Jeanne Guillemin offers a chilling, yet surprisingly calm, account of the development and aftermath of state-sponsored biological weapons programs. The author presents the book as a short, yet concise, history of how biology became a weapon. This is no easy task, as a plethora of books exist solely on a single episode that this book outlines. Guillemin, a passionate speaker on nonproliferation in the field of bio-weapons, writes this book solely on facts.
The book details the development of the first state-sponsored programs of pre-World War I towards their ban by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. In detail Guillemin describes how scientists experimented with bio-agents to find their virulence, or effectiveness of contraction. This included wind tests off the coast of Los Angeles to check how anthrax spores might spread. The US, however, never truly experimented on human subjects. Most of US virulence tests came from animals, factory workers (exposed by mill and textile conditions), and Japanese tests conducted on the Chinese during World War II. The US is not the only program detailed in this book, though it is the backdrop. In fact, it primarily starts with detailing the development in Europe and Canada out of fear of Germany’s ability. The author also details the lack of will to use bio agents because of international scrutiny during the Vietnam War. However, chemical weapons, labeled as riot or nerve agents such as VX or BZ, were used and experimented with. Many of them were quickly banned because of their effects, BZ such as is a nerve agent that caused sever psychological effects.
With the signing of the BWC, most national programs ended. The Soviets, however, were just getting started at this time. Parties to the BWC, the Soviets undertook the largest secret state-sponsored bio program. One that, though not expressed in the book, is still haunting because of the lack of security on the facilities in Russia today. The collapse of the Soviet state, also saw the end of the Soviet secret program. The last few chapters are dedicated to the present issue with international terrorism. It isn’t until these last few chapters that the author begins to have a activist voice. With 9/11 and the next failure of various US government agencies (including the Postal Service) anthrax attacks, came the development of biodefense labs. The author cautions the reader to look between the lines that many of the original weaponizing programs, such as Camp Dietrick in World War II, were sold as defensive in nature. However, bio-agents, unlike nuclear weapons, can easily be transformed into a weapon by sheer contraction. Guillemin advises that the best defense against bio-terrorism is open transparency. This is a lesson that must be learned from the anthrax letters of 2001, which saw agencies lack of communication lead to avoidable deaths.