Marcuse’s analysis of man in modern industrial society has in recent years become a source for revolutionary ideas and slogans. Is his analysis sound? Are his conclusions treu? Alasdair Mac-Intyre pursues these questions in a brilliant, forthright, and highly critical study of Marcuse's thought and his relation to other writers, especially Freud, Marx, and Hegel.
Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre was a British-American philosopher who contributed to moral and political philosophy as well as history of philosophy and theology. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) is one of the most important works of Anglophone moral and political philosophy in the 20th century. He was senior research fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) at London Metropolitan University, emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and permanent senior distinguished research fellow at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture. During his lengthy academic career, he also taught at Brandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt University, and Boston University.
در واقع یک ستاره دادم چون گودریدز نشانهای برای کتاب "خیلی بد" یا "افتضاح" و یا "سطحی" نداره! به نظرم اگر کتابی از مارکوزه یا درباره ش نخواندید اول از همه سراغ این کتاب نرید. کتابهای دیگهای وجود دارند که مکتب فرانکفورت و مارکوزه رو در بستر فلسفیای که این مکتب به اون تعلق داره، بررسی میکنند. بناراین مفیدترند و از گزاف گویی پرهیزمیکنند. صرفنظر از استدلال و بیان عامیانهی کتاب، پوزیتیویسم سطحی و محافظهکاری سیاسی نویسنده در کنار تحجر فرهنگی اش برای من زننده بود. در یک کلام: پیشنهادش نمیکنم!
This promising polemic against the work of the author of "One-Dimensional Man" is undermined by the fact that MacIntyre seems more interested in criticising Marcuse for what he isn't that what he is. Whilst MacIntyre raises some good points about Marcuse's problematic interpretations of analytic language philosophy and Freud, his criticisms of Marcuse's unorthodox Marxism miss the point entirely as he fails to acknowledge the significance of the Frankfurt School's break from prior Marxist tradition. Consequently, this reads in many places like an attack on Marcuse for drawing on a differing philosophical tradition to MacIntyre's own analytic approach.
Alasdair MaCintyre's book is a systematic critique and engagement with Herbert Marcuse's sociology and philosophy. This was written when MaCintyre was engaging with Marxism, presumably swept up in the New Left spirit in Britain, something MaCintyre's colleagues still grieve and mourn over, although MaCintyre swiftly moved towards an Aristotelian(ish) position.
MaCintyre centres his critique of four lines of attack: 1- Marcuse's notion of truth 2- Marcuse's history of culture 3- Marcuse's correlation of politics and various philosophies 4-Marcuse's relationship to 'classical' Marxism.
Issue 1 is dealt with pretty poorly. He just bemoans the fact that Marcuse distances himself from the analytic, and rather authoritarian obsession with truth. For MaCintyre, truth is either the positivist facts he has decided are truth, or else you're simply talking hogwash. Whilst it's correct that Marcuse doesn't address this as well as he could, at least based on my limited reading of him, it doesn't mean that his notion of truth is garbage, it simply isn't his focus. Instead of trashing him, MaCintyre should've looked elsewhere. The critique is similar to me criticising Wittgenstein for refusing to address feminism, and therefore labelling the 'Tractatus' sexist. Marcuse's critique doesn't embrace a postmodern ideal of truth, it critiques the positivist ahistorical notion of truth, something plenty of philosophers have done.
Marcuse's history of culture and philosophy is critiqued for being selective. Marcuse, following a slightly revised Marxist history of culture, interprets philosophies in generalities, for example the 20th century rise of Phenomonelogy shows a society sliding into fascism. MaCintyre takes aim at this kind of historicising, as it tends to overgeneralise and often ignores the opposing tendencies as well as the political commitments of said philosophers.
Linked with Marcuse's history of philosophy is his idea of philosophy and commitment. Marcuse's critique of 'contemporary philosophy' is against the rising analytic school of Russell, Frege, Austin etc. By obsessing over ahistorical facts and logic, it ignores the historicity of knowledge and the social conditions surrounding it. However, MaCintyre questions how this analytic philosophy is pro-status quo, for MaCintyre analytic philosophy simply provides universal and clear categories for thought, to prevent it being a meaningless Saussurian ribbon of sound. Without logic, what are our grounds for discussion? How do we know anything? One could simply retort that Marcuse could reach for Hegel's logic, or combine his work with some other continental approaches, but MaCintyre doesn't allow for this, and again rather than throwing Marcuse a bone, he critiques him for not addressing an issue which wasn't his primary concern, and could have been dealt with.
MaCintyre's last critique addresses Marcuse's Marxism. Marcuse saw socialism as a panacea for a pretty much everything. In 'Eros and Civilisation' Marcuse paints an Earthly utopia of free love and people who labour expressively and freely. Of course he offers little of how or why this would work, other than expanding on Freudo-Marxist categories by stretching and moulding, and ignoring praxis. MaCintyre takes aim at this kind of empty humanism and dreamy notion of liberation. MaCintyre rejects Marcuse's humanism and non-Marxist, although critics like Leszek Kolakowski have pointed out, Marcuse barely was a Marxist, and it's unfair to call him insufficiently Marxist, considering the Frankfurt School drifted so far from Leninism or even 'classical' Marxists. MaCintyre points to quotes from Marx, Lenin and Trotsky to support his thesis, and further claims that Marcuse's programme and lack of focus on praxis would ultimately lend itself to nothing but brute authoritarianism, despite Marcuse critiquing that very authoritarianism in the USSR. Whilst this critique is key, and can be extended to much Frankfurt School theory, it does ignore Marcuse's siding with the New Left, and the ignorance of the fact that the Frankfurt School wanted to free Marxism from praxis, to create a critical theory which was separate from the dirty work of real life activisim and revolution, which is confusing since MaCintyre references the books wherein these ideas are expounded.
MaCintyre does point out some critical problems with Marcuse and his theory, but he ignores much of the point of the Marcuse's work and the Frankfurt School, and appears to let his analytic bias blind him to the fact that he's engaging with somebody in a totally different tradition. But this is worth reading for a fan of the Marcuse's work.
An overly polemical analysis of the weakest elements of Marcuse's thought. I'd have liked to see critical engagement with a carefully considered account of Marcuse's system of philosophy. Instead, Macintyre gets bogged down in Marcuse's departures from Marx and Hegel and reduces these departures to misinterpretation. 'Rationality' is invoked ad nauseum and there's an unconvincing dismissal of how modernity leads to totalitarianism (apparently we can rule that out because some liberal theorists had progressive nurses for parents - Heidegger notwithstanding). I'd recommend this book to haters of Marcuse, of which I'm sure there are many.
نویسنده متن در جهت گیری خاصی به دنبال بی ارزش کردن حرف های مارکوزه است اما استدلال های غیرمنطقی که ارزش وقت گذاشتن برای مطالعه هم ندارد ولی میتوان این کتاب را از نقطه نظری دیگر خواند و آنهم اینکه چه مسائل مهمی را مارکوزه تاکید داشته است که موجب نگرانی کاپیتالیسم از اتنشار کتاب هایش شده است
Fairly strong criticisms of Marcuse throughout. I agree most with MacIntyre on two specific points: that Marcuse often homogenises Marx in such a way that the variety of periods, disconnections, etc., in Marx's corpus are obscured, and that Marcuse has problematic interpretations and applications of Freud stemming in a similar way from this homogenisation.
That said, I think MacIntyre is wrong or misleading on some objections. Firstly, though Marcuse's interpretation of Marx relies, I think, on a particular line of "critical" philosophy or theory, I do not think Marcuse necessarily tries to hide this much. Marcuse tends to be pretty clear in his use of vocabulary and concepts as tools derived from Marx which are then modified for his subject matter. This does not pardon the homogenisation of Marx, but it does explain it better and provides it slightly more leeway.
Secondly, Marcuse is charged on pp. 47, 49 as both being unable to provide the future alternatives so as to understand liberated sexuality in society, as well as not placing his criticism in empirical structure as Freud would. On the first charge, I think it is odd to demand that Marcuse does provide a future vision. Though MacIntyre holds that this is necessary to understand present sexual repression in Marcuse's view, I think that this is just plainly false, that there is no reason to believe this to be the case. It would be good, of course, if Marcuse could produce such a vision of liberation, but I do not think it stands as a criticism against him that he cannot. On the second charge, MacIntyre is often right, but not always. In Counterrevolution and Revolt for instance, Marcuse places his criticism very much within the structure of bourgeois morality. He gives the example of the regulation of discourse by a taboo of sexual expression in the comments of "Fuck Nixon," which though seemingly radical, draws its power from the structure whose representative is being criticised. This is structural.
Lastly, MacIntyre's criticism of Marcuse's (and Adorno and Horkheimer's) put-down of formal logic is semi-correct, but I think misses the critique. MacIntyre predictably argues that formal logic simply brings out the regulatory principles of ordinary language in the first-place, it's strength is that it is content-neutral. Marcuse's criticism, however, is that it is this separation of content and form which is ideological. Marcuse is charged with being the real ideologue of sorts, of putting down a truly neutral position for his own ideological form of dialectics which blend content and form. MacIntyre is semi-correct again, I agree that formal logic has its root mainly in grammar, in the regulation of valid forms of arguments, but he does not do enough to tackle the fact that Marcuse fundamentally disagrees with this use of logic. Marcuse's point is that it's formalisation and focus within Anglo-American schools is a form of "domination" in its unconcern with the content. For Marcuse, the content is intimately connected in our expressions, and this needs to be accounted for. A disjunct like "this is a cat or it is raining", may be a valid form of expression, but its incessant formalisation and the abandonment of its content represents, for Marcuse, a kind of emptiness in philosophical discourse which disconnects from oppression etc etc. Whether Marcuse is right is a bit...unproven, but MacIntyre does not do enough to dispel his thoughts. Nor does he address the differences between Adorno and Horkheimer's criticisms from Marcuse, which are substantially different.
Overall though, this is a very strong criticism of Marcuse and worth reading.
Todellakin kriittinen katsaus Marcuseen. MacIntyre ei paljon armoa anna. Hänen mukaansa Marcuse ei ole totuutta etsivä filosofi vaan ideologinen runoilija, jonka omalaatuinen sekoitus Hegeliä, Marxia ja Freudia johtaa vasemmistolaiseen elitismiin. Marcuse tulkitsee aatehistoriaa tarkoitushakuisesti, vastustaa empirismiä ja hylkää selväsanaisesti tieteen auktoriteetin. Freudilta hän ottaa kyseenalaisimman eli spekulatiivisimman aineksen, samoin Marxilta hegeliläisimmän.
Marcuselle ominaista on nimittää asioita mielivaltaisesti oikeiksi tai vääriksi (tarpeellinen torjunta ja "ylitorjunta"; oikeat tarpeet ja "väärät tarpeet"; onni ja "todellinen onni"; jne.) Kaiken huippuna on orwellilainen "sortava suvaitsevaisuus" (repressive tolerance), jolla Marcuse tarkoittaa kaikille avointa julkista keskustelua; todellista suvaitsevaisuutta olisi "väärien mielipiteiden" (lue: Marcusen vastustajien) vaientaminen. Kuulostaako tutulta? Marcuse oli 1960-luvun uusvasemmiston oppi-isä ja perintö näkyy yhä. Hänen ohjelmansa on elimellinen osa nykyvasemmiston toimintaa aina työväenluokan hylkäämisestä (etnisten ym. vähemmistöjen hyväksi) poliittisten vastustajien sananvapauden tukahduttamiseen.
Marcusen mukaan moderni teollinen yhteiskunta - kuten esim. Yhdysvallat tai Englanti - on yhteiskuntajärjestykseltään maailmanhistorian kiintein: jopa ajattelun muodot on alistettu järjestelmälle, eikä kritiikki ole enää mahdollista (paitsi Marcusen edustamalle valaistuneelle vähemmistölle, minkä olemassaolo tässä kritiikin mahdottomuuden maailmassa tuntuu paradoksaaliselta). Tätä järjestelmää Marcuse vertaa fasismiin, mikä retorinen vauhtisokeus on tuttua vasemmistolta: Saksan kommunistit nimittivät sosiaalidemokraatteja "sosiaalifasisteiksi" ennen Hitlerin valtaannousua. MacIntyre tyrmää Marcusen väitteen ja esittää päinvastaisen: ihmisiä ei ahdista voimattomuuden tunne järjestelmän kaikkivoipaisuuden vuoksi vaan juuri kontrollin puute, niin yksilöiden kuin järjestelmän tasolla. Vaikka MacIntyreä ei aivan uskoisikaan, on Marcusen jutuissa kieltämättä vaikea olla näkemättä vainoharhaista salaliittoteoreetikkoa, joka selittää aivan kaiken (myös loogisen empirismin) fasismilla.
On kylmäävää lukea näin ajankohtaista tekstiä 51 vuoden takaa: "Korostunut huoli suvaitsevaisuudesta on luonteenomaista vain osalle älymystöä, mutta tällä älymystön osalla on meihin helposti suhteeton vaikutus, koska sillä on vahva ote joukkotiedotusvälineisiin." Ja: "Tämän hetken tärkeimpiä tehtäviä on pitää järkähtämättä kiinni vaatimuksesta, että yhteiskunnallinen ja poliittinen järjestys on alistettava jatkuvaan rationaaliseen kritiikkiin ja että rationaalisen tutkimuksen itsenäisyys on säilytettävä yliopistoissa ja muualla. - - Yliopiston oikeudelle vapaasti opettaa ja tutkia ovat Marcusen ylioppilasliittolaiset suurempi suoranainen uhka kuin mikään muu ryhmä[.]"
A quick and dirty takedown of Marcuse's special blend of Young Hegelianism and Freud. MacIntyre's most damning criticism is just a description of Marcuse's attitude towards the late 60s student protests in the USA, namely that they are a force of genuine revolution, rather than, as MacIntyre puts it, "a new version of the children's crusade" (p. 89):
Marcuse devotes most of his account of the forces of liberation to an argument about the character of the student revoluts; what leads him to take them to be authentic agents of liberation is above all their aesthetic quality, their style. Flower power, the language of the hippie subculture, that of soul culture, the use of four-letter words, mark, so Marcuse claims, a new sensibility which breaks with the culture of the market. What traditional Marxism saw as petty-bourgeois bohemia close[ly] allied to the Lumpenproletariat has become in Marcuse's latest theoretical stance the potential catalyst of change. Traditional Marxism took the view that it did for a very good reason: that the sensibility of bohemia effectively cuts it off from the vast mass of mankind on whom the bohemians are in economic fact parasitic. So of course are Marcuse's idealized students who have produced the first parent-financed revolts in what is more like a new version of the children's crusade than a revolutionary movement". (p.89)
Em 1970, o filósofo escocês Alasdair MacIntyre publicou uma análise crítica do pensamento de Herbert Marcuse, importante pensador alemão radicado nos EUA que influenciou fortemente a esquerda progressista contemporânea.
Marcuse desenvolveu uma teoria crítica em relação à racionalidade moderna. Partindo de Marx e Freud, ele buscou integrar liberdade, felicidade e sexualidade sugerindo que as satisfações libidinais humanas deveriam ser libertadas das repressões da civilização.
Segundo Marcuse, o trabalho e a sexualidade monogâmica eram repressivas porque eram limitadas por uma ordem social irracional. A sexualidade deveria ser emancipada para que o ser humano se tornasse livre existencialmente.
Marcuse considerava que o sistema capitalista satisfaz as necessidades materiais básicas, dificultando os protestos revolucionários e tornando as pessoas dominadas pela repressão. Isto é, a sexualidade, o bem-estar e o trabalho se tornaram âmbitos de dominação das instituições liberais, capazes de restringir o ímpeto revolucionário.
Nesse cenário, Marcuse propôs uma ação radical e revolucionária. Minorias deveriam expressar suas necessidades para se libertar e libertar a maioria da repressão da racionalidade. Movimentos sociais e coletivos identitários deveriam revolucionar a sociedade, libertando-a da repressão sexual e da racionalidade moderna.
Para Marcuse, a maioria deveria ser libertada e “reeducada para a verdade por essa minoria, habilitada a suprimir opiniões rivais e perniciosas” (“As ideias de Marcuse”, p. 106).
MacIntyre avalia que, além de um pensamento elitista e disruptivo de Marcuse e de seus seguidores identitários, essa visão que orienta o progressismo contemporâneo atenta contra a racionalidade da civilização ocidental, criando barreiras insuperáveis no debate público.
A proposta de Marcuse ajudou a construir uma esquerda identitária contrária à racionalidade moderna influenciada por valores cristãos. O resultado foi a normalização da agressividade e a tentativa de, em nome do bem para alguns, destruir os oponentes políticos. Surgiu o discurso divisionista e a “guerra cultural”.
What delusions held them captive? Frankfurt School mandarins and their so called dialectical critique were perhaps one of the shallowest currents in the past century's intellectual history. Of course the competition is stiff given the number of delusional preceding and following fads. MacIntyre wrote this at the time when the two currents fused in Marcuse's radical brew had still life and many followers, and yet without being deterred he invites the reader to ask a series of simple questions about theses developed by Marcuse. Once these are posed and considered the emperor is exposed in his obscene nudity.
Highly mixed in it's quality of insight and evaluation..some moments seemed penetratingly lucid and cutting to the core of Marcuse's philosophical shortcomings - describing his mode of thought as more pre-marxist, like the young Hegelians. But other moments seemed pedantic, maybe I missed the significance. But I'm not a big Marcuse fan and this book helped clarify what has felt disappointing about his works.
This is such an important work that should be taken seriously then, as well as today - as Marcuse is a figure that needs to be stripped naked. MacIntyre does a good job, although, the book is very short - and incomplete as it was written while Marcuse was still alive (and Marcuse, of course, never responded).