertheless, this is a very balanced, if short, history for both sides of the conflict.
August 5, 2020
Although it is really designed for someone looking for a more granular view of the battle, there are some interesting details that make it worthwhile. Just make sure it's not your first book on the topic.
November 2, 2024
The “Valley of the Shadow” by Kevin Boylan and Luc Olivier is a revisionist attempt at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The authors have indeed uncovered new sources for the battle but, they seem often too ready to accept Vietnamese sources uncritically on all manner of things.
July 28, 2018
This is a great book on Vietnam. Love this book!
May 19, 2019
Excellent Book! The battle of Dien Bien Phu is described in great detail. The authors used Vietnamese sources to fill in blanks left by many other books who only use French sources.
July 6, 2019
An interesting read on this historic turn of event that changed the course on the future of Vietnam. Very comprehensive and well researched and balanced details.
November 6, 2020
Detailed interesting and slightly revisionist take on this pivotal battle
February 24, 2023
Great book, many Vietnamese sources. Several interesting refuted claims (i.e. Viet artillery supremacy, human wave attacks, lack of truck transport on Viet side), nice maps.
April 5, 2023
Incredible statistics!
Very well researched. A definitive work on Dien Bien Phu. Made me understand the Vietnam War in a completely different light.
Very well researched. A definitive work on Dien Bien Phu. Made me understand the Vietnam War in a completely different light.
July 11, 2025
The author presents many historical distortions.
January 26, 2022
Excellently researched. Easy read and written, Diffently a keeper1 PLus to my collection on subject!
September 19, 2018
Osprey's books often have many charts, graphs, and maps. since I am not able to view these within a book it makes it difficult to enjoy a book in totallity. That said, this book is unusual and valuable for the perspective given by the French adversarys, the communist Vietnamese. The narreative is clear and detailed and adds to the historical record.
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews