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Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence
The respective policies of the governments of Iran and Pakistan pose serious challenges to US interests in the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. These two regional powers, with a combined population of around 300 million, have been historically intertwined in various cultural, religious, and political ways. Iran was the first country to recognize the emerging independent state of Pakistan in 1947 and the Shah of Iran was the first head of state to visit the new nation. While this relationship shifted following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and tensions do exist between Sunni Pakistan and Shi'i Iran, there has nevertheless been a history of cooperation between the two countries in fields that are of great strategic interest to the US: Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. Yet much of this history of cooperation, conflict, and ongoing interactions remains unexplored. Alex Vatanka here presents the first comprehensive analysis of this long-standing and complex relationship.
320 pages, Paperback
First published September 30, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
November 20, 2017
The relationship between Iran and Pakistan has never been the same since the 1971 India-Pakistan War when Pakistan's attractiveness as an ally decreased and Iran began to tilt towards India. Before that time there was much talk of a federation between the two countries, potentially including Afghanistan or Turkey as well. Despite deep cultural, religious and linguistic affinities between Iran and Pakistan, the two countries have never really established correspondingly important political or economic ties. The heydey of bilateral relations occurred in the 50s and 60s under Reza Pahlavi, who was the first foreign head of state to visit the new nation and did much to promote Persian language and culture there.
But since then, and particularly since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran and Pakistan have clashed over a number of issues - most important among them the status of Afghanistan. Pakistan's ties to the Gulf Arabs and the United States have not helped matters and have helped inculcate a feeling of mutual distrust and uneasiness vis a vis Iran. The ongoing tensions between both nations and their Baloch minorities has also played a role in complicating relations, leading in some cases to low-level hostilities on the border. It seems like the structural issues impeding closer relations are quite deep, with a long-discussed natural gas pipeline the only game changer on the horizon; if it ever happens.
There were a few interesting pieces of history in here, particularly some notes about Ayub Khan, Benazir Bhutto and Maulana Maududi's ties to current and former Iranian officials. Its clear that despite their cultural affinities the two countries have been driven apart by their decades-long Afghan proxy war and the increasingly bellicose political Islamization of the region. There does not appear to be any imminent prospect of a transformation in the relationship, though that could change when the United States leaves the region, particularly if its relationship with Pakistan falls apart in the process.
I thought this was a relatively solid and straightforward book that helped clarify much recent history in the region and particularly helped shed light on the situation in Afghanistan and the Baluch regions. One minor gripe is that the editing was full of typos and other errors, something that might not mean much in the big picture but slightly undermines the polish of the work as a whole.
But since then, and particularly since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran and Pakistan have clashed over a number of issues - most important among them the status of Afghanistan. Pakistan's ties to the Gulf Arabs and the United States have not helped matters and have helped inculcate a feeling of mutual distrust and uneasiness vis a vis Iran. The ongoing tensions between both nations and their Baloch minorities has also played a role in complicating relations, leading in some cases to low-level hostilities on the border. It seems like the structural issues impeding closer relations are quite deep, with a long-discussed natural gas pipeline the only game changer on the horizon; if it ever happens.
There were a few interesting pieces of history in here, particularly some notes about Ayub Khan, Benazir Bhutto and Maulana Maududi's ties to current and former Iranian officials. Its clear that despite their cultural affinities the two countries have been driven apart by their decades-long Afghan proxy war and the increasingly bellicose political Islamization of the region. There does not appear to be any imminent prospect of a transformation in the relationship, though that could change when the United States leaves the region, particularly if its relationship with Pakistan falls apart in the process.
I thought this was a relatively solid and straightforward book that helped clarify much recent history in the region and particularly helped shed light on the situation in Afghanistan and the Baluch regions. One minor gripe is that the editing was full of typos and other errors, something that might not mean much in the big picture but slightly undermines the polish of the work as a whole.
November 1, 2017
The takeaway assessment here is that neither country views relations with the other as their most important immediate regional security or diplomatic concern, so engagement has generally been fitful. Helpful as background to understanding the Iran-Pakistan relationship, but the history primarily focuses on state-to-state relations during the Cold War period (if you ever wanted to read more than the one-paragraph reference CENTO usually gets in Cold War histories, here's your book), so there's not too much on more contemporary ties or interactions outside the official realm.
August 13, 2023
A must-read book for those wanting to understand why things are the way they are in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.
While Pakistan and Iran should be close diplomatic and trading partners, this is not the case, originally due to a failure of Iran, and the West, to back Pakistan in two conflicts with India. Pakistan’s resentment at lack of support saw them seek other, oil-rich allies in the Arab Peninsula, while the Shah became increasingly disillusioned with Pakistan as a partner, especially following a third military loss against Bangladesh and India’s successful nuclear program. The two nations share a similar strategy towards Afghanistan, which is perpetually under the threat of Soviet invasion but this creates a vacuum once that USSR collapses, which Iran and Pakistan fill with their own trained insurgents, many of whom were nominally on the same side fighting against the USSR. This mirrors an increase of sectarianism in Pakistan, which Iran is careful not to challenge too strongly, lest the Pakistanis become irate.
Into this mix one adds Baluch insurgency in both nations (which varies from communism to Sunni Islamism to generic separatism and is seemingly sponsored by everyone from India to the US to Arab states) and US/Saudi attempts to undermine relations through sponsoring Sunni Islamist and blocking an oil pipeline. The outcome? A hell of a delicate situation.
Born into a prominent Bengali feudal family in then East Pakistan [now Bangladesh], Mirza belonged to the Shi'a branch of Islam, which is the majority religion in Iran. In fact, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam, or Great Leader), was himself a member of Pakistan's minority Shi'a population - albeit of a 'heterodox’ kind. If solely based on the sectarian background of key personalities, then the early post-independence period in Pakistan can be termed the "heyday' of the country's minority Shi'a elite. (p. 6)
At first, the Afghans could not come to terms with the creation of the state of Pakistan. In fact, Afghanistan was the sole vote against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations in 1947. Pakistan's creation was an affront to Afghan nationhood because the new state included regions and peoples that successive regimes in Kabul have considered an integral part of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, except for brief periods when it was itself an empire had always been a series of disjointed tribal kingdoms. This was until Russian designs in Central Asia greatly alarmed Queen Victoria and British colonial interests, which then forced the Afghans into a modern stare in order to act as a capable buffer against the expansionist Russians…
For the British, the jewel in the crown of their empire was India, to be defended at all costs. To do this, London went ahead and arranged for a definitive demarcation of the border between Afghanistan and British India. The boundary has since been known as the Durrand Line, named after its British originator, Sir Mortimer Durand.
The Durrand Line subsequently became the 2,600-km-long Afghan-Pakistani border. The disputed boundary cut through historically Pashtun-populated regions, in effect dividing one 'nation' into two parts. This has since remained one of the unfinished chapters left behind by the 'Great Game' between Imperial Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century. In 1947, when it was born out of British India, Pakistan inherited this border dispute with Afghanistan. To this day, with some 13 million Pashtun in Afghanistan and about 30 million in Pakistan, Kabul does not accept this internationally recognized boundary between the two countries. (p. 32-33)
It was about this time that Islamabad began to cultivate Afghan Islamists in order to rattle Mohammad Daoud Khan. Many of Daoud's foes, the future Afghan Mujahedeen commanders, had found sanctuary and support in Bhutto's Pakistan. It was in 1973 that Peshawar fist became the main hub for Afghan opposition and militant forces. (p. 124)
On 7 June 1992, fighters from the Iran-backed Hezb-e Wahdat clashed in Kabul with supporters of Ittehad-e-Islami, a coalition supported by Saudi Arabia. By now, Riyadh was again back in the game of propping up hard-line Sunnis such as Itehad-e-Islami, which was led by the anti-Shia Sayyaf. Sayyaf’s fighters targeted ethnic Hazaras in systematic sectarian killings, while Hezb-e Wahdat retaliated by killing Pashtuns. This was an Iranian versus Pakistani -Saudi proxy war, leaving hundreds dead in that summer of 1992. (p. 207)
Iran was suddenly no longer alone in fearing the consolidation of Sunni fundamentalist control of Afghanistan. Russia, the Central Asian states, China and even India all shared this fear. Pakistan stood out as a benefactor of Sunni radicalism, a tendency thar rapidy consolidated when Islamabad banked on a new emerging Sunni Islamist movement in Afghanistan. (p. 208)
Only three countries recognized the new 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan': Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. (p. 214)
Unbeknownst to the Taliban delegation, Tehran had by then already agreed to help the US military campaign. It had assented to close is border with Afghanistan, return any US troops forced to land in Iranian territory during the invasion of Afghanistan and proactively ask the Northern Alliance to facilitate the US war against the Taliban…
…The role of Pakistan was far less clear-cut. Immediately before the US military began its Afghan campaign, the George W. Bush Administation had given Islamabad an ultimatum. Faced with the wrach of the United States, President Musharraf promptly backed Washington - but Pakistan still needed to deal with the legacy of its seven years of support for the Taliban. By some accounts, what followed was an expedient arrangement. In one instance, Pakistani intelligence agents stranded with Taliban fighters in Afghanistan were quietly permitted by the US military to return home. The Pentagon denied that it had cut a deal with Islamabad, but the fact was that Washington desperately wanted Pakistan on its side and was not about to hold Islamabad's prior backing of the Taliban against it…
…Unlike the Iranians, who were brought on board to actually help shape a political solution, the Pakistanis were mainly a token presence as the conference. ‘They weren't likely to be helpful. We just didn't want them to be unhelpful’, Dobbins later recalled….
…Tehran had hoped collaboration with the United States in removing the Taliban might continue and even expand into other areas. Dobbins heard first-hand from the Iranians that they were willing to work under US command in order to establish a post-Taliban Afghan national army. From Pakistanis vantage point, such an Iranian Aislan nacompromise was tantamount to defeat of its decade-long Afghan scrategy aimed af making Islamabad the principal foreign power broker in Kabul.
The Pakistanis, however, need not have worried for long. Within few short weeks of the Taliban's fall, President Bush had rejected all Iranian overtures and, in his January 2002 State of the Union speech, branded Iran as part of an 'Axis of Evil'.
…By 2004, the George W. Bush Administration made Pakistan into a Non-NATO Major Ally', while Tehran remained part of the Axis of Evil.
Pakistan was suddenly at the forefront of the US global campaign against terrorism. This did not make sense in Tehran. The Iranians had betted the United States in removing a Pakistan-created movement that had hosted al-Qaeda, but now Washington was rewarding Islamabad. (p. 222-225)
While Pakistan and Iran should be close diplomatic and trading partners, this is not the case, originally due to a failure of Iran, and the West, to back Pakistan in two conflicts with India. Pakistan’s resentment at lack of support saw them seek other, oil-rich allies in the Arab Peninsula, while the Shah became increasingly disillusioned with Pakistan as a partner, especially following a third military loss against Bangladesh and India’s successful nuclear program. The two nations share a similar strategy towards Afghanistan, which is perpetually under the threat of Soviet invasion but this creates a vacuum once that USSR collapses, which Iran and Pakistan fill with their own trained insurgents, many of whom were nominally on the same side fighting against the USSR. This mirrors an increase of sectarianism in Pakistan, which Iran is careful not to challenge too strongly, lest the Pakistanis become irate.
Into this mix one adds Baluch insurgency in both nations (which varies from communism to Sunni Islamism to generic separatism and is seemingly sponsored by everyone from India to the US to Arab states) and US/Saudi attempts to undermine relations through sponsoring Sunni Islamist and blocking an oil pipeline. The outcome? A hell of a delicate situation.
Born into a prominent Bengali feudal family in then East Pakistan [now Bangladesh], Mirza belonged to the Shi'a branch of Islam, which is the majority religion in Iran. In fact, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam, or Great Leader), was himself a member of Pakistan's minority Shi'a population - albeit of a 'heterodox’ kind. If solely based on the sectarian background of key personalities, then the early post-independence period in Pakistan can be termed the "heyday' of the country's minority Shi'a elite. (p. 6)
At first, the Afghans could not come to terms with the creation of the state of Pakistan. In fact, Afghanistan was the sole vote against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations in 1947. Pakistan's creation was an affront to Afghan nationhood because the new state included regions and peoples that successive regimes in Kabul have considered an integral part of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, except for brief periods when it was itself an empire had always been a series of disjointed tribal kingdoms. This was until Russian designs in Central Asia greatly alarmed Queen Victoria and British colonial interests, which then forced the Afghans into a modern stare in order to act as a capable buffer against the expansionist Russians…
For the British, the jewel in the crown of their empire was India, to be defended at all costs. To do this, London went ahead and arranged for a definitive demarcation of the border between Afghanistan and British India. The boundary has since been known as the Durrand Line, named after its British originator, Sir Mortimer Durand.
The Durrand Line subsequently became the 2,600-km-long Afghan-Pakistani border. The disputed boundary cut through historically Pashtun-populated regions, in effect dividing one 'nation' into two parts. This has since remained one of the unfinished chapters left behind by the 'Great Game' between Imperial Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century. In 1947, when it was born out of British India, Pakistan inherited this border dispute with Afghanistan. To this day, with some 13 million Pashtun in Afghanistan and about 30 million in Pakistan, Kabul does not accept this internationally recognized boundary between the two countries. (p. 32-33)
It was about this time that Islamabad began to cultivate Afghan Islamists in order to rattle Mohammad Daoud Khan. Many of Daoud's foes, the future Afghan Mujahedeen commanders, had found sanctuary and support in Bhutto's Pakistan. It was in 1973 that Peshawar fist became the main hub for Afghan opposition and militant forces. (p. 124)
On 7 June 1992, fighters from the Iran-backed Hezb-e Wahdat clashed in Kabul with supporters of Ittehad-e-Islami, a coalition supported by Saudi Arabia. By now, Riyadh was again back in the game of propping up hard-line Sunnis such as Itehad-e-Islami, which was led by the anti-Shia Sayyaf. Sayyaf’s fighters targeted ethnic Hazaras in systematic sectarian killings, while Hezb-e Wahdat retaliated by killing Pashtuns. This was an Iranian versus Pakistani -Saudi proxy war, leaving hundreds dead in that summer of 1992. (p. 207)
Iran was suddenly no longer alone in fearing the consolidation of Sunni fundamentalist control of Afghanistan. Russia, the Central Asian states, China and even India all shared this fear. Pakistan stood out as a benefactor of Sunni radicalism, a tendency thar rapidy consolidated when Islamabad banked on a new emerging Sunni Islamist movement in Afghanistan. (p. 208)
Only three countries recognized the new 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan': Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. (p. 214)
Unbeknownst to the Taliban delegation, Tehran had by then already agreed to help the US military campaign. It had assented to close is border with Afghanistan, return any US troops forced to land in Iranian territory during the invasion of Afghanistan and proactively ask the Northern Alliance to facilitate the US war against the Taliban…
…The role of Pakistan was far less clear-cut. Immediately before the US military began its Afghan campaign, the George W. Bush Administation had given Islamabad an ultimatum. Faced with the wrach of the United States, President Musharraf promptly backed Washington - but Pakistan still needed to deal with the legacy of its seven years of support for the Taliban. By some accounts, what followed was an expedient arrangement. In one instance, Pakistani intelligence agents stranded with Taliban fighters in Afghanistan were quietly permitted by the US military to return home. The Pentagon denied that it had cut a deal with Islamabad, but the fact was that Washington desperately wanted Pakistan on its side and was not about to hold Islamabad's prior backing of the Taliban against it…
…Unlike the Iranians, who were brought on board to actually help shape a political solution, the Pakistanis were mainly a token presence as the conference. ‘They weren't likely to be helpful. We just didn't want them to be unhelpful’, Dobbins later recalled….
…Tehran had hoped collaboration with the United States in removing the Taliban might continue and even expand into other areas. Dobbins heard first-hand from the Iranians that they were willing to work under US command in order to establish a post-Taliban Afghan national army. From Pakistanis vantage point, such an Iranian Aislan nacompromise was tantamount to defeat of its decade-long Afghan scrategy aimed af making Islamabad the principal foreign power broker in Kabul.
The Pakistanis, however, need not have worried for long. Within few short weeks of the Taliban's fall, President Bush had rejected all Iranian overtures and, in his January 2002 State of the Union speech, branded Iran as part of an 'Axis of Evil'.
…By 2004, the George W. Bush Administration made Pakistan into a Non-NATO Major Ally', while Tehran remained part of the Axis of Evil.
Pakistan was suddenly at the forefront of the US global campaign against terrorism. This did not make sense in Tehran. The Iranians had betted the United States in removing a Pakistan-created movement that had hosted al-Qaeda, but now Washington was rewarding Islamabad. (p. 222-225)
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 14, 2019
Shah always remained a fatherly figure for Pakistan. He also helped Pakistan overcome its financial as well as existantial crises believing Pak as Iran's strategic depth. Then came mullahs in 1979 with their rigid religeous sectarian agenda. Irani mullahs initiated brutal sectarian voilence which we have & are facing as a curse on our economy & development.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews