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金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储
In 2012, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, gave a series of lectures about the Federal Reserve and the 2008 financial crisis, as part of a course at George Washington University on the role of the Federal Reserve in the economy. In this unusual event, Bernanke revealed important background and insights into the central bank's crucial actions during the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Taken directly from these historic talks, "The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis" offers insight into the guiding principles behind the Fed's activities and the lessons to be learned from its handling of recent economic challenges.
Bernanke traces the origins of the Federal Reserve, from its inception in 1914 through the Second World War, and he looks at the Fed post-1945, when it began operating independently from other governmental departments such as the Treasury. During this time the Fed grappled with episodes of high inflation, finally tamed by then-chairman Paul Volcker. Bernanke also explores the period under his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, known as the Great Moderation. Bernanke then delves into the Fed's reaction to the recent financial crisis, focusing on the central bank's role as the lender of last resort and discussing efforts that injected liquidity into the banking system. Bernanke points out that monetary policies alone cannot revive the economy, and he describes ongoing structural and regulatory problems that need to be addressed.
Providing first-hand knowledge of how problems in the financial system were handled, "The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis" will long be studied by those interested in this critical moment in history.
Bernanke traces the origins of the Federal Reserve, from its inception in 1914 through the Second World War, and he looks at the Fed post-1945, when it began operating independently from other governmental departments such as the Treasury. During this time the Fed grappled with episodes of high inflation, finally tamed by then-chairman Paul Volcker. Bernanke also explores the period under his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, known as the Great Moderation. Bernanke then delves into the Fed's reaction to the recent financial crisis, focusing on the central bank's role as the lender of last resort and discussing efforts that injected liquidity into the banking system. Bernanke points out that monetary policies alone cannot revive the economy, and he describes ongoing structural and regulatory problems that need to be addressed.
Providing first-hand knowledge of how problems in the financial system were handled, "The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis" will long be studied by those interested in this critical moment in history.
260 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2013
67 people are currently reading
760 people want to read
About the author
Ben S. Bernanke
114 books203 followersBen S. Bernanke served as chairman of the Federal Reserve from 2006 to 2014. He was named Time magazine’s Person of the Year in 2009 and was a professor of economics at Princeton University prior to his career in public service.
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January 2, 2017
Two-and-a-half stars.
See the videotapes & transcripts of the lectures comprising this short 42,000-word book here.
See Robert Solow's review here.
Near the very end of this book (pp. 125-126), a student asks:
STUDENT: Do you think that 2 percent is enough of a cushion to prevent deflation? And have you considered higher inflation target rates?
BERNANKE: That is a great question, and there has been a lot of research on it. It seems that the international consensus is around 2 percent. Almost all central banks that have a target have either a 2 percent target or a 1-3 percent target or something similar. And there is a trade-off here, because, on the one hand, you want to have it above zero, as you say, in order to avoid or reduce deflation risk. But on the other hand, if inflation is too high, it is going to create problems for markets. It is going to make the economy less efficient. And so there is a trade-off in which one level of inflation gives you at least some reasonable buffer against deflation, but it is not so high that it makes markets work less well. And so again, the international consensus has been around 2 percent, and that is where the Fed has been informally for quite a while. So that is what we announced, and for the foreseeable future that is where we plan to stay. But obviously researchers will continue to look at this issue, trying to pinpoint exactly where the optimal trade-off is [my emphases].
What's striking about Bernanke's reply is its implication that he believes matters like the optimal rate of currency debasement are technical, not ethical; for him the proper rate of inflation is a technical question best decided upon by "researchers" whom he believes can "pinpoint exactly where the optimal" rate of debasement should be. This is one of many instances in which he exudes extraordinary (and imo unfounded) confidence in the salvific powers of fellow members of his particular clerisy.
This short book is loaded with unthought suppositions & professions of such faith. Ben rarely imagines himself faced with an ethical or moral question that cannot be settled by researchers.
I found it odd that in this short book Bernanke repeatedly justifies his actions by citing Walter Bagehot's famous dictum to lend freely at a penalty rate—as if invocation of the dictum could serve as a talisman to repulse criticism of various bailouts. What restrains anyone from invoking Bagehot's dictum to justify anything? Ben, a historian, doesn't muse upon this question.
It's a shame that Ben proffers no thoughts upon Bagehot's contemporary & intellectual opponent, Thomson Hanke, whose writings on the the unintended consequences of socialized credit risk strike me as far more prophetic.
Bernanke comes across in these lectures as unperturbable, self-assured, and wildly incurious about the actual activities taking place in the realm over which he presides, a man who justifies his controversial decisions by invoking the talismanic power of a famous economist (Bagehot) whose precept is treated as unquestionable holy writ, a man with no ambition seemingly greater than maintaining the perogatives of the institution that has benefitted him so greatly and that he would like to see perpetuated, even though he offers scant evidence of its worth and inadvertently provides numerous examples justifying its disbandment.
August 24, 2023
The Federal Reserve and The Financial Crisis collects a series of lectures that Ben Bernanke gave at George Washington University. I find I learn the most from these simple explanatory books, and a start-at-the-basics approach to any topic is helpful.
The cause of the 2008 recession was that a lot of people – knowingly and unknowingly – were betting on home prices to continue going up, which they did not. This was compounded by lack of government oversight, excessive debt levels, faulty risk management, and improper lending practices, but the underlying story is one of falling home prices.
Here’s the surprising thing. People weren’t just wrong about the direction of home prices. They were wrong about the effect of such a fall – even Bernanke. He oversaw a 2005 CEA report that predicted that a fall in home prices would cause only a mild recession.
To be fair, the actual economic value lost from falling home prices was only equivalent to “one bad day in the stock market”! The reason the crash precipitated a broader meltdown was the complicated second-order effects, such as the bank-run dynamics on firms heavily exposed to mortgage losses. These were really really hard consequences to predict ex ante, which is part of the reason people felt secure holding such large mortgage debt.
Bernanke stresses over and over again that firms simply did not have the ability to monitor the risk from these financial assets. It was too complicated to understand what the effects of falling home valuations would be on one’s balance sheet, let alone the overall economy.
Why, then, did these financial firms hold such assets if they couldn’t accurately predict their portfolio effects? I understand a mortgage lender who sells a bad loan knowing that they’ll be able to pawn it off to a bank (as was common at this time). But why was Lehman holding so many mortgages with such a bad understanding of the assets? Perhaps they didn’t know what they didn’t know.
The cause of the 2008 recession was that a lot of people – knowingly and unknowingly – were betting on home prices to continue going up, which they did not. This was compounded by lack of government oversight, excessive debt levels, faulty risk management, and improper lending practices, but the underlying story is one of falling home prices.
Here’s the surprising thing. People weren’t just wrong about the direction of home prices. They were wrong about the effect of such a fall – even Bernanke. He oversaw a 2005 CEA report that predicted that a fall in home prices would cause only a mild recession.
To be fair, the actual economic value lost from falling home prices was only equivalent to “one bad day in the stock market”! The reason the crash precipitated a broader meltdown was the complicated second-order effects, such as the bank-run dynamics on firms heavily exposed to mortgage losses. These were really really hard consequences to predict ex ante, which is part of the reason people felt secure holding such large mortgage debt.
Bernanke stresses over and over again that firms simply did not have the ability to monitor the risk from these financial assets. It was too complicated to understand what the effects of falling home valuations would be on one’s balance sheet, let alone the overall economy.
Why, then, did these financial firms hold such assets if they couldn’t accurately predict their portfolio effects? I understand a mortgage lender who sells a bad loan knowing that they’ll be able to pawn it off to a bank (as was common at this time). But why was Lehman holding so many mortgages with such a bad understanding of the assets? Perhaps they didn’t know what they didn’t know.
July 7, 2019
There is one reform still needed following the financial crisis and recession of December 2007 - June 2009 and this book makes an admirable attempt. That needed teform lay with the American public learning more about financial and economic stability, the function of the Federal Reserve and other key players, the difference between monetary and fiscal policy, and perhaps most important, how not to be swept up ever again in a tsunami of pre-crisis economic optimism and a complex financial world we don’t understand as American citizens. I have long admired Ben Bernanke’s communication skills and he delivers again with this slim volume of four lectures. I have spent 13 years living through the effects of the housing/financial crisis and recession. I figured it was worth a day of my time to read this book to understand what I did not understand before. I hope you will, too.
November 4, 2019
This book is a compilation of four lectures delivered in 2012 by Ben Bernanke, the former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve. These lectures formed part of a course at George Washington University on the role played by the Federal Reserve in the Economy.
The first lecture elucidates the underpinnings that lead to the formation of the Federal Reserve as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Reserve in keeping the economy stable as well as ensuring financial and fiscal balance. Bernanke provides a clear overview of the tools employed by the Federal Reserve such as monetary policy and also acting as a lender of last resort. The events leading to the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1914 sets the flavor for the next three lectures.
The second lecture reviews milestone developments in Central Banking and with the Federal Reserve post the catastrophic World War II. The perils of inflation and the potential remedial measures are dealt with in parallel to a refreshing overview of the Great Moderation. This lecture also lays out the build up to the Great Financial Recession of 2008-09.
The penultimate lecture dwells at length on the Financial Recession in general and what Bernanke terms "its intense phase" in particular. The cataclysmic collapse of Lehmann Brothers and the near disastrous folding up of AIG are some of the features forming part of this lecture. The swift response initiated by the Federal Reserve and the policy making body in conjunction with similar establishments across the globe are cited as stellar examples of international co-operation undertaken to prevent a global financial meltdown.
The final lecture is somewhat introspective in nature. Employing a medium of candour that is rare amongst policymakers, Bernanke admits to various shortcomings, both in the Federal Reserve as well as in the Banking Regulatory mechanisms that more or less led to unscrupulous deal making; spawned the creation of esoteric derivatives/financial instruments; facilitated the expansion of systemically gargantuan firms that were "too big to fail"; and ultimately bought the entire global financial system to the brink of ruin. Bernanke also talks about future reforms such as the implementation of reforms such as the Dodd-Frank Act, supervising the working of investment banks and other player in the money market such as hedge funds etc. He also makes a very important point of allowing firms to 'fail' but in a manner that would pose the least strain on the economy. Allowing the untrammeled growth of "too big to fail" firms would not only lead to a sense of complacency, but will also fuel the undesirable feature of "moral hazard".
For a person desirous of understanding the working of the United States Federal Reserve in general and the institutional role played by it during a financial crisis, in particular, she would be well served to read this collection of lectures.
The first lecture elucidates the underpinnings that lead to the formation of the Federal Reserve as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Reserve in keeping the economy stable as well as ensuring financial and fiscal balance. Bernanke provides a clear overview of the tools employed by the Federal Reserve such as monetary policy and also acting as a lender of last resort. The events leading to the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1914 sets the flavor for the next three lectures.
The second lecture reviews milestone developments in Central Banking and with the Federal Reserve post the catastrophic World War II. The perils of inflation and the potential remedial measures are dealt with in parallel to a refreshing overview of the Great Moderation. This lecture also lays out the build up to the Great Financial Recession of 2008-09.
The penultimate lecture dwells at length on the Financial Recession in general and what Bernanke terms "its intense phase" in particular. The cataclysmic collapse of Lehmann Brothers and the near disastrous folding up of AIG are some of the features forming part of this lecture. The swift response initiated by the Federal Reserve and the policy making body in conjunction with similar establishments across the globe are cited as stellar examples of international co-operation undertaken to prevent a global financial meltdown.
The final lecture is somewhat introspective in nature. Employing a medium of candour that is rare amongst policymakers, Bernanke admits to various shortcomings, both in the Federal Reserve as well as in the Banking Regulatory mechanisms that more or less led to unscrupulous deal making; spawned the creation of esoteric derivatives/financial instruments; facilitated the expansion of systemically gargantuan firms that were "too big to fail"; and ultimately bought the entire global financial system to the brink of ruin. Bernanke also talks about future reforms such as the implementation of reforms such as the Dodd-Frank Act, supervising the working of investment banks and other player in the money market such as hedge funds etc. He also makes a very important point of allowing firms to 'fail' but in a manner that would pose the least strain on the economy. Allowing the untrammeled growth of "too big to fail" firms would not only lead to a sense of complacency, but will also fuel the undesirable feature of "moral hazard".
For a person desirous of understanding the working of the United States Federal Reserve in general and the institutional role played by it during a financial crisis, in particular, she would be well served to read this collection of lectures.
March 15, 2014
This book presents four lectures that Chairman Bernanke gave recently on the origins and details of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, what the Federal Reserve did in response to the crisis, and how the actions taken by the Federal Reserve worked out. These are exceptionally clear and thoughtful statements of both policy and its execution and the do a great service to the public by showcasing the Federal Reserve chairman's efforts to inform the public and clarify expectations to market actors. The lectures will not provide much new information to those who have been following the crisis, but they will shed light on the Fed and Ben Bernanke's role. It would be wonderful if other heads of government branches provided such a service to the public. For readers with less background, these lectures provide a good introduction to the crisis and its contexts.
May 31, 2015
A collection of four lectures Bernanke gave to a GW undergraduate course in 2012, The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis covers the history of the central banking, the origins of the crisis, the response to the crisis, and the status of the recovery (circa 2012, which is probably the only dated aspect of the book since the roles of unemployment and productivity have more clearly reversed since then). Overall an excellent overview of all of these topics, very little that is new for a specialist (especially one who follows Bernanke's speeches), but certainly a good first stop for a non-specialist who is interested in these questions and worthwhile reading more broadly.
May 11, 2015
This book should renamed, "How I Ben Bernanke kept the world from collapsing and saved capitalism, and now there's nothing to worry about." There is some information about how the Fed functions, but it's largely just a puff piece on how great the Fed is and how they totally had everything under control, ignoring that if they had anything in hand there never would have been a financial crisis in the first place.
February 23, 2018
Төв банкны үүрэг, ашигладаг арга хэрэгслүүд, санхүүгийн хямралын урьтал нөхцөл, санхүүгийн хямралын үед авсан арга хэмжээ, түүний дараах сургамж, хор нөлөө, системийн шинэчлэл зэргийн тухай тун сонирхолтой 4 цуврал лекцийг багтаасан ном байна. Над шиг мэргэжлийн бус хүн уншихад их амар ном ажээ.
Санхүүгийн шинэчлэлийн хамгийн гол зорилтуудын нэг нь "дампуурахад хэт том" байгууллагуудыг байхгүй болгох явдал юм. -Бен Бернанке
Санхүүгийн шинэчлэлийн хамгийн гол зорилтуудын нэг нь "дампуурахад хэт том" байгууллагуудыг байхгүй болгох явдал юм. -Бен Бернанке
June 13, 2013
A good economics book explains things you didn't realize before and makes you think about things you hadn't thought about before. This series of four lectures isn't an exhaustive history of the fed, nor is it an exhaustive look at fed policy during and after the crisis. But in a mere 129 Bernanke gets a lot done.
May 10, 2021
What a concise and understandable book about the Fed and money market.
April 28, 2024
The unfortunate thing about reading about the 2008 financial crisis is that you've probably already heard it. Most of what was discussed in these lectures is pretty obvious at this point, depending on how many times you've rewatched The Big Short.
A few interesting points though that were new to me:
1 - 2008 peak crisis was essentially a corporate bank run and the issue is that FDIC was only built for retail bank runs. This has since been addressed with Dodd-Frank but made me think about what the next bank run might be...sovereign debt came to mind immediately.
2 - the fed is a fairly new institution, est. 1914 and the only real history they had to lean on in 2008 was the 1930s depression where the fed was too slow to support the economy. This explains alot of the decisions they made in 2008.
3 - the 2% target inflation rate is actually just the ">0% i.e. anti-deflation + adjustment for data delays" target inflation rate. It's a tradeoff between keeping it as close to 0 as possible for optimal efficiency and avoiding deflation.
A nice short read.
A few interesting points though that were new to me:
1 - 2008 peak crisis was essentially a corporate bank run and the issue is that FDIC was only built for retail bank runs. This has since been addressed with Dodd-Frank but made me think about what the next bank run might be...sovereign debt came to mind immediately.
2 - the fed is a fairly new institution, est. 1914 and the only real history they had to lean on in 2008 was the 1930s depression where the fed was too slow to support the economy. This explains alot of the decisions they made in 2008.
3 - the 2% target inflation rate is actually just the ">0% i.e. anti-deflation + adjustment for data delays" target inflation rate. It's a tradeoff between keeping it as close to 0 as possible for optimal efficiency and avoiding deflation.
A nice short read.
October 14, 2019
Full of contradictions, omissions and self-avowed ignorance. Ben Bernanke has mastered the art of appearing competent while serving Wall St and not having good answers for issues that affect Main St, which is essentially how he sees the role of the Federal Reserve: To perpetuate the economic system that squeezes life out of ordinary people for the wealthy profit seekers on corporate boards and Wall St offices.
August 28, 2018
Must read - understand what our last depression was all about
Very readable by non economist. Gives you a clear picture of what happened in the 2008 crash as well as 1930. And where better to get this information than Bernanke, the Feds chairman
I bought 4 copies and am giving it to each one of my children.
Very readable by non economist. Gives you a clear picture of what happened in the 2008 crash as well as 1930. And where better to get this information than Bernanke, the Feds chairman
I bought 4 copies and am giving it to each one of my children.
February 28, 2017
Very informative read. Clearly walks the reader through the origination and history of the Federal Reserve, the response of the FED during the financial crisis, and the aftermath of the crisis. Simple to understand. Would highly recommend.
July 29, 2020
Good summary of what happened in 2008 and very easy to read.
Great background of what happening in 2008 and Fed’s role at the time, most importantly very easy to read and understand.
Great background of what happening in 2008 and Fed’s role at the time, most importantly very easy to read and understand.
July 9, 2023
Mostly tries to tell us how "valuable" the Fed is for the US and world economies. How the Fed helped work through economic issues that were created by the Fed. In my opinion this screams of too much government in the market. A market that would correct itself faster and come back stronger.
April 5, 2025
He’s incredibly well-written, with a great flow and clear, simple language.
He truly breaks down the complex concepts behind the GFC and the Fed — its mandate, toolkit, way of thinking, and evolution — in a way that anyone can understand.
He truly breaks down the complex concepts behind the GFC and the Fed — its mandate, toolkit, way of thinking, and evolution — in a way that anyone can understand.
March 12, 2018
Very clear explanation of what fed does, how and why. Good analysis of the 2008 financial crisis, the action fed has taken, and how to exit. Many of what he says has since played out.
June 20, 2018
Good for a topline understanding of the Fed, as well as their role in the Financial Crisis - both before and after. It's based on a series of lectures, so it's a fairly quick and easy read.
July 5, 2018
Excellent set of lectures, to include student questions on the Financial Crisis of 2008. Lot's of history and supporting financial theory. In general a good read.
December 3, 2018
An eye opening account of the other side of the financial crisis. Describes among other things how the unpopular bailouts was the best action the Fed could've taken.
April 9, 2020
An essential primer for anyone wanting to know more about the Federal Reserve.
September 18, 2020
Provides an interesting perspective. One common theme throughout the entire book is the purpose of the Fed, and Bernanke's dedication to this perspective is admirable. An interesting read.
March 1, 2021
Absolutely fantastic first-hand look at the 2008 financial crisis. The lectures are presented very clearly and easy to understand.
April 13, 2022
Bernanke's lectures are clear, concise, and provide a lot of good information about the 2008 financial crisis without a lot of fluff
August 14, 2024
Easy to read with a minimal background in macroeconomic understanding.
September 22, 2024
Parts from 21st century monetary policy
December 28, 2024
Really appreciate how easy to read this book is and how it breaks down parts of the federal reserve and financial markets
October 21, 2025
讲得很好。但是可能翻译有点问题，把收益率翻译为利率，实在令人困惑。
June 5, 2022
Great lectures, no need to explain how great they are, these lectures are a perfect starting place for understanding Fed and the GFC (they can be freely accessed on Fed's website, along with sides and transcripts, so it's not necessary to purchase this book). But the book is poorly printed with zero top margin. Two sides of the paper also have different textures.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 50 reviews