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Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos
In Warrior Politics , the esteemed journalist and analyst Robert D. Kaplan explores the wisdom of the ages for answers for today’s leaders. While the modern world may seem more complex and dangerous than ever before, Kaplan writes from a deeper historical perspective to reveal how little things actually change. Indeed, as Kaplan shows us, we can look to history’s most influential thinkers, who would have understood and known how to navigate today’s dangerous political waters.
Drawing on the timeless work of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, among others, Kaplan argues that in a world of unstable states and an uncertain future, it is increasingly imperative to wrest from the past what we need to arm ourselves for the road ahead. Wide-ranging and accessible, Warrior Politics is a bracing book with an increasingly important message that challenges readers to see the world as it is, not as they would like it to be.
Drawing on the timeless work of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, among others, Kaplan argues that in a world of unstable states and an uncertain future, it is increasingly imperative to wrest from the past what we need to arm ourselves for the road ahead. Wide-ranging and accessible, Warrior Politics is a bracing book with an increasingly important message that challenges readers to see the world as it is, not as they would like it to be.
224 pages, Paperback
First published December 26, 2001
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About the author
Robert D. Kaplan
52 books1,264 followersRobert David Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, and his more controversial essays about the nature of U.S. power have spurred debate in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. A frequent theme in his work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 89 reviews
May 25, 2024
I am not an optimist or an idealist. Americans can afford optimism partly because their institutions, including the Constitution, were conceived by men who thought tragically. Before the first president was sworn in, the rules of impeachment were established. James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51 that men are so far beyond redemption that the only solution is to set ambition against ambition, and interest against interest: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." Our separation of powers is based on that grim view of human behavior. The French Revolution, conversely, began with boundless faith in the good sense of the masses - and in the capacity of intellectuals to engineer good results - and ended with the guillotine.
And there you have the defining aspect of one modern mind exerting itself to express its thoughts on strategy, much as Machiavelli did, much as Montaigne did, much as Sun Tzu did...and, surprisingly, holding its own.
Robert D. Kaplan works as a journalist; this is his baseline employment. He is, though, more accomplished than that and has made a reputation on his analysis of foreign affairs. Many books have been written and are esteemed by those in the field. Many watch him, many listen. In Warrior Politics (which I thought was particularly well done), he tackles what he perceives to be the fundamental qualities of successful leadership. His claim that leadership requires a "pagan" ethos is...well now, you see, I haven't really decided...deceptive? Disingenuous? He means the lessons must be taken from the ancients, who were not necessarily pagan unless one considers the learned among the Greeks, the Chinese, and the Romans essentially barbaric. Eleven chapters pull from historic texts to mix-and-match with contemporary events. Wells drawn upon include Livy, Homer, Tiberius, Hobbes, Malthus, Kant, and Churchill...with a dozen or so side trips to associated aquifers.
It's fascinating, the way his mind works. But I will warn you that this was published in 2002. I will warn you that Covid is a gamechanger, and Ukraine is a gamechanger, and these were so far out of conscious prediction at the time the book was written that little of what he makes explicit will be relevant. Still, the philosophical stance holds.
And there you have the defining aspect of one modern mind exerting itself to express its thoughts on strategy, much as Machiavelli did, much as Montaigne did, much as Sun Tzu did...and, surprisingly, holding its own.
Robert D. Kaplan works as a journalist; this is his baseline employment. He is, though, more accomplished than that and has made a reputation on his analysis of foreign affairs. Many books have been written and are esteemed by those in the field. Many watch him, many listen. In Warrior Politics (which I thought was particularly well done), he tackles what he perceives to be the fundamental qualities of successful leadership. His claim that leadership requires a "pagan" ethos is...well now, you see, I haven't really decided...deceptive? Disingenuous? He means the lessons must be taken from the ancients, who were not necessarily pagan unless one considers the learned among the Greeks, the Chinese, and the Romans essentially barbaric. Eleven chapters pull from historic texts to mix-and-match with contemporary events. Wells drawn upon include Livy, Homer, Tiberius, Hobbes, Malthus, Kant, and Churchill...with a dozen or so side trips to associated aquifers.
It's fascinating, the way his mind works. But I will warn you that this was published in 2002. I will warn you that Covid is a gamechanger, and Ukraine is a gamechanger, and these were so far out of conscious prediction at the time the book was written that little of what he makes explicit will be relevant. Still, the philosophical stance holds.
February 21, 2009
Kaplan is thoroughly versed in history and classic philosophy, and some of his message in this book is valid and valuable.
However - I believe it is flawed in two ways: his emphasis on realpolitik outweighs morality too heavily; he's right that this is a balance that must be struck, but I find his fulcrum, so to speak, too far toward the amoral end of that continuum - he seems to value stability in a society so heavily that he loses sight of liberties, the things we enshrine in our Bill of Rights. He appears to be too comfortable with situations in which some are oppressed and abused as long as the majority are relatively docile. His expressed admiration for Kissinger and Reagan sticks in my throat when I reflect on both the massive suffering they casually inflicted - it wasn't so much that they considered the impact on people in other places and decided that the price was worth paying (for whom?) but that they never even considered those people. Not only was that evil beyond justification, it caused blowback that hurt the U.S. in the long run much more than it helped us or anyone else.
The other flaw I see is that he leaves out a big part of the picture in his analysis of the uses of power. He focuses on both military and economic power as tools of raw force. A lot of what he has to say about their utility is legitimate, but he neglects the strategic value of soft power - the best example I can think of is the Marshall Plan, which deliberately diffused and to some extent diminished America's potential for dominance after World War II for the sake of recreating both battered allies and former enemies as partners in Europe and the Far East. At the same time it reduced opportunities for totalitarianism to regrow (the far right type) or spread (communism), it won the U.S. huge amounts of goodwill and also led to strong economic benefits in the form of more prosperous markets down the road. It didn't eliminate the need for military and economic power that could be used to attack, but it augmented those kinds of power - unlike the USSR, which never seemed to get beyond exploiting any other nation it could, regardless of rhetoric about the brotherhood of world socialism.
Today, we need military power, of course - as a retired Marine officer, I am very aware of that. In addition, though, we could probably do ourselves and the rest of the world huge amounts of good by channeling some of the drive and resources that are going into hard power into soft power initiatives - for instance, without weakening our defensive power in any real way, we could decide to forgo building another aircraft carrier and instead create projects to provide safe drinking water and childhood immunizations in many parts of the Third World that currently see us as nothing but bullies.
I admire this author and his work, but of all his books that I've read, so far, this one is the disappointment.
However - I believe it is flawed in two ways: his emphasis on realpolitik outweighs morality too heavily; he's right that this is a balance that must be struck, but I find his fulcrum, so to speak, too far toward the amoral end of that continuum - he seems to value stability in a society so heavily that he loses sight of liberties, the things we enshrine in our Bill of Rights. He appears to be too comfortable with situations in which some are oppressed and abused as long as the majority are relatively docile. His expressed admiration for Kissinger and Reagan sticks in my throat when I reflect on both the massive suffering they casually inflicted - it wasn't so much that they considered the impact on people in other places and decided that the price was worth paying (for whom?) but that they never even considered those people. Not only was that evil beyond justification, it caused blowback that hurt the U.S. in the long run much more than it helped us or anyone else.
The other flaw I see is that he leaves out a big part of the picture in his analysis of the uses of power. He focuses on both military and economic power as tools of raw force. A lot of what he has to say about their utility is legitimate, but he neglects the strategic value of soft power - the best example I can think of is the Marshall Plan, which deliberately diffused and to some extent diminished America's potential for dominance after World War II for the sake of recreating both battered allies and former enemies as partners in Europe and the Far East. At the same time it reduced opportunities for totalitarianism to regrow (the far right type) or spread (communism), it won the U.S. huge amounts of goodwill and also led to strong economic benefits in the form of more prosperous markets down the road. It didn't eliminate the need for military and economic power that could be used to attack, but it augmented those kinds of power - unlike the USSR, which never seemed to get beyond exploiting any other nation it could, regardless of rhetoric about the brotherhood of world socialism.
Today, we need military power, of course - as a retired Marine officer, I am very aware of that. In addition, though, we could probably do ourselves and the rest of the world huge amounts of good by channeling some of the drive and resources that are going into hard power into soft power initiatives - for instance, without weakening our defensive power in any real way, we could decide to forgo building another aircraft carrier and instead create projects to provide safe drinking water and childhood immunizations in many parts of the Third World that currently see us as nothing but bullies.
I admire this author and his work, but of all his books that I've read, so far, this one is the disappointment.
September 7, 2022
"The last temptation is the greatest treason,
To do the right deed for the wrong reason."
T.S. Eliot, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL
"Optimism is cowardice."---Oswald Spengler
Eliot's chilling maxim precisely sums up my reaction to WARRIOR POLITICS. Robert Kaplan takes us on a journey through history, via the classics---Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Homer, Machiavelli---to warn us that all life is conflict and idealism is for fools. Whether in politics, the office or among nations you must assume that men are wicked or potentially so, and that requires an amoral, pagan and relativistic approach to reach an outcome favorable to you and your family, tribe, nation or any other grouping. Moral absolutism, on the other hand, will lead to defeat, or extremism (take, for example, the Catholic Church's ban on abortion and all contraception) or else hypocrisy; you make so many exceptions to your morality it becomes meaningless (not to pick on Catholics, but look at how many annulments of marriage the Church grants every year). Strange as it may sound, it is precisely pessimism and cynicism about other people's motives that paves the road to everything from fair trade to democracy and democratic institutions. Now for the bad news: Kaplan, writing at the start of the century, published this essay to aid and inspire American leaders on how to keep the U.S. on top of the world, if only because "who else is going to step into the breach? There is no other hegemonic power on the horizon." Kaplan does not assume the U.S. is more virtuous than other nations (good for him) just craftier at knowing when to use soft power, e.g. economic warfare, and hard power, as in the bombing of Serbia during the 1990s, of which heartily approves. There's nothing wrong in rooting for your team to win in the global arena, but why should not other nations adopt the same attitude and tactics? The Russians assume they are still "The Third Rome" and the Chinese "The Center of the Universe". A book to recommend to leaders of organized crime and Henry Kissinger, who endorsed it before publication.
To do the right deed for the wrong reason."
T.S. Eliot, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL
"Optimism is cowardice."---Oswald Spengler
Eliot's chilling maxim precisely sums up my reaction to WARRIOR POLITICS. Robert Kaplan takes us on a journey through history, via the classics---Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Homer, Machiavelli---to warn us that all life is conflict and idealism is for fools. Whether in politics, the office or among nations you must assume that men are wicked or potentially so, and that requires an amoral, pagan and relativistic approach to reach an outcome favorable to you and your family, tribe, nation or any other grouping. Moral absolutism, on the other hand, will lead to defeat, or extremism (take, for example, the Catholic Church's ban on abortion and all contraception) or else hypocrisy; you make so many exceptions to your morality it becomes meaningless (not to pick on Catholics, but look at how many annulments of marriage the Church grants every year). Strange as it may sound, it is precisely pessimism and cynicism about other people's motives that paves the road to everything from fair trade to democracy and democratic institutions. Now for the bad news: Kaplan, writing at the start of the century, published this essay to aid and inspire American leaders on how to keep the U.S. on top of the world, if only because "who else is going to step into the breach? There is no other hegemonic power on the horizon." Kaplan does not assume the U.S. is more virtuous than other nations (good for him) just craftier at knowing when to use soft power, e.g. economic warfare, and hard power, as in the bombing of Serbia during the 1990s, of which heartily approves. There's nothing wrong in rooting for your team to win in the global arena, but why should not other nations adopt the same attitude and tactics? The Russians assume they are still "The Third Rome" and the Chinese "The Center of the Universe". A book to recommend to leaders of organized crime and Henry Kissinger, who endorsed it before publication.
July 6, 2012
As someone who adores Greek's warrior epics and the strategy tomes of Machiavelli and Von Clauswitz, this book was disappointing and frustrating. Not only does Kaplan regularly incorrectly understand the people he's cribbing from, but he does so in a boring, uninspired fashion.
For example, Machiavelli wrote of "virtu" NOT "virtue" as he wrongly titles Chapter V. Virtu is the spirit and skill of a leader - the cunning one must have to overcome fortune - and although the words are similar, it has absolutely nothing to do with virtuousness. Or worse, there's a line in the same chapter where Kaplan lists thinkers who have been influenced heavily by Machiavelli. Heading that list most impossibly: Aristotle.
It's difficult to ignore Kaplan's weak scholarship. Their are countless instances where the reader sees what source Kaplan should be reaching for, only to be disappointed when he is forced to settle on something else. Even an undergrad student could have matched him on his history.
Even when one can, however, ignore this, they're left with one question: What does this book add to the discussion? Not only are the primary sources incredibly readable, but there have been dozens of better books that compile them and ultimately add value through their analysis.
One would be much better off reading Robert Greene's The 33 Strategies of War (Joost Elffers Books) or The 48 Laws of Power.
For example, Machiavelli wrote of "virtu" NOT "virtue" as he wrongly titles Chapter V. Virtu is the spirit and skill of a leader - the cunning one must have to overcome fortune - and although the words are similar, it has absolutely nothing to do with virtuousness. Or worse, there's a line in the same chapter where Kaplan lists thinkers who have been influenced heavily by Machiavelli. Heading that list most impossibly: Aristotle.
It's difficult to ignore Kaplan's weak scholarship. Their are countless instances where the reader sees what source Kaplan should be reaching for, only to be disappointed when he is forced to settle on something else. Even an undergrad student could have matched him on his history.
Even when one can, however, ignore this, they're left with one question: What does this book add to the discussion? Not only are the primary sources incredibly readable, but there have been dozens of better books that compile them and ultimately add value through their analysis.
One would be much better off reading Robert Greene's The 33 Strategies of War (Joost Elffers Books) or The 48 Laws of Power.
June 15, 2024
There is so much that is wrong with this book. It is one of the most backwards books that I have read in a long time. I’ll start with a particular criticism, then move to a more general one.
The most obvious flaw with the book is its shockingly poor source analysis. Aristotle, Livy, Hobbes, and others get absolutely butchered. Here are just a few of the glaringly wrong conclusions drawn by the author:
- The Romans defeated Carthage in the 2nd Punic War because of their democratic institutions.
- Sun Tzu hated war and wanted to avoid it at all costs.
- Sun Tzu and Clausewitz basically agree about the relationship between war and politics.
- Hobbes and Aristotle agree about the function of political power and the origins of human society.
- Kant wrote a book that proved the existence of inalienable human rights.
- Medieval Christianity was hopelessly fatalistic.
These are just some of the many errors that jumped out at me. Given that one of the stated goals of this book was to bring the wisdom of the ancients, medievals, and early moderns to bear on current political issues, this abysmal source interpretation is doubly damning.
There is a deeper problem with this book though. The whole project was conceived in error. Grounding international politics in Machiavellian pseudo-paganism is silly. The “profound advice” that this book offers can be boiled down to one sentence: Morally questionable things are permissible in the service of good ends.
Anyway, I didn’t like the book. Kaplan’s prose is nice though.
The most obvious flaw with the book is its shockingly poor source analysis. Aristotle, Livy, Hobbes, and others get absolutely butchered. Here are just a few of the glaringly wrong conclusions drawn by the author:
- The Romans defeated Carthage in the 2nd Punic War because of their democratic institutions.
- Sun Tzu hated war and wanted to avoid it at all costs.
- Sun Tzu and Clausewitz basically agree about the relationship between war and politics.
- Hobbes and Aristotle agree about the function of political power and the origins of human society.
- Kant wrote a book that proved the existence of inalienable human rights.
- Medieval Christianity was hopelessly fatalistic.
These are just some of the many errors that jumped out at me. Given that one of the stated goals of this book was to bring the wisdom of the ancients, medievals, and early moderns to bear on current political issues, this abysmal source interpretation is doubly damning.
There is a deeper problem with this book though. The whole project was conceived in error. Grounding international politics in Machiavellian pseudo-paganism is silly. The “profound advice” that this book offers can be boiled down to one sentence: Morally questionable things are permissible in the service of good ends.
Anyway, I didn’t like the book. Kaplan’s prose is nice though.
April 25, 2013
Does history repeat itself? For those who do not think so, read this book. The author uses the advice of past intellectuals and shows how they predicted the future from the past. For example, he uses Thucydides description of Athens’s difficulty defeating the tiny island of Mytilea due to the arrogance it possessed. Does the French and U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet’s in Chechnya and Afghanistan ring a bell?
September 5, 2010
I'm still figuring out my feelings for this book. Half the time while I was reading it, I was thinking to myself: "This man is brilliant!" The other half, I was thinking, "He has no idea what he's talking about!"
Kaplan's slender work is, at its core, a tract about how America should direct its foreign policy in future endeavors. To that end, Kaplan analyzes historical writings on foreign policy and war, although only those that he feels embody characteristics that American politicians should employ.
Some of the chapters are very weak. He can ramble a bit, his arguments are sometimes unsupported, and his point can be vague - the Machiavelli chapter in particular comes to mind as falling victim to this. But other chapters are very strong - the chapter on Livy comes to mind for this, as does his discussion of Thucydides. I don't remember which chapter it's in, but I also greatly enjoyed his discussion of the free media and the part it plays de-legitimizing government, which gave me a lot to think about.
Ultimately, I was intrigued enough by the book that I'm planning on forwarding it to one of my brothers. Since I virtually never send people books I've read, that's saying something! This book has staying power.
Kaplan's slender work is, at its core, a tract about how America should direct its foreign policy in future endeavors. To that end, Kaplan analyzes historical writings on foreign policy and war, although only those that he feels embody characteristics that American politicians should employ.
Some of the chapters are very weak. He can ramble a bit, his arguments are sometimes unsupported, and his point can be vague - the Machiavelli chapter in particular comes to mind as falling victim to this. But other chapters are very strong - the chapter on Livy comes to mind for this, as does his discussion of Thucydides. I don't remember which chapter it's in, but I also greatly enjoyed his discussion of the free media and the part it plays de-legitimizing government, which gave me a lot to think about.
Ultimately, I was intrigued enough by the book that I'm planning on forwarding it to one of my brothers. Since I virtually never send people books I've read, that's saying something! This book has staying power.
January 8, 2008
Not Kaplan's best book, but has some very good and tough arguments to defend as with all philosophical threads. But Kaplan lays out his own experiences and his studied mind to bare and having an IA (International Affairs) degree I recall many of these topics in my undergrad life. Kaplan's original 'Coming Anarchy' reportage started in Time magazine if memory serves me and it was a watershed article on truth versus gloss. Kaplan sees the places that conflicts have turned into wastelands-either politically or economically (and sadly sometimes both) and bravely fights common consensus on what the future may hold. I agree with him on the lack of United Nations efficacy on most matters and how it truly has become a crony filled, self-important bureaucracy, much like the failed governments that are represented in his writing.
People can fault him for his opinion but he does an incredibly effective job of relating international matters in a way that isn't populist editorializing and instead stating the hard truths involved in these conflicts and the harder solutions for future leaders. Good for IA interested readers.
People can fault him for his opinion but he does an incredibly effective job of relating international matters in a way that isn't populist editorializing and instead stating the hard truths involved in these conflicts and the harder solutions for future leaders. Good for IA interested readers.
January 19, 2021
A very realist perspective on international affairs. Some good ideas and perspectives on, for example, taking a more cyclical understanding of history and promoting more study of the classics to understand contemporary issues, as well as the philosophical compatibility of morality and self-interested realism. I also like his idea that the media has gone beyond the fourth estate to a more nefarious power that promotes moral perfectionism with zero accountability. But, there is some weird obsession with Churchill-ian nationalism, a simplistic reliance on 'clash of civilizations' type ideas, and overall the book is too short to achieve the comparative political analysis between ancient and modern history that it set out to do (and only uses a realist lens when making the attempt.) Not bad!
February 20, 2018
Good!
This came highly recommended by John Gray (who calls it "brilliant" not just in his Straw Dogs but in Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern, so I had to read it. And no wonder John Gray likes it, because there is so much overlap between the two thinkers. Kaplan's got a fine historical/philosophical sensibility that will find company in thinkers such as Nassim Taleb (who has tremendous respect for John Gray). In this book, Kaplan distills wisdom from ancient sources and apply it to modern international relations.
Pragmatic, realist, and Machiavellian in its best sense, Kaplan upholds the morality of consequences (over morality of good intentions) when it comes to international politics/policymaking. Which makes sense because what matters at that level are the results, not intentions. I haven't thought through the implications and how his views would interact with Gray's and Margalit's (whose On Compromise and Rotten Compromises I read in tandem with this book and found deliciously coincidental overlap). One difference between Gray and Kaplan is that the latter embraces an imperial role for the US, while the former rejects it, but that's just one difference among many.
Made me want to read ancient history and Machiavelli, and I'll definitely check out more of Kaplan's books, too.
Some morsels of wisdom include:
-the link between technological acceleration and barbarism
-Like all wise men, he [Churchill] thought tragically: for we create moral standards in order to measure our own inadequacies (18)
-Livy: the importance of pride in our accomplishments and romanticizing our past; "Never mind if they call your caution timidity, your wisdom sloth, your generalship weakness; it is better that a wise enemy should fear you than that foolish friends should praise" (35, from Livy)
-Sun-Tzu: the importance of pursuing national self-interest strategically to avoid war
-Thucydides: human behavior is guided by fear, self-interest, and honor
-Machiavellian virtue: "In an imperfect world, good men bent on doing good must know how to be bad" (53); manly vigor usually in the pursuit of the general good
-Projecting power comes first, values second (61)
-"Anxious foresight" and keeping a sense of fallibility/vulnerability = cornerstone of prudent policy
-What can be foreseen is what changes slowly or not at all (66)
-Reagan: "I do not believe in fate that will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing" (71)
-Hobbes: peace/order first, then freedom and morality
-Realism: international relations are governed by different moral principles than domestic politics (103); morality lies in "fidelity to one's own sense of honor and decency."
-Democracies have been as prone to war as other regimes. (106)
-"War is subject to democratic control only when it is a condition distinctly separate from peace"(121)
-The tunnel vision of the media: "nothing matters to them except the horrendous spectacle before their eyes—about which something must be done!
-Warring States in China and Raison de système: "the belief that making the system work constituted the highest morality, because the alternative was chaos" (139)
-"there is no greater attribute for a ruler than humility built on an accurate assessment of his own limits" (153)
This came highly recommended by John Gray (who calls it "brilliant" not just in his Straw Dogs but in Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern, so I had to read it. And no wonder John Gray likes it, because there is so much overlap between the two thinkers. Kaplan's got a fine historical/philosophical sensibility that will find company in thinkers such as Nassim Taleb (who has tremendous respect for John Gray). In this book, Kaplan distills wisdom from ancient sources and apply it to modern international relations.
Pragmatic, realist, and Machiavellian in its best sense, Kaplan upholds the morality of consequences (over morality of good intentions) when it comes to international politics/policymaking. Which makes sense because what matters at that level are the results, not intentions. I haven't thought through the implications and how his views would interact with Gray's and Margalit's (whose On Compromise and Rotten Compromises I read in tandem with this book and found deliciously coincidental overlap). One difference between Gray and Kaplan is that the latter embraces an imperial role for the US, while the former rejects it, but that's just one difference among many.
Made me want to read ancient history and Machiavelli, and I'll definitely check out more of Kaplan's books, too.
Some morsels of wisdom include:
-the link between technological acceleration and barbarism
-Like all wise men, he [Churchill] thought tragically: for we create moral standards in order to measure our own inadequacies (18)
-Livy: the importance of pride in our accomplishments and romanticizing our past; "Never mind if they call your caution timidity, your wisdom sloth, your generalship weakness; it is better that a wise enemy should fear you than that foolish friends should praise" (35, from Livy)
-Sun-Tzu: the importance of pursuing national self-interest strategically to avoid war
-Thucydides: human behavior is guided by fear, self-interest, and honor
-Machiavellian virtue: "In an imperfect world, good men bent on doing good must know how to be bad" (53); manly vigor usually in the pursuit of the general good
-Projecting power comes first, values second (61)
-"Anxious foresight" and keeping a sense of fallibility/vulnerability = cornerstone of prudent policy
-What can be foreseen is what changes slowly or not at all (66)
-Reagan: "I do not believe in fate that will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing" (71)
-Hobbes: peace/order first, then freedom and morality
-Realism: international relations are governed by different moral principles than domestic politics (103); morality lies in "fidelity to one's own sense of honor and decency."
-Democracies have been as prone to war as other regimes. (106)
-"War is subject to democratic control only when it is a condition distinctly separate from peace"(121)
-The tunnel vision of the media: "nothing matters to them except the horrendous spectacle before their eyes—about which something must be done!
-Warring States in China and Raison de système: "the belief that making the system work constituted the highest morality, because the alternative was chaos" (139)
-"there is no greater attribute for a ruler than humility built on an accurate assessment of his own limits" (153)
July 23, 2017
I found this book left on a seat while departing an airplane. It would have been a great book to actually read on an airplane, ideally from Chicago to New York. But only if purchased at an airport book store. As a book read in my living room (and having been stolen), it was engaging but not spectacular. There was a lot of critical thinking, which I'm big on, and some really respectable interpretations of philosophy, which is something I haven't approached since high school. What surprised me the most was how significant the United State's involvement in the Balkans under Bill Clinton was, as that now seems completely lost to history. I was mostly unaware of it aside from some really gritty photos I've seen on Wikipedia and, if I had to speculate, some Vice documentary with a compelling thumnail that I've watched at least five minutes of. I don't know who I would recommend this book to aside from the type of person to pay for Economy+ and leave a book on a plane.
November 9, 2023
I first purchased and read this book around the time of its original release in early 2022. After having just read (and re-read) two of Kaplan’s most recent books, The Loom of Time (2023) and The Tragic Mind (2023), I was curious to see how this work, written over a generation ago, stands up today.
It stands up very well. Alas.
Whether one thinks of this book as timely or timeless, I found the re-reading well worth the relatively short time that it took to read it. This isn’t so much a work of reporting as it is of reflection. As I’ve written of Kaplan before (see my immediately preceding post), he’s a deep reader of history and literature, and this work is a reflection on those he’s read, mostly from the deep past. The most contemporary figure that receives a chapter of consideration in the book is Winston Churchill and his work The River Wars, originally published in 1899. Other figures meriting extensive consideration in this book include Thucydides, Sun-Tzu, Livy, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Malthus, and Kant, along with a scattering of others, from both the distant and recent past. But while Kaplan delves into the work of these figures from the past, he relates their insights about the present. The sum of Kaplan’s take, which he’s consistently espoused for as long as I’ve been reading him (although I haven’t read some of his earlier works), is one of classic realism and what he here terms, “a pagan ethos.”
In arguing for a pagan ethos, Kaplan isn’t promoting a new viewpoint or argument. Indeed, it is the viewpoint of the articulate pagans, to wit, the Greeks and Romans (and to a lesser—but still important—extent, the Chinese tradition). But this tradition didn’t die with the Roman Empire and the advent of Christianity as the dominant source of culture and morality in Europe. Christianity, of course, never brought universal peace and prosperity to medieval Europe, but Christian precepts remained dominant. Then, along came the Renaissance (as a re-birth of classical culture) and Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli argued not against Christianity in everyday life, in the sphere of the personal and private, but he did argue against Christianity in the realm of politics. This attitude was reinforced by Hobbes, and in practice, even by otherwise pious (or at least churchly) leaders like Richelieu and Bismark, who divided their private lives and morality from their standards of conduct of political relations. Even within Christianity, figures from St. Augustine (d. 430) to the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) recognized the need for a different set of ethics to guide political life, especially in the realm of international relations.
In addition to referencing traditions of religious and moral philosophy (including Kant), Kaplan draws much of his argument from historians: Thucydides, Livy, and Churchill. In brief, the events recounted by these and other historians reveal patterns of conduct that remain visible today. Humankind is a species given to war and conquest; we should know better, but we don’t act with wisdom very often. The world experienced by Kaplan’s guides was not so different from ours, advances in technology and such, notwithstanding. Current events in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine amply demonstrate this. Each of those situations can be seen as the manifestation of an archetype that we’ve experienced throughout human history.
In sum, Kaplan’s book has withstood the test of time, and I expect (alas) that it will continue to do so. At least we can’t say that we haven’t been forewarned.
It stands up very well. Alas.
Whether one thinks of this book as timely or timeless, I found the re-reading well worth the relatively short time that it took to read it. This isn’t so much a work of reporting as it is of reflection. As I’ve written of Kaplan before (see my immediately preceding post), he’s a deep reader of history and literature, and this work is a reflection on those he’s read, mostly from the deep past. The most contemporary figure that receives a chapter of consideration in the book is Winston Churchill and his work The River Wars, originally published in 1899. Other figures meriting extensive consideration in this book include Thucydides, Sun-Tzu, Livy, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Malthus, and Kant, along with a scattering of others, from both the distant and recent past. But while Kaplan delves into the work of these figures from the past, he relates their insights about the present. The sum of Kaplan’s take, which he’s consistently espoused for as long as I’ve been reading him (although I haven’t read some of his earlier works), is one of classic realism and what he here terms, “a pagan ethos.”
In arguing for a pagan ethos, Kaplan isn’t promoting a new viewpoint or argument. Indeed, it is the viewpoint of the articulate pagans, to wit, the Greeks and Romans (and to a lesser—but still important—extent, the Chinese tradition). But this tradition didn’t die with the Roman Empire and the advent of Christianity as the dominant source of culture and morality in Europe. Christianity, of course, never brought universal peace and prosperity to medieval Europe, but Christian precepts remained dominant. Then, along came the Renaissance (as a re-birth of classical culture) and Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli argued not against Christianity in everyday life, in the sphere of the personal and private, but he did argue against Christianity in the realm of politics. This attitude was reinforced by Hobbes, and in practice, even by otherwise pious (or at least churchly) leaders like Richelieu and Bismark, who divided their private lives and morality from their standards of conduct of political relations. Even within Christianity, figures from St. Augustine (d. 430) to the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) recognized the need for a different set of ethics to guide political life, especially in the realm of international relations.
In addition to referencing traditions of religious and moral philosophy (including Kant), Kaplan draws much of his argument from historians: Thucydides, Livy, and Churchill. In brief, the events recounted by these and other historians reveal patterns of conduct that remain visible today. Humankind is a species given to war and conquest; we should know better, but we don’t act with wisdom very often. The world experienced by Kaplan’s guides was not so different from ours, advances in technology and such, notwithstanding. Current events in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine amply demonstrate this. Each of those situations can be seen as the manifestation of an archetype that we’ve experienced throughout human history.
In sum, Kaplan’s book has withstood the test of time, and I expect (alas) that it will continue to do so. At least we can’t say that we haven’t been forewarned.
June 15, 2019
This book is really an important read. It was more philosophical than political, which I appreciate, and Kaplan does a masterful job in describing, analyzing, and comparing the contexts of the wars and political structures of ancient Greece, China, the Roman Empire and contemporary Europe and then orienting how they fit into the modern/post cold war era. One of the central philosophical themes presented throughout deals with the difference between "morals," and "interests." Kaplan notes how we should all strive for moral virtues within our private lives, however he espouses the realism and real world Politik elaborated on by scholars such as Hobbes and Nye as being rooted firmly within the notion that smart diplomacy rests in weighing the balance between self-interest and compromise.
Essentially, he seems to intimate that conflating moral issues with self-interest removes an ability to workout compromised solutions that provide stability to world order- as any issue labeled as fundamentally "moral" means that there can be no compromise, simply because to do so would by definition lead to an immoral result. That is not to say that Kaplan champions or calls for simply allowing others to always continue amoral actions unabated, far from it. Kaplan does a fine job in elucidating the moral reasoning behind negotiated compromise, primarily by implying that there is no one cultural or universal set of morals, and that compromise itself often serves as the basis from which further progress develops, rather than engaging in the alternative of never compromising (on a "moral" stance) which potentially causes only more strife and leads to more suffering in both the short and long term.
Anyone interested in geopolitical dynamics, philosophy of morality within alliance structures, and transnational organizations, should study this book as a guide that shows how past history can repeat itself in futures generations, regardless of how separated they may feel from ancient generations.
Essentially, he seems to intimate that conflating moral issues with self-interest removes an ability to workout compromised solutions that provide stability to world order- as any issue labeled as fundamentally "moral" means that there can be no compromise, simply because to do so would by definition lead to an immoral result. That is not to say that Kaplan champions or calls for simply allowing others to always continue amoral actions unabated, far from it. Kaplan does a fine job in elucidating the moral reasoning behind negotiated compromise, primarily by implying that there is no one cultural or universal set of morals, and that compromise itself often serves as the basis from which further progress develops, rather than engaging in the alternative of never compromising (on a "moral" stance) which potentially causes only more strife and leads to more suffering in both the short and long term.
Anyone interested in geopolitical dynamics, philosophy of morality within alliance structures, and transnational organizations, should study this book as a guide that shows how past history can repeat itself in futures generations, regardless of how separated they may feel from ancient generations.
March 14, 2016
Kaplan has proven himself a student of the ancients and he has done his damndest to secure that "the more cautious we are, the more effective we will be" (p. 154) in a Foreign Policy that uses its military force judiciously. I liked how he works to re-instate the Greco-Roman back into our cultural discourse; at one point he declares that the repeated use of Judeo-Christion reference about our heritage lacks exactly one half of the truth. His effort in this book is to restore the ancients into contemporary discussions of current events and for this, I applaud the book wholeheartedly.
Where I fault the book--and here comes my bias--is in its nascent conservatism. Kaplan hums the melody of Conservatism without singing outright the words. I will support the notion, however, that a liberal democracy must have a disciplined militia at its service and not be afraid to use it.
Unfortunately, since the book has been published, the U. S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan strikes more hegemonic chords for Empire than any soft-sell; the Bush administration's protection of corporate interests (oil, commerce) have more apparent rationale than the smokescreen of establishing democracy in the Middle East that we have been told from that White House. In this regard, Kaplan runs perilously too close to being a spokesperson for a flawed military invasion.
Where I fault the book--and here comes my bias--is in its nascent conservatism. Kaplan hums the melody of Conservatism without singing outright the words. I will support the notion, however, that a liberal democracy must have a disciplined militia at its service and not be afraid to use it.
Unfortunately, since the book has been published, the U. S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan strikes more hegemonic chords for Empire than any soft-sell; the Bush administration's protection of corporate interests (oil, commerce) have more apparent rationale than the smokescreen of establishing democracy in the Middle East that we have been told from that White House. In this regard, Kaplan runs perilously too close to being a spokesperson for a flawed military invasion.
January 16, 2015
I have read several of Mr. Kaplan' s books and admire his vast experience as an international journalist. To enjoy this particular book, the reader must accept two premises: 1.The future will present conflicts between nations that can only be successfully approached with the wisdom and philosophy of the greatest minds that the world has known, and 2. War is inevitable amongst men in any era. I accept and agree with the two aforementioned premises (I take exception however to the author's insistence that Ronald Reagan was a brilliant strategist or brilliant at anything other than being a mouthpiece for the emerging right wing party). Towards the end of the book Mr. Kaplan refers briefly to the new stratagems that we may face by fierce uncivilized opponents and that we will have to be grounded in our pagan warrior ethos to prevail. I agree with that as well but I think all the military aggression will be for naught as the consequences of global warming envelope us all and our great military industrial complex shrivels in the face of collapsing economic systems required to support it. Still a wonderful read that makes me long for the days when it was only the barbarians at the gates that we had to worry about.
November 25, 2021
This book sets forth a gamut of leadership “philosophies” over the ages. I especially liked the chapter on the Italian sometime diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli. It's the clearest and most straightforward summary of his tenets that I've ever read. His essence: While ultimate goals are often moral, the means to achieve them are sometimes offensive. I liked also the chapter on Winston Churchill. He was familiar with monsters whereas Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who attempted to negotiate peace with a monster (Hitler) was not. Other lessons for diplomacy can be derived from Sun-Tzu, Hobbs, Malthus and others. This book was published before 9-11, Osama bin Laden and all that so it's a bit dated. I look forward to reading later Kaplan books.
March 11, 2021
“The reason I have come to admire Bob Kaplan’s little book ... is its refusal to apologize for analogies. What Kaplan is saying—and what Hobbes and Machiavelli and some of the Founders said—was that realism is in fact more moral than idealism. Idealism as state craft is based on an abdication of responsibility—to govern the world as it is.” — Andrew Sullivan, review of Warrior Politics
“I am not an optimist or an idealist. Americans can afford optimism partly because their institutions, including the Constitution, were conceived by men who thought tragically.” — Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics
“I am not an optimist or an idealist. Americans can afford optimism partly because their institutions, including the Constitution, were conceived by men who thought tragically.” — Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics
December 19, 2016
Con este libro realmente aprendí la importancia de conocer la historia para afrontar el futuro, ya que a raíz de referencias historicas nos cuenta los procesos hacia una solución que se tenga en el presente
October 14, 2023
Kaplan is a man with a clear head. This statement means that when he observes the world, he distinguishes between the reality of the world and the discourse system we use to describe it.
There is no way we can understand reality without using language to describe it. But reality is always in an infinite chain of intertwined cause and effect relationships, and coupled with the lagging nature of human language and understanding, language will always have an outdated and inaccurate grasp of reality. The use of language can help us to systematise reality in a simplistic way and to form an order that can be easily grasped by our minds, but this is only of instrumental value. We use language to help us understand reality, but clarity of mind means that we must always realise that it only helps us to understand reality, but it is not reality itself. Distinguishing this is very rare.
The vast majority of the book is uninspiring and seems to me to be little more than platitudes. For example, blind faith in experts and science will lead to the age of the last man and the mediocrity of the human race as a whole; the seeming increase in moral standards is an illusion of economic prosperity; and generational forgetfulness and the war on abstraction.
But from Kaplan's analysis of modernity and antiquity in the opening, he has hinted at the importance of the difference between name and reality. What I find worth pondering is his later contrast between modern international politics and the logic of feudal protection in primitive societies. The construction of a community of human depends on the birth of a globalised Leviathan, and until there is one, all we can hope for is mere existence in a state of nature. This requires us to abandon the moral system that exists only in civil societies and to see the operation of power behind international relations. Understanding the logic of this operation allows us to seek a new way of coexistence outside the globlised Leviathan. Under the system of feudal patronage (in which the nation-state and national sovereignty have only nominal value), ritualised power struggles have replaced barbaric wars. This was a hundred thousand miles away from the ideal of permanent peace, but it was the best way to resolve feuds. It is only on the basis of ritualised conflict that international law - the guide to the rules of ritualised conflict - can exist and function. Only on this basis is it possible to construct a possible international order.
On a negative level, the advantage of an international order is that it dispenses with the fear of violent death and creates an order on the basis of which hope for the future is possible. It is only on the basis of hope that a normal life for human beings becomes possible.
In the light of Foreign Affair's recent article Delusions of Détente, perhaps this ritualised war is the best we can hope for.
But the author also reminds us that ours is an age of forgetting:
"Perhaps for the first time in history, there was a generation without direct experience of poverty, depression, war, invasion, and other terrors that human beings for ages have regarded as ordinary elements of daily life: the Cold War, because it was cold, was also abstract"
So while ritualised war is the least difficult to achieve and has the best possible outcome, we still cannot be naive enough to think that it is the most likely outcome. Oblivion is a terrible thing, and it is the operating logic behind the phenomenon of "nothing new under the sun". If I had to choose one sentence from this book as the final comment, it would be this: The closer we look at antiquity, the more we learn about this new world.
There is no way we can understand reality without using language to describe it. But reality is always in an infinite chain of intertwined cause and effect relationships, and coupled with the lagging nature of human language and understanding, language will always have an outdated and inaccurate grasp of reality. The use of language can help us to systematise reality in a simplistic way and to form an order that can be easily grasped by our minds, but this is only of instrumental value. We use language to help us understand reality, but clarity of mind means that we must always realise that it only helps us to understand reality, but it is not reality itself. Distinguishing this is very rare.
The vast majority of the book is uninspiring and seems to me to be little more than platitudes. For example, blind faith in experts and science will lead to the age of the last man and the mediocrity of the human race as a whole; the seeming increase in moral standards is an illusion of economic prosperity; and generational forgetfulness and the war on abstraction.
But from Kaplan's analysis of modernity and antiquity in the opening, he has hinted at the importance of the difference between name and reality. What I find worth pondering is his later contrast between modern international politics and the logic of feudal protection in primitive societies. The construction of a community of human depends on the birth of a globalised Leviathan, and until there is one, all we can hope for is mere existence in a state of nature. This requires us to abandon the moral system that exists only in civil societies and to see the operation of power behind international relations. Understanding the logic of this operation allows us to seek a new way of coexistence outside the globlised Leviathan. Under the system of feudal patronage (in which the nation-state and national sovereignty have only nominal value), ritualised power struggles have replaced barbaric wars. This was a hundred thousand miles away from the ideal of permanent peace, but it was the best way to resolve feuds. It is only on the basis of ritualised conflict that international law - the guide to the rules of ritualised conflict - can exist and function. Only on this basis is it possible to construct a possible international order.
On a negative level, the advantage of an international order is that it dispenses with the fear of violent death and creates an order on the basis of which hope for the future is possible. It is only on the basis of hope that a normal life for human beings becomes possible.
In the light of Foreign Affair's recent article Delusions of Détente, perhaps this ritualised war is the best we can hope for.
But the author also reminds us that ours is an age of forgetting:
"Perhaps for the first time in history, there was a generation without direct experience of poverty, depression, war, invasion, and other terrors that human beings for ages have regarded as ordinary elements of daily life: the Cold War, because it was cold, was also abstract"
So while ritualised war is the least difficult to achieve and has the best possible outcome, we still cannot be naive enough to think that it is the most likely outcome. Oblivion is a terrible thing, and it is the operating logic behind the phenomenon of "nothing new under the sun". If I had to choose one sentence from this book as the final comment, it would be this: The closer we look at antiquity, the more we learn about this new world.
October 24, 2017
I've recently finished Warrior Politics by Robert D. Kaplan, in a bid to boost my understanding of foreign policy and statesmanship. Political thinking doesn't come easy for me, but Kaplan has written something that I can easily use as a reference in the future. At 155 pages, it is not a long read, but its contents require thoughtful consideration after you shut the covers.
The central idea of the book is that statesmen and rulers should look to the past in order to govern the future, because people remain consistently human in their urges and motivations; there is a pervasive pessimism in that we as a species have yet to outgrow our territorial and aggressive instincts. Of course, looking at the world as it is in 2017, it is hard to dispute that particular perspective.
Kaplan writes from the perspective of an American, and hence the focus of the book's conclusion is on how America can become the next great empire, by using its overwhelming power (military, economic and cultural) to create an international government. However, from my point of view, that is an unwelcoming thought. For every conquering nation, there are many conquered states. The notion of an American-led Leviathan is as unpalatable as a resurgent Chinese empire or a Russian hegemony.
On the whole, Warrior Politics was a fascinating read. Even though this was first published in 2002, much of it is relevant today. After all, as Kaplan states, there is no modern or postmodern world, "only a continuation of the ancient".
The central idea of the book is that statesmen and rulers should look to the past in order to govern the future, because people remain consistently human in their urges and motivations; there is a pervasive pessimism in that we as a species have yet to outgrow our territorial and aggressive instincts. Of course, looking at the world as it is in 2017, it is hard to dispute that particular perspective.
Kaplan writes from the perspective of an American, and hence the focus of the book's conclusion is on how America can become the next great empire, by using its overwhelming power (military, economic and cultural) to create an international government. However, from my point of view, that is an unwelcoming thought. For every conquering nation, there are many conquered states. The notion of an American-led Leviathan is as unpalatable as a resurgent Chinese empire or a Russian hegemony.
On the whole, Warrior Politics was a fascinating read. Even though this was first published in 2002, much of it is relevant today. After all, as Kaplan states, there is no modern or postmodern world, "only a continuation of the ancient".
November 26, 2017
This was my least favorite Kaplan book, I think because there was no geography in it. He goes through the ancient classical political theorists with small comment on current (2002) affairs. He is supposedly making predictions for the 21st century. He did get it right in some respects. "Unfortunately the enemies we are likely to face will not be soldiers with the discipline and professionalism which that word implies in the West but "warriors"---erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence with no stake in civil order." Also something to consider in "nationalism in our age is simply a secular form of fundamentalism." Yet he says we need to "encourage American patriotism--honoring the flag, July 4th celebrations, and so on--these must survive long enough to provide the military armature for an emerging global civilization that may eventually make such patriotism obsolete." He talked about the "populist rage fueled by social and economic tensions, aggravated often by population growth and resource scarcity in an increasingly urbanized planet" which would certainly come to the fore in the 2016 election. But his hope for the US as the global super power with the strongest military and altruistic bent to protect and lead the planet to some kind of global world seems less likely 15 years later especially since he states "the statesman of the future will need to control his emotions" as we have elected a man not able to control his emotions or words.
December 27, 2017
la hipótesis que se desarrolla en El retorno de la Antigüedad, es decir, que el conocimiento de los hechos de naciones y hombres en el pasado, más que las desaforadas teorías de nuestros contemporáneos, pueden servir de guía para prevenir los acontecimientos políticos y sociales que nos aguardan.
Estos acontecimientos son migraciones, guerras, crisis, la dolorosa evolución de los modelos políticos actuales hacia otros, todavía inimaginables, pero cuyos cimientos se adivinan en el creciente poder de las empresas multinacionales, y los reordenamientos regionales de negocios y demografía, que merman cada vez más los poderes de los estados centrales. Tal y como dice Vargas Llosa, Kaplan no mira el futuro bajo los tonos armónicos de la civilidad triunfante, sino que anticipa un nuevo feudalismo, producto tanto de la ilusoria "globalización" como de la decadencia de un sistema (el democrático occidental) que difícilmente podrá ser transplantado con éxito a sociedades no occidentales antes de que la inmigración y la influencia de éstas lo aniquilen o, cuando menos, lo transformen hasta dejarlo irreconocible
Estos acontecimientos son migraciones, guerras, crisis, la dolorosa evolución de los modelos políticos actuales hacia otros, todavía inimaginables, pero cuyos cimientos se adivinan en el creciente poder de las empresas multinacionales, y los reordenamientos regionales de negocios y demografía, que merman cada vez más los poderes de los estados centrales. Tal y como dice Vargas Llosa, Kaplan no mira el futuro bajo los tonos armónicos de la civilidad triunfante, sino que anticipa un nuevo feudalismo, producto tanto de la ilusoria "globalización" como de la decadencia de un sistema (el democrático occidental) que difícilmente podrá ser transplantado con éxito a sociedades no occidentales antes de que la inmigración y la influencia de éstas lo aniquilen o, cuando menos, lo transformen hasta dejarlo irreconocible
September 13, 2024
Not life-changing, but a good read if you want to understand some historical similarities between ancient and modern international relations. The hardest thing about this book, written in 2002, is the sense that Kaplan's ideas feel very dated. It was fascinating to read from this post-9/11 pre-Iraq war perspective; perspective arguing for more American intervention abroad, not just to promote democracy, but to ensure a Roman-like American empire across the globe. Yet, with hindsight, the first two decades of the 21st-Century were marred with armed conflicts, many of which left the home country worse than before the conflict (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, Gaza, among many others). The main highlights of this book are the ancient comparisons, even if the modern equivalents cited in the book may come off as obsolete.
July 24, 2017
Dull and meandering. I was excited to read this book because I like works that incorporate the ideas of the classics, like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, into modern situations, but this book was poorly executed. First off, the author never really clearly states what he is trying to accomplish. Second, his writing style comes off as very holier-than-thou, as if he's trying to show off how smart he is and how many classics he has read. Each chapter seems to be arguing to a point, but many are not that well proven. Additionally, this book was originally published in 2002, and very little attention is paid to Osama bin Laden. I'm sure that other, more modern, works deal with the post-9/11 world in a much more clear way.
November 23, 2018
The past is important and one should never forget how history can change the future. Kaplan’s essays provide the reader an idea of how the writings of Churchill,Livy, Sun-Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavellian, Hobbes and Malthus have a direct impact on what is happening in our world today. History seems to be repeating itself and the question is will it be Christian morals, Political Ideologies, Monarchies or Global coverage that bring global peace. Through the Greeks, Romans, British, German, Arab, Indian and Chinese histories we seem to be following a similar pattern of peace and war. The book is an exciting read enabling readers connect the dots between the past and future.
August 5, 2022
War is the least likable form of foreign policy but when diplomacy fails, it's all there is. With the Russian aggression in Ukraine we lament the lack of a global Leviathan which would put the aggressor in the corner. In his essay Kaplan argues that to win a good war we should read the Ancient Greeks, Romans and Chinese. As opposed to science or domestic affairs, little had changed when it comes to wars and power is the only rule. That's an interesting thought, yet Kaplan contradicts himself while saying that media has changed the stakes by rallying on moral grounds rather than strategic interests. Anyway, good food for thought.
May 28, 2022
As a teacher of World History & Geography as well as Americans at War, I thoroughly enjoyed the numerous ideas and philosophies discussed. Kaplan’s thought process seemed a bit chaotic at times as he is prone to tangents, at least in this essay. I wasn’t too thrilled with him blowing his own horn…”the media’s moral perfectionism is possible only because it is politically unaccountable.” However, his common theme of mirroring ancient war philosophy and the Leviathan made for an interesting and thought-provoking read.
July 11, 2023
Hmmm. Written 21 years ago this is an argument for realpolitik rather than idealism and personal morality in foreign policy based on readings from ancient and modern history. The author relies too much on statements from idolized historical figures and seems at time sin favor of authoritarian figures. The last 20 years has not been kind to this treatise as its hubristic view of the US has been undermined by economic crises and crises of democracy at home and the backlash against globalization.
April 16, 2025
Kaplan fails to grasp basic history. He claims that Christianity was responsible for the fall of Rome, that Kant proved the existence of human rights and that Churchills colonialist ideals ought to be celebrated
Kaplan champions US interventionist policy along with many other white washed perspectives of Human History.
All in all, this is a poorly sourced mishmash of neo conservatism and "the white man's burden"
Kaplan champions US interventionist policy along with many other white washed perspectives of Human History.
All in all, this is a poorly sourced mishmash of neo conservatism and "the white man's burden"
October 28, 2025
Very thought provoking. Interesting to hear Kaplans predictions for the 21st century pre-Iraq invasion and his thoughts on how the information revolution will change things. He is pretty spot on for many of his 21st century predictions. Glorifies Reagan a bit too much. Overall very much enjoyed this read.
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