‌پدیده‌شناسی

by Jean-François Lyotard, عبدالکریم رشیدیان

This translation of Lyotard's first book, La Phenomenologie, supplies an important link to Lyotard's more recent works. Phenomenology presents a commentary on the phenomenological movement. From the dual perspectives of a work on, and of, phenomenology, Lyotard's text profiles the different aspects of phenomenology, focusing particularly on the writings of Hegel, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Tran Duc Thao. Phenomenology marks a particular episode in Lyotard's reflections on the "philosophical project" and is emblematic of his critical reflections on philosophy's involvements in routine, daily commitments. Like Merleau-Ponty, in this work Lyotard eliminates philosophy as a "separate existence." Beyond offering an account of certain phenomenological themes, Lyotard's commentary explicates phenomenology's relevance to psychology, sociology, and history.

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology, Theory, Nonfiction

134 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1954

About the author

Jean-François Lyotard (DrE, Literature, University of Paris X, 1971) was a French philosopher and literary theorist. He is well-known for his articulation of postmodernism after the late 1970s and for his analysis of the impact of postmodernity on the human condition.

He went to primary school at the Paris Lycées Buffon and Louis-le-Grand and later began studying philosophy at the Sorbonne. After graduation, in 1950, he took a position teaching philosophy in Constantine in French East Algeria. He married twice: in 1948 to Andrée May, with whom he had two daughters, and for a second time in 1993 to the mother of his son, who was born in 1986.

Reviews

[فرشاد · Rating 4 out of 5]

نام ادموند هوسرل اغلب با کتاب تأملات دکارتی گره خورده است. کتابی که در آن، هوسرل توضیح می‌دهد که چگونه از طریق نگاه پدیدارشناسانه می‌توان تجربه‌ی اگو را توضیح داد. بیشتر علاقه‌مندان به فلسفه، او را به عنوان بنیان‌گذار یک روش فلسفی به نام پدیدارشناسی می‌شناسند. هرچند هوسرل در مقایسه با شاگردان خود نظیر هایدگر، سارتر و مرلوپونتی در زمینه‌ی مطالعات فلسفه اخلاق به نتایج مطلوبی دست نیافت که شاید یک علت عمده آن، رویکرد منطقی و ریاضی‌وار او در فلسفه و علاقه‌ی ناچیز او به مباحثی مانند اخلاق، رستگاری و وجود خدا باشد‫.

کارهای هوسرل البته از همان بدو پیدایش، آماج انتقاد فلاسفه پست‌مدرن قرار گرفته است. به ویژه می‌توان از انتقادات تمام‌نشدنی امانوئل لِویناس، ژاکوب دمدا، ژان پل سارتر و نویسنده کتاب حاضر، یعنی ژان فرانسوا لیوتار نام برد که البته همگی این منتقدین، آثار هوسرل را از چشم‌انداز هایدگر مورد بررسی قرار داده‌اند. به طور دقیق‌تر، دمدا بارها از هوسرل برای ساده‌انگاری از مفهوم حضور در فلسفه هوسرل انتقاد کرده است و لویناس، تعریف وی از پدیدارشناسی را مانعی برای گسترش مفهوم 'دیگری' در فلسفه می‌داند‫.

کتاب حاضر به معرفی و نقد مختصری از کارهای هوسرل می‌پردازد. این کتاب در دهه پنجاه قرن گذشته به چاپ رسید و سریعا مورد استقبال مخاطبین قرار گرفت. رویکرد لیوتار دو بخش دارد. بخش اول به مرور روش فلسفی هوسرل با تمرکز بر کتابهای پژوهش‌های منطقی و تأملات دکارتی می‌پردازد. در فصل دوم، نویسنده تلاش کرده است تا تاثیر تحلیل پدیدارشناسانه را در سه حوزه مجزای فکری مشخص کند: روانشناسی، جامعه‌شناسی و تاریخ. این دو فصل با یک بخش کوتاه که افکار هوسرل را با آراء هگل مقایسه می‌کند به هم مربوط شده‌اند. کتاب با یک پیشگویی از اورمیستون آغاز می‌شود تا خواننده را با کار لیوتار و اهمیت آن در حوزه‌ی پدیدارشناسی و پست‌مدرنیسم آشنا کند. اورمیستون، البته به نکات ارزشمندی اشاره می‌کند، فی‌المثل می‌گوید که از منظر لیوتار، پدیدارشناسی، تلاشی در جهت بهبود یافتن بشریت است هرچند نتیجه‌گیری او مبنی براینکه کتاب لیوتار 'پدیدارشناسی پدیده‌شناسی' است، نمیتواند قانع کننده باشد‫.

کتاب با این ایده آغاز می‌شود که هوسرل ابتدا موضوع اصلی پدیدارشناسی خود را آگاهی قرار می‌دهد و این امر باعث شده است که بسیاری، کار او را نوعی شناخت‌شناسی تلقی کنند. سپس این نکته بیان می‌شود که هرچند رویکرد آغازی هوسرل متوجه آگاهی استعلایی است اما او در آثار متأخر خود از این آگاهی‌شناسی یا اگولوژی فراتر رفته و موضوع جهان‌زندگی یا زیست‌جهان [یعنی جهان آن‌چنان که توسط فرد زیسته می‌شود و نه این که مجزای از انسان وجود دارد] را موضوع پدیدارشناسی دانسته است‫.

[M&A Ed · Rating 2 out of 5]

کتابی نسبتا سخت خوان بود. ترجمه کتاب خیلی روان و شفاف نبود. با این اوصاف کتاب به بررسی مقوله ی پدیده شناسی در آثار کسانی هوسرل، هایدگر، سارتر و... می پردازد.از جمله مباحث جالب این کتاب بحث رابطه ی پدیده شناسی با روان شناسی، علوم اجتماعی و تاریخ بود.

[Abdullah Başaran · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lyotard'ın "Fenomenoloji" kitabı Türkçedeki en yalın giriş kitaplarından biri olarak okunabilir. Hem detaylı bir Husserl bölümüyle fenomenolojinin temel problemlerini ele alıyor hem de kitabın diğer yarısında fenomenolojiyle başka disiplinler arasındaki ilişkiyi kuruyor.

[Alex Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

So Lyotard sees how stories arise out of phenomenology and how phenomenology can rationalize stories.

We live by stories. That's how we know who we are. But here, Lyotard shows us how a philosophy like Phenomenology can both highlight the stories in terms of itself, or tracing stories leads us back into philosophy.

Lyotard takes apart each different field (like History, Sociology or Psychology) and shows how phenomenology can account for them and how they account for phenomenology. This is a game of signification, where structures and processes are held to be simultaneously equivalent.

Each of these are a different dimension of social development. Evolution of those domains are captureable in terms of the formations of their phenomenon within the consciousness of being able to name them and be aware.

And so, Lyotard step-sides Hegel and embraces Kant's knowable through Husserl, to collapse our lifeworld into a narrative itself as narrative is the process of becoming.

"All told, a monad in X is just a monoid in the category of endofunctors of X, with product × replaced by composition of endofunctors and unit set by the identity endofunctor."

[Pierre E. Loignon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent topo très partiel et partial sur la phénoménologie, qui aboutit entre la destruktion heideggérienne et les thèses communisantes de Tran-Duc-Thao.

[Apo_kran]

Zor bir metin olduğunu itiraf etmeliyim. İlk 60 sayfasını okuyabildim sadece. Lyotard'ın üslubundan mı, İsmet Birkan'ın çevirisinden mi yoksa fenemonolojiye uzaklığımdan mı, pek emin değilim; fakat somut bir düşünce ele geçirdiğimi söyleyemem. Bu yüzden birkaç defa metinle mücadele edeceğim.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

AN “EARLY” (PRE-“POSTMODERNIST”) BOOK BY THE FRENCH PHILOSOPHER

Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) was a French philosopher, sociologist, and literary theorist, best known as a pioneer of Postmodernism. He was co-founder of the International College of Philosophy with Jacques Derrida, François Châtelet, and Gilles Deleuze.

He wrote at the conclusion of the Introduction to this 1954 book, “It is above all with respect to the human sciences that phenomenological reflection claims our attention. This is no accident: in the investigation of the immediate data prior to all scientific thematization, and the justification of such, phenomenology lays bare the fundamental manner, of essence, of the consciousness of this data, which is intentionality… the phenomenological temptation is not to replace the sciences of man, but to focus their problematics, thus selecting their results and orienting their research. We will attempt to retrace this path… there remains a common phenomenological ‘style’… it is this common style above all which we will seek to outline after having rendered to Husserl that which is Husserl’s: ‘having begun.’” (Pg. 33-34)

He explains, “What phenomenology tries to do… is, beginning with the true judgment, to descend again to what is ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED by the individual who judges. Yet in order to grasp what is actually experienced, one must adhere to a description that closely follows the modifications of consciousness…” (Pg. 74) He continues, “The truth of what the subject judges to be observed is for the psychologist only one more event, in no way privileged; the judging subject is determined, bound up in the series of motivations that bear responsibility for the judgment. Thus, we can reach the experience of truth which is to be described only if we do not eliminate the subject of the experience from the outset.” (Pg. 75)

He observes, “In this way phenomenological reflection distinguishes itself from the reflection of traditional philosophies, which consisted in reducing the lived experience to it’s a priori conditions; and thus we find again, at the foundation of this reflection that phenomenology opposes to introspective psychology, the Husserlian concern with the thing itself… the concern which motivates the reduction, the guarantee against the insertion of prejudices and the appearance of alienations in the reflective description I make of anger. It is thus the experience of anger prior to all rationalization, to all thematization, that I must first extract through reflective analysis in order then to reconstitute its meaning.” (Pg. 79-80)

He says, “For the phenomenologist, the social is in no way an object; it is grasped as lived experience, and calls, here as in psychology, for an adequate description of this experience in order to reconstitute its meaning. But this description in turn can only be made on the basis of sociological data, themselves resulting from a prior objectivation of the social.” (Pg. 105)

He suggests, “We know now how there is history for consciousness: consciousness is itself history. Any serious reflection on historical science must begin with this beginning.” (Pg. 117) Later, he adds, “Thus phenomenology does not propose a philosophy of history, but it responds in the affirmative to the question that began this chapter [“How is a historical science possible?”]… It proposes rather a reflective recovery of the data of historical science, an intentional analysis of the culture and period laid out by this science, and the reconstruction of the concrete, historical Lifeworld, through which the meaning of this culture and period is revealed.” (Pg. 122-123)

He concludes, “Phenomenology contributes essentially to Marxism concerning two theses: the meaning of history, and class consciousness. In fact, these two theses are the same, since for Marxism the meaning of history can only be read through the stages of class conflict, and the stages are dialectically linked to the consciousness that classes have of themselves in the total historical process.” (Pg. 127) He adds, “Far from surpassing them, then, phenomenology is retrograde with respect to Hegelian and Marxist philosophies. This regression is explained historically.” (Pg. 135)

For those who are most familiar with Lyotard’s later “Postmodernist” writings, this early, more directly “philosophical” book may be of great interest.

[Ella Frances · Rating 2 out of 5]

"My consciousness cannot be thought if we imaginarily take away what it is consciousness of.... Imaginary variation operated on consciousness thus reveals that its proper being is to be consciousness of something."

I am afraid I strongly disagree with this conviction. There can be consciousness 'of', in the case of consciousness of objects (thoughts, images, subjects) or there can be consciousness without objects [i.e., in the state of deep sleep, when there are no objects of thought to be conscious 'of', yet in which nevertheless awareness is present since it always necessarily is and can never not be (there can be no experience of the absence of awareness, since if we claim the absence of awareness as an experience, something must have been there to witness it)]. Let's be clear, although consciousness 'of' objects can be experienced, it is not a prerequisite of consciousness, since consciousness is continually present without qualification - hence, consciousness need not be aware of anything.
To imply consciousness must be aware 'of' something assigns a dual subject/ object relationship to the matter (consequently asserting concepts of space/time/matter into the algorithm), which is a mistaken proposition.

[Truls Ljungström · Rating 3 out of 5]

Väldigt vriden, men förklarar Husserl på ett väldigt bra och effektivt sätt. Det är behjärtansvärt att se att till och med Lyotard medgav att relativism förintar vetenskapernas vetenskapliga validitet.