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The foreign policy of the Third Reich
In this short outline history of Hitler's foreign policy, Professor Hildebrand contends that the National Socialist Party achieved popularity largely because it integrated all the political, economic and socio-political expectations prevailing in Germany since Bismarck. Thus, foreign policy under Hitler was a logical extension of the aims of the newly created German nation-state of 1871.
Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics-backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase-European hegemony-was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third American intervention and "racial purification." The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.
Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics-backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase-European hegemony-was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third American intervention and "racial purification." The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.
209 pages, Hardcover
First published November 17, 1973
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
July 16, 2016
The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich is a short, yet dense, read that analyzes the diplomatic initiatives of Hitler's Germany. This small book is packed with insight and information regarding what Germany was able to achieve before the outbreak of war and what caused its decline. The idea of living space (Lebensraum) is a major theme throughout this history. Acquiring agricultural land from Germany's eastern adversaries was essential to fuel imperial expansion and proposed global domination. One aspect of the book that is highly interesting is Hitler's pursuance of an alliance with Britain. He had believed that an alliance between Britain, Italy, and Germany would be successful in conquering Europe, Russia, and achieving victory over the inevitable conflict with the United States of America. This is a bit of a head scratcher for contemporary audiences unfamiliar with 1930s diplomacy but Hildebrand presents sound analysis as to why this was reasonable for Hitler to think in such a way. The sources of Nazi militarism and imperial outlook are traced back to Prussia and the Wilhelmine eras. These origins are intriguing but controversial. Debating Hitler's continuation of German history is an academic chicken or the egg argument. As someone who perceives Germany's actions as somewhat unique in the post-World War I era, it was interesting to consider Hildebrand's proposals and conclusions. This book also gives insight into how and why leaders form diplomatic alliances and what holds them together.
October 19, 2025
The book presents several compelling arguments about Nazi foreign policy, with the most convincing being Hitler's personalised vision of alliance with Britain and his conception of a world order built around this partnership. This argument is particularly persuasive because Hitler demonstrated remarkable consistency on this point throughout his political career—from before his election through the pre-war period and into wartime itself. He wrote extensively about seeking British alliance in his second book, pursued agreements such as the Anglo-German Naval Pact, and even during wartime, consistently framed the conflict as being against Churchill personally rather than against the British people.
The author's assertion that Hitler viewed France as Germany's natural rival is equally convincing. This perspective has deep roots in German political history. Following the Franco-Prussian War, France exhibited the same revanchist mentality that Germany would later display after World War I. That defeat shaped their entire political culture. The Dreyfus Affair remained politically relevant until WWI, and France notably paid its war indemnities from 1871 with remarkable speed. It is therefore unsurprising that Germany perceived similar sentiments and anticipated inevitable confrontation.
However, the analysis becomes more complex regarding Nazi ideology toward the Soviet Union. While it is indisputable that the Soviets were viewed as the enemy, the nature of this enmity requires nuance. The Nazis conceptualised the Soviet threat in Schmittian terms—as an existential enemy with whom pragmatic engagement was nonetheless possible and even encouraged. The Nazi approach to the USSR was driven as much by recognising a security dilemma as by ideological confrontation. Through their foreign policy framework of Geopolitik, Nazi leaders understood that Germany lacked autarky and was strategically vulnerable.
This reality created significant divisions within the Nazi leadership. The party's more left-wing elements, including Ribbentrop and Goebbels, viewed Soviet cooperation as essential to Germany's objectives. Conversely, Wehrmacht leadership favoured decisive action. This internal divergence strengthens the functionalist interpretation of Nazi decision-making. Furthermore, the intense elite infighting—which was endemic to the regime—meant that Hitler's ideological commitment to British alliance was not universally shared. Figures like Göring and Goebbels held different priorities, which undermines the notion of a simple top-down command structure where Hitler's word was widely obeyed.
The author's treatment of Chamberlain and Britain's decision to fight requires greater nuance. British engagement in WWII was far from monolithic. The majority of the British public initially opposed war, and entry resulted from several specific factors: First, the press played a crucial role in framing the Munich Agreement as a failure and Chamberlain as an appeaser, generating sufficient public pressure to force his resignation. Second, a segment of Britain's elite class held deeply anti-German sentiments—Churchill, for instance, had declared during WWI that Germans were genetically bred for war. This was not the prevailing view, as evidenced by the coalition government's collapse during the Blitz over Churchill's refusal to negotiate peace with Germany. Additionally, Britain was already operating within the emerging framework of American supremacy, with the United States seeking to expand its global hegemony through continued conflict. These factors played a substantial role in Britain's decision to continue the war.
I have significant reservations about the extent to which the author attributes racial ideology to German foreign policy, and particularly regarding Hildebrand's emphasis on the new SS elite's role. If the SS was as racially dogmatic as suggested, why was Hitler reportedly upset when Himmler accepted Ukrainians into the SS? While Germans indeed viewed Slavs as militarily inferior, this attitude was typical among European nations at the time. Churchill's own comments exemplify how social Darwinism was widespread—indeed, the Nazis drew heavily on British and American scientific racism.
More fundamentally, I question whether the SS played the central role in foreign policy that Klaus suggests. His claim that the old guard was displaced seems dubious, given that traditional military elites retained extraordinary power—they nearly succeeded in their coup attempt against Hitler in 1944. Wehrmacht leadership, operating from Clausewitzian principles, drove much of the aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union, conceptualising it as a war of attrition.
Nazi Germany was emphatically not monolithic but instead characterised by intense elite competition. As Speer documented, various elite factions constantly vied for Hitler's approval. To suggest the SS held supreme authority oversimplifies this dynamic—at different times, Bormann and the Gauleiters, Speer, or other factions held ascendancy. This constant competition aligns with patterns in other revolutionary regimes, such as the Bolsheviks or the English Roundheads.
I agree with Kershaw's interpretation of Hitler as the chief mediator who maintained regime cohesion. Still, this role resembled the Japanese gunbatsu system, where competing factions deliberately withheld information from one another.
Overall, the book successfully emphasises the ideological foundations of Germany's relations with France and Britain, I agree Nazi Germany was more Wilhelmine than Bismarckian in character, and the source collection is impressive. However, it falls short in analysing the regime's internal dynamics and has not aged well in light of newer scholarship on the Eastern Front.
The author's assertion that Hitler viewed France as Germany's natural rival is equally convincing. This perspective has deep roots in German political history. Following the Franco-Prussian War, France exhibited the same revanchist mentality that Germany would later display after World War I. That defeat shaped their entire political culture. The Dreyfus Affair remained politically relevant until WWI, and France notably paid its war indemnities from 1871 with remarkable speed. It is therefore unsurprising that Germany perceived similar sentiments and anticipated inevitable confrontation.
However, the analysis becomes more complex regarding Nazi ideology toward the Soviet Union. While it is indisputable that the Soviets were viewed as the enemy, the nature of this enmity requires nuance. The Nazis conceptualised the Soviet threat in Schmittian terms—as an existential enemy with whom pragmatic engagement was nonetheless possible and even encouraged. The Nazi approach to the USSR was driven as much by recognising a security dilemma as by ideological confrontation. Through their foreign policy framework of Geopolitik, Nazi leaders understood that Germany lacked autarky and was strategically vulnerable.
This reality created significant divisions within the Nazi leadership. The party's more left-wing elements, including Ribbentrop and Goebbels, viewed Soviet cooperation as essential to Germany's objectives. Conversely, Wehrmacht leadership favoured decisive action. This internal divergence strengthens the functionalist interpretation of Nazi decision-making. Furthermore, the intense elite infighting—which was endemic to the regime—meant that Hitler's ideological commitment to British alliance was not universally shared. Figures like Göring and Goebbels held different priorities, which undermines the notion of a simple top-down command structure where Hitler's word was widely obeyed.
The author's treatment of Chamberlain and Britain's decision to fight requires greater nuance. British engagement in WWII was far from monolithic. The majority of the British public initially opposed war, and entry resulted from several specific factors: First, the press played a crucial role in framing the Munich Agreement as a failure and Chamberlain as an appeaser, generating sufficient public pressure to force his resignation. Second, a segment of Britain's elite class held deeply anti-German sentiments—Churchill, for instance, had declared during WWI that Germans were genetically bred for war. This was not the prevailing view, as evidenced by the coalition government's collapse during the Blitz over Churchill's refusal to negotiate peace with Germany. Additionally, Britain was already operating within the emerging framework of American supremacy, with the United States seeking to expand its global hegemony through continued conflict. These factors played a substantial role in Britain's decision to continue the war.
I have significant reservations about the extent to which the author attributes racial ideology to German foreign policy, and particularly regarding Hildebrand's emphasis on the new SS elite's role. If the SS was as racially dogmatic as suggested, why was Hitler reportedly upset when Himmler accepted Ukrainians into the SS? While Germans indeed viewed Slavs as militarily inferior, this attitude was typical among European nations at the time. Churchill's own comments exemplify how social Darwinism was widespread—indeed, the Nazis drew heavily on British and American scientific racism.
More fundamentally, I question whether the SS played the central role in foreign policy that Klaus suggests. His claim that the old guard was displaced seems dubious, given that traditional military elites retained extraordinary power—they nearly succeeded in their coup attempt against Hitler in 1944. Wehrmacht leadership, operating from Clausewitzian principles, drove much of the aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union, conceptualising it as a war of attrition.
Nazi Germany was emphatically not monolithic but instead characterised by intense elite competition. As Speer documented, various elite factions constantly vied for Hitler's approval. To suggest the SS held supreme authority oversimplifies this dynamic—at different times, Bormann and the Gauleiters, Speer, or other factions held ascendancy. This constant competition aligns with patterns in other revolutionary regimes, such as the Bolsheviks or the English Roundheads.
I agree with Kershaw's interpretation of Hitler as the chief mediator who maintained regime cohesion. Still, this role resembled the Japanese gunbatsu system, where competing factions deliberately withheld information from one another.
Overall, the book successfully emphasises the ideological foundations of Germany's relations with France and Britain, I agree Nazi Germany was more Wilhelmine than Bismarckian in character, and the source collection is impressive. However, it falls short in analysing the regime's internal dynamics and has not aged well in light of newer scholarship on the Eastern Front.
April 4, 2026
I first read this when I took my history degree years ago, and came to revisit now it as I love how it's so traditionally written in essay style format. I would recommend this to any serious historian, keeping in mind that although it is beautifully researched, it was published in 1973.
June 30, 2008
Damn interesting
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews