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From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict
In his new book, Jack Snyder focuses his clear logic on a pressing issue of our nationalism. From Voting to Violence examines the ways in which democratization can exacerbate nationalist fervor and ethnic conflict if the conditions promoting a successful transition are not in place. The book argues that international organizations sometimes cause more conflict than they avert in their rush to establish democratic governments and punish outgoing leaders. Snyder closes by prescribing policies that can make democratic transitions less dangerous and allow fledgling democracies to flourish.
320 pages, Paperback
First published April 28, 2000
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November 28, 2018
According to twentieth-century conventional wisdom, and throughout much of American foreign policy, the spread of democracy has been considered inherently beneficial—what President Bill Clinton called the “best strategy…to build a durable peace.” Snyder, a political scientist at Columbia University, dissects this view "From Voting to Violence," which critically assesses the role played by democratization in fomenting violent nationalism, ethnic conflicts, and war. Through a careful analysis of democratic transition in cases that span regions and periods of modern history, Snyder provides a thought-provoking conceptual framework to better understand the puzzling paradox of why so often, nationalist conflicts take place in early democracies.
Employing perhaps the most compelling way to finish his analysis, Snyder applies his findings to make policy prescriptions, calling for the reader and the statesman to reevaluate conventional wisdom as it applies to democratization in foreign policy. In doing so, the author reemphasizes the significance of his research: to come to terms with the conditions that are likely to transform democratic transitions into catastrophes of violent nationalism. His work falls short in this regard, however, as Snyder provides more lofty goals of creating a “thickly embedded institutional context” than practical solutions for how to assist fledgling democratic states.
Employing perhaps the most compelling way to finish his analysis, Snyder applies his findings to make policy prescriptions, calling for the reader and the statesman to reevaluate conventional wisdom as it applies to democratization in foreign policy. In doing so, the author reemphasizes the significance of his research: to come to terms with the conditions that are likely to transform democratic transitions into catastrophes of violent nationalism. His work falls short in this regard, however, as Snyder provides more lofty goals of creating a “thickly embedded institutional context” than practical solutions for how to assist fledgling democratic states.
April 15, 2022
Having been published in 2000, I am sure that From Voting to Violence is in need of an update that reflects on the events of the past 20 years: the road from the War on Terror to Trump, the rise and consolidation of Orbáns and Kaczynskis, and the spectacular degeneration of post-Soviet Russia. All the same, reading Snyder's book in 2022, I feel as if his main argument has only been vindicated and strengthened by these events. It also becomes increasingly relevant as we question our media sources, and a we debate the merits of radical free speech.
Snyder starts from the assumption that all democracies have a certain nationalist ideology that drives them, organizing these nationalisms into four buckets: civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary. Of these four nationalisms, civic nationalism is the most stable and prudent. The other three are recipes for democratic deterioration and 'non-prudent war' (wars that the nationalistic state is bound to lose or otherwise undermine that state's health). He admits that most of the time these nationalisms mix, but nevertheless it's worth separating them into ideal types to more properly understand what drives their creation.
Furthermore, he holds that developing-world democratization is more likely to cause ethnic, revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary nationalism than civic nationalism. This is because democracy is built on political competition, and competitors have an incentive to segment their political markets with divisive rhetoric that gives them legitimacy while undermining their opponents. (The corollary is that because this rhetoric is exclusionary it increases the likelihood of frivolous conflict.) In other words, ethnic, revolutionary, and/or counterrevolutionary ideologies are political strategies used by competitors to gain control of the state — and, afterward, dismantle the competitive institutions that made their rise possible. According to Snyder, there are specific criteria that determine the direction of nationalism taken.
The criteria that determine the path of a nascent democracy are boiled down to two major axes. First, are the interests of the nation's elite adaptable to democracy? Second, what is the strength of the nation's political institutions? If the elites' interests are adaptable to democracy and the state's institutions are strong, the outcome will be civic nationalism (e.g. Britain). If elite interests are adaptable but institutions are weak, the outcome will be revolutionary nationalism (e.g. revolutionary France). If interests are unadaptable and institutions strong, democracies will breed counterrevolutionary governments (e.g. pre-WW1 Germany). Finally, if interests are unadaptable and the state is weak, the outcome will be ethnic nationalism (e.g. pre-WW1 Serbia).
Snyder looks at a broad swath of evidence to make his case. Specifically, each chapter is a case study. First, he looks at pre-WW1 Germany, then 18th century Britain and revolutionary France, to post-Cold War Yugoslavia, and then the rest of the modern developing world. He organizes this data very intelligently to show why the key variable is democracy. There are, after all, ethnically diverse states that are very stable and pluralistic. And there are very ethnically homogenous states that are nevertheless unstable and built on ethnic nationalism. There are states that had very little history of ethnic violence before democracy. The point is that it's the introduction of democracy that makes the difference.
Snyder's criticism of democracy for democracy's sake is compelling as the empirical validation is strong. The broad mechanism makes sense: competition invites political tactics that aim to capture political audiences through divisive rhetoric. Because ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary rhetoric is built on "us versus them", they are therefore exclusionary and promote violent outcomes. Democracies, therefore, cause ethnic and nationalist violence where there otherwise wouldn't have been.
Where the case weakens is in the details. Snyder has done corollary research that focuses on the media marketplace and how elites use it to magnify their rhetoric and capture power. This book naturally puts a lot of emphasis on the role of markets for information, explaining that because democratization tends to come with an opening and deregulation of information markets that had previously been monopolized by the state, this competitive environment is exploited by divisive politicians seeking to build their constituencies. There is truth to this idea and Anne Applebaum makes a similar point in Twilight of Democracy, pointing out that many great periods of upheaval follow revolutionary changes to how information spreads — think the printing press and the great religious wars of the 17th century, the invention of the radio and the early 20th century, and now the internet. Media markets need constraints that limit their exploitation by divisive leaders.
Surely, though, there are other equally as important institutions that help to define the health of a democracy? One that immediately comes to mind is the rule of law (versus the rule by law, a distinction recently made in Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow the World) and the role of police and courts. Another is the extensive network of organizations that publishes data and research that putatively help us to better reflect on government policies. And yet another is the institution of the military and whether it is an instrument of the civil state or lives above the state.
And the notion that the success of democracy depends on the strength of its institutions certainly begs the question. What determines how those institutions are built? Who determines the rules of the game? And why are certain rules chosen over others? After all, it's the same elites that a healthy democracy requires to be constrained that design those very constraints.
Take, for example, the United States and the United Kingdom, two examples Snyder gives of civic nationalism. As a side note, I’m not so sure the United States is a clear example of civic nationalism, but rather a dialectic between civil and ethnic nationalism (consider our unique black-only slavery, the extermination of Native Americans, the U.S. Civil War, the rise of ethnic-based immigration policies, et cetera). Anyway, my bigger point is that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. was born with their modern-day institutions. They had to be developed. The question is: why did they develop in the direction that they did?
I think to answer that question you need to look beyond the existing institutional set and media markets. Politics is a bargaining process, so what are the incentives that apply to each agent? It seems to me that, historically, ‘civic nationalisms’ are the product of elite decision-making that seek the broader distribution of power. In the U.S., the paths taken by the northern and southern states were very different. The north was much more democratic and power distributed much more broadly, while the south was much more aristocratic. Why? Because the northern elites were already living in a more competitive setting, while southern elites enjoyed greater economies of scale in the resources they controlled. In the same year that this book was published, Sokoloff and Engerman published their paper titled “History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New
World,” which explores exactly this theme.
When we look at the potential for, and direction of, democratization in the modern world, we should look at what the objectives of the elite are. Decision-makers using media markets to communicate divisive rhetoric have reasons for doing so, so what are those reasons?
I suppose that if I were to sum up my criticism it’s that I think Snyder begs the question in his analysis.
Regardless, Snyder’s framework at least seems to capture a large part of the picture and it is undeniably an interesting argument. It leads to the conclusion that democracies cannot grow and survive secularly. There are no inherent forces that protect democracy from deterioration or authoritarianism. Rather, healthy, civic democracy needs to be cultivated, advocated, and actively shaped. Furthermore, democratization is dangerous if it’s introduced without consideration of the wider incentive and power structure facing elite decision-makers.
Snyder starts from the assumption that all democracies have a certain nationalist ideology that drives them, organizing these nationalisms into four buckets: civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary. Of these four nationalisms, civic nationalism is the most stable and prudent. The other three are recipes for democratic deterioration and 'non-prudent war' (wars that the nationalistic state is bound to lose or otherwise undermine that state's health). He admits that most of the time these nationalisms mix, but nevertheless it's worth separating them into ideal types to more properly understand what drives their creation.
Furthermore, he holds that developing-world democratization is more likely to cause ethnic, revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary nationalism than civic nationalism. This is because democracy is built on political competition, and competitors have an incentive to segment their political markets with divisive rhetoric that gives them legitimacy while undermining their opponents. (The corollary is that because this rhetoric is exclusionary it increases the likelihood of frivolous conflict.) In other words, ethnic, revolutionary, and/or counterrevolutionary ideologies are political strategies used by competitors to gain control of the state — and, afterward, dismantle the competitive institutions that made their rise possible. According to Snyder, there are specific criteria that determine the direction of nationalism taken.
The criteria that determine the path of a nascent democracy are boiled down to two major axes. First, are the interests of the nation's elite adaptable to democracy? Second, what is the strength of the nation's political institutions? If the elites' interests are adaptable to democracy and the state's institutions are strong, the outcome will be civic nationalism (e.g. Britain). If elite interests are adaptable but institutions are weak, the outcome will be revolutionary nationalism (e.g. revolutionary France). If interests are unadaptable and institutions strong, democracies will breed counterrevolutionary governments (e.g. pre-WW1 Germany). Finally, if interests are unadaptable and the state is weak, the outcome will be ethnic nationalism (e.g. pre-WW1 Serbia).
Snyder looks at a broad swath of evidence to make his case. Specifically, each chapter is a case study. First, he looks at pre-WW1 Germany, then 18th century Britain and revolutionary France, to post-Cold War Yugoslavia, and then the rest of the modern developing world. He organizes this data very intelligently to show why the key variable is democracy. There are, after all, ethnically diverse states that are very stable and pluralistic. And there are very ethnically homogenous states that are nevertheless unstable and built on ethnic nationalism. There are states that had very little history of ethnic violence before democracy. The point is that it's the introduction of democracy that makes the difference.
Snyder's criticism of democracy for democracy's sake is compelling as the empirical validation is strong. The broad mechanism makes sense: competition invites political tactics that aim to capture political audiences through divisive rhetoric. Because ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary rhetoric is built on "us versus them", they are therefore exclusionary and promote violent outcomes. Democracies, therefore, cause ethnic and nationalist violence where there otherwise wouldn't have been.
Where the case weakens is in the details. Snyder has done corollary research that focuses on the media marketplace and how elites use it to magnify their rhetoric and capture power. This book naturally puts a lot of emphasis on the role of markets for information, explaining that because democratization tends to come with an opening and deregulation of information markets that had previously been monopolized by the state, this competitive environment is exploited by divisive politicians seeking to build their constituencies. There is truth to this idea and Anne Applebaum makes a similar point in Twilight of Democracy, pointing out that many great periods of upheaval follow revolutionary changes to how information spreads — think the printing press and the great religious wars of the 17th century, the invention of the radio and the early 20th century, and now the internet. Media markets need constraints that limit their exploitation by divisive leaders.
Surely, though, there are other equally as important institutions that help to define the health of a democracy? One that immediately comes to mind is the rule of law (versus the rule by law, a distinction recently made in Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow the World) and the role of police and courts. Another is the extensive network of organizations that publishes data and research that putatively help us to better reflect on government policies. And yet another is the institution of the military and whether it is an instrument of the civil state or lives above the state.
And the notion that the success of democracy depends on the strength of its institutions certainly begs the question. What determines how those institutions are built? Who determines the rules of the game? And why are certain rules chosen over others? After all, it's the same elites that a healthy democracy requires to be constrained that design those very constraints.
Take, for example, the United States and the United Kingdom, two examples Snyder gives of civic nationalism. As a side note, I’m not so sure the United States is a clear example of civic nationalism, but rather a dialectic between civil and ethnic nationalism (consider our unique black-only slavery, the extermination of Native Americans, the U.S. Civil War, the rise of ethnic-based immigration policies, et cetera). Anyway, my bigger point is that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. was born with their modern-day institutions. They had to be developed. The question is: why did they develop in the direction that they did?
I think to answer that question you need to look beyond the existing institutional set and media markets. Politics is a bargaining process, so what are the incentives that apply to each agent? It seems to me that, historically, ‘civic nationalisms’ are the product of elite decision-making that seek the broader distribution of power. In the U.S., the paths taken by the northern and southern states were very different. The north was much more democratic and power distributed much more broadly, while the south was much more aristocratic. Why? Because the northern elites were already living in a more competitive setting, while southern elites enjoyed greater economies of scale in the resources they controlled. In the same year that this book was published, Sokoloff and Engerman published their paper titled “History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New
World,” which explores exactly this theme.
When we look at the potential for, and direction of, democratization in the modern world, we should look at what the objectives of the elite are. Decision-makers using media markets to communicate divisive rhetoric have reasons for doing so, so what are those reasons?
I suppose that if I were to sum up my criticism it’s that I think Snyder begs the question in his analysis.
Regardless, Snyder’s framework at least seems to capture a large part of the picture and it is undeniably an interesting argument. It leads to the conclusion that democracies cannot grow and survive secularly. There are no inherent forces that protect democracy from deterioration or authoritarianism. Rather, healthy, civic democracy needs to be cultivated, advocated, and actively shaped. Furthermore, democratization is dangerous if it’s introduced without consideration of the wider incentive and power structure facing elite decision-makers.
February 9, 2008
He works out his theories on democratization, violence, and nationalism, and they helped me start to figure out what democracy means (in a very tongue stumbling not understanding kind of way). The difficult part in reading this book is that Snyder is writing it as a prescription with the civil democratization process of Great Britain as a universal ideal for all nation states. His desire isn't to challenge democracy, but to prescribe the best process to achieve it (best meaning least amount of violence). His words assume that democracy is inherently good, Europe and the United States have progressed in great ways, violence is undesired, and that he the great colombian scholar has figured it all out. So if you read it perhaps do it with some caution and apprehension.
July 13, 2022
I read this book as part of my summer independent research and it actually is very good. I like Jack Snyder’s writing and he does a good job of making academia accessible. He fleshes out his arguments well and gives quantitative and qualitative evidence.
Now would you pick this off the shelves and read it as someone who isn’t a political science major? probably not but that’s all right.
Now would you pick this off the shelves and read it as someone who isn’t a political science major? probably not but that’s all right.
June 17, 2020
Shit, a hard one to read. But insanely good book
Read
April 11, 2013Jack Snyder s’est fait connaître en France en 1995 grâce à un article de Foreign Affairs, « Democratization and War ». Edward Mansfield et lui y démontraient, avec force statistiques à l’appui, que la plus forte bellicosité ne se rencontrait ni chez les États autoritaires, ni chez les États démocratiques, mais chez les États en transition. Conclusion inquiétante, s’il en fut, à l’heure où, précisément, nombreux étaient ceux qui émergeaient du communisme pour se réclamer de la démocratie.
Jack Snyder poursuit cette réflexion pour expliquer cette grande déception post-totalitaire que fut la multiplication paradoxale des conflits dans ces temps de démocratisation. Comment expliquer cette violence ? Par la résurgence des « haines ancestrales » souvent fondées sur des différences culturelles, voire « civilisationnelles » ? Jack Snyder combat cette thèse – dont un inconvénient majeur réside dans les remèdes qu’elle prescrit : le séparatisme selon des frontières ethniques ou à défaut le partage du pouvoir entre groupes. Il soutient au contraire que le nationalisme, loin d’être « inné », est « créé » durant la transition démocratique par les élites soucieuses de conserver leur hégémonie politique. Le nationalisme permet aux élites de satisfaire les aspirations démocratiques du peuple sans pour autant leur abandonner le pouvoir ; il leur permet « d’être populaire sans être tout à fait démocratique » (p. 36).
Avec une rigueur toute américaine, Jack Snyder dresse une typologie de quatre nationalismes, fonction de la capacité d’adaptation des élites et de la solidité des institutions existantes. L’Angleterre du XVIIIe siècle incarne un nationalisme civique, qui s’appuie sur une tradition ancienne de reconnaissance des droits de l’individu. Au contraire, la France de 1789 ne peut revendiquer un tel socle démocratique et cède à la tentation d’étendre la Révolution à l’humanité tout entière – une forme paradoxale de nationalisme universaliste. L’Allemagne bismarckienne illustre peut-être le mieux la thèse de l’auteur – qui lui consacre d’ailleurs les plus longs développements. On y voit une élite menacée par le « printemps des peuples » utiliser à son profit ces aspirations démocratiques en exacerbant l’esprit nationaliste. Ce nationalisme contre-révolutionnaire, que l’on retrouvera dans l’Argentine des Falkland, a besoin d’un ennemi extérieur : l’Autriche Hongrie jusqu’à Sadowa, la France jusqu’à Sedan. Enfin, la Serbie de 1840 à 1914 est présentée comme l’archétype de la forme la plus nuisible, mais aussi la plus fréquente, de nationalisme : l’« ethnicisme». Il combine une absence totale de structures démocratiques et un refus des élites de la moindre concession.
Pour autant, toutes les démocratisations ne conduisent pas à une flambée de nationalisme. Pour éviter que la transition ne dégénère, Jack Snyder formule un certain nombre de recommandations. Elles tournent autour de l’idée, politiquement incorrecte, qu’on ne devient pas démocrate en un jour, mais qu’au contraire, il y faut du temps et un certain nombre de conditions préalables : un certain niveau de développement (avec un PNB/hab. supérieur à 6 000 dollars, la transition a toutes les chances de réussir ; en dessous de 1 000 dollars, l’échec est quasi systématique), un bon niveau d’éducation, des institutions déjà solides (médias, justice…). Si ces conditions ne sont pas remplies, la démocratisation est vouée à l’échec, comme l’a montré Karl Polanyi dans ses études du fascisme.
Dans ces conditions, l’hégémonie – temporaire – d’une ethnie n’est pas nécessairement condamnable si elle prépare le terrain à une authentique coalition (Snyder croit en voir des indices en Malaisie, en Estonie, en Israël). Symétriquement, la promotion systématique de la liberté d’expression risque d’être contre-productive s’il n’existe pas au préalable une réelle culture démocratique : on l’a vu au Rwanda avec les mots d’ordre génocidaire de la Radio- Télévision libre (sic) des Mille collines. Enfin, les anciens dirigeants doivent être assurés d’une amnistie, sans quoi ils exacerberont les pulsions nationalistes pour demeurer au pouvoir.
Le professeur Snyder ne conteste jamais le bien-fondé de la démocratie comme fin ultime. Il se borne à souligner les dangers que présente sa mise en œuvre et les risques que court la communauté internationale à vouloir partout à travers le monde en précipiter l’avènement.
Jack Snyder poursuit cette réflexion pour expliquer cette grande déception post-totalitaire que fut la multiplication paradoxale des conflits dans ces temps de démocratisation. Comment expliquer cette violence ? Par la résurgence des « haines ancestrales » souvent fondées sur des différences culturelles, voire « civilisationnelles » ? Jack Snyder combat cette thèse – dont un inconvénient majeur réside dans les remèdes qu’elle prescrit : le séparatisme selon des frontières ethniques ou à défaut le partage du pouvoir entre groupes. Il soutient au contraire que le nationalisme, loin d’être « inné », est « créé » durant la transition démocratique par les élites soucieuses de conserver leur hégémonie politique. Le nationalisme permet aux élites de satisfaire les aspirations démocratiques du peuple sans pour autant leur abandonner le pouvoir ; il leur permet « d’être populaire sans être tout à fait démocratique » (p. 36).
Avec une rigueur toute américaine, Jack Snyder dresse une typologie de quatre nationalismes, fonction de la capacité d’adaptation des élites et de la solidité des institutions existantes. L’Angleterre du XVIIIe siècle incarne un nationalisme civique, qui s’appuie sur une tradition ancienne de reconnaissance des droits de l’individu. Au contraire, la France de 1789 ne peut revendiquer un tel socle démocratique et cède à la tentation d’étendre la Révolution à l’humanité tout entière – une forme paradoxale de nationalisme universaliste. L’Allemagne bismarckienne illustre peut-être le mieux la thèse de l’auteur – qui lui consacre d’ailleurs les plus longs développements. On y voit une élite menacée par le « printemps des peuples » utiliser à son profit ces aspirations démocratiques en exacerbant l’esprit nationaliste. Ce nationalisme contre-révolutionnaire, que l’on retrouvera dans l’Argentine des Falkland, a besoin d’un ennemi extérieur : l’Autriche Hongrie jusqu’à Sadowa, la France jusqu’à Sedan. Enfin, la Serbie de 1840 à 1914 est présentée comme l’archétype de la forme la plus nuisible, mais aussi la plus fréquente, de nationalisme : l’« ethnicisme». Il combine une absence totale de structures démocratiques et un refus des élites de la moindre concession.
Pour autant, toutes les démocratisations ne conduisent pas à une flambée de nationalisme. Pour éviter que la transition ne dégénère, Jack Snyder formule un certain nombre de recommandations. Elles tournent autour de l’idée, politiquement incorrecte, qu’on ne devient pas démocrate en un jour, mais qu’au contraire, il y faut du temps et un certain nombre de conditions préalables : un certain niveau de développement (avec un PNB/hab. supérieur à 6 000 dollars, la transition a toutes les chances de réussir ; en dessous de 1 000 dollars, l’échec est quasi systématique), un bon niveau d’éducation, des institutions déjà solides (médias, justice…). Si ces conditions ne sont pas remplies, la démocratisation est vouée à l’échec, comme l’a montré Karl Polanyi dans ses études du fascisme.
Dans ces conditions, l’hégémonie – temporaire – d’une ethnie n’est pas nécessairement condamnable si elle prépare le terrain à une authentique coalition (Snyder croit en voir des indices en Malaisie, en Estonie, en Israël). Symétriquement, la promotion systématique de la liberté d’expression risque d’être contre-productive s’il n’existe pas au préalable une réelle culture démocratique : on l’a vu au Rwanda avec les mots d’ordre génocidaire de la Radio- Télévision libre (sic) des Mille collines. Enfin, les anciens dirigeants doivent être assurés d’une amnistie, sans quoi ils exacerberont les pulsions nationalistes pour demeurer au pouvoir.
Le professeur Snyder ne conteste jamais le bien-fondé de la démocratie comme fin ultime. Il se borne à souligner les dangers que présente sa mise en œuvre et les risques que court la communauté internationale à vouloir partout à travers le monde en précipiter l’avènement.
July 23, 2008
Also a book I read for class; Snyder makes an argument regarding how nationalism, and the rise of nationalistic movements impacts a nation's chance at acheiving democratic statehood; drawing from examples across Europe and including America.
April 9, 2008
A well argued book about the conditions needed for democracy to emerge and the horrible things that happen when only some of them are present when the voting day comes...
January 24, 2016
Excellent descriptions, insightful theoretical framework, bit abstract policy recommendations.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews