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Under the Crescent Moon with the XI Corps in the Civil War: Volume 1 - From the Defenses of Washington to Chancellorsville, 1862-1863
The XI Corps served in the Army of the Potomac for just twelve months (September 1862-August 1863), during which it played a pivotal role in the critical battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Thereafter, the corps hastened westward to reinforce a Union army in besieged Chattanooga, and marched through brutal December weather without adequate clothing, shoes, or provisions to help rescue a second Northern army under siege in Knoxville, Tennessee. Despite its sacrifices in the Eastern campaigns and successes in Tennessee, the reputation of the XI Corps is one of cowardice and failure. James S. Pula sets the record straight in his two-volume study Under the Crescent Moon: The XI Corps in the American Civil War, 1862-1864.
Under the Crescent Moon (a reference to the crescent badge assigned to the corps) is the first study of this misunderstood organization. The first volume, From the Defenses of Washington to Chancellorsville, opens with the organization of the corps and a lively description of the men in the ranks, the officers who led them, the regiments forming it, and the German immigrants who comprised a sizable portion of the corps. Once this foundation is set, the narrative flows briskly through the winter of 1862-63 on the way to the first major campaign at Chancellorsville. Although the brunt of Stonewall Jackson’s flank attack fell upon the men of the XI Corps, the manner in which they fought and many other details of that misunderstood struggle are fully examined here for the first time, and at a depth no other study has attempted. Pula’s extraordinary research and penetrating analysis offers a fresh interpretation of the Chancellorsville defeat while challenging long-held myths about that fateful field.
The second volume, From Gettysburg to Victory, offers seven chapters on the XI Corps at Gettysburg, followed by a rich exploration of the corps’ participation in the fighting around Chattanooga, the grueling journey into Eastern Tennessee in the dead of winter, and its role in the Knoxville Campaign. Once the corps’ two divisions are broken up in early 1864 to serve elsewhere, Pula follows their experiences through to the war’s successful conclusion.
Under the Crescent Moon draws extensively on primary sources and allows the participants to speak directly to readers. The result is a comprehensive personalized portrait of the men who fought in the “unlucky” XI Corps, from the difficulties it faced to the accomplishments it earned. As the author demonstrates time and again, the men of the XI Corps were good soldiers unworthy of the stigma that has haunted them to this day. This long overdue study will stand as the definitive history of the XI Corps.
Under the Crescent Moon (a reference to the crescent badge assigned to the corps) is the first study of this misunderstood organization. The first volume, From the Defenses of Washington to Chancellorsville, opens with the organization of the corps and a lively description of the men in the ranks, the officers who led them, the regiments forming it, and the German immigrants who comprised a sizable portion of the corps. Once this foundation is set, the narrative flows briskly through the winter of 1862-63 on the way to the first major campaign at Chancellorsville. Although the brunt of Stonewall Jackson’s flank attack fell upon the men of the XI Corps, the manner in which they fought and many other details of that misunderstood struggle are fully examined here for the first time, and at a depth no other study has attempted. Pula’s extraordinary research and penetrating analysis offers a fresh interpretation of the Chancellorsville defeat while challenging long-held myths about that fateful field.
The second volume, From Gettysburg to Victory, offers seven chapters on the XI Corps at Gettysburg, followed by a rich exploration of the corps’ participation in the fighting around Chattanooga, the grueling journey into Eastern Tennessee in the dead of winter, and its role in the Knoxville Campaign. Once the corps’ two divisions are broken up in early 1864 to serve elsewhere, Pula follows their experiences through to the war’s successful conclusion.
Under the Crescent Moon draws extensively on primary sources and allows the participants to speak directly to readers. The result is a comprehensive personalized portrait of the men who fought in the “unlucky” XI Corps, from the difficulties it faced to the accomplishments it earned. As the author demonstrates time and again, the men of the XI Corps were good soldiers unworthy of the stigma that has haunted them to this day. This long overdue study will stand as the definitive history of the XI Corps.
312 pages, Hardcover
Published October 13, 2017
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195 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
February 25, 2018
I won this book in a goodreads drawing.
A great history book that tries to revive the reputation of a largely German regiment of the Civil War. Long reviled for getting routed at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, they've had the coward tag for a long time.
This book attempts to remedy that, claiming the regiment suffered a bad rep because they were perceived as being foreign.
A good book, with a good argument.
A great history book that tries to revive the reputation of a largely German regiment of the Civil War. Long reviled for getting routed at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, they've had the coward tag for a long time.
This book attempts to remedy that, claiming the regiment suffered a bad rep because they were perceived as being foreign.
A good book, with a good argument.
November 6, 2021
James Pula's in-depth examination of the XI Corps of the Union Army of the Potomac is required reading for a clear understanding of the most famous moment of the Chancellorsville battle, Stonewall Jackson's flank attack. Pula demonstrates how these "German" troops were deliberately blamed for the loss of Joe Hooker's grand plan despite the fact that the XI Corps units had a better defensive response than is traditionally recounted.
While not explicitly stated, Pula's analysis of the events reminds the reader of how easily historical fact can be swept away, even in the moment, with the result that 160 years later popular memory will still think of the XI Corps routed from the field in disgrace. To that point, Pula's work is an excellent defense to the common challenge that there is no wider historical value to micro-histories of battlefield maneuvers. Here we see how a detailed examination of the regimental movements, responding bravely and competently in the face of overwhelming adversity, dispels not only the assumption of the XI Corps' ineptitude, but highlights the ease with which cultural bias can alter the true historical record.
While not explicitly stated, Pula's analysis of the events reminds the reader of how easily historical fact can be swept away, even in the moment, with the result that 160 years later popular memory will still think of the XI Corps routed from the field in disgrace. To that point, Pula's work is an excellent defense to the common challenge that there is no wider historical value to micro-histories of battlefield maneuvers. Here we see how a detailed examination of the regimental movements, responding bravely and competently in the face of overwhelming adversity, dispels not only the assumption of the XI Corps' ineptitude, but highlights the ease with which cultural bias can alter the true historical record.
March 13, 2024
This is one of those books that makes you think about your prior knowledge. Pula does very good job at researching and writing this narrative history of the Eleventh Corps. Pula’s description of how the corps met Jackson’s massive attack at Chancellorsville is worth reading. He causes you to begin to question previous historians analysis of that event. It’s well worth reading.
February 10, 2018
Excellent book about the much criticized 11th Corps. Removes the stain of Chancellorsville on the 11th Corps and its German regiments. Well researched using many new primary sources.
September 23, 2021
Great unit history with an emphasis on the Chancellorsville campaign and brief biographies of the corps' officers and men. However, I don't understand why this history was split into two volumes; it doesn't seem to be so long as to make a one volume history too long.
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February 18, 2019About 30 years ago, I was involved in a writing project that I thought might be
enlivened by a plot dealing with a Civil War theme. I found the Union army’s 11th Corps
offered the perfect backdrop. Before I knew it, my research into the original sources of that Army Unit supplanted the original project. At that time, I thought to myself, I’ve gathered all these regimental histories, why don’t I write the History of the 11th Corp. Well, the enormity of the project soon became apparent and knowing I was not up to the task for several reason, I abandoned it. Fortunately, decades later, Dr James Pula did not.
This is an absolutely delightful rendering of the history of the Union army’s 11th corps, an organization made up with a large German segment and of other immigrants from Poland, Italy and the Slavic countries. It was this corps misfortune to be at crucial locations during the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, when their positions were overrun and they were forced to retreat in various stages of disorder. There was an anti-immigrant feeling that existed in the country before the Civil War, but during the war, that prejudice seemed to have metastasized, often coloring events that did not appropriately explain the debacles.
“Under the Crescent Moon” is a two-volume history. The first Volume spans the time from the creation Of the 11th Corp under General Sigel, through the battle of Chancellorsville, ending on the day before the Battle of Gettysburg, after their long March from the Chancellorsville area. The Battle of Chancellorsville takes up a large portion of the book. Army Commander Joseph Hooker had a plan to put a large force of Union soldiers behind Lee’s Army, and in a vice-like squeeze, had planned to have that army between two wings of his own. The initial plan worked well – Hooker had 3 Army Corps cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers in the rear of Lee. However, for some unknown reason, on May 2, Hooker ceased his aggressive stance and kept his troops in a temporary camp. The 11th Corps under General Otis Howard was given the task by Hooker to connect his right flank with Hunting Run creek which emptied into the Rapidan. It was accepted military practice at the time that your flank should rest on a natural structure like a river or mountain that can’t be easily flanked. Howard failed to do this, instead, he left his right flank under Colonel Von Gilsa, a German national, ‘in the air.’ There was very dense vegetation in front of his position called “The Wilderness;” Howard thought that this barrier was sufficient protection. It should be noted that Howard’s 1st Division was commanded by General Devens, who like Howard and Hooker were non-Germans. (I will return to the importance of that fact.)
There were two other relevant incidents that I had either forgotten from my studies 30 years ago, or had never known. Firstly, Hooker had ordered General Averell, a Calvary Commander, to move his unit To Howard’s right flank and cover the distance from Von Gilsa to the river. Averell never showed up and he was subsequently relieved of duty. The Second incident was with the First Corps commanded by General Reynolds, who, as far as I have read was competent, well-respected and well loved by his troops. (He was killed on the first day at Gettysburg.) Reynolds was commanded by Hooker to cross the river and bring his Corps to extend and protect Von Gilsa’s position. For reasons not explained by Pula, this never happened. If either of the events had been successfully completed, the rout of the 11th Corp would never have happened. As to the actual debacle, all day long there were reports that a large Confederate force was moving in a westerly direction near the 11th Corps lines. Although Hooker had warned Howard that he needed to protect his right flank, Hooker also floated the misinformation that the Confederates were actually retreating. They were not. Various regimental commanders of the 11th Corp sent out groups of skirmishers and they all came back with the same report, that there were large movements of troops moving west (towards Von Gilsa’s flank.) The Commanders went to both Division commander Devin’s HQ and Howard’s Corps HQ to report this. The answer was always the same – you’re just scared; the Confederates are retreating.
One other subject needs to be mentioned to explain how the rout occurred. General Howard allowed
the supply wagons, cattle and non-combatants to get right up on the Corps battle line. This was against standard wisdom and for good reason. When the attack finally came, the incremental retreat by the front-line 11th Corps regiments were initially blocked by these impediments, increasing casualties and captures. Once the shooting and cannonading began, the animals became frenzied as did many of the non-combatants and there became an uncontrolled rush to the rear. Meanwhile General Carl Schurz and other commanders attempted to create secondary lines of resistance using the more rearward Regiments. Schurz’s attempts were severely hampered because of the hordes of animals and non-combatants rushing into his newly formed lines. Several of these temporary lines were created by the remnants of the 11th Corps regiments. At one point, artillery Captain Hubert Dilger put his battery across the Orange Plank road and temporarily slowed the advance of Stonewall Jackson’s advance so the remaining infantry could retreat into a more formal line, created by the unengaged General Barlow's brigade and Regiments of the 3rd Army Corps. (Dilger received the Medal of Honor for his efforts.)
Here is one important point Pula brings out about the retreat of the 11th Corps – it did NOT end the Battle of Chancellorsville! The retreat occurred on May 2, the battle did not end until the 5th, when Hooker ordered all his troops across the river. On the night of May 2, Hooker had a strong defensive line to stand behind from which he could have launched an attack. But he didn’t. In fact he withdrew the 3rd Corps from a very strategic point in his front leaving it in the hands of the enemy who immediately mounted Batteries on. This is important to keep in mind, as Newspaper accounts of the battle were published.
Once newspaper accounts of the 11th Corp retreat came out, the submerged bigotry towards the
Germans resurfaced. The German soldier became the target of many vile reports. Unfortunately, it didn’t end with the newspapers. Other Army Corps members joined in on attacks of 11th Corps German soldiers, but probably worst of all was the attacks coming from the Non-German soldiers within the 11th Corps itself!
It is this idea that the 11th Corps Germans were somehow cowards or poor soldiers is at the heart of the book's interest – at least for me and I suspect for Pula. Pula does include in the volume a number of interesting charts. One in particular shows that the 11ths Corps soldiers were deemed the best soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. There were less desertions, better results in training, kept an orderly camp and marching skills. That Leaves combat. Yet, there were some high-level commanders who did come to the defense of the Corps saying that any military organization put in such a terrible position, would have acted likewise. Another thing that may have been part of the perception that the 11th Corps was ‘different’ is that a large number of their officers were involved in the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe before immigrating to the US. There was probably a lot of suspicion around that fact and maybe a lack of trust. There were political and economic radicals that immigrated at the same time as these officers. Karl Marx and Carl Schurz were both in England at the same time – and knew each other.
Pula does mention the case of General Francis C. Barlow, nick-named the ‘Boy General.’ Barlow was a Brigade leader in the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville and was promoted to fill the place of General Devins, who was partially responsible for the debacle as 1st Division commander. Barlow’s bravery was never in doubt and he was always in the forefront of military action, being wounded often. In his letters home, Barlow was very critical of the Germans and pronounced his loathing for them. His attitude was on display whenever he met with those troops. At Gettysburg, Barlow the non-German would again cause his troops to be in an untenable position that ended in another rout and more criticism for the Germans. But that is for Volume 2!
Pula’s depiction of the battle of Chancellorsville, serves, for me, as a metaphor for any military or political situation where arrogance combines with intellectual laziness and the inability to process
changing data correctly creates a catastrophe. In more modern US history, we can see this in the Tet Offensive in 1968 during the Vietnam war. The same obliviousness among certain US commanders lead to the denial of intelligence reports that a large-scale attack was imminent. Unlike Chancellorsville, this did not lead to a military defeat, but, much worse, it lead to a political defeat that put the war's continuance in severe jeopardy.
I really enjoyed reading Volume 1 of Pula’s 11th Corps history. I can’t wait to read Volume 2. Pula has been writing on 11th Corps subjects for over 30 years. His volume is chock full of photographs of 11th Corps soldiers and officers. This was especially appealing for me who had read a lot of the source accounts but rarely saw any of the photographs of the authors. I recommend this book to anyone With an interest in the Army of the Potomac and their battles. Or to those who are interested in how ideas of our national diversity were handled during the mid-Nineteenth century.
enlivened by a plot dealing with a Civil War theme. I found the Union army’s 11th Corps
offered the perfect backdrop. Before I knew it, my research into the original sources of that Army Unit supplanted the original project. At that time, I thought to myself, I’ve gathered all these regimental histories, why don’t I write the History of the 11th Corp. Well, the enormity of the project soon became apparent and knowing I was not up to the task for several reason, I abandoned it. Fortunately, decades later, Dr James Pula did not.
This is an absolutely delightful rendering of the history of the Union army’s 11th corps, an organization made up with a large German segment and of other immigrants from Poland, Italy and the Slavic countries. It was this corps misfortune to be at crucial locations during the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, when their positions were overrun and they were forced to retreat in various stages of disorder. There was an anti-immigrant feeling that existed in the country before the Civil War, but during the war, that prejudice seemed to have metastasized, often coloring events that did not appropriately explain the debacles.
“Under the Crescent Moon” is a two-volume history. The first Volume spans the time from the creation Of the 11th Corp under General Sigel, through the battle of Chancellorsville, ending on the day before the Battle of Gettysburg, after their long March from the Chancellorsville area. The Battle of Chancellorsville takes up a large portion of the book. Army Commander Joseph Hooker had a plan to put a large force of Union soldiers behind Lee’s Army, and in a vice-like squeeze, had planned to have that army between two wings of his own. The initial plan worked well – Hooker had 3 Army Corps cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers in the rear of Lee. However, for some unknown reason, on May 2, Hooker ceased his aggressive stance and kept his troops in a temporary camp. The 11th Corps under General Otis Howard was given the task by Hooker to connect his right flank with Hunting Run creek which emptied into the Rapidan. It was accepted military practice at the time that your flank should rest on a natural structure like a river or mountain that can’t be easily flanked. Howard failed to do this, instead, he left his right flank under Colonel Von Gilsa, a German national, ‘in the air.’ There was very dense vegetation in front of his position called “The Wilderness;” Howard thought that this barrier was sufficient protection. It should be noted that Howard’s 1st Division was commanded by General Devens, who like Howard and Hooker were non-Germans. (I will return to the importance of that fact.)
There were two other relevant incidents that I had either forgotten from my studies 30 years ago, or had never known. Firstly, Hooker had ordered General Averell, a Calvary Commander, to move his unit To Howard’s right flank and cover the distance from Von Gilsa to the river. Averell never showed up and he was subsequently relieved of duty. The Second incident was with the First Corps commanded by General Reynolds, who, as far as I have read was competent, well-respected and well loved by his troops. (He was killed on the first day at Gettysburg.) Reynolds was commanded by Hooker to cross the river and bring his Corps to extend and protect Von Gilsa’s position. For reasons not explained by Pula, this never happened. If either of the events had been successfully completed, the rout of the 11th Corp would never have happened. As to the actual debacle, all day long there were reports that a large Confederate force was moving in a westerly direction near the 11th Corps lines. Although Hooker had warned Howard that he needed to protect his right flank, Hooker also floated the misinformation that the Confederates were actually retreating. They were not. Various regimental commanders of the 11th Corp sent out groups of skirmishers and they all came back with the same report, that there were large movements of troops moving west (towards Von Gilsa’s flank.) The Commanders went to both Division commander Devin’s HQ and Howard’s Corps HQ to report this. The answer was always the same – you’re just scared; the Confederates are retreating.
One other subject needs to be mentioned to explain how the rout occurred. General Howard allowed
the supply wagons, cattle and non-combatants to get right up on the Corps battle line. This was against standard wisdom and for good reason. When the attack finally came, the incremental retreat by the front-line 11th Corps regiments were initially blocked by these impediments, increasing casualties and captures. Once the shooting and cannonading began, the animals became frenzied as did many of the non-combatants and there became an uncontrolled rush to the rear. Meanwhile General Carl Schurz and other commanders attempted to create secondary lines of resistance using the more rearward Regiments. Schurz’s attempts were severely hampered because of the hordes of animals and non-combatants rushing into his newly formed lines. Several of these temporary lines were created by the remnants of the 11th Corps regiments. At one point, artillery Captain Hubert Dilger put his battery across the Orange Plank road and temporarily slowed the advance of Stonewall Jackson’s advance so the remaining infantry could retreat into a more formal line, created by the unengaged General Barlow's brigade and Regiments of the 3rd Army Corps. (Dilger received the Medal of Honor for his efforts.)
Here is one important point Pula brings out about the retreat of the 11th Corps – it did NOT end the Battle of Chancellorsville! The retreat occurred on May 2, the battle did not end until the 5th, when Hooker ordered all his troops across the river. On the night of May 2, Hooker had a strong defensive line to stand behind from which he could have launched an attack. But he didn’t. In fact he withdrew the 3rd Corps from a very strategic point in his front leaving it in the hands of the enemy who immediately mounted Batteries on. This is important to keep in mind, as Newspaper accounts of the battle were published.
Once newspaper accounts of the 11th Corp retreat came out, the submerged bigotry towards the
Germans resurfaced. The German soldier became the target of many vile reports. Unfortunately, it didn’t end with the newspapers. Other Army Corps members joined in on attacks of 11th Corps German soldiers, but probably worst of all was the attacks coming from the Non-German soldiers within the 11th Corps itself!
It is this idea that the 11th Corps Germans were somehow cowards or poor soldiers is at the heart of the book's interest – at least for me and I suspect for Pula. Pula does include in the volume a number of interesting charts. One in particular shows that the 11ths Corps soldiers were deemed the best soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. There were less desertions, better results in training, kept an orderly camp and marching skills. That Leaves combat. Yet, there were some high-level commanders who did come to the defense of the Corps saying that any military organization put in such a terrible position, would have acted likewise. Another thing that may have been part of the perception that the 11th Corps was ‘different’ is that a large number of their officers were involved in the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe before immigrating to the US. There was probably a lot of suspicion around that fact and maybe a lack of trust. There were political and economic radicals that immigrated at the same time as these officers. Karl Marx and Carl Schurz were both in England at the same time – and knew each other.
Pula does mention the case of General Francis C. Barlow, nick-named the ‘Boy General.’ Barlow was a Brigade leader in the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville and was promoted to fill the place of General Devins, who was partially responsible for the debacle as 1st Division commander. Barlow’s bravery was never in doubt and he was always in the forefront of military action, being wounded often. In his letters home, Barlow was very critical of the Germans and pronounced his loathing for them. His attitude was on display whenever he met with those troops. At Gettysburg, Barlow the non-German would again cause his troops to be in an untenable position that ended in another rout and more criticism for the Germans. But that is for Volume 2!
Pula’s depiction of the battle of Chancellorsville, serves, for me, as a metaphor for any military or political situation where arrogance combines with intellectual laziness and the inability to process
changing data correctly creates a catastrophe. In more modern US history, we can see this in the Tet Offensive in 1968 during the Vietnam war. The same obliviousness among certain US commanders lead to the denial of intelligence reports that a large-scale attack was imminent. Unlike Chancellorsville, this did not lead to a military defeat, but, much worse, it lead to a political defeat that put the war's continuance in severe jeopardy.
I really enjoyed reading Volume 1 of Pula’s 11th Corps history. I can’t wait to read Volume 2. Pula has been writing on 11th Corps subjects for over 30 years. His volume is chock full of photographs of 11th Corps soldiers and officers. This was especially appealing for me who had read a lot of the source accounts but rarely saw any of the photographs of the authors. I recommend this book to anyone With an interest in the Army of the Potomac and their battles. Or to those who are interested in how ideas of our national diversity were handled during the mid-Nineteenth century.
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