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The Age of Sacred Terror
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon began working on this book shortly after leaving the National Security Council, where, as director and senior director for counterterrorism, they watched the rise of al-Qaeda and helped coordinate America’s fight against Usama bin Laden and his organization. They warned in articles and interviews about the appearance of a new breed of terrorists who were determined to kill on the grand scale. More than a year before September 11, 2001, they began writing The Age of Sacred Terror to sound the alarm for a nation that had not recognized the gravest threat of our time.
One of their book’s original goals has remained: to provide the insights to understand an enemy unlike any seen in living memory—one with an extraordinary ability to detect weakness and exploit it, one with a determination to inflict catastrophic damage, one that will not be deterred. But after September 11, a second, equally crucial goal was added: to understand how America let its defenses down, how warnings went unheeded, and how key parts of the government failed at vital tasks. The Age of Sacred Terror also describes the road ahead, where the terrorists will look to draw strength, and what the United States must do, at home and abroad, to stop them. For a year after the attacks that redefined terrorism and devastated the public’s sense of security, America has been searching for answers about those responsible for one of the darkest days in our history and explanations for the glaring gaps in our defenses. The Age of Sacred Terror provides both, with unique authority. It is the book that Americans must read to understand the foremost challenge we face.
From the Hardcover edition.
One of their book’s original goals has remained: to provide the insights to understand an enemy unlike any seen in living memory—one with an extraordinary ability to detect weakness and exploit it, one with a determination to inflict catastrophic damage, one that will not be deterred. But after September 11, a second, equally crucial goal was added: to understand how America let its defenses down, how warnings went unheeded, and how key parts of the government failed at vital tasks. The Age of Sacred Terror also describes the road ahead, where the terrorists will look to draw strength, and what the United States must do, at home and abroad, to stop them. For a year after the attacks that redefined terrorism and devastated the public’s sense of security, America has been searching for answers about those responsible for one of the darkest days in our history and explanations for the glaring gaps in our defenses. The Age of Sacred Terror provides both, with unique authority. It is the book that Americans must read to understand the foremost challenge we face.
From the Hardcover edition.
490 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2002
23 people are currently reading
459 people want to read
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September 15, 2012
Interesting and easy to read. Many books I've read cite this, and the authors worked for Richard Clarke, whose memoir Against All Enemies I've read.
The first half is a crisp, brisk read jammed with vital detail on the history behind radical Islamism. That history, from the Crusades to the Balfour declaration, is ever present before the minds' eye of the terrorists, so it behooves us to know it. These are guys who know how to put together an executive summary. Without a word wasted on horrified emotion, partisan sentiment, or political correctness, they give us the names, the dates, the theologies, the actions that led to the current confrontation. You are unlikely to find a precis of Al-Qaeda's motivations and makeup anywhere as complete, concise, and pertinent.
In particular, Benjamin and Simon give the definitive answer to "why they hate us." Many social, economic, and political factors go into the level of tacit support for Al Qaeda on "the street." But the operatives themselves are motivated entirely by religion, and nothing short of the death of all Jews and the destruction of the West will satisfy them. In one sense it is true that what they peddle is a perversion of Islam. Even the virulently anti-American head of Iran's clergy, Ali Khamenei, condemned the WTC attacks, because the Quran clearly forbids targeting civilians. But at the same time, Al-Qaeda's theological line has very deep historical roots in Islam, tracing back to Wahabbi in the seventeenth century (a version of Islam which Saudi money has recently made dominant through much of Asia), to ibn Taymiyya in the thirteenth century (who held that jihad in the sense of killing unbelievers was more important than any of the traditional five pillars of Islam). And ibn Taymiyya was a kind of Reformation figure; in his exaltation of jihad, he was rejecting all of the Islamic scholarship of the preceding five centuries, and trying to return to a kind of 'sola scriptura' depending only on the Quran and the hadith, in which with one ill attested exception there was no concept of a "greater" or "inner" jihad. It is difficult for moderate Muslims to mount a theological response to the jihaddists, especially when the "ulemas", the scholarly establishment within each Muslim country, are so closely identified with governments that are repressive, or dismissive of sharia law, or both.
The second part talks about the developing awareness of the problem in the U.S. through the nineties, and all of the obstacles that prevented sufficient mobilization. This is less important for most of us to know than the preceding material, but the authors' position as insiders, especially in the light of partisan blame tactics sometimes used on both sides, more or less obligated them to assess that history.
The two most important obstacles were: (1) a mindset that saw terrorism as a tactical tool used by rogue states or liberation movements, and smugly imagined that Al-Qaeda was just more of the same. At its top levels, the Clinton administration got over this hump by 1995; and the Bush administration, initially convinced that Al-Qaeda was a minor annoyance that Clinton had blown out of proportion, climbed a steep learning curve and changed its mind by the summer of 2001. (2) The difficulty of making the sense of urgency in either administration trickle down through the federal bureaucracy, in the absence of any media appreciation of the seriousness of the threat. The only way to overcome the enormous inertia of Treasury, State, and FBI would have been to share the information that, to avoid compromising intelligence, the cabinet and NSC level people had to keep close to their chests. September 11 did a great deal to put both problems to rest, but the book warns that institutional inertia and counterproductive turf wars, especially at the FBI, still pose significant risk.
A third short section assesses the current (2002, at least) state of play, and considers short and long term strategies for dealing with terrorism when it springs from a "virtual state" like Al-Qaeda. The outlook is both grim (terrorists *will* sometimes succeed, and civil liberties will be compromised) and hopeful (we have a lot of natural allies, Bush has restored the funding he originally cut for dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and Al-Qaeda's attempts to groom operatives who are ethnically western offers a potential handhold for better human intel.)
The authors criticize the CIA for not using its paramilitary Special Activities Division to hunt bin Laden, writing that the White House thought that the CIA had no confidence in them. "Their performance in Afghanistan suggests that this was not the case," they write. Huh? It wasn't SAD that was the issue, it was that the CIA lacked confidence in the Afghan tribal agents they recruited. But, yes, SAD had been somewhat gutted after the Reagan years.
The authors struggle to somehow paint Aum Shinrikyo in Japan as influenced by Christianity. The authors also paint Tim McVeigh as a Christian terrorist, although he himself claimed not to be a Christian.
The first half is a crisp, brisk read jammed with vital detail on the history behind radical Islamism. That history, from the Crusades to the Balfour declaration, is ever present before the minds' eye of the terrorists, so it behooves us to know it. These are guys who know how to put together an executive summary. Without a word wasted on horrified emotion, partisan sentiment, or political correctness, they give us the names, the dates, the theologies, the actions that led to the current confrontation. You are unlikely to find a precis of Al-Qaeda's motivations and makeup anywhere as complete, concise, and pertinent.
In particular, Benjamin and Simon give the definitive answer to "why they hate us." Many social, economic, and political factors go into the level of tacit support for Al Qaeda on "the street." But the operatives themselves are motivated entirely by religion, and nothing short of the death of all Jews and the destruction of the West will satisfy them. In one sense it is true that what they peddle is a perversion of Islam. Even the virulently anti-American head of Iran's clergy, Ali Khamenei, condemned the WTC attacks, because the Quran clearly forbids targeting civilians. But at the same time, Al-Qaeda's theological line has very deep historical roots in Islam, tracing back to Wahabbi in the seventeenth century (a version of Islam which Saudi money has recently made dominant through much of Asia), to ibn Taymiyya in the thirteenth century (who held that jihad in the sense of killing unbelievers was more important than any of the traditional five pillars of Islam). And ibn Taymiyya was a kind of Reformation figure; in his exaltation of jihad, he was rejecting all of the Islamic scholarship of the preceding five centuries, and trying to return to a kind of 'sola scriptura' depending only on the Quran and the hadith, in which with one ill attested exception there was no concept of a "greater" or "inner" jihad. It is difficult for moderate Muslims to mount a theological response to the jihaddists, especially when the "ulemas", the scholarly establishment within each Muslim country, are so closely identified with governments that are repressive, or dismissive of sharia law, or both.
The second part talks about the developing awareness of the problem in the U.S. through the nineties, and all of the obstacles that prevented sufficient mobilization. This is less important for most of us to know than the preceding material, but the authors' position as insiders, especially in the light of partisan blame tactics sometimes used on both sides, more or less obligated them to assess that history.
The two most important obstacles were: (1) a mindset that saw terrorism as a tactical tool used by rogue states or liberation movements, and smugly imagined that Al-Qaeda was just more of the same. At its top levels, the Clinton administration got over this hump by 1995; and the Bush administration, initially convinced that Al-Qaeda was a minor annoyance that Clinton had blown out of proportion, climbed a steep learning curve and changed its mind by the summer of 2001. (2) The difficulty of making the sense of urgency in either administration trickle down through the federal bureaucracy, in the absence of any media appreciation of the seriousness of the threat. The only way to overcome the enormous inertia of Treasury, State, and FBI would have been to share the information that, to avoid compromising intelligence, the cabinet and NSC level people had to keep close to their chests. September 11 did a great deal to put both problems to rest, but the book warns that institutional inertia and counterproductive turf wars, especially at the FBI, still pose significant risk.
A third short section assesses the current (2002, at least) state of play, and considers short and long term strategies for dealing with terrorism when it springs from a "virtual state" like Al-Qaeda. The outlook is both grim (terrorists *will* sometimes succeed, and civil liberties will be compromised) and hopeful (we have a lot of natural allies, Bush has restored the funding he originally cut for dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and Al-Qaeda's attempts to groom operatives who are ethnically western offers a potential handhold for better human intel.)
The authors criticize the CIA for not using its paramilitary Special Activities Division to hunt bin Laden, writing that the White House thought that the CIA had no confidence in them. "Their performance in Afghanistan suggests that this was not the case," they write. Huh? It wasn't SAD that was the issue, it was that the CIA lacked confidence in the Afghan tribal agents they recruited. But, yes, SAD had been somewhat gutted after the Reagan years.
The authors struggle to somehow paint Aum Shinrikyo in Japan as influenced by Christianity. The authors also paint Tim McVeigh as a Christian terrorist, although he himself claimed not to be a Christian.
February 13, 2016
I had previously read portions of this as part of a Homeland Security course many years ago.
This book provides the fascinating backstory for the origins of many of today's terrorist movements. At nearly 18 hours, be prepared for a long 'read.'
This book provides the fascinating backstory for the origins of many of today's terrorist movements. At nearly 18 hours, be prepared for a long 'read.'
October 26, 2008
There is a lot of history in this dense volume, tracing the roots of Islamic terrorism back many centuries. It deals with other types of terrorism as well. Although I found it interesting, I did not feel an uncontrollable urge to return to it all that much, which accounts, in addition to its length, to the fact that it took me a month to read it.
May 20, 2022
Good but too long. Simon and Benjamin (SB) worked at high-ish levels of the Clinton admin on terrorism, and in this book they provide both a historical and policy account of modern terrorism. The book was written mostly before 9/11 and then altered/expanded because of 9/11. This makes it rather sprawling, repetitive, and sometimes unfocused. It really could have been 50-100 pages shorter, and I can only assume that it has scared off some readers with its size. I did find myself saying "ok, you talked about this earlier" many times in this book.
Still, this is one of the clearer explorations of the idea of the "new terrorism" from the 1990s. This was a paradigm shift in terrorism that occurred in the 1990s with the increased blending of fundamentalist religion, apocalypticism, WMD, and mass casualty terrorism (or at least the intention to commit mass casualties). The older paradigm from the 70s and 80s was that terrorists used violence instrumentally; kill ten or twenty or one prominent person to get media attention, leverage, etc. The saying was that terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. However, in the new terrorism, especially in radical Islamist circles, sought out mass casualty attacks (hundreds or thousands dead) for a number of reasons: to fulfill what they saw as divine imperatives to destroy evil-doers, to achieve strategic goals like the ejection of U.S. power from the Middle East, to annihilate a dehumanized, demonic foe, and to fulfill internal fantasies of destructive purification. Aum Shinrikyo, White Power, and Islamist groups like AQ were the harbingers of the new terrorism, and 9/11 was its pinnacle.
SB argue that the US needs a new approach to counterterrorism in the age of new terrorism, but they sketch out a vision of CT quite different from the Bush administration. They are firmly multilateralist, even willing to restrain U.S. power in order to build a wider coalition. They do not see Iraq as closely connected to terrorism, although they see it as a conventional strategic challenge, in contrast to Bush's weak efforts to combine the threats. They see failed states like Sudan or Afghanistan as the real problem or location where terrorism can hide, plot, and expand rather than state sponsors like Iran or Syria, who have more control of their territory and usually don't sponsor mass-casualty, expeditionary terrorism. Overall, this approach to the GWOT probably would have been more restrained and effective than what we got under Bush, especially in Iraq.
A lot of the book is about the roots of Islamic extremism in general and how it transmogrified into various terrorist movements in the late 20th century. SB discuss the impact of Ibn Taymiyya on later thinkers, as well as the importance of ideas like jahiliyya and takfir. I thought these sections were very informative and interesting, although writers like Glenn Robinson cover this ground more effectively and precisely. SB are pretty harsh about the larger context of the Islamic world: they blast the governments and clerical establishments of places like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for churning out radical propaganda and encouraging Islamist extremism as long as it's directed somewhere other than the ruling regime. They also show the considerable embrace of conspiracy theory and extreme beliefs in the Middle East in general, showing that the extremists are not as much of a fringe as we would like to think. They recommend that the US push for democratization as part of the GWOT in order to create more functional, inclusive states, but to me the experience of the Arab Spring should suggest caution here. What parties are waiting in the wings in these nations to take power? Let's just say they are rarely liberal ones, so we should not deceive ourselves about the most likely alternatives to the current regimes.
While this book is too long and a bit repetitive, it's a solid and mostly interesting look at the evolution of terrorism as well as politics and violence in the Islamic world. It's a bit on the hawkish side, but it's clearly well-informed and not at all prejudiced against Muslims. Recommended if you are a terrorism scholar; if you are just looking for interesting reads on terrorism, try Lawrence Wright or Steve Coll, who are still the gold standards for journalism on modern terrorism.
Still, this is one of the clearer explorations of the idea of the "new terrorism" from the 1990s. This was a paradigm shift in terrorism that occurred in the 1990s with the increased blending of fundamentalist religion, apocalypticism, WMD, and mass casualty terrorism (or at least the intention to commit mass casualties). The older paradigm from the 70s and 80s was that terrorists used violence instrumentally; kill ten or twenty or one prominent person to get media attention, leverage, etc. The saying was that terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. However, in the new terrorism, especially in radical Islamist circles, sought out mass casualty attacks (hundreds or thousands dead) for a number of reasons: to fulfill what they saw as divine imperatives to destroy evil-doers, to achieve strategic goals like the ejection of U.S. power from the Middle East, to annihilate a dehumanized, demonic foe, and to fulfill internal fantasies of destructive purification. Aum Shinrikyo, White Power, and Islamist groups like AQ were the harbingers of the new terrorism, and 9/11 was its pinnacle.
SB argue that the US needs a new approach to counterterrorism in the age of new terrorism, but they sketch out a vision of CT quite different from the Bush administration. They are firmly multilateralist, even willing to restrain U.S. power in order to build a wider coalition. They do not see Iraq as closely connected to terrorism, although they see it as a conventional strategic challenge, in contrast to Bush's weak efforts to combine the threats. They see failed states like Sudan or Afghanistan as the real problem or location where terrorism can hide, plot, and expand rather than state sponsors like Iran or Syria, who have more control of their territory and usually don't sponsor mass-casualty, expeditionary terrorism. Overall, this approach to the GWOT probably would have been more restrained and effective than what we got under Bush, especially in Iraq.
A lot of the book is about the roots of Islamic extremism in general and how it transmogrified into various terrorist movements in the late 20th century. SB discuss the impact of Ibn Taymiyya on later thinkers, as well as the importance of ideas like jahiliyya and takfir. I thought these sections were very informative and interesting, although writers like Glenn Robinson cover this ground more effectively and precisely. SB are pretty harsh about the larger context of the Islamic world: they blast the governments and clerical establishments of places like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for churning out radical propaganda and encouraging Islamist extremism as long as it's directed somewhere other than the ruling regime. They also show the considerable embrace of conspiracy theory and extreme beliefs in the Middle East in general, showing that the extremists are not as much of a fringe as we would like to think. They recommend that the US push for democratization as part of the GWOT in order to create more functional, inclusive states, but to me the experience of the Arab Spring should suggest caution here. What parties are waiting in the wings in these nations to take power? Let's just say they are rarely liberal ones, so we should not deceive ourselves about the most likely alternatives to the current regimes.
While this book is too long and a bit repetitive, it's a solid and mostly interesting look at the evolution of terrorism as well as politics and violence in the Islamic world. It's a bit on the hawkish side, but it's clearly well-informed and not at all prejudiced against Muslims. Recommended if you are a terrorism scholar; if you are just looking for interesting reads on terrorism, try Lawrence Wright or Steve Coll, who are still the gold standards for journalism on modern terrorism.
May 10, 2024
The Age of Sacred Terror is the book I wanted to read about the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center just after it happened. When it showed up in the Book-of-the-Month Club sometime in 2002, I immediately added it to my list of books I wanted to read. But I figured I would have to wait until I found it available in the library. Then I found it available on Kindle. Yay!
According to the authors in their preface, the book was conceived, largely written, and almost ready for publication before the attacks happened. It was designed to be an analysis of and partly a warning about the threat of religiously inspired terrorism in the world at that time. Then September 11 happened, and they delayed the imminent publication to include more details on that plot and some more information on Usama bin Laden (this is how they spell his name).
The details of the attack and the period just before and afterward include some things I hadn’t heard before, for which I am grateful. It’s always nice to know what has been going on – even if what has been going on isn’t itself especially nice. As I am irrationally a little scared of reading too many intimate details of such actions too soon after they happen, now is a good time for me to read this book. Although as usual, I now wish I had had the time to read it earlier.
In addition to the information on the 9-11 attacks themselves, the book includes a lot of background on the origins of Islamic violence and the evolution of the concept of jihad going back some 700 or more years. This goes a long way to explain why these people did what they did. It’s also very scary because it shows how deeply these concepts are embedded in their core beliefs.
They spend a lot of time covering the actions the United States and other countries attempted to take to deter terrorist attacks in general in the years leading up to 9-11 and how political maneuvering and public disbelief and apathy contributed to making that more difficult.
Near the end of the book, they discuss some other religiously motivated terrorist organizations, some of them (sort of) Christian or Jewish or even quasi-Buddhist in origin. I found some of these groups even scarier than the Islamic groups, although they are not, or at least were not at the time, as large as the combined menace of the Islamic groups. I think some of these must have increased in size and/or influence since the early years of this century though given what is going on in the world today.
I also find it interesting (and not reassuring) that most of these groups seem to share the same ultimate goal – namely to bring about the end of the world, because they are convinced that this, and only this, will lead to their particular group somehow being victorious and gaining total control over everything.
According to the authors in their preface, the book was conceived, largely written, and almost ready for publication before the attacks happened. It was designed to be an analysis of and partly a warning about the threat of religiously inspired terrorism in the world at that time. Then September 11 happened, and they delayed the imminent publication to include more details on that plot and some more information on Usama bin Laden (this is how they spell his name).
The details of the attack and the period just before and afterward include some things I hadn’t heard before, for which I am grateful. It’s always nice to know what has been going on – even if what has been going on isn’t itself especially nice. As I am irrationally a little scared of reading too many intimate details of such actions too soon after they happen, now is a good time for me to read this book. Although as usual, I now wish I had had the time to read it earlier.
In addition to the information on the 9-11 attacks themselves, the book includes a lot of background on the origins of Islamic violence and the evolution of the concept of jihad going back some 700 or more years. This goes a long way to explain why these people did what they did. It’s also very scary because it shows how deeply these concepts are embedded in their core beliefs.
They spend a lot of time covering the actions the United States and other countries attempted to take to deter terrorist attacks in general in the years leading up to 9-11 and how political maneuvering and public disbelief and apathy contributed to making that more difficult.
Near the end of the book, they discuss some other religiously motivated terrorist organizations, some of them (sort of) Christian or Jewish or even quasi-Buddhist in origin. I found some of these groups even scarier than the Islamic groups, although they are not, or at least were not at the time, as large as the combined menace of the Islamic groups. I think some of these must have increased in size and/or influence since the early years of this century though given what is going on in the world today.
I also find it interesting (and not reassuring) that most of these groups seem to share the same ultimate goal – namely to bring about the end of the world, because they are convinced that this, and only this, will lead to their particular group somehow being victorious and gaining total control over everything.
March 4, 2023
What do the Central Intelligence Agency, Monica Lewinsky, a rabbi, 14 Tomahawk cruise missiles, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and a 13th century Muslim scholar have in common? A connection to the September 11th terrorist attacks, according to the former National Security Council leaders who wrote The Age of Sacred Terror. Neither the global rise in violent Islamist extremism nor the failure to mitigate 9/11 are stories to be told with brevity, thus the long-winded nature of this non-fiction piece. Not for the casual reader, this book is very detail heavy with source annotations and therefore great reference material for anyone conducting academic or professional research. By theologically exploring the connection between religion and terrorism, while incorporating lessons learned from modern day atrocities, The Age of Sacred Terror could be considered color commentary to the 9/11 Commission Report. Politicians and policy go hand in hand, but the authors ride a nonpartisan line even when speaking opinions rather than facts. Given the amount of time which has passed between the writing of this book and our present day, the authors’ summarized outlook on the future of terrorism was grimly accurate inasmuch as it will take a nearly unachievable geopolitical paradigm shift plus decades of work to rid our world of Islamist extremist violence.
Read
December 20, 2020Pg. 5 - "In 1989, most of the world understood jihad to mean...: Afghanistan, the fight against the Soviet Union."
Pg. 79 - "Ideology tells us a great deal about these radicals, but so does sociology."
Pg. 173 - "Strengthening the appeal of radical Islam is the illegitimacy of the governments that oppose it."
Pg. 129 - "The combination of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction is the stuff of countless movies and television shows. The reality is otherwise: very, very few groups have ever seriously tried to acquire such weapons. Almost all of those that have... have sought them primarily for purposes of blackmail."
Pg. 153 - "As is so often true, low-tech means offered the greatest security..."
Pg. 79 - "Ideology tells us a great deal about these radicals, but so does sociology."
Pg. 173 - "Strengthening the appeal of radical Islam is the illegitimacy of the governments that oppose it."
Pg. 129 - "The combination of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction is the stuff of countless movies and television shows. The reality is otherwise: very, very few groups have ever seriously tried to acquire such weapons. Almost all of those that have... have sought them primarily for purposes of blackmail."
Pg. 153 - "As is so often true, low-tech means offered the greatest security..."
August 7, 2019
I gave up about half way through the book. I hate to give up on a book. But this was just too tedious. It's probably a good reference book and will perhaps be read in future when people try and understand WTF is going on right now. But I just couldn't read any more.
August 17, 2012
This book is now dated. So much has happened: the invasion of Iraq, the killing of Bin Laden, etc. I can't give it a stellar review because some aspects are very good and others are amateur. The authors lack an understanding and a sensitivity to religion and an understanding of anthropology, so their roots of Islamic terrorism is superficial, as is their final chapter about other violent religious movements. They don't know the difference between messianism and millenarianism. These criticisms aside, the book has some great meat in it regarding the things the Clinton administration did successfully and unsuccessfully in confronting Bin Laden that I was ignorant of (thanks to the feckless mainstream media which is the subject of one chapter).
May 2, 2009
Age of Sacred Terror analyzes the connections between radical Islam, terrorism and the “war on terror” as conducted by the United States. Benjamin and Simon centrally position jihad in their analysis of the implications of the rise of radical Islam on the United States. Their argument on jihad traces jihads historical path, its manifestations in recent decades, and its implications on foreign relations, specifically relations between the United States and Muslim countries.
September 22, 2016
Very good overview of what factors have created the current error of Islamic terrorism. The authors focus primarily on Islamic terrorism but also branch off into other religions and states to show their influence on each other. The authors also convincingly illustrate how this era has been created not just by the the US and its allies but by the middle eastern nations as well. The blame is spread all around as the reader is guided through the history of Islamic based terror.
June 30, 2007
This is a good book for people interested in international relations. It explains the rise of al-Qaeda and radical Islam and provides interesting background from authors who worked for the National Security Council. It is a little biased at times but provides insight into the forces that shape our world.
April 27, 2010
This is an excellent recounting of the birth of Al Qaeda and Al Quaeda's message and how it relates to Muslims. In this case, the history is much more strange than any fictional account could be. It is well researched and documented.
It really helps to read this book to understand what is going on with Al Quaeda.
I reccomend this book to everyone.
It really helps to read this book to understand what is going on with Al Quaeda.
I reccomend this book to everyone.
Read
August 1, 2008There is and was a lot I do/did not know about Radical Islam. This book has encouraged me to do more reading on the topic and become more culturally aware of the Middle East and its peoples and thier various faiths.
December 11, 2008
Very good (although dated) book on the philosophy of the internaitonal jihadi movement -- does a good though not always convincing job of connecting it with similar movements from other religions in different eras. A similar book, just as good, is The Looming Tower.
September 1, 2012
Great historical, cited, context of why the Jihadist movement is what it is. Shows the roles of mullahs, politicos, and warriors and why this is really about haves and have nots and always will be.....
January 16, 2013
A good overview on the origins of al-Qaeda and Islamic militancy. It tries to address other forms of religious terrorism, but doesn't go very far, and it's already somewhat out of date, since it was published in 2003.
July 29, 2008
The first couple hundred pages took a long time to read since they described the beginnings of Islam, but wasn't too bad.
May 18, 2012
great read,very interesting
September 28, 2015
Very informative
Displaying 1 - 20 of 20 reviews