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Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda
Why was the UN a bystander during the Rwandan genocide? Do its sins of omission leave it morally responsible for the hundreds of thousands of dead? Michael Barnett, who worked at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1993 to 1994, covered Rwanda for much of the genocide. Based on his first-hand experiences, archival work, and interviews with many key participants, he reconstructs the history of the UN's involvement in Rwanda.
In the weeks leading up to the genocide, the author documents, the UN was increasingly aware or had good reason to suspect that Rwanda was a site of crimes against humanity. Yet it failed to act. Barnett argues that its indifference was driven not by incompetence or cynicism but rather by reasoned choices cradled by moral considerations. Employing a novel approach to ethics in practice and in relationship to international organizations, Barnett offers an unsettling possibility: the UN culture recast the ethical commitments of well-intentioned individuals, arresting any duty to aid at the outset of the genocide.
Barnett argues that the UN bears some moral responsibility for the genocide. Particularly disturbing is his observation that not only did the UN violate its moral responsibilities, but also that many in New York believed that they were "doing the right thing" as they did so. Barnett addresses the ways in which the Rwandan genocide raises a warning about this age of humanitarianism and concludes by asking whether it is possible to build moral institutions.
In the weeks leading up to the genocide, the author documents, the UN was increasingly aware or had good reason to suspect that Rwanda was a site of crimes against humanity. Yet it failed to act. Barnett argues that its indifference was driven not by incompetence or cynicism but rather by reasoned choices cradled by moral considerations. Employing a novel approach to ethics in practice and in relationship to international organizations, Barnett offers an unsettling possibility: the UN culture recast the ethical commitments of well-intentioned individuals, arresting any duty to aid at the outset of the genocide.
Barnett argues that the UN bears some moral responsibility for the genocide. Particularly disturbing is his observation that not only did the UN violate its moral responsibilities, but also that many in New York believed that they were "doing the right thing" as they did so. Barnett addresses the ways in which the Rwandan genocide raises a warning about this age of humanitarianism and concludes by asking whether it is possible to build moral institutions.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
April 14, 2015
This is by far the least-accessible book I've read on Rwanda. But while it's thoroughly awful to slog through (it reads like a dry academic dissertation), I do think it's an important analysis of the international community's role in the 1994 genocide.
Other books I've read on the topic focus more closely on events in Rwanda; this one was centered on the UN and whether the Security Council, the Secretariat, and/or member states bear moral responsibility for the genocide. I thought Barnett's research and conclusions were thorough, balanced, fair yet pointed. In between the incredibly tedious writing and interminable paragraphs, he also had some profound things to say--provocative truths about the nature of bureaucracies and morality and about human nature in general.
Other books I've read on the topic focus more closely on events in Rwanda; this one was centered on the UN and whether the Security Council, the Secretariat, and/or member states bear moral responsibility for the genocide. I thought Barnett's research and conclusions were thorough, balanced, fair yet pointed. In between the incredibly tedious writing and interminable paragraphs, he also had some profound things to say--provocative truths about the nature of bureaucracies and morality and about human nature in general.
March 23, 2025
3 / 5 Stars | 60 / 100
I found myself strongly agreeing with the opinions that a couple other readers had left in their reviews here on Goodreads, and so I wanted to include these opinions in order to emphasize these points to any potential future readers.
"This is by far the least accessible book I've read on Rwanda. But while it's thoroughly awful to slog through (it reads like a dry academic dissertation), I do think it is an important analysis of the international community's role in the [Rwandan] Genocide."
- Ms. Amy Kannel
"This book was very small, but still incredibly inflated. Dozens of pages could be removed without taking away from the story. The point the author makes is a good one, but I think it would have benefitted from a stronger hand in editing."
- Kat
------------------------------------------------
This book is a conundrum to review. It's well researched and the analysis is logical, however it's also incredibly verbose and tedious to work through. What felt strange throughout my reading is Barnett's oscillation between clear examples that the administrative arm of the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) failed to appropriately convey the magnitude of the violence on the ground despite insightful intelligence from ground forces, and purporting that the circumstances surrounding the genocide were too complex to be understood and that there couldn't have been another outcome.
Even if the DPKO had failed to rouse The Secretariat into action, they owed it to both their fellow UN Staff and the many innocent Rwandans to speak earnestly in the name of preservation of humanity. The DPKO's description of the violence in Rwandan as initially unworthy of an attempt at intervention is at the very least a gross ethical violation, and at most malicious in its' willingness to strand hundreds of thousands men, women, and children (including fellow UN Staff and humanitarian workers) in a slaughterhouse.
Despite my criticism's of this work, however, there are still some shrewd insights put forward by Barnett:
"This alteration in the concept of security was due to two related 'discoveries.' The state frequently was not the guardian it pretended to be, but rather was the principal threat to its' citizens. In theory the state was to provide security against foreign intruders, but in practice many societies had more to fear from their imposed protector than they did from other states. Also, domestic and civil wars seemed to be outstripping international wars in number and ferocity. Interstate war, though far from solved, paled in comparison to the growing number of ethnonational conflicts that were producing grim upheavals, crimes against humanity, and mass population movements. These conflicts would jar visions at any time, but did so particularly now because of the presumption that a kinder, gentler world was to succeed the Cold War. Something had to be done. These new security threats called for new security remedies."
- p. 26
"The UN's foray into civil wars and humanitarian assistance, however, stretched its ability to maintain a neutral and impartial stance - and the very desirability of doing so. Consent would become a cowardly and dysfunctional shield that nearly transformed the UN into an unwitting accomplice to human rights violations and war crimes. The alternative was, if need be, to enforce the mandate without the parties' consent. Doing so, however, could sacrifice the UN's impartiality and embroil it in a military adventure that it neither wanted nor was capable of fighting. And if the UN departed from neutrality and became another combatant, then it might sacrifice its special standing in global politics, becoming just like a state, but without the resources, and forfeiting its authority and influence."
- p. 43
"There is an extraordinary chasm between what Dallaire told UN headquarters and what headquarters told the Security Council. Dallaire told DPKO that there was a well-organized plan for ethnic cleansing. The Secretariat's reports to the council highlighted the "chaos" and conveyed an image of violence that was spontaneous, erupting from long-standing hatred tensions and hatreds. Dallaire told DPKO that there were two dimensions to the crisis - humanitarian, and political, and that the most efficient way to control the humanitarian crisis was to re-establish the cease-fire. The Secretariat's reports honed in on the civil war and the political crises to the neglect of the humanitarian crisis. Dallaire pleaded for reinforcements as a show of the international community's resolve and as the only chance of containing the extremists. The Secretariat reported to the council that it had not received any concrete recommendations from the field, and that UNAMIR was so consumed by self-protection tasks that it was unable to develop any."
- p.110
"The willingness to accept the "state of mind" of UN Staff as a part of a duress excuse raises two deeply troubling issues. The first is an uncomfortable parallel with a familiar argument about the banality of evil. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt too noted that bureaucrats do not see themselves as being in charge or having any real autonomy. She too hinted that the psychological effect may relieve bureaucrats of the sense of responsibility for their actions and allow them to act in an unreflexive way. She too argued that bureaucrats can come to treat the morality of the bureaucracy as superior to their private morality. She too observed that action once judged as morally wrong may become behavior that is merely difficult to bear. She too seemed ready to advance the argument that a bureaucratic mentality immediately qualifies for diminished responsibility. The banality of evil bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the banality of bureaucratic indifference. A bureaucratic mentality inspires ordinary individuals to tolerate evil. Bureaucratic virtue is now found in tolerating the existence of immoral acts. Note that we are no longer speaking of unrelenting pressures but rather of the predispositions of all bureaucracies. Organizational culture is a veritable petri dish for moral amnesia and the distortion of ethical principles."
- p. 165
"An impressive number of workshops, reports, and statements from an equally striking array of international organizations, states, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, research institutions, scholars, and politicians have recommended how to fix the system. Only the most optimistic could see these tremendous efforts as anything more than a ritualistic attempt to find some uplifting message as a substitute for concrete action. Many politicians who showed no courage during the Genocide now started preaching the need to honor the dead by creating moral institutions. In his highly abbreviated visit to Kigali, President Clinton echoed these themes, but did not specify what he was prepared to contribute (beyond warm thoughts). His subsequent actions suggested not much. He and many other politicians have spun powerful vision of muscular humanitarian organizations but have delivered, instead, emaciated institutions as placeholders for a half-baked humanitarianism."
- p. 178
------------------------------------------------
With these thoughts in mind, I find myself unable to either endorse or deprecate Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. For those willing to endure the dryness of this text, I do believe there is insight to be gained. That being said, however, I genuinely feel as though this text cannot hold a candle to some of the more noted memoirs of Rwanda (Dallaire's Shake Hands With the Devil, Gourevitch's We Wish to Inform You..., etc.)
I found myself strongly agreeing with the opinions that a couple other readers had left in their reviews here on Goodreads, and so I wanted to include these opinions in order to emphasize these points to any potential future readers.
"This is by far the least accessible book I've read on Rwanda. But while it's thoroughly awful to slog through (it reads like a dry academic dissertation), I do think it is an important analysis of the international community's role in the [Rwandan] Genocide."
- Ms. Amy Kannel
"This book was very small, but still incredibly inflated. Dozens of pages could be removed without taking away from the story. The point the author makes is a good one, but I think it would have benefitted from a stronger hand in editing."
- Kat
------------------------------------------------
This book is a conundrum to review. It's well researched and the analysis is logical, however it's also incredibly verbose and tedious to work through. What felt strange throughout my reading is Barnett's oscillation between clear examples that the administrative arm of the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) failed to appropriately convey the magnitude of the violence on the ground despite insightful intelligence from ground forces, and purporting that the circumstances surrounding the genocide were too complex to be understood and that there couldn't have been another outcome.
Even if the DPKO had failed to rouse The Secretariat into action, they owed it to both their fellow UN Staff and the many innocent Rwandans to speak earnestly in the name of preservation of humanity. The DPKO's description of the violence in Rwandan as initially unworthy of an attempt at intervention is at the very least a gross ethical violation, and at most malicious in its' willingness to strand hundreds of thousands men, women, and children (including fellow UN Staff and humanitarian workers) in a slaughterhouse.
Despite my criticism's of this work, however, there are still some shrewd insights put forward by Barnett:
"This alteration in the concept of security was due to two related 'discoveries.' The state frequently was not the guardian it pretended to be, but rather was the principal threat to its' citizens. In theory the state was to provide security against foreign intruders, but in practice many societies had more to fear from their imposed protector than they did from other states. Also, domestic and civil wars seemed to be outstripping international wars in number and ferocity. Interstate war, though far from solved, paled in comparison to the growing number of ethnonational conflicts that were producing grim upheavals, crimes against humanity, and mass population movements. These conflicts would jar visions at any time, but did so particularly now because of the presumption that a kinder, gentler world was to succeed the Cold War. Something had to be done. These new security threats called for new security remedies."
- p. 26
"The UN's foray into civil wars and humanitarian assistance, however, stretched its ability to maintain a neutral and impartial stance - and the very desirability of doing so. Consent would become a cowardly and dysfunctional shield that nearly transformed the UN into an unwitting accomplice to human rights violations and war crimes. The alternative was, if need be, to enforce the mandate without the parties' consent. Doing so, however, could sacrifice the UN's impartiality and embroil it in a military adventure that it neither wanted nor was capable of fighting. And if the UN departed from neutrality and became another combatant, then it might sacrifice its special standing in global politics, becoming just like a state, but without the resources, and forfeiting its authority and influence."
- p. 43
"There is an extraordinary chasm between what Dallaire told UN headquarters and what headquarters told the Security Council. Dallaire told DPKO that there was a well-organized plan for ethnic cleansing. The Secretariat's reports to the council highlighted the "chaos" and conveyed an image of violence that was spontaneous, erupting from long-standing hatred tensions and hatreds. Dallaire told DPKO that there were two dimensions to the crisis - humanitarian, and political, and that the most efficient way to control the humanitarian crisis was to re-establish the cease-fire. The Secretariat's reports honed in on the civil war and the political crises to the neglect of the humanitarian crisis. Dallaire pleaded for reinforcements as a show of the international community's resolve and as the only chance of containing the extremists. The Secretariat reported to the council that it had not received any concrete recommendations from the field, and that UNAMIR was so consumed by self-protection tasks that it was unable to develop any."
- p.110
"The willingness to accept the "state of mind" of UN Staff as a part of a duress excuse raises two deeply troubling issues. The first is an uncomfortable parallel with a familiar argument about the banality of evil. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt too noted that bureaucrats do not see themselves as being in charge or having any real autonomy. She too hinted that the psychological effect may relieve bureaucrats of the sense of responsibility for their actions and allow them to act in an unreflexive way. She too argued that bureaucrats can come to treat the morality of the bureaucracy as superior to their private morality. She too observed that action once judged as morally wrong may become behavior that is merely difficult to bear. She too seemed ready to advance the argument that a bureaucratic mentality immediately qualifies for diminished responsibility. The banality of evil bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the banality of bureaucratic indifference. A bureaucratic mentality inspires ordinary individuals to tolerate evil. Bureaucratic virtue is now found in tolerating the existence of immoral acts. Note that we are no longer speaking of unrelenting pressures but rather of the predispositions of all bureaucracies. Organizational culture is a veritable petri dish for moral amnesia and the distortion of ethical principles."
- p. 165
"An impressive number of workshops, reports, and statements from an equally striking array of international organizations, states, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, research institutions, scholars, and politicians have recommended how to fix the system. Only the most optimistic could see these tremendous efforts as anything more than a ritualistic attempt to find some uplifting message as a substitute for concrete action. Many politicians who showed no courage during the Genocide now started preaching the need to honor the dead by creating moral institutions. In his highly abbreviated visit to Kigali, President Clinton echoed these themes, but did not specify what he was prepared to contribute (beyond warm thoughts). His subsequent actions suggested not much. He and many other politicians have spun powerful vision of muscular humanitarian organizations but have delivered, instead, emaciated institutions as placeholders for a half-baked humanitarianism."
- p. 178
------------------------------------------------
With these thoughts in mind, I find myself unable to either endorse or deprecate Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. For those willing to endure the dryness of this text, I do believe there is insight to be gained. That being said, however, I genuinely feel as though this text cannot hold a candle to some of the more noted memoirs of Rwanda (Dallaire's Shake Hands With the Devil, Gourevitch's We Wish to Inform You..., etc.)
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June 1, 2017Michael Barnett was a political officer during the Rwanda genocide. In 2002, he wrote about his political observances and other political accounts in a book called "Eyewitness to a genocide." Through his accounts historians can form a better understanding of why and how the world failed to protect Rwandians from ethnic cleaning.
October 5, 2025
I truly don’t know how to rate this book. The writing is excellent, and the narrative hangs together well. The author deserves high ratings for that. The content of the book on the other hand makes me want to deck somebody and cry, maybe alternately and repetitively. That is not the authors fault. He is reporting what actually happened. He can’t change that to make us all feel better. He has tried to be fair on all sides, and he has tried to explain the mixed motivations and actions of the people involved at the UN. I don’t think I could be that objective. The fact that some people deliberately chose not to share field reports with the security council to help them assess the severity of the situation, in my book, is utterly deplorable.
June 4, 2008
I loved this book! It not only made me look at what happend in Rwanda, but it made me take a good look at the UN and how it works (or rather does not work). I never realized how much political pressure there was in it, and how much they could actually do if they would let their people do their jobs, instead of stalling any progress that might be made.
April 2, 2019
Educational, but doesn't address the impact that colonialism has on the Rwandan genocide. Also fails to hold UN accountable for the purposeful mislabeling of the genocide as a civil war.
May 30, 2019
This book started slow, but the last few chapters were great!
March 13, 2007
It is a sad world where its generally agreed upon worldwide governing body cannot/ will not stand in the face of blatant crimes of war, whether or not they want to haggle over the use of the term genocide. This book describes precisely how the UN acts: by talking, talking, hearing justified reasons of why it should act and diplomatic, bureaucratic, self-interested reasons why it doesn't. They were receiving real-time information on what was happening, and all the governing bodies who could do anything about it just didn't do it. This book provides sound insight as to why the UN doesnt get the respect it should, doesnt have the authority it should, and doesnt function as it should, all while keeping the ideal in mind that its the only way we're ever going to get along in an increasingly intertwined global neighborhood.
December 27, 2007
A very important book in understanding decision-making within the UN and the failure of the organization and the "international community" to respond to the Rwandan genocide. Written by Mike Barnett - an academic who held a fellowship at the UN mission to the UN in 1994 and witnessed and experienced the failed and inadequate response (and the immediate history, internal bureaucracies and individuals that stalled response). Excellent analysis - very illuminating.
April 30, 2008
Overall, a good book for anyone wanting to know more about events surrounding the Rwandan genocide. The author comes down quite hard on the role of the United Nations which at times seems a bit extreme. What is interesting is the discussion of how framing the conflict in Rwanda as a "civil war" as opposed to "genocide" affected the response of the international community.
September 14, 2012
Barnett's clear and concise look at the role of the UN is well written and thorough. An investigation of the UN's response to Rwanda and its ethical responsibilities, the book also serves as a wider look at institutional morality and the effect of a bureaucracy on the ethics of individuals as members. Insightful and eye-opening, I found this a very worthwhile and interesting read.
December 4, 2015
This book was very small, but still incredibly inflated. Dozens of pages could be removed without taking away from the story. The point the author makes is a good one, but I think it would have benefited from a stronger hand in editing.
November 16, 2013
All I can say was that the book was extremely political and extremely biased, but then again, so was the subject matter.
August 30, 2015
Had the potential to be good, but reads like a bad dissertation.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews