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The river and the gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist forces, November, 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea
Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea.
373 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1953
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134 people want to read
About the author
S.L.A. Marshall
58 books38 followersS.L.A. Marshall (full name, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall) served in World War I and then embarked in a career in journalism. In World War II, he was chief combat historian in the Central Pacific (1943) and chief historian for the European Theater of Operations (1945). He authored some 30 books about warfare, including Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, The River and the Gauntlet and Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
November 24, 2021
History is written by the winners, but defeat is silent. There are hundreds of books commemorating every United States victory, but The River and the Gauntlet, published in 1953, is one of the few recounting the disastrous defeat of the 8th Army near the Chongchon River in Korea in late November 1950. In fact, until this book percolated to the top of my reading list as a one-time selection of the long defunct Time Reading Program I had never even heard of the battle.
After the landings at Inchon the U.N. forces started rolling up the Korean peninsula, although it was an ominous sign that they were unable to coordinate the movements from east and west to cut off the retreating North Koreans before they crossed back over the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, it looked like it was going to be a rout all the way to the border with China, and beyond if MacArthur got his way and Truman released the couple dozen atomic bombs he wanted. He spoke of the war being over by Christmas if his forces hurried.
As they pressed toward the Yalu River more troubling signs appeared, such as Chinese soldiers being captured, and evidence of large scale troop movements inside China. MacArthur was one of those leaders with charismatic personalities, huge egos, and limited talents. Like others of his kind (think Donald Trump) he valued loyalty above ability and, while demanding absolute loyalty from those below him, he thought little of them. He was fond of calling his intelligence chief Major General Charles Willoughby “my pet fascist.”
Although he is mentioned only once in the book, Willoughby deserves to be remembered for his role in the debacle. Born in Germany possibly as Adolph Karl Weidenbach (his early life is obscure), he emigrated to the United States in 1910 at about age 18. In 1913 he was accepted as a senior at Gettysburg College based on his claim that he had spent three years at the University of Heidelberg and the Sorbonne, though there is no evidence he attended either. He fought in World War I and remained in the Army, eventually becoming Douglas MacArthur’s chief of intelligence (G2) during World War II, the occupation of Japan, and the Korean War.
Willoughby was loyal to his boss to the point of ignoring or altering intelligence that contradicted MacArthur’s beliefs, which had led to disastrous blunders in the Philippines against the Japanese. MacArthur firmly believed that China would not intervene to help the North Koreans, and had assured President Truman of this only weeks earlier when they met on Wake Island. Not surprisingly, once 380,000 Chinese “volunteers” attacked, MacArthur claimed that he never said anything of the kind, despite the presence of a dozen witnesses and the meeting’s official minutes.
This book is divided into two parts. The first, the river portion, describes the actions of the 25th Division around the Chongchon River as they came under attack by vast numbers of Chinese and had to stage a fighting retreat across inhospitable terrain with few roads, in weather just a few degrees above zero Fahrenheit. In the gauntlet portion of the book the 2nd Division found itself caught in a trap, having to move the entire division, about 15,000 men and hundreds of vehicles, along a six mile road that was under heavy fire the entire way from Chinese on the hills on both sides.
The book is not about grand strategy, nor does it trace the entire fight as the 8th Army was pushed all the way back across the 38th parallel, and it does not describe the fighting on the east coast where the Marines fought their way back from the Chosin reservoir. Then-colonel S.L.A. Marshall was brought in after the battle to talk to soldiers as the army tried to understand what had gone wrong and how the troops had responded. His interviews form the basis of this book, which describes the fighting mostly as it was experienced at the company, platoon, and squad level.
Northwest Korea was a hell of a place to fight a war. The units were already understrength from having fought the past five months, and found themselves in a landscape of hills, dense scrub, and widely separated peaks. There were few flat places to put artillery, and poor communications further hindered its use. This was a fighting landscape for mortars and grenades. The Americans had some, but the Chinese had more.
To maintain the high ground companies were stretched very thinly, and platoons were often out of communication with the rest of their company either because the radios didn’t work in the cold, the wire didn’t reach, or the surrounding hills blocked reception. The Chinese used infiltration tactics, crawling through the dense brush to within yards of the American troops, then launching a shower of grenades and rushing the position. It was an effective technique, often pushing the Americans out with many dead or captured, and the loss not only of the high ground, but of their weapons as well, which the Chinese then turned against them. In the maze of small valleys and hills that all looked alike, reinforcements got lost and wandered deep into enemy territory. Some were able to fight their way back and some were lost to a man.
There are stories of great courage here, of men fighting to the last bullet and then using their rifles as clubs against overwhelming numbers. Many of these heroic stands are not remembered because no one survived to tell the tale. As the Americans tried to pull back they found that the Chinese had pushed large numbers of troops behind their lines and used the hilltops to block movement and prevent resupply. By the time the last troops had crossed back over the Chongchon, many having to wade for hundreds of yards waist deep in freezing water, the units barely existed any longer. Battalions were reduced to company size, and sometimes no more than platoon size.
The Chinese thrust had destroyed the 8th Army’s right flank, allowing them to pour divisions onto ground held by the 2nd Division, which was on the right of the 25th Division. By the time the 2nd Division made the decision to pull back it was already too late. Although the Americans did not yet know it, the Chinese held the hills overlooking their line of retreat with a full, entrenched division.
Somehow the Americans needed to move the entire 2nd Division down a single lane road for six miles, under heavy fire the entire way, and once the force started making its way out it lost all cohesion as men were spread out to catch a ride on any available tank, truck, or jeep, meaning that that could only fight as small groups of men who mostly did not know each other. “Until a short time past 1200 on 30 November, 2nd Division had remained a coherent body responsive to the will of command. Once started on the road, it became inorganic and could neither be controlled nor recalled.” (p. 267)
It was a disaster. Disabled vehicles brought the convoy to a halt, subjecting it to withering fire. Men bailed out to take cover in the ditches, and then were left behind as the convoy started up again and the vehicles moved off without waiting for them. Hundreds of wounded men lined the ditches along the entire route. Some passing trucks and jeeps tried to save as many of them as they could, but even when stacked four deep they could only take a fraction of the total. The Air Force plastered the hills with napalm, white phosphorous, and high explosive all day until it was too dark to see, which sometimes slowed the Chinese fire but could not suppress it entirely. At other times units hauled out of the line and attempted to suppress the incoming fire, which led to scenes like 155mm artillery engaging machine guns over open sights at ranges of 75 yards. It was a nightmare of death and destruction that would cost the division a third of its men in less than twelve hours.
With that the fight went out of the 8th Army on the west coast, and it would retreat over 200 miles in headlong flight before it was finally halted and cohesion began to be restored. Courts of inquiry would be convened, senior officers relieved of command, and Congress would start demanding answers about how the debacle was allowed to happen. Ultimately it was a question of hubris, of Douglas MacArthur believing he was invincible and that no force in the world could stand against him. As Marshall puts in, “In the conduct of military operations, great illusions are born out of a poverty of information coupled with a wealth of confidence that the enemy in any case is unequal to the task of promoting a decisive change in events.” (p. 13) President Truman finally had had enough, and in April 1951 MacArthur was sacked, coming home to a tumultuous hero’s welcome and a ticker-tape parade, followed by a self-pitying speech to Congress (again, shades of Donald Trump) about how badly he had been treated, and how old soldiers never die, they just fade away. It was time for him to go, and his reputation as a general and a man has been falling ever since.
After the landings at Inchon the U.N. forces started rolling up the Korean peninsula, although it was an ominous sign that they were unable to coordinate the movements from east and west to cut off the retreating North Koreans before they crossed back over the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, it looked like it was going to be a rout all the way to the border with China, and beyond if MacArthur got his way and Truman released the couple dozen atomic bombs he wanted. He spoke of the war being over by Christmas if his forces hurried.
As they pressed toward the Yalu River more troubling signs appeared, such as Chinese soldiers being captured, and evidence of large scale troop movements inside China. MacArthur was one of those leaders with charismatic personalities, huge egos, and limited talents. Like others of his kind (think Donald Trump) he valued loyalty above ability and, while demanding absolute loyalty from those below him, he thought little of them. He was fond of calling his intelligence chief Major General Charles Willoughby “my pet fascist.”
Although he is mentioned only once in the book, Willoughby deserves to be remembered for his role in the debacle. Born in Germany possibly as Adolph Karl Weidenbach (his early life is obscure), he emigrated to the United States in 1910 at about age 18. In 1913 he was accepted as a senior at Gettysburg College based on his claim that he had spent three years at the University of Heidelberg and the Sorbonne, though there is no evidence he attended either. He fought in World War I and remained in the Army, eventually becoming Douglas MacArthur’s chief of intelligence (G2) during World War II, the occupation of Japan, and the Korean War.
Willoughby was loyal to his boss to the point of ignoring or altering intelligence that contradicted MacArthur’s beliefs, which had led to disastrous blunders in the Philippines against the Japanese. MacArthur firmly believed that China would not intervene to help the North Koreans, and had assured President Truman of this only weeks earlier when they met on Wake Island. Not surprisingly, once 380,000 Chinese “volunteers” attacked, MacArthur claimed that he never said anything of the kind, despite the presence of a dozen witnesses and the meeting’s official minutes.
This book is divided into two parts. The first, the river portion, describes the actions of the 25th Division around the Chongchon River as they came under attack by vast numbers of Chinese and had to stage a fighting retreat across inhospitable terrain with few roads, in weather just a few degrees above zero Fahrenheit. In the gauntlet portion of the book the 2nd Division found itself caught in a trap, having to move the entire division, about 15,000 men and hundreds of vehicles, along a six mile road that was under heavy fire the entire way from Chinese on the hills on both sides.
The book is not about grand strategy, nor does it trace the entire fight as the 8th Army was pushed all the way back across the 38th parallel, and it does not describe the fighting on the east coast where the Marines fought their way back from the Chosin reservoir. Then-colonel S.L.A. Marshall was brought in after the battle to talk to soldiers as the army tried to understand what had gone wrong and how the troops had responded. His interviews form the basis of this book, which describes the fighting mostly as it was experienced at the company, platoon, and squad level.
Northwest Korea was a hell of a place to fight a war. The units were already understrength from having fought the past five months, and found themselves in a landscape of hills, dense scrub, and widely separated peaks. There were few flat places to put artillery, and poor communications further hindered its use. This was a fighting landscape for mortars and grenades. The Americans had some, but the Chinese had more.
To maintain the high ground companies were stretched very thinly, and platoons were often out of communication with the rest of their company either because the radios didn’t work in the cold, the wire didn’t reach, or the surrounding hills blocked reception. The Chinese used infiltration tactics, crawling through the dense brush to within yards of the American troops, then launching a shower of grenades and rushing the position. It was an effective technique, often pushing the Americans out with many dead or captured, and the loss not only of the high ground, but of their weapons as well, which the Chinese then turned against them. In the maze of small valleys and hills that all looked alike, reinforcements got lost and wandered deep into enemy territory. Some were able to fight their way back and some were lost to a man.
There are stories of great courage here, of men fighting to the last bullet and then using their rifles as clubs against overwhelming numbers. Many of these heroic stands are not remembered because no one survived to tell the tale. As the Americans tried to pull back they found that the Chinese had pushed large numbers of troops behind their lines and used the hilltops to block movement and prevent resupply. By the time the last troops had crossed back over the Chongchon, many having to wade for hundreds of yards waist deep in freezing water, the units barely existed any longer. Battalions were reduced to company size, and sometimes no more than platoon size.
The Chinese thrust had destroyed the 8th Army’s right flank, allowing them to pour divisions onto ground held by the 2nd Division, which was on the right of the 25th Division. By the time the 2nd Division made the decision to pull back it was already too late. Although the Americans did not yet know it, the Chinese held the hills overlooking their line of retreat with a full, entrenched division.
Somehow the Americans needed to move the entire 2nd Division down a single lane road for six miles, under heavy fire the entire way, and once the force started making its way out it lost all cohesion as men were spread out to catch a ride on any available tank, truck, or jeep, meaning that that could only fight as small groups of men who mostly did not know each other. “Until a short time past 1200 on 30 November, 2nd Division had remained a coherent body responsive to the will of command. Once started on the road, it became inorganic and could neither be controlled nor recalled.” (p. 267)
It was a disaster. Disabled vehicles brought the convoy to a halt, subjecting it to withering fire. Men bailed out to take cover in the ditches, and then were left behind as the convoy started up again and the vehicles moved off without waiting for them. Hundreds of wounded men lined the ditches along the entire route. Some passing trucks and jeeps tried to save as many of them as they could, but even when stacked four deep they could only take a fraction of the total. The Air Force plastered the hills with napalm, white phosphorous, and high explosive all day until it was too dark to see, which sometimes slowed the Chinese fire but could not suppress it entirely. At other times units hauled out of the line and attempted to suppress the incoming fire, which led to scenes like 155mm artillery engaging machine guns over open sights at ranges of 75 yards. It was a nightmare of death and destruction that would cost the division a third of its men in less than twelve hours.
With that the fight went out of the 8th Army on the west coast, and it would retreat over 200 miles in headlong flight before it was finally halted and cohesion began to be restored. Courts of inquiry would be convened, senior officers relieved of command, and Congress would start demanding answers about how the debacle was allowed to happen. Ultimately it was a question of hubris, of Douglas MacArthur believing he was invincible and that no force in the world could stand against him. As Marshall puts in, “In the conduct of military operations, great illusions are born out of a poverty of information coupled with a wealth of confidence that the enemy in any case is unequal to the task of promoting a decisive change in events.” (p. 13) President Truman finally had had enough, and in April 1951 MacArthur was sacked, coming home to a tumultuous hero’s welcome and a ticker-tape parade, followed by a self-pitying speech to Congress (again, shades of Donald Trump) about how badly he had been treated, and how old soldiers never die, they just fade away. It was time for him to go, and his reputation as a general and a man has been falling ever since.
January 1, 2014
One of the classic Korean War books by the controversial military historian S.L.A. Marshall (among the allegations the biggest is that he manufactured data claiming that in WWII only 25% of U.S. soldiers actually fired their weapons in combat.A claim that changed how the Army trained soldiers). It covers the Chinese Offensive in late November of 1950 which pushed the U.N. military forces out of North Korea and back into South Korea. Published in 1953 the book concerns itself with the battle at the infantryman's level. This is not a book that looks at the strategic or geopolitical situation. It was published in 1953 and does not address details that have since come to light. The focus of the book is mainly with the fighting that the U.S. 2nd Infantry and 25th Infantry Divisions went through.
The experience of other (non-U.S.) units get cursory coverage and the U.S. 10th Corp ,over in the eastern side of North Korea, (popularly referred to as the Battle of Chosin Reservoir) receives just a few sentences! In 2013 such a narrow focus can cause endless criticism of a writer, but I suppose that in the early 1950's the average reader just figured somebody else would eventually write a book about what the other units went through.
Since the story predominantly takes place at the infantryman's level the players are individual infantrymen, squads, platoons and companies. To the layman it will seem to all jumble together at times. There is a glossary at the back and I strongly suggest the reader with no military experience refer to it frequently.There are also numerous maps throughout the book and illustrations of the small arms used by the American Army in 1950 which help. It is a book best read a couple chapters at a time (again especially if you're a layman when it comes to military tactics), but despite that it is a imminently readable book.
Marshall remains controversial, but "The River and the Gauntlet" is considered to be one of his better books and I have to agree. It's staying in my library.
The experience of other (non-U.S.) units get cursory coverage and the U.S. 10th Corp ,over in the eastern side of North Korea, (popularly referred to as the Battle of Chosin Reservoir) receives just a few sentences! In 2013 such a narrow focus can cause endless criticism of a writer, but I suppose that in the early 1950's the average reader just figured somebody else would eventually write a book about what the other units went through.
Since the story predominantly takes place at the infantryman's level the players are individual infantrymen, squads, platoons and companies. To the layman it will seem to all jumble together at times. There is a glossary at the back and I strongly suggest the reader with no military experience refer to it frequently.There are also numerous maps throughout the book and illustrations of the small arms used by the American Army in 1950 which help. It is a book best read a couple chapters at a time (again especially if you're a layman when it comes to military tactics), but despite that it is a imminently readable book.
Marshall remains controversial, but "The River and the Gauntlet" is considered to be one of his better books and I have to agree. It's staying in my library.
July 20, 2022
Wow. This is a Korean 'Dunkirk' event that didn't have the happy, feel-good ending.
At Valley Forge, in the birth struggle of a nation, but 3,000 of 7,000 Continentals died or faded from the force in one terrible winter. In round figures, the wasting away of the 2nd Division and its attachments is roughly comparable. But it all happened in one day.
I wanted to read this because my husband's uncle (who died in Korea 2.14.51) was part of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Division. He survived the Gauntlet.
The gauntlet was a six-mile downhill road that had to be traversed with the Chinese entrenched along both sides of road. There was nothing for the column to do but try to barrel through. But vehicles were disabled and unmanned, blocking the road, making the troops behind standing targets. Merely to keep moving required greater resolution than to take cover and await what developed.
Along with horrific details, there are stories of valor and courage.
On a technical note, I read this book through the generosity of archive.org. It was a struggle to read this tethered to my desktop. I used the text-to-speech reader with its AI powered voice. That was a gauntlet of its own. Only my high interest in this subject propelled me forward.
At Valley Forge, in the birth struggle of a nation, but 3,000 of 7,000 Continentals died or faded from the force in one terrible winter. In round figures, the wasting away of the 2nd Division and its attachments is roughly comparable. But it all happened in one day.
I wanted to read this because my husband's uncle (who died in Korea 2.14.51) was part of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Division. He survived the Gauntlet.
The gauntlet was a six-mile downhill road that had to be traversed with the Chinese entrenched along both sides of road. There was nothing for the column to do but try to barrel through. But vehicles were disabled and unmanned, blocking the road, making the troops behind standing targets. Merely to keep moving required greater resolution than to take cover and await what developed.
Along with horrific details, there are stories of valor and courage.
On a technical note, I read this book through the generosity of archive.org. It was a struggle to read this tethered to my desktop. I used the text-to-speech reader with its AI powered voice. That was a gauntlet of its own. Only my high interest in this subject propelled me forward.
May 30, 2014
At the end of November, 1950, the U.S. 8th Army was defeated by Chinese Communist Forces along the Chongchon River in the northwestern part of orth Korea. Military intelligence failed to detect that a significant number of Chinese Communist Forces had already crossed into North Korea from Manchuria. The rough terrain hampered communication among U.S. forces. That, coupled with some poor decisions, led to a series of isolated small unit actions on both sides of the Chongchon River. Some of these actions were Chinese victories and some were U.S. victories. Strategically, however, the 8th Army was in danger of being cut up & defeated in detail.
U.S. forces also failed to detect that the Chinese in division strength surrounded one of the main retreat routes, culminating in a pass, which became known as "The Gauntlet." Wrecked vehicles became roadblocks. Losses in the U.S. 2nd Division varied depending on where you were in the column of vehicles. Those in the front of the column fared better than those strung out towards the rear.
U.S. forces hadn't yet learned how best to fight the Chinese Communist Forces, who liked to launch their attacks at night. U.S. forces learned by accident (grass fires and huts catching on fire) that illuminating the attacking Chinese at night was a key to success. These lessons were eventually passed along to other soldiers as developing doctrine.
Marshall specialized in interviewing soldiers shortly after the action and telling the story on a small unit, even individual, scale. His stories of individual heroics, cowardice, successes & failures are gripping.
One plus of this book is the glossary of military terms for weapons and other equipment. I found the maps to be rather crude but they helped illustrate the events in the story.
On the minus side is Marshall's often racist language (this book was written in 1953). He treats the performance of African-American soldiers with respect, but his choice of words makes unnecessary racial distinctions. Also he frequently refers to South Korean troops as ROKs and Chinese Communist Forces as "gooks." If you can overlook these flaws, this book tells a story that should be told about a largely overlooked episode in what has been called "The Forgotten War."
U.S. forces also failed to detect that the Chinese in division strength surrounded one of the main retreat routes, culminating in a pass, which became known as "The Gauntlet." Wrecked vehicles became roadblocks. Losses in the U.S. 2nd Division varied depending on where you were in the column of vehicles. Those in the front of the column fared better than those strung out towards the rear.
U.S. forces hadn't yet learned how best to fight the Chinese Communist Forces, who liked to launch their attacks at night. U.S. forces learned by accident (grass fires and huts catching on fire) that illuminating the attacking Chinese at night was a key to success. These lessons were eventually passed along to other soldiers as developing doctrine.
Marshall specialized in interviewing soldiers shortly after the action and telling the story on a small unit, even individual, scale. His stories of individual heroics, cowardice, successes & failures are gripping.
One plus of this book is the glossary of military terms for weapons and other equipment. I found the maps to be rather crude but they helped illustrate the events in the story.
On the minus side is Marshall's often racist language (this book was written in 1953). He treats the performance of African-American soldiers with respect, but his choice of words makes unnecessary racial distinctions. Also he frequently refers to South Korean troops as ROKs and Chinese Communist Forces as "gooks." If you can overlook these flaws, this book tells a story that should be told about a largely overlooked episode in what has been called "The Forgotten War."
March 10, 2018
This is one of my favorite books -- very well written just a few years after this pivotal Korean War battle, covering the battle from start to finish in good, even detail, and brutally honest. I hope I am wrong, but I wonder if some of the less than sterling support for the book and its author, S. L. A. Marshall, might come from Marshall's honest depiction of possibly America's worst military defeat of the 20th Century. "The River and the Gauntlet" would make for a great film. (Biased disclosure: One of my uncles was in the thick of this battle, and he came back with hard first-hand memories of the horrors of war, and PTSD. He was a hero.)
May 31, 2022
Good retelling of the fighting along the Chongchon River during the Second Phase Chinese Offensive that took place the day after Thanksgiving, 1950. This is a story told from the bottom up, of company actions along the front of the 2nd Infantry Division, with some coverage of the 25th Infantry Division. The story is told as it developed in different regimental sectors, following one sector at a time. This leads to a certain amount of confusion, unless one is already familiar with the overall campaign. It is necessarily incomplete, as it was put together by interviewing the survivors a few months after the event. Some additional details and corrections to the story surfaced after the war, with interviews from returned POW's and eventually the use of Chinese sources in the late 1980's and the use of declassified intelligence reports from the same timeframe. A good overview can be found in Appleman's Disaster in Korea.
This edition includes Marshall's original maps, which help greatly in trying to follow the action. The stories are gripping, and full of useful lessons. The most striking one is that a small unit leader really needs to be a strict disciplinarian, making sure that good decisions are made (many of the leaders here made poor decisions), and that the NCO's carry them out and enforce obedience.
This edition includes Marshall's original maps, which help greatly in trying to follow the action. The stories are gripping, and full of useful lessons. The most striking one is that a small unit leader really needs to be a strict disciplinarian, making sure that good decisions are made (many of the leaders here made poor decisions), and that the NCO's carry them out and enforce obedience.
August 1, 2021
For us who have never been involved in warfare except through movies, TV, books and maybe old newsreels, this book graphically depicts for us the horrors, the grief of war never to be forgotten. It explains why America failed in this war. I had purchased this book years ago as I knew someone who served in this war by name of John Evans. After so many years I discovered it in my pile of to read books So I figured it was time to learn why we failed and lost so many innocent lives: not enough manpower ; insufficient equipment; telephone lines for communication lacking; misread mind of enemy; infiltration of Chinese; lack of security; hills and ridges/no flat spaces suitable for guns, command posts, aid stations or supply points. Some parts I scanned but reading the names of our soldiers made this more real to me caused me to continue reading to at least honor in some way our heroes !🤓
September 5, 2021
The motivation to read this book written near the end of the Korean fighting was to understand better what may have happened to my wife's uncle when he was lost during the first Chinese incursion in early November. Understanding the small unit tactics while fighting in forbidding terrain and frigid weather is very helpful. The men involved were a mix of WWII veterans and new young soldiers fresh from Japanese garrison duty. Slam Marshall does a great job of getting to the lowest level soldier, sergeants and lieutenants. This is not a story about strategy or tactics but about survival and heroism.
July 18, 2018
This read is best for those with military experience.
It is sad, very sad, but too often true in many aspects. During the story I was mostly depressed, even when progress was made by some.
It is sad, very sad, but too often true in many aspects. During the story I was mostly depressed, even when progress was made by some.
March 25, 2015
This is a close look at how the People's Liberation Army (the Chinese Communist Armed Forces) ambushed and defeated the US Army, in particular the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions. It was a muddled battle which means this is can be a muddle of a read. The focus is often down at the squad level. Marshall did a lot of interviewing for this book that was completed before the war ended, so there is an urgency and freshness to it. I found the clarity of the book to vary. At times, I could almost feel the Chinese advancing on US position, in others, the chaos of combat became all too apparent. What I found missing was a more analytical detachment to explain why the US troops performed so badly, and why the Chinese did well. The wartime writing prevented any kind of inclusion of Chinese sources, and Koreans are under used too.
The best part of the book was understanding how the troops actually operated. Reading this made me pick up This Kind of War for a broader view which is a victory of sorts!
The best part of the book was understanding how the troops actually operated. Reading this made me pick up This Kind of War for a broader view which is a victory of sorts!
October 28, 2010
In this book, SLA Marshall details just what can happen when an army is unprepared for battle. In 1950 the US Army was under-trained, under-equiped and under-armed, having been largely dismantled after 1945. Its intelligence capacity was a shadow of what it had been in WW2. The ChiComs acheived strategic and tactical surprise which gave them crushing victories. Marshall tells the stories of different platoons or companies as they were overrun and massacred. Most of the stories are told by survivors who fled and survived through luck. Several units managed to place themselves in good postions with sufficient ammo and were able to withdraw in some order. Others were wiped out and any surviving soldiers shot. The lesson seems to be, don't go to war unless you are well and truly ready for the worst.
June 6, 2015
Marshall wrote "The River and Gauntlet" in 1953. It chronicles the U.S. Army's battle against the Chinese People's Voluntary Army in November 1950 along the Chongchon River in North Korea. The recount is written from a diarist's perspective and in great detail chronicles US Army failed strategies and tactics leading to 3,000 to 7,000 U.S. casualties. It is used by military historians to teach "lessons learned" when communications and mechanism fail in forbidding terrain in the face of formable counter strategies.
August 10, 2011
An amazing look at a forgotton war in all of its fury and sadness. Not the best written read of all time but an amazing story of fierce fighting, scare tactics, and a humbling defeat by China.
February 15, 2016
Been a while, but captures the heroism and challenges of Chosin Reservoir. Best read after a more general history of the Yalu/Chosin Reservoir campaign in Korean War or the war generally.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews