Note: I see that here on Goodreads Seymour Hersh's two books about the My Lai Massacre, MY LAI 4 and COVER-UP, are listed as different editions of the same book. This is inaccurate and should be corrected by a librarian.
In MY LAI 4, Hersh accounts for the My Lai massacre itself and then dedicates one chapter respectively to its aftermath, Ridenhour's exposé, and the investigation of the Peers Commission. I found that there is little to argue against in Hersh's book, and just as little to praise in it, because it lacks any substance whatsoever.
I could have criticized the fact that Hersh makes his pro-Communist bias obvious at times, but this issue is not as glaring. As a journalist, Hersh sought to appeal to the American people's sentiments, and in the turbulent 1960s and early 1970s, the Vietnam conflict made public sympathies lean more towards the left than the American government. This is rather sensationalist of Hersh and deprives his narrative of the objectivity of a historical work. However, this is a minor issue compared to the main problem that his book faces: a complete absence of analysis. Hersh somehow managed to write a whole book in the style of a newspaper column. He gives clear answers to the what?, when?, and where? of the situation, but does not even attempt to address the most important of all main questions – the why?
The counterargument to my complaint will be that I am judging Hersh from the perspective of a modern reader, while the importance of his work lies in the fact that he was the one to break the story of My Lai in his cable that was filed through Dispatch News Service and picked up by more than thirty newspapers. This is true – the value of his contribution is not unquestionable. However, I am also taking into account the fact that Hersh travelled 50,000 miles in Vietnam and interviewed almost every member of Charlie Company. This was extensive fieldwork that yielded a wealth of firsthand materiel. It genuinely baffles me how he could base his narrative on such a source and still produce a shallow book. It is not about his not having access to the documents that modern historians use, it is about him not making use of what he had. I wonder if he did not have the analytical ability to piece together a more insightful account. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. caller Hersh one of the most naive journalists that he knew. I think that this naivety might have stemmed precisely from this inability to analyze and see the bigger picture.
For instance, Hersh presents what I can classify as one of the most listless portrayals of Charlie Company that I have ever read. He does describe Medina as an able but cruel commander, Calley was the incapable "swetheart" officer, and the men as a bunch of veteran infantrymen who thought of themselves as an elite unit. Where are the atrocity-producing conditions, though? In January 1968, during the Tet Offensive, the men of Charlie Company were deeply traumatized because they lost over half of their men. Later the same year they mourned the death of a beloved platoon leader. For someone who had interviewed those men and had hurt their stories of suffering, heartbreak, and anger, Hersh remains surprisingly indifferent to their plight. It is true that pitying war criminals too much is not right either, but Hersh seems to have assumed a firmly hostile attitude toward them.
He also does not bother to dive deeper into the relationship between Medina, Calley, and Charlie's men. He mentions that Medina encouraged the soldiers to murder whomever they saw first and inquire whether he or she was actually a Viet Cong later, but he does not discuss the fact that Medina was one of the reasons the unit's discipline degraded because he actively encouraged tensions and conflicts among the men. Furthermore, his dismissive attitude toward Lieutenant Calley, whom he called "sweetheart", was what made the men lose respect in Calley, and as is well known, when the men do not respect their commander, they are prone to do things he had not ordered. Hersh does not make the connection here. Instead, he dwells on whether "sweetheart" was simply a nickname or actually demonstrated what Medina thought of the second lieutenant.
I also did not like Hersh's depiction of the massacre itself. Considering that he had spoken to so many participants, I have no doubt that he could have written a more detailed and engaging account of the atrocities. He does not do a horrible job, but the chapters dedicated to the massacre read like summaries. The modern reader would not be satisfied if he or she has read other accounts of the event.
MY LAI 4 is a mediocre account of the My Lai massacre. Hersh does not analyze the reasons behind the atrocity, although he had enough materiel to at least suggest what sent Charlie Company over the edge and into a killing spree. This book is a more of a monument to Hersh's well-known exposé of My Lai than an academically valuable study.