Too Important for the Generals: Losing & Winning the First World War

by Allan Mallinson

One of the great questions in the ongoing discussions and debate about World War I is why winning took so long and exacted so appalling a human cost. In this major new history, Allan Mallinson provides answers that are disturbing as well as controversial, and have a contemporary resonance. He disputes the growing consensus among historians that British generals were not to blame for the losses—that, given the magnitude of their task, they did as well anyone could have. He takes issue with the popular view that the "amateur" opinions on strategy of politicians such as Lloyd George and, especially, Winston Churchill, prolonged the war and increased the death toll. On the contrary, he argues, even before the war began Churchill had a far more realistic, intelligent, and humane grasp of strategy than any of the admirals or generals, while very few senior officers were up to the intellectual challenge of waging war on this scale. Mallinson argues that from day one of the war Britain was wrong-footed by absurdly faulty French military doctrine and paid, as a result, an unnecessarily high price in casualties. He shows that Lloyd George understood only too well the catastrophically dysfunctional condition of military policy-making and struggled against the weight of military opposition to fix it. And he asserts that both the British and the French failed to appreciate what the Americans’ contribution to victory could be and, after the war, to acknowledge fully what it had actually been.

Genres: History, World War I, War, Military Fiction, Nonfiction

480 pages, Paperback

First published June 2, 2016

About the author

Brigadier Allan Lawrence Mallinson is an English author and was an officer in the British Army.

Mallinson is best known for writing a series of novels chronicling the (fictional) life of Matthew Hervey, an officer serving in the (fictional) British 6th Light Dragoons from the late Napoleonic Wars through subsequent colonial conflicts in India, North America and south Africa.

Reviews

[Carlos · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is chronological book about the mistakes of Britain in the First World War. The first one was to be dragged immediately to the war in France with scarce preparation. Since the British regular army was tiny, it was completely exterminated in the first months of the war, which meant that the UK did not have technical staff to train the volunteers that would come next. These green troops had to learn-by-doing, which meant huge number of casualties in 1916 and 1917. The technology had also evolved in such a way that it became very painful to maintain an offensive strategy: one defender with an automatic machine gun could inflict terrible pain to an advancing army. The author takes a strong stance against the theory that this terrible loss of life was necessary to win the war. He shows that the British, as junior partners, simple followed the mentality of the French in the first two years of war. When they became a partner in equal terms after the French were exhausted and Britain's army was enlarged by volunteers and afterwards draft, it was too late to change strategy - the infamous war of attrition was too ingrained in the mentality of the generals. The authors favors the idea that the offensive strategy in France was a mistake and that the war could be shortened by building offensives in other fronts, mainly in the Balkans to help Russia. The book's main point was that there was a detachment between the political and the military leadership. Since the British government refused to think about the grand strategy of the war, the generals and marshall were able to impose their own, which meant throwing more and more lives in the fields of Flanders. What I actually found fascinating was to see how in 1918 the British Army finally learnt the tactics to fight a static war - improving over the idiotic frontal attack. I could already recognize the embryo of the tactics of the Second War,such as breakthroughs provided by tanks and coordination with aerial bombing. Of course, the technology did not allow for much - radio was not part of the military kit yet. All in all, a good book that taught me a lot, and was able to defend its thesis. The writing could be a little bit clearer.

[Jby · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book doesn´t quite live up to it´s title, i.e the book is more about the military blunders than anybody (politicians or other people) having alternative tactics or strategy (at the time).
On the other hand the book is a good (party revisionist) analysis of the first world war.

[Roger Woods · Rating 4 out of 5]

The military historian Allan Mallinson takes a look at the lack of Allied strategy in the First World War which lead to such a huge loss of life. He supports his analysis with a thorough examination of the evidence and it is a devastating indictment of the lack of an overall strategy and political control.

[Grey Wolf · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book does a good chronological job of taking the reader through the Western Front (and attempted diversions at the Dardanelles) from a general staff point of view. It's major focus is on Britain and the BEF, but France is covered in good detail, and the way that the politicians interact with and enact their rivalries with the generals is quite a fascinating read. Major engagements are covered in detail, and we see the Indian divisions on Haig's left flank at Ypres, the tanks at Cambrai, and the cavalry ever massing behind the lines ready for a breakthrough.

[Peter · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very interesting analysis of British generalship in the Kaiser’s War, but lost me a little as although the author’s line is that the generals were less good at strategy and tactics than the politicians, the narrative left me thinking that the generals were, generally, ill-served, and then blamed, by the politicians.

[Mark Adams · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent examination of WWI and why it was so badly botched by leadership on both sides.

[Robin W]

Criticism of the tactics and strategy of the British generals. And German and French for that matter although the French get off a little better. A follow-up to his earlier book 1914 - Fight the Good Fight.
Five star read.