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Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality and Hitler's Lightning War – France, 1940
The German campaign in France during the summer of 1940 was pivotal to Hitler's ambitions and fundamentally affected the course of the Second World War. Having squabbled about fighting methods right up to the start of the campaign, the German forces provided the Führer with a swift, efficient and decisive military victory over the Allied forces.In achieving in just six weeks what their fathers had failed to accomplish during the four years of the First World War, Germany altered the balance of power in Europe at a stroke. Yet, as Lloyd Clark shows in this enthralling new book, it was far from a foregone conclusion. Blitzkrieg tells the story of the campaign, while highlighting the key technologies, decisions and events that led to German success, and details the mistakes, good fortune and chronic weaknesses in their planning process and approach to war fighting. There are also compelling portraits of the officers who played key roles, including Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, Kurt Student, Charles de Gaulle and Bernard Montgomery.Clark argues that far from being undefeatable, the France 1940 campaign revealed Germany and its armed forces to be highly vulnerable - a fact dismissed by Hitler as he began to plan for his invasion of the Soviet Union - and offers a gripping reassessment of the myths that have built up around one of the Second World War's greatest military victories.
546 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 15, 2016
122 people are currently reading
634 people want to read
About the author
Lloyd Clark
20 books39 followersLloyd Clark is a senior lecturer in war studies at Great Britain's Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and he has lectured on military history around the world. His special interests are the Western Front of the First World War, the Mediterranean Front of the Second World War, and airborne warfare.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 49 reviews
July 5, 2020
I truly enjoyed this book but I think the title may be slightly misleading as it relates to myths.....I didn't find any that haven't already been discussed in other histories but that really is minor. I hardly know where to start on this review because there is quite a bit of material in the book, especially related to the specific battles in the Low Countries, ending with the fall of France. In May and June of 1940, Germany rolled through the defenses of these countries, shocking the world, not necessarily for the horrors that befell these countries but the lack of it. They were expecting another Great War which consisted of trench warfare that gained a few miles or even yards of land which was quickly retaken the next day......a war of attrition. The military leadership of France seemed to base their strategies on a creeping, slow moving attack by the Germans against their defenses and were totally unprepared to cope with the unexpected and rapid movements of their enemy. They were slow to respond and continued to follow very strict battle plans. Since battle is fluid and the enemy may do something unexpected, the French were in a world of trouble.
Germany, on the other hand gave their field commanders the liberty to respond to situations as they developed and explore weaknesses where they found them. When Hitler started meddling in operational details, to the frustration of experienced commanders, they found a way to get around his most ludicrous plans and somehow got away with it.
The author goes into intensive detail regarding some of the more strategic battles and that becomes rather confusing and sometimes hard to follow. He does provide maps, thank heavens, but he put them all in the front of the book instead of in the chapter dedicated to a particular battle. I had to put post-it notes on the maps so I could turn back to them to follow the battle more closely.
We see Rommel moving forward with his career as a bold, brash, and brilliant Panzer leader. He was a genius of finding ways to ignore orders and luckily for him, his decisions were the right ones.
The reader also gets a close look at the French leadership and it is not a pretty picture. Elderly, past their prime as leaders, and still obsessed with antiquated plans of another war, they were on their back foot before they even started.
I could go on and on but will leave it here, with a solid recommendation for the WWII buff.
Germany, on the other hand gave their field commanders the liberty to respond to situations as they developed and explore weaknesses where they found them. When Hitler started meddling in operational details, to the frustration of experienced commanders, they found a way to get around his most ludicrous plans and somehow got away with it.
The author goes into intensive detail regarding some of the more strategic battles and that becomes rather confusing and sometimes hard to follow. He does provide maps, thank heavens, but he put them all in the front of the book instead of in the chapter dedicated to a particular battle. I had to put post-it notes on the maps so I could turn back to them to follow the battle more closely.
We see Rommel moving forward with his career as a bold, brash, and brilliant Panzer leader. He was a genius of finding ways to ignore orders and luckily for him, his decisions were the right ones.
The reader also gets a close look at the French leadership and it is not a pretty picture. Elderly, past their prime as leaders, and still obsessed with antiquated plans of another war, they were on their back foot before they even started.
I could go on and on but will leave it here, with a solid recommendation for the WWII buff.
February 27, 2017
Excellent account of the German Blitzkrieg into France. It also goes into the battles for Belgium and the Netherlands as well. The author does a very good job with blending first hand accounts into the overall narrative. The first few chapters explain the evolution of the Wermacht's operational doctrine and both German and French military preparations leading up to Fall Gelb. The maps are pretty decent and I found the German order of battle to be extremely helpful. Once I got to the chapters going into Fall Gelb, the book was very page-turning and I found it hard to put down. Overall a great book that explains how Hitler's armies subdued a nation as powerful as France in less than six weeks.
November 9, 2017
"BLITZKRIEG - Myth, Reality, and Hitler's Lightning War: France 1940" provides the reader with a fairly comprehensive account of the German invasion of the Benelux countries and France during May and June 1940. The author sets out to show that the German victory in Western Europe was by no means certain. Indeed, Hitler had plans to invade Western Europe as early as November 1939. But postponements were made on several occasions owing to the weather. There was also an occasion in which a Luftwaffe courier plane carrying the invasion plans veered off course and crashed in Belgium in January 1940. The German officer who had the plans, tried to burn them but was thwarted by the Belgians, who soon arrived on the scene. This led the Allies to believe that the Germans would attack them in the same way as had happened in 1914. For their part, the German General Staff had their fears of repeating the mistakes of 1914. Thus, the plans for invasion were altered.
The French entered the war in a state of wearied resignation with little enthusiasm for offensive operations. Their political and military leadership were prepared for a war of attrition. They had expectations of the Germans attacking them, Luxembourg, and Belgium in much the same way as they did in August 1914. To that end, their plan was to commit their best units - along with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) - to Central Belgium in response to a German attack there. But, as the author points out, the French top commander Maurice Gamelin failed to take into account the possibility of the Germans making a bold thrust through the Ardennes Forest with their tanks (the Ardennes was regarded by the French as impassable to tanks and thus was lightly defended on the premise that the Germans would never make a major attack there). So, when the Germans sent their tanks, motorized units, and infantry through the Ardennes and into the key town of Sedan, Gamelin treated the German thrust as a diversion, requiring little response. But the Germans were wary of attritional warfare, knowing that their chances for success rested on exploiting any breakthrough with speed, dash, and savage attacks against the French designed to shock them both militarily and psychologically. Consequently, the Germans were able to reach the English Channel 10 days after the invasion began and within the following fortnight to compel the BEF to evacuate from the ports of Boulogne and Dunkirk.
"BLITZKRIEG" contains pages of maps showing the development of the German offensives in the West (codenamed 'Fall Gelb' and 'Fall Rot') and several photos, which should appeal to any student of military history, as well as the general reader.
Again from reading this book, I learned how much success or defeat in a military campaign encompasses many factors - human, economic, political, and psychological - that, taken together, contribute to the triumph of the conquering nation (Nazi Germany) and the demoralization and defeat of the opposing nation (France).
The French entered the war in a state of wearied resignation with little enthusiasm for offensive operations. Their political and military leadership were prepared for a war of attrition. They had expectations of the Germans attacking them, Luxembourg, and Belgium in much the same way as they did in August 1914. To that end, their plan was to commit their best units - along with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) - to Central Belgium in response to a German attack there. But, as the author points out, the French top commander Maurice Gamelin failed to take into account the possibility of the Germans making a bold thrust through the Ardennes Forest with their tanks (the Ardennes was regarded by the French as impassable to tanks and thus was lightly defended on the premise that the Germans would never make a major attack there). So, when the Germans sent their tanks, motorized units, and infantry through the Ardennes and into the key town of Sedan, Gamelin treated the German thrust as a diversion, requiring little response. But the Germans were wary of attritional warfare, knowing that their chances for success rested on exploiting any breakthrough with speed, dash, and savage attacks against the French designed to shock them both militarily and psychologically. Consequently, the Germans were able to reach the English Channel 10 days after the invasion began and within the following fortnight to compel the BEF to evacuate from the ports of Boulogne and Dunkirk.
"BLITZKRIEG" contains pages of maps showing the development of the German offensives in the West (codenamed 'Fall Gelb' and 'Fall Rot') and several photos, which should appeal to any student of military history, as well as the general reader.
Again from reading this book, I learned how much success or defeat in a military campaign encompasses many factors - human, economic, political, and psychological - that, taken together, contribute to the triumph of the conquering nation (Nazi Germany) and the demoralization and defeat of the opposing nation (France).
July 22, 2016
Disclosure: I received a review copy of this book from NetGalley.
There is a lot of misunderstanding about the causes and process of the fall of France in May and June of 1940. Popular history seldom does it any favors, focusing almost exclusively on tanks and technology. Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler’s Lightning War, France 1940 does the study of German operational techniques few favors.
In his introduction, Lloyd Clark, a fairly prolific British historian, argues that this book “provides some new ideas” about the fall of France. He outlines three research questions he had going into the project: 1. What preparations were conducted by belligerent countries? 2. What capabilities existed in 1940? 3. How well did they perform their operational doctrine? The answers are not immediately forthcoming.
Clark only briefly touches on the run-up to war, which is an interesting choice considering the outcome of 1940 can be found in the doctrine and training the belligerent powers engaged in. Rather than a significant discussion about the major paradigms of interwar military theory, he focuses extensively on German civil-military relations. Certainly, this is a significant point for a book on German practices—especially as they pertain to the Eastern Front and the role the Wehrmacht played in the Final Solution—but it is somewhat less profound in the context of 1940, I think, than Clark assumes it should be. He also spends time in French civil-military relations, which is much more germane.
Before I continue, a point should be made about Clark’s sources. His notes are made almost entirely of English-language secondary sources, and where primary sources are implied in the text they are almost always as quoted in secondary literature. It is bizarre that one would attempt to provide an in-depth discussion of either French or German contexts without relying on relevant primary sources. This important to the primary point because, in a strange twist, Clark pays only lip service to British contexts; which would provide him the most significant sources for his analysis, given the implied language barrier.
Additionally, the discussion is often given to non-factual implications. While Clark mentions the trouble French and German armor proponents had, he glosses over the far more extreme hostility within the British military—to the point of conducting fraudulent test maneuvers to show the superiority of infantry over armor—and implies the British establishment was just hunky-dory.
As his narrative enters the campaigns in France, it takes on the character of a basic military history battle narrative. Relevant quotes from participants are drawn almost entirely from other secondary sources, a blow by blow of the campaign divided in phases: opening, the offensive to the Meuse, crossing the Meuse, etc… There is very little new or particularly unique about the narrative. It is perfectly competent in its writing and a very fine “drums and trumpets” narrative.
The argument of the book only reappears in the conclusion, where Clark discloses two chief points, which one must assume constitute his “new ideas”. First and probably most significant is that the German victory was not the result of “tanks and stukas” but of inter-service and combined arms cooperation. Second, he argues that the French were most hampered by their institutional culture, which promoted mediocrity and conformity and weeded out excellence. Neither of these points are “new ideas”; and are points made in many of the secondary sources Clark leaned on, including the work of Robert Citino, Dennis Showalter, and James Corum. They may be new to the lowest common denominator, but not anyone who reads on the subject in any depth.
The edition I was given for review is an uncorrected proof, and it is quite well polished on its own. There were very few errors made: one exception being the annoying British custom of misspelling Carl von Clausewitz’s given name with a K. It is not unique to Clark; it is quite common even amongst the most significant scholars. The edition was utterly bereft of maps, which are an absolute necessity in military history. Hopefully, that will be changed in the final proof.
Lacking originality, Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler’s Lightning War, France 1940 does not live up to its own subtitle, or to the promise of new ideas in the introduction. One wonders if the sensationalism in the book is rather due to the publisher trying to edge out its competition at a bookseller. Instead, Blitzkrieg is a readable synthesis which breaks down many great works into a consumable package.
There is a lot of misunderstanding about the causes and process of the fall of France in May and June of 1940. Popular history seldom does it any favors, focusing almost exclusively on tanks and technology. Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler’s Lightning War, France 1940 does the study of German operational techniques few favors.
In his introduction, Lloyd Clark, a fairly prolific British historian, argues that this book “provides some new ideas” about the fall of France. He outlines three research questions he had going into the project: 1. What preparations were conducted by belligerent countries? 2. What capabilities existed in 1940? 3. How well did they perform their operational doctrine? The answers are not immediately forthcoming.
Clark only briefly touches on the run-up to war, which is an interesting choice considering the outcome of 1940 can be found in the doctrine and training the belligerent powers engaged in. Rather than a significant discussion about the major paradigms of interwar military theory, he focuses extensively on German civil-military relations. Certainly, this is a significant point for a book on German practices—especially as they pertain to the Eastern Front and the role the Wehrmacht played in the Final Solution—but it is somewhat less profound in the context of 1940, I think, than Clark assumes it should be. He also spends time in French civil-military relations, which is much more germane.
Before I continue, a point should be made about Clark’s sources. His notes are made almost entirely of English-language secondary sources, and where primary sources are implied in the text they are almost always as quoted in secondary literature. It is bizarre that one would attempt to provide an in-depth discussion of either French or German contexts without relying on relevant primary sources. This important to the primary point because, in a strange twist, Clark pays only lip service to British contexts; which would provide him the most significant sources for his analysis, given the implied language barrier.
Additionally, the discussion is often given to non-factual implications. While Clark mentions the trouble French and German armor proponents had, he glosses over the far more extreme hostility within the British military—to the point of conducting fraudulent test maneuvers to show the superiority of infantry over armor—and implies the British establishment was just hunky-dory.
As his narrative enters the campaigns in France, it takes on the character of a basic military history battle narrative. Relevant quotes from participants are drawn almost entirely from other secondary sources, a blow by blow of the campaign divided in phases: opening, the offensive to the Meuse, crossing the Meuse, etc… There is very little new or particularly unique about the narrative. It is perfectly competent in its writing and a very fine “drums and trumpets” narrative.
The argument of the book only reappears in the conclusion, where Clark discloses two chief points, which one must assume constitute his “new ideas”. First and probably most significant is that the German victory was not the result of “tanks and stukas” but of inter-service and combined arms cooperation. Second, he argues that the French were most hampered by their institutional culture, which promoted mediocrity and conformity and weeded out excellence. Neither of these points are “new ideas”; and are points made in many of the secondary sources Clark leaned on, including the work of Robert Citino, Dennis Showalter, and James Corum. They may be new to the lowest common denominator, but not anyone who reads on the subject in any depth.
The edition I was given for review is an uncorrected proof, and it is quite well polished on its own. There were very few errors made: one exception being the annoying British custom of misspelling Carl von Clausewitz’s given name with a K. It is not unique to Clark; it is quite common even amongst the most significant scholars. The edition was utterly bereft of maps, which are an absolute necessity in military history. Hopefully, that will be changed in the final proof.
Lacking originality, Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler’s Lightning War, France 1940 does not live up to its own subtitle, or to the promise of new ideas in the introduction. One wonders if the sensationalism in the book is rather due to the publisher trying to edge out its competition at a bookseller. Instead, Blitzkrieg is a readable synthesis which breaks down many great works into a consumable package.
May 1, 2017
A competent description of the 1940 campaign in France and the Low Countries
The title implies some new revelations, however Clark doesn’t appear to provide anything particularly revelatory or new. That being said, it’s a good solid description of the campaign itself.
In summary a solid history for anyone new to the campaign, but nothing new for the more knowledgeable reader.
Disclosure: I received a review copy of this book from the publisher.
The title implies some new revelations, however Clark doesn’t appear to provide anything particularly revelatory or new. That being said, it’s a good solid description of the campaign itself.
In summary a solid history for anyone new to the campaign, but nothing new for the more knowledgeable reader.
Disclosure: I received a review copy of this book from the publisher.
January 31, 2025
'Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality and Hitler's Lightning War' by Lloyd Clark an 'academic' at Sandhurst and author of several other military books, is an account of the Battle of France in May-June, 1940. For even amateur military historians (as I county myself) there is little new here and the various 'myths' he discusses have long been recognized. The German Army of 1940 was one the most impressive fighting machines of history, and it remains a fascinating campaign. What the Allies faced in 1944 was in many ways a shell of that earlier splendid instrument after 3 harrowing years in Russia. I read 'To Lose a Battle: France 1940' by Alistair Horne many years ago and it will always be a classic, at least in my own memory. But Clark delivers a solid retelling of one the most consequential military campaigns in history and I guess it shows there is always a market for retakes on the past. It is an engaging narrative with good (not superb) maps, some nice photos and lots of interesting quotes from various participants plus a full order of battle. Nothing remarkable but a solid outing and for someone with little knowledge of the conflict it would be an excellent introduction. 3.5 stars rounded up.
July 19, 2025
Lloyd Clark applied an expert understanding of military history to thoroughly document the Fall of France and the Low Countries in 1940. The book analyzes the political instability and strategic shortcomings that left France unprepared and unable to adapt when the invasion began. In contrast, the Wehrmacht took advantage of these factors and utilized their resources effectively, creating a clear advantage despite being outnumbered. Germany’s ability to avoid a war of attrition (which France was prepared for) was monumental to their success.
The Blitzkrieg strategy itself wasn’t the sole contributing factor to Fall Gelb’s success, and Clark paints a fuller picture of what actually went in to the high-risk plan. In some instances, Germany’s success was due to little more than French incompetence and luck.
I appreciate the regular inclusion of diary entries and first-hand accounts from politicians, generals, soldiers, and civilians throughout the book. The various personalities of the war’s characters are made clearer this way.
The Blitzkrieg strategy itself wasn’t the sole contributing factor to Fall Gelb’s success, and Clark paints a fuller picture of what actually went in to the high-risk plan. In some instances, Germany’s success was due to little more than French incompetence and luck.
I appreciate the regular inclusion of diary entries and first-hand accounts from politicians, generals, soldiers, and civilians throughout the book. The various personalities of the war’s characters are made clearer this way.
September 24, 2017
I really enjoyed this book. Clark considers the effect of political systems, industry, national military traditions, tactical doctrines, weapon design, economies, how the two sides perceived the lessons that they learned from World War I, etc., in his analysis of the German victory over France in 1940. The two nations had some very stark differences in these fields that contributed to the outcome. For example, the French communicated through landline telephones, which limited their mobility. The Germans, on the other hand, utilized the new technology of the radio, which allowed them to communicate on the move much more effectively. Clark concludes that the Blitzkrieg doctrine was created after the fall of France, not before. During the campaign the Germans relied on combined arms and mobility, which were always central features in their military tradition, but there was still a fundamental tension between the more conservative military commanders and the more radical armor commanders like Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel. In the end Guderian and Rommel pushed the envelope, so to speak, by exceeding their objectives and orders and dragging the rest of the army after them. The Blitzkrieg as an idea was formulated after the fall of France largely to intimidate enemies. By enshrining this as military doctrine, however, Clark argues it sowed the seeds of future German failures because it dismissed numerous factors, such as geography, and led the Germans to think that every nation would fall as quickly as France. Russia, of course, did not, and Germany was poorly prepared for a prolonged conflict that they ultimately lost.
May 3, 2017
Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality and Hitler's Lightning War is a compelling account of the Battle of France during the Second World War.
Popular accounts often make much of a German doctrine of Blitzkreig or Lightning War that the Nazi regime masterfully deployed against the Western powers during the opening stages of WW2. Clark compelling argues that no such doctrine existed before the Battle of France. In fact the picture is much more complicated, with a few elite Panzer divisions forming a spearhead, whilst being supported by non-mechanised infancty divisions who effectively pinned the Allied forces in the Low Countries. Conflict within the German heirarchy gave the Allies space to withdraw at Dunkirk; the German military command initially planned to repeat the strategies of WW1, but only changed tack after repeated pressure from Hitler; meanwhile, France lacked the political willpower to either lead a defence or respond to changes in technology.
In the final analysis - the German army was just better prepared, with a better esprit de corps, to overcome the opposition it faced. There was no Blitzkrieg. But that shouldn't detract from the remarkable victory won by the Nazi forces.
I'd highly recommend this volume as an account of the Battle of France.
Popular accounts often make much of a German doctrine of Blitzkreig or Lightning War that the Nazi regime masterfully deployed against the Western powers during the opening stages of WW2. Clark compelling argues that no such doctrine existed before the Battle of France. In fact the picture is much more complicated, with a few elite Panzer divisions forming a spearhead, whilst being supported by non-mechanised infancty divisions who effectively pinned the Allied forces in the Low Countries. Conflict within the German heirarchy gave the Allies space to withdraw at Dunkirk; the German military command initially planned to repeat the strategies of WW1, but only changed tack after repeated pressure from Hitler; meanwhile, France lacked the political willpower to either lead a defence or respond to changes in technology.
In the final analysis - the German army was just better prepared, with a better esprit de corps, to overcome the opposition it faced. There was no Blitzkrieg. But that shouldn't detract from the remarkable victory won by the Nazi forces.
I'd highly recommend this volume as an account of the Battle of France.
May 22, 2018
Siempre me había llamado la atención cómo fue posible que, en solo seis semanas, Alemania lograse vencer a Francia, una de las potencias de la época, que contaba además con el apoyo del Imperio Británico. En este sentido el libro ha cumplido perfectamente con su función, explicando tanto el desarrollo de las operaciones como la preparación y espíritu bélico de cada uno de los contendientes.
El primer tercio del libro, en el que habla de la situación previa a la guerra y la preparación y doctrina de los contendientes me ha resultado muy interesante. Sin embargo cuando comienza la ofensiva me he encontrado a menudo perdido en la vorágine de datos y nombres de unidades, oficiales o pueblos. Era esperable, pero a ratos me ha hecho la lectura cuesta arriba.
A pesar de esto el balance es positivo, cumpliendo sobradamente el objetivo que tenía al empezarlo.
El primer tercio del libro, en el que habla de la situación previa a la guerra y la preparación y doctrina de los contendientes me ha resultado muy interesante. Sin embargo cuando comienza la ofensiva me he encontrado a menudo perdido en la vorágine de datos y nombres de unidades, oficiales o pueblos. Era esperable, pero a ratos me ha hecho la lectura cuesta arriba.
A pesar de esto el balance es positivo, cumpliendo sobradamente el objetivo que tenía al empezarlo.
October 22, 2018
I consider myself a student of the Second World War but I really don't know much of the fine detail of the early years of the war, particularly 1940. This book has given me the understanding for me to go off and research further.
I found the conclusion a bit short and I would've enjoyed the authors own opinions as to what might happened if things were different.
I found the conclusion a bit short and I would've enjoyed the authors own opinions as to what might happened if things were different.
June 25, 2023
The fall of France in 1940 is a story regularly told, as the lead up to Dunkirk and subsequent Battle of Britain it is the prelude to events that are significant in British national consciousness the subject therefore needs to be taken from a slightly different angle to ensure a book is worthwhile. Fortunately Lloyd Clark does just enough to make his account different. This is a narrative largely of the campaign at the operational level, though including both strategic and tactical at times. So it does give impressions from those at the top and the bottom, but with a focus on the g
There are two ways in which Clark aims to make his account different. First he concentrates on the French so relegating the British to the auxiliary status they deserve in terms of contributed men and material. This is refreshing as it means the narrative focuses on the two main protagonists, their actions and reactions. This is particularly the case once we get to, and after Dunkirk which is usually a bit of an afterthought in an Anglo-centric account but Lloyd shows that the Germans had some hard fighting still to come as their armies turned south to complete the defeat of France.
The second way in which the book claims to be different is in fighting against the myth of Blitzkrieg as some brilliantly planned combined arms warfare taking advantage of the Germans great advantage in mobility and in the air. And while Clark does a good job of showing this was not the case; the Germans were no more mobile than the allies, they simply concentrated their forces better and took risks. But I dont feel this is anything new, almost every book covering the Germans in WWII has a go at this myth making me wonder whether anyone actually believes the myth to make it worth having a go at.
The maps are reasonable, there are nine of them which is a decent number. Though perhaps unsurprisingly they certainly don't cover everywhere in the text. This was particularly perplexing with regards to crossing the Meuse at Sedan where there is a really zoomed in map so it should have been possible, yet several hills are not marked as mentioned in the text making it much harder to follow the course of the battle than it need have been.
All in all this is a good book to get an overview of the fall of France. It is a good corrective to books focusing on the retreat to Dunkirk. But it does feel a bit overblown to be selling this as something that is radical and new mythbusting.
There are two ways in which Clark aims to make his account different. First he concentrates on the French so relegating the British to the auxiliary status they deserve in terms of contributed men and material. This is refreshing as it means the narrative focuses on the two main protagonists, their actions and reactions. This is particularly the case once we get to, and after Dunkirk which is usually a bit of an afterthought in an Anglo-centric account but Lloyd shows that the Germans had some hard fighting still to come as their armies turned south to complete the defeat of France.
The second way in which the book claims to be different is in fighting against the myth of Blitzkrieg as some brilliantly planned combined arms warfare taking advantage of the Germans great advantage in mobility and in the air. And while Clark does a good job of showing this was not the case; the Germans were no more mobile than the allies, they simply concentrated their forces better and took risks. But I dont feel this is anything new, almost every book covering the Germans in WWII has a go at this myth making me wonder whether anyone actually believes the myth to make it worth having a go at.
The maps are reasonable, there are nine of them which is a decent number. Though perhaps unsurprisingly they certainly don't cover everywhere in the text. This was particularly perplexing with regards to crossing the Meuse at Sedan where there is a really zoomed in map so it should have been possible, yet several hills are not marked as mentioned in the text making it much harder to follow the course of the battle than it need have been.
All in all this is a good book to get an overview of the fall of France. It is a good corrective to books focusing on the retreat to Dunkirk. But it does feel a bit overblown to be selling this as something that is radical and new mythbusting.
Read
July 7, 2022I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It got a bit big brain at times (I got lost in the battles and wasn't familiar with the names of weapons and machinery) but the explanations and personal accounts from soldiers made up for it and then some. The more you know about the history of WWII before reading this book, the more you will glean :)
Some of the personal accounts I found most poignant include:
There are several quotes that I feel appropriately captured the fighting spirit of both France and Germany:
- "[France] was in discussions about its own funeral" (370)
- "German strategy was riskier than French strategy. Yet, it sought swift victory, while French strategy initially sought only to avoid defeat" (384)
- "... [to Germany], chaos was something to be created and embraced because it was so potent with possibilities, while to the French chaos was to be avoided at all costs" (388)
Miscellaneous
Some other words that caught my attention were "illogicality" (287), Franglais (305), and "unconquerable fidelity" (315).
Lastly, the term "high ground" appeared over and over again when discussing maneuvers which made me think of Revenge of the Sith oops....
Some of the personal accounts I found most poignant include:
There are several quotes that I feel appropriately captured the fighting spirit of both France and Germany:
- "[France] was in discussions about its own funeral" (370)
- "German strategy was riskier than French strategy. Yet, it sought swift victory, while French strategy initially sought only to avoid defeat" (384)
- "... [to Germany], chaos was something to be created and embraced because it was so potent with possibilities, while to the French chaos was to be avoided at all costs" (388)
Miscellaneous
Some other words that caught my attention were "illogicality" (287), Franglais (305), and "unconquerable fidelity" (315).
Lastly, the term "high ground" appeared over and over again when discussing maneuvers which made me think of Revenge of the Sith oops....
September 20, 2025
This is a maps and arrows campaign history, pretty much top down with just a few street level vignettes to give it some semblance of life: easily my least favorite of the three Lloyd Clark's I've read, and a bit difficult, at that. I stuck with it, though, because it did not lock on to Dunkirk and nothing but Dunkirk. It really is a history of the entire campaign -- origins included -- and as such does a good job of covering the French attempts at response and counterattack, which many other books on this topic simply don't mention. I think if anyone is ignored it is the Dutch and Belgians. Belgium remained in the fight for some weeks and their contributions are only tangentially addressed. The Italians get the mention they deserve -- very little. Lancastria is mentioned, but only in passing. The events that led to her loss and loss of life are not detailed.
I think too much attention is given over to the victors and their nasty little inter army spats amongst each other. The French are not discussed in nearly such painstaking detail, perhaps because they were on the short end of the stick. And with that, the three French commanders -- Renault, Weygand and Petain, don't get enough screen time. More could have been done here. However, the issue of the Maginot Line and how it was subverted is a major theme of the study and its eventual reduction and capture come in to play in a late chapter, showcasing their strength and robust construction, silently justifying both their construction and the German plan to take these fortifications out of the equation for all but mopping up.
For devoted students/junkies of WW2 only.
I think too much attention is given over to the victors and their nasty little inter army spats amongst each other. The French are not discussed in nearly such painstaking detail, perhaps because they were on the short end of the stick. And with that, the three French commanders -- Renault, Weygand and Petain, don't get enough screen time. More could have been done here. However, the issue of the Maginot Line and how it was subverted is a major theme of the study and its eventual reduction and capture come in to play in a late chapter, showcasing their strength and robust construction, silently justifying both their construction and the German plan to take these fortifications out of the equation for all but mopping up.
For devoted students/junkies of WW2 only.
February 25, 2025
"I could have sworn they'd never break through the Maginot line"~MAINWAIRING
"They didn't, [they went round the side]" ~WILSON
"[They what?!?] That's a shabby nazi trick!" ~MAINWAIRING
Although its myth portion was placed on the back burner, Lloyd Clark delivers a highly detailed, in depth reliving of the infamous Blitzkrieg, including the invasion of the Low Countries, day by day. Clark's covering of preparations prior to the invasion taught me new perspectives of the damned Maginot Line and the feud of higher inner German circles; it grants a more nuanced view of the prejudiced incompetence of the French army versus the almighty German war machine.
Given the most important fraction of the invasion of France was performed in the time span it took me reading this book, i can only say to be impressed by the lighting war's history.
The only aspects I find lacking in the end is the situation in the German Reich during and near the end of the invasion; no mention of political, economic and social status, which were given for the French. All in all, a great recommendation for 20th century military history enthousiast.
"They didn't, [they went round the side]" ~WILSON
"[They what?!?] That's a shabby nazi trick!" ~MAINWAIRING
Although its myth portion was placed on the back burner, Lloyd Clark delivers a highly detailed, in depth reliving of the infamous Blitzkrieg, including the invasion of the Low Countries, day by day. Clark's covering of preparations prior to the invasion taught me new perspectives of the damned Maginot Line and the feud of higher inner German circles; it grants a more nuanced view of the prejudiced incompetence of the French army versus the almighty German war machine.
Given the most important fraction of the invasion of France was performed in the time span it took me reading this book, i can only say to be impressed by the lighting war's history.
The only aspects I find lacking in the end is the situation in the German Reich during and near the end of the invasion; no mention of political, economic and social status, which were given for the French. All in all, a great recommendation for 20th century military history enthousiast.
May 9, 2023
I read this well-written and well-researched study because I can't find a copy of Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend (2013). Mr. Clark accomplishes what he sets out to do. He examines why this campaign was so shocking at the time and why it is still remembered today mainly as the prime example of a brilliant plan perfectly executed when it was actually neither. Clark shows that it was a good plan that matched up well with the Allies' very conservative approach to defending France (the infamous Dyle Plan) and that its success depended heavily on German adaptability at the tactical level. As other reviewers noted, the myths surrounding Fall Gelb have already been thoroughly busted by other authors, so this is really more of a recap of current views than a revelation. That said, it's well worth reading especially for someone unfamiliar with the campaign who wants to gain a good, balanced understanding of what happened in France from May 10 to June 22, 1940.
July 28, 2022
I listened to this book and found it to be somewhat confusion. I had a hard time keeping the German forces and the Allies straight. I don't know anything about the armed forces, so the numbers of the units just went over my head.
It was interesting to read how the French, the British, and even the Germans felt that France had a superior army and would be difficult to defeat--during the opening months of WWII, that wasn't true--Germany dealt the Allies a stunning defeat by rolling through Holland, Belgium, and part of France.
If you're into WWII military history, this is a good book, but if not, not so much.
It was interesting to read how the French, the British, and even the Germans felt that France had a superior army and would be difficult to defeat--during the opening months of WWII, that wasn't true--Germany dealt the Allies a stunning defeat by rolling through Holland, Belgium, and part of France.
If you're into WWII military history, this is a good book, but if not, not so much.
March 31, 2024
The Battle of France
The book moves along quickly documenting The Battle of France.
I enjoyed the book, but there is a lot of tactical detail at points. I needed additional maps to comprehend all actions. The maps included in the book are good but unless you are totally familiar with the terrain covered, you may need additional maps.
I found the conclusions and assertions by the author reasonable. The explanation of the halt order was convincing to me and I had not read that take previously.
Worth reading.
The book moves along quickly documenting The Battle of France.
I enjoyed the book, but there is a lot of tactical detail at points. I needed additional maps to comprehend all actions. The maps included in the book are good but unless you are totally familiar with the terrain covered, you may need additional maps.
I found the conclusions and assertions by the author reasonable. The explanation of the halt order was convincing to me and I had not read that take previously.
Worth reading.
July 12, 2018
A good book that covers familiar territory for those who have more than a passing interest in the concepts of Blitzkrieg and mobile warfare. Well written without becoming exhaustive on detail.
I did love the little tales interwoven into the narrative - amazing to think that the head of the French Army couldn't communicate with his subordinates for two hours a day while the lady at the local telephone exchange took her lunch break!
I did love the little tales interwoven into the narrative - amazing to think that the head of the French Army couldn't communicate with his subordinates for two hours a day while the lady at the local telephone exchange took her lunch break!
April 21, 2020
A thorough study of the German offensive against France in the spring of 1940, where Germany, which failed to defeat the French during the first world war, defeated the French in 7 weeks. The book is maybe a little too detailed and I wish the maps included in the book where placed in the book nearest the dates instead of being placed all together in the front of the book.
January 12, 2021
OK read on France 1940
Hoped for a better analysis of Blitzkrieg - before, during and after France 1940. Maps at front of book & photos at back are a mistake - they should be coordinated with the text to help reader orient themselves to the history unfolding. For as extensively researched wanted more.
Hoped for a better analysis of Blitzkrieg - before, during and after France 1940. Maps at front of book & photos at back are a mistake - they should be coordinated with the text to help reader orient themselves to the history unfolding. For as extensively researched wanted more.
May 18, 2021
First published in 2016, 'Blitzkrieg' gives an account of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in May-June 1940. This is a fairly conventional, detailed and well-written account of the events of that military campaign, with the minor let-down that the captioning of the accompanying 40 photos is hopeless.
July 30, 2018
So much of American military tactics is now based on what Nazi Germany succeeded in accomplishing in France in 1940. However, in reading this book, the allusion that was an "easy" German victory is shattered - the fortunes of war seemingly played a larger role than could have first been imagined.
August 10, 2019
Fairly good book about the starting months of the second World War. The author mixes between discussion of high level strategy and minute troop movements, which can sometimes be difficult to follow. Nonetheless, the book had good analysis of how Germany was able to suddenly defeat France.
July 15, 2020
Well planned and executed
The German army was prepared, well led and moved fast. The speed of attack and the well executed follow thru was and is. very impressive. Defense by committee does not work.
The German army was prepared, well led and moved fast. The speed of attack and the well executed follow thru was and is. very impressive. Defense by committee does not work.
April 22, 2021
I’ve had this book for a long time; I think I won it on Goodreads. It gave a different perspective of Germany’s attack that led to the fall of France. I was glad to know more about that, but the book was too detailed (technical, I guess) for me.
November 23, 2017
The best book I've read yet about why France fell so quickly in 1940 despite having Europe's largest standing army and 20 years to prepare
June 28, 2018
Best account of the 1940 campaign I've read.
May 28, 2019
This book was a good read. The comparison and contrast of the two opponents was examined in detail. If he had placed the maps in the chapter that they were relevant to would have been more helpful.
August 22, 2020
Returned by Kindle. Great reference. Enjoy!
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