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384 pages, Paperback
First published May 19, 2013
Author Stephen M. Hood, General John Bell Hood’s second cousin via shared descent from the general’s grandfather, has written a book attempting to redeem his reputation. The book is not a biography, but an examination of criticism the general’s reputation has endured since he died in 1879, criticism which the author tries to disprove.
Summarizing some of the points he makes, we find the following.
General Robert E. Lee did not advise against Hood’s appointment to command of the Army of Tennessee.
The supposition that Hood tried to undermine General Johnston is a bid to replace him as commanding general of the Army of Tennessee is unfair.
Hood, in command of a corps, had valid reasons not to attack the Federals at Cassville during the Atlanta Campaign.
Hood’s moves during the battles for Atlanta receive censure while similar moves by Saint Lee at Gettysburg and Petersburg do not.
The Tennessee campaign didn’t just spring half-baked from Hood’s fevered brain. It had potential.
The failure at Spring Hill to close the trap on Schofield’s force can be attributed to Cheatham’s failure to obey orders.
The attack on Franklin was the best the Army of Tennessee could do given the strategic situation. It could not be flanked.
The death of Cleburne was not as the result of Hood’s blaming him for the fiasco at Spring Hill.
Hood did not accuse his soldiers of cowardice, he did not try to make his army bleed as a means of stiffening discipline, and he was no more fonder of frontal assaults than any other of his contemporaries.
He was not unduly affected by drugs (laudanum)nor by his failed romance with Sally Preston.
The Army of Tennessee wasn’t destroyed at Nashville.
General Hood retained the respect of his men.
Author Hood’s particular bête noires are the Southern Historical Society’s glorifying Virginian heroes at the expense of others, and works by Stanley Horn (The Army of Tennessee), Thomas Connelly (Autumn of Glory) and Wiley Sword (Embrace an Angry Wind). He says, in page xxxvi of his introduction, negative portrayals of Hood are caused by what is essentially misuse of source material (if used at all). He examines these in detail and provides reasoning to believe them false, and he provides positive quotes from other sources.
What he cannot do, and doesn’t try, is deny the fact that Hood commanded the army that lost Atlanta and conducted a failed campaign in Tennessee. It may be fair to remember Pickett’s explanation for the defeat at Gettysburg, “I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.” How inept a commander was will be up to the reader after reading this, and, to be fair, the above-named books.
This is not a book to pick up if the first and only book one has read is, say, Ken Burns’ book accompanying the television series. Some appreciation of the western and Atlanta campaigns is necessary. I am now curious enough to read more of Hood’s campaigns again.