Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership 1945-1982

by Mike Worden

Study of American airpower and leadership

Genres: Nonfiction, History

281 pages, paperback

First published January 1, 1998

Reviews

[Scottnshana · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is not what you think. When it came out in 1998, it was deemed an attack on a denuded Strategic Air Command by gloating fighter pilots. The first 3/4 of the book does describe SAC and the men who ran it--mostly bomber pilots who flew in the Pacific Theater in WWII--as acolytes of the single, overwhelming knock-out blow approach that brought the Japanese to unconditional surrender. I repeatedly thought of Bernard Baruch's "Hammers and Nails" quote as I read here about how SAC leadership kept advocating nuclear strikes to assail Cold War developments around the world. The French are about to lose Indochina at Dien Bien Phu? Nukes on the perimeter. Missiles in Cuba? Nukes on the sites. Col. Worden describes the men running SAC--in the top leadership positions of the Air Force until General Brown became Chief of Staff in the early '70s--as men obsessed with checklists who failed to adapt to U.S. challenges throughout their tenure. On p.213, Col. Worden lists those challenges: "Complexities of deterrence, detente, strategic sufficiency, arms limits, limited war, and peacekeeping proved more comprehensible to pragmatists than they did to absolutists." The "Rise of the Fighter Generals" thus refers to Generals Brown, Jones, and subsequent leadership that brought the pragmatic--a.k.a. experience outside SAC--approach to the top positions in the U.S. Air Force. I think the book goes hand-in-hand with H.R. McMaster's "Dereliction of Duty" as an examination of LBJ's approach to targeting over Viet Nam and I think the author offers good suggestions based on the Linebacker I/II air campaigns--Joint, no restrictions, and all planning done in-theater. I also think that this book is a fine companion to James Kitfield's "Prodigal Soldiers," a work on how the field-grade officers who saw combat in Viet Nam (a.k.a. General Horner, who found that repetitive tactical nuke delivery training in airframes like the F-105 was somewhat inadequate for the tasks he and his compatriots faced over the North) changed the military and laid the foundations for success in Desert Storm. I believe "Rise..." is a well-researched USAF leadership, intellectual, and doctrinal history and that the author has presented a good argument.

[Evan Þ. · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this as a history of US Air Force command from the end of World War II through Vietnam. Early on, it was commanded by generals who'd risen through bomber command, emphasizing Strategic Air Command preparing for nuclear bombing of the Soviet Union, at the expense of shorter-range fighter support operations. The two had dramatically different organization and command styles, due both to LeMay's style and the needs of dispersing Strategic Air Command bombers while keeping tight control. But, eventually this fell through - due in part to a reaction against LeMay, and also due to the increasing need for shorter-range missions in Vietnam.

This made me doubt again whether Strategic Air Command was good for the country. You could say MAD kept us safe from destruction... but here, I see it poisoning military culture and impeding the actual wars America fought. This's another side of the Cold War grand strategy tradeoffs Friedman was writing about. Perhaps the Soviets had the right idea of organizing the strategic nuclear forces totally separate from the rest of the air force?

[Chris Stephens · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book for the AF Officer or Enlisted member who wants to learn about the origin of broadening and AADs.

[Barry Hunte · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book will explain some of the reasons the Air Forces does what it does.