Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev

by Yegor Ligachev

This memoir by the second most powerful Communist Party leader during the early Gorbachev years provides an important alternative view of the USSR’s transformation—a view that is gaining ground in Russian politics today. In a substantial new piece for this edition, Mr. Ligachev outlines the political agenda of today’s communist coalition—the establishment of a new Soviet Union, with strong economic and political integration of its member-states.Yegor Ligachev, a seasoned Party boss from Siberia, made a solid career for himself in the capital during the Khrushchev era, but, following Khrushchev’s ouster, chose to retreat to the provinces. In 1985, his political patrons brought him back to Moscow to help them build a dynamic new leadership team under Mikhail Gorbachev. The two reform-minded communists launched an effort to inject life and energy into the Party, economy, and society through a series of liberalizing measures. But when Ligachev saw the reforms moving into a revolutionary phase that could result in the Party’s loss of control over the helm of state, he found himself increasingly siding with the opposition.In this gripping book, Ligachev describes the evolving confrontation between opposing forces at high-level Party meetings and sessions of the Politburo as well as in less formal conversations. Along the way, he gives revealing glimpses not only of Gorbachev but also of Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Boris Yeltsin, and other top leaders. Notorious events such as the 1989 massacre in Tbilisi and the Gdlyan/Ivanov affair—in which, Ligachev argues, he was unjustly implicated—are also highlighted.

Genres: History, Soviet Union, Nonfiction

512 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1996

Reviews

[Rhuff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Those who label Ligachev a "bitter old Communist reactionary" obviously are grinding an ideological axe, and didn't bother with Stephen Cohen's indispensible introduction. Only those committed a priori to the downfall of the USSR demonized Ligachev in such terms - confirming the very points raised in his memoir.

As Cohen discusses in the introduction, this book is self-serving like all political memoirs - it's far from the "true story." But it's a necessary prism in decoding the full history of the perestroika era. Ligachev's main thesis - that Gorby unleashed forces he couldn't control, like a sorcerer's apprentice - has a credible basis. In separating the party from the state, it wasn't long before the state itself came apart. Which raises the question Ligachev addresses: was the USSR reformable?

Yes - but on its own terms, Ligachev argues. Gorbachev strayed from Andropov's original vision, importing Western forms not compatible with "Soviet reality." Such Soviet-realistic reforms would have focused on pluralism within the CPSU, not outside it; on building upon other social structures than nationalism to revitalize Soviet society. Gorby was caught between appeasing Western leaders and banks, and leading his own empire, and fell into the breach.

Is the world better off for Ligachev being the loser? Gorby himself joined his former aide in the ash heap of history, but there's no evidence that what followed in Moscow or the rest of the world has been any improvement. Corruption is worse than under Brezhnev; similarly, "New Russia's" wars have been just as brutal. There is no "empire," but then there is no counterweight to NATO. The thought of placing missiles in the heart of Europe, or unceasing "wars on terror" in the Middle East, or unilateral "global force projection" were unreal in Ligachev's time - and should have stayed so.