Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparently excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.
Basically the author took High Reliability Organizations theory (which state it is possible to safely operate hazardous systems if you structure your org the right way) and pitted it against Normal Accident theory (which states tightly coupled and highly Interactive systems fundamentally can’t be made completely safe), and then dug in old us military records, got documents declassified, and interviewed people who worked in the US military to see which would win.
Why many signs and official records pointed at HRO being right, further digging following the Normal Accident theory kept identifying repeated near-misses and issues in alignment that makes the author (who initially thought nuclear weapons were safe) no longer believe so.
There's a decent amount of counterfactualism in play, but a) the author states so and does so to study possibilities more than likelihood, and b) the analysis still goes further in comparing both theories based on what mechanisms are though to mediate their dynamics. Overall, the book's approach is really clever, I wish more theories were tested this way, and I'm surprised the book hasn't been mentioned too often to me before.