Who was Fox Conner (FC)? I have not read anything about him, except he was a mentor to Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall. This alone got my attention; these men are all iconic names in our military history.
This book is Rabalais’s first published work, and he did a fine job. Yet, I sense he fell into the trap of hero worship, but it is not fatal in this work because his skill at research makes this work a good study of the American military, up to and including World War II.
I did feel that the narrative regarding the First World War was too much in Conners’ favor. Rabalais gave this reader the impression that FC lead the American forces in the First World War and made most of the major decisions, of course that overlooks the fact that General Pershing was in command. I attribute this to his zeal for telling the FC story, that he overreached on his focus on FC.
Rabalais does point out that most of the criticism regarding the management of that war fell on FC and not as much on Pershing. In his narrative Rabalais states, for instance, that FC’s battle strategies did incur many casualties, and after the war Congressional committees did point this out.
Rabalais also provided full accounts of the Belfort Ruse, where he misled his field, Commanders to surprise the German Army, this type of action by the man in charge loses the respect of his subordinates and affects team moral; his division leaders felt betrayed once the truth was known and were critical of FC in their post war narratives.
FC went out of his way to attacked and regain the city of Sedan from German occupation rather than allowing the French forces to have the honor of avenging a previously lost battle for this town. His actions and the fact that the town was in the French zone of operation caused an uproar with our allies.
Despite knowing that the armistice had been signed, Conner did not direct any of his forces to stand down. The AEF suffered 3,912 casualties on 11-11-1918 including 268 American’s killed on the war’s last day. Conner received a lot of criticism for these needless acts, but none of these acts of poor judgement got a reaction from Rabalais; he states the facts and moves on, and maybe this was the right response, yet I wanted some condemnation.
Another point that struck this reader was a sentence in Rahis prologue that read, “…..imparted that belief to his protégé Eisenhower and transformed him from a struggling officer facing a court-martial into one of the Army’s rising stars.” Eisenhower about to be court-martialed? I did not know about this, and I have read Eisenhower’s biography; so, I had to go to outside sources for the details, then our author provided the detail one hundred pages later page 185. He brought this up in the Prologue and in my opinion should have addressed it there.
Eisenhower’s writings in the Infantry Journal showed disfavor with the Chief of Infantry, Major General, Charles S. Farnsworth, who told young Eisenhower that his ideas were wrong and dangerous. Farnsworth added that if he published anything further incompatible with “solid Infantry doctrine,” he would be hauled before a court-martial. Rabalais could have done a better job on this most interesting factoid, but I must admit that he made me scurry to get the facts from outside sources, and this need for further research was something I enjoyed, yet I felt that Rabalais should have given this little-known bit of history more attention in this book.
During FC’s West Point days, he did quite well academically despite his backwater heritage and lack of education. His senior class was graduated early because of America’s war with Spain. Most of his class went right into battle while FC was sent to Leavenworth for more training and then to the Army War College for intensive leadership training. He asked repeatedly for a combat assignment yet was refused. This reader never served, so some of the subtler concepts of military life escaped me. The question that comes to my mind is why was FC handled differently? Like FC, Eisenhower and George Marshall followed a similar path. None of these men could get a combat assignment and was routed through many assignments that eventually placed them in high level staff positions. How does the military decide where the millions of men who pass through the system get placed? These three men were clearly singled out and withheld from combat yet nurtured into high level staff positions. They managed wars without ever leading in combat. This has never been explained to me and while our author to his credit pointed this phenomenon out, he does not explain who and why such decisions are made. We can only assume that these three men were singled out because of traits or academic excellence to be trained to lead rather than fight. These men were frustrated in seeking combat assignments and were criticized by those in combat for never leading men in action. History vindicated the military judgement because these men were responsible for the allied victory in WWII. What makes me sensitive to this issue was the fact that my grandfather in 1917 was sent to Kentucky rather than most other Maryland recruits who went to Fort Meade. I regret never having asked him why he was sent to Kentucky, but I do know he was trained for ambulance duty. Was this action arbitrary on the part of the military or did testing indicate his proper area of service?
An interesting fact that is little discussed in other narratives on World War 1, was that the Americans arrived in Europe with little more than their rifles. France made a commitment to supply needed resources such as Artillery; but they were slow to fulfill the need, so rich America went to war with just rifles and had to borrow and beg the other allies for needed supplies.
After the American force was in Europe, Rabalais did a good job illustrating the dysfunction of the ally’s high command, they fought over resources and actual command. Pershing and his Chief of Staff Conners were in a constant fight to command their own American forces. The French General Foch was the overall allied Commander and he insisted on controlling the American forces, he integrated them into French divisions with French leadership; and so did the British. Perching and Conner felt that they were not equal partners in this war until 1918 when Pershing stood up and told Foch that he acknowledged Foch’s authority as overall commander, but he insisted that all American forces would be under his command from that day forward. Perching was a team player and stated while controlling his own forces he would follow Foch’s commands, because he was the supreme allied Commander. This dysfunction and command challenges are an interesting aspect of this book and illustrates the authors through research.
After the War years, Rabalais describes the deep military and personal relationship between Eisenhower and FC. The author states that FC saw the great potential in the young Eisenhower and groomed him and protected him as he rose through the ranks. To a lesser extent he did the same for Patton and Marshal. All three of these men were instrumental in the allied success in World War II; and to a man point to what they learned under FC’s tutelage.
I enjoyed this book and I applaud this successful first publication by the author.
Among the things learned in this study is that politics exists in every human endearer. A mentor, whether in business, or life and especially in the military is essential for eventual success. Another thing learned is there is always tension between the field and Headquarters, particularly when the person giving orders never had field experience. The final lesson learned is that Fox Conner was vital to winning WWI and helped win WW II by preparing the Army and mentoring the likes of Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshal. His continuous fights with Congress for the budgets necessary to fight a Pacific and a European war helped in the preparation for the next war, and the innovations he introduced and utilized by his three students helped in the allied victory. It is a wonder that more has been said about this genius for war.