How do people live in a country that has experienced rebellions and state-organised repressions for decades and that is still marked by routine forms of violence and impunity? What do combatants do when they are not mobilised for war? Drawing on over ten years of fieldwork conducted in Chad, Marielle Debos explains how living by the gun has become both an acceptable form of political expression and an everyday occupation. Contrary to the popular association of violence and chaos, she shows that these fighters continue to observe rules, frontiers and hierarchies, even as their allegiances shift between rebel and government forces, and as they drift between Chad, Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic. Going further, she explores the role of the globalised politico-military entrepreneurs and highlights the long involvement of the French military in the country. Ultimately, the book demonstrates that ending the war is not enough. The issue is ending the 'inter-war' which is maintained and reproduced by state violence. Combining ethnographic observation with in-depth theoretical analysis, Living by the Gun in Chad is a crucial contribution to our understanding of the intersections of war and peace.
This book uses a lot of big words to say that Chad's military is corrupt and informal from top to bottom based on shifting loyalties of convenience and ethnicity or family ties but ferociously dominates its region thanks to oil money and see-no-evil arms support from France, US, Russia, China, literally anyone who wants a ferocious, shiftingly loyal, friend of convenience with a gun in the Sahel or Central Africa. If you know anything at all about Chad, Lake Chad, CAR, or the Sahel, you probably knew this already.
Read chapter 5 if you want a detailed recent history of that military; read the rest if you want a super detailed history of individual militants padded with complex political theorizing that amounts to "Chad's military is corrupt and informal from top to bottom based on shifting loyalties of convenience and ethnicity or family ties." I like the author and what she tried to do here, but there's too much thesis left in this trade paperback to make it a good general resource on Chad.
On a du Tchad une image caricaturale : celle d’un pays sahélien d’une grande pauvreté peuplé de rude guerriers qui s’entre-déchirent dans des guerres civiles sans fin qu’alimentent les ingérences étrangères et qui opposent grosso modo un Sud animiste et un Nord arabe.
Marielle Debos combat ces stéréotypes. Sa thèse de science politique, soutenue en 2009 à l’IEP de Paris, abrégée et actualisée, n’a pas pour ambition de refaire l’histoire, des conflits qui rythment l’histoire du Tchad depuis l’indépendance . Sa démarche relève de la sociologie politique et vise à décrire la vie des hommes en armes. Ils n’ont rien de bêtes de guerre surarmées. Ils ne présentent pas une inclinaison naturelle à la violence. Il s’agit de « débrouillards » qui, dans un contexte de violence routinisée, emprunte un répertoire d’action banal. L’étude de leurs trajectoires révèle la fluidité de leurs loyautés, présentée à tort comme traduisant un goût atavique pour la trahison. Les statuts sont beaucoup moins marqués qu’en Europe. Le civil est souvent armé ; le militaire n’a pas toujours un uniforme. Les forces régulières et irrégulières se ressemblent et il est fréquent qu’on passe des unes ou autres en fonction des opportunités du moment. A la fluidité des statuts fait écho la fluidité des « situations ». Le Tchad est rarement tout à fait en guerre. Les combats y sont épisodiques et rarement meurtriers. Les guerriers pratiquent la technique du rezzou, des attaques surprises visant moins à tuer l’ennemi qu’à le faire fuir et à s’emparer de ses biens. Le Tchad n’est jamais non plus tout à fait en paix. L’arrêt des hostilités permet aux combattants d’engranger les bénéfices de la dernière guerre tout en préparant la suivante. L’auteure utilise fort à propos l’expression d’entre-guerres pour caractériser cette période interstitielle où chacun vit dans l’attente anxieuse de la reprise des hostilités. Pendant l’entre-guerres, les combattants se recyclent. Certains rallient le gouvernement ; d’autres restent en rébellion, trouvant parfois refuge à l’étranger. La plupart évoluent dans un espace flou situé « aux portes de l’Etat » : faux douaniers, coupeurs de routes … Là encore, il faut se départir des grilles occidentalo-centrées héritées de Max Weber qui caractérisait l’Etat légal-rationnel par la détention du monopole de l’utilisation légitime de la violence. Rien de tel au Tchad où les frontières entre le droit et le non-droit sont floues. On y applique le « décret sans numéro », des règles non écrites et fluctuantes qui n’en sont pas moins respectées pour autant. Marielle Debos a raison de s’inscrire en faux contre les théories de l’Etat « failli ». Au Tchad, l’Etat n’a jamais eu un rôle protecteur : les institutions légales ne fonctionnent pas ; les acteurs privés peuvent recourir à la violence sans encourir de sanctions. Pour autant, l’Etat est omniprésent, qui sait par un habile mélange de répression et de cooptation, conclure de nouvelles alliances ou consolider les anciennes sans verser pour autant dans le quadrillage social des Etats autoritaires. Dès lors, point n’est besoin d’importer un kit de « bonne gouvernance » pour lui conférer les attributs dont il est dépourvu. Il ne s’agit pas pour l’auteure de s’accommoder de cette situation ; mais elle a au moins le mérite de nous la faire comprendre.
This book provides an important perspective on fragile states: rather than being states without governing power, states like Chad are ruled by informal rules and power relations centered around violence and the threat of violence. This violence is not the result of state weakness but rather a result of a present, albeit often informal, brutal state ruling by the gun. While lacking a well functioning public administration and public services, the state is strong when it comes to subduing rebellions and discouraging political mobilization. The disorder of Chadian political history - including rebel movements, coups, etc. - are the result of politics in a state characterized by rule by the gun: political success depends on one's successful use (or threat) of military power. Which is why we so often see Chadian figures moving in and out of rebel groups and government - all in a game for greater political power. This results in a more fluid/disorganized order but not necessarily an unstable one.
Good governance programs must take into account this political situation to have any chance of succeeding. Development programs must also move away from an emphasis on securing stability, when it means maintaining an unjust and brutal status quo, and towards focusing on issues of poverty and human rights. After all, as the author notes, wars kill less people than poverty and a poor access to health services do.
The first third of the book reviews Chad's history in precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial times up to the present. We learn about Chad's often conflicting relationship to Libya and Sudan, especially involving Libya and Sudan hosting rebel groups from the other country. We learn about the organization and development of military power through these conflicts and power changes, and we learn about France's constant influence in Chadian politics.
Based especially on her own fieldwork in Chad over ten years, the second and third parts of the book review the intentions and experiences of actors in Chad, including the fluid loyalties of actors moving in and out of government and rebel groups, often having dual loyalties through having family and friends on both sides of military conflict. We learn about the unequal share of war dividends by those who are closer to people in power, whether due to familial or ethnic reasons, or due to one's military prowess which defines political power in Chad. We learn about the disorganized and often informal nature of Chad's military, resisting outside streamline and reform efforts. And we learn about the importance of external actors keeping Chad's current system in power, including through oil wealth and international cooperation in the war on terror.
Highly recommended for anyone interested in fragile states, war and conflict in Africa, and authoritarian states.
On m’a dit depuis longtemps de lire Marielle Debos. Trouver Le Métier des armes au Tchad (Le Gouvernement de l’entre-guerres) n’était pas facile. Bref – c’est un chef d’œuvre. Un monument au métier de la recherche. Je fais le va-et-vient au Tchad depuis 14 ans et ce bouquin m’a appris énormément, même après avoir lu des dizaines de livres sur le sujet. Bravo Marielle Debos !
Reading this from a future (post-Deby era) is interestingly anticlimactic (at least for now). Same junta with a younger face. Grossly irresponsible and oppressive leadership seems poised to continue to be the order of the day. How civil society can fight the junta, to takeover the reins of this most intriguing nation, still remains a mystery.
In summary, I loved the concept of the "inter-war" to describe the charged political space in-between and after wars. I agree that the way we interpret stability and the presence/absence of the state needs a multi-dimensional revision.
What appears to be a failing/failed state might just be a polity specifically engineered for oppression and wealth extraction by its elites. An intentional process that beats the rules of rational state formation/administration. Yet, we somehow fail to consider this, when discussing such states.
Chad is a country close to my heart. Wish the best for them in this chapter of their national existence.