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Munich: The Price of Peace
In " The Price of Peace," Taylor traces the military and diplomatic alignments and machinations in Europe from Versailles to Munich and its aftermath.
1084 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1979
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January 13, 2016
Page 482 (my book) Neville Chamberlain
“It was desirable to seek an accord with Germany on Central Europe no matter what her objectives were, even if she wished to absorb some of her neighbors.”
Page 555
He [Neville Chamberlain] continued to regard the Axis leaders as men with whom one could bargain and trade, and he seems never to have grasped the irrational, tide-like quality of Hitlerian Nazism.
Page 791 Hubert Ripka (Czechoslovakian journalist)
“it was generally felt that it would be an inadmissible adventure to embark on a struggle with Germany in the state of absolute isolation to which we had been reduced by the defection of our Western friends and allies... For side by side with Germany...Poland and Hungary were preparing to act against us.”
Page 794 Leon Blum, September 20,938 (former prime minister of France)
“War has probably been avoided. But under such circumstances that I who have for many years never ceased to struggle for peace, I who have for many years dedicated my life to it, cannot feel joy. I feel myself torn between a sense of cowardly relief and shame.”
This book is a true Shakespearean tragedy as it outlines in detail the chronology of events that led to the Munich Agreement in September, 1938. Many believed peace had been achieved, but less than one year later World War II broke out.
Over half of this book is on the three meetings that occurred in September, 1938 between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. The author provides portraits of many of the personalities involved and also the very conflicting and acrimonious relationships between the nations of Europe. The book is superbly written and the author is never afraid to offer an evaluation on the topics and figures under discussion. Even at one thousand pages I found this book a page turner; but admittedly I am enthralled by this era of European history.
The two key figures are Neville Chamberlain and, of course Adolf Hitler. It was the actions of Neville Chamberlain that led to Munich. Hitler was the catalyst, but Chamberlain was extremely proactive. Chamberlain was a headstrong individual with definite points of view and would go to great efforts to implement them. Chamberlain was a “Go it alone” person. He excluded France (Britain’s principal ally) and crucially, Czechoslovakia, from the first two meetings with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and Godesberg. He felt he alone, was fully capable of dealing with Hitler, without hindrances from allied countries. It must be emphasized that it was Chamberlain who instigated these first two meetings with Hitler – almost literally saying “Let’s talk”. He sincerely believed that by giving into Hitler’s demands on Czechoslovakia peace could be attained for Europe. This was known as appeasement, which at the time many in Britain, France and elsewhere regarded positively. To some extent it was perceived as making amends for the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which many believed had unduly punished Germany.
Hitler ostensibly wanted to incorporate the Sudeten-German area of Czechoslovakia into Germany. He claimed loudly and falsely, that Sudeten Germans were persecuted by Czechoslovakia (in point of fact Sudeten Germans had far more rights in Czechoslovakia than German Jews in Germany). However, Hitler’s primary aim was to incorporate the entire nation of Czechoslovakia into the German Reich – and he was starting with the Sudetenland – which bordered Germany and Austria – and where many of the Czech military fortifications were located.
Chamberlain believed Hitler when he said “I don’t want any Czechs.” The Munich Agreement was signed on September 30, 1938 giving large swaths of Czechoslovakia over to the Reich. It was presented to the Czech government as their sacrifice for peace in Europe. In Mid-March of 1939 Hitler’s troops took what was left of Czechoslovakia.
It was indeed ironic that when the Munich Agreement was signed, the new and reduced Czech state was to be guaranteed from aggression by Britain and France. Prior to Munich, Czechoslovakia was far more defensible – so the two major European democracies were now “guaranteeing” a defenceless Czechoslovakia.
To summarize very simply – Hitler wanted Czechoslovakia either by force or diplomacy, but did not want to be attacked by France or Britain (in fact he felt they did not want to defend Czechoslovakia). Chamberlain did not want France to go to war to defend Czechoslovakia – a war which Britain would inevitably be drawn into. So he relentlessly pursued peace at the cost of Czechoslovakia.
Page 978 Winston Churchill
“You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.”
This book provides us with the multitude of reasons that led up to the tragic Munich Agreement. With different leaders, quite possibly Hitler could have been stopped in September of 1938. The German military machine was much stronger in September, 1939 when they attacked Poland, and no longer had Czechoslovakia as a foe, and had just concluded a non-aggression pact with Stalin.
A few other interesting notes in this book:
Dictators, like Hitler, always want to meet their adversaries on their own home turf. Chamberlain went to Germany three times. Interestingly at his first meeting Chamberlain did not even bring his own translator, relying on the German translator, Paul Otto Schmidt. Chamberlain was totally dominated by Hitler, where the Czechs had no input and were not even consulted beforehand. At Munich they were shunted aside in another room – and told to sign the accords at the end.
The author examines many of the preludes to Munich – Hitler’s breaking of the Treaty of Versailles by enlarging the German Army, then the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland by the army in 1936, and the annexation of Austria in early 1938. France and Britain meekly capitulated to these developments. This book is a compelling history of Europe from 1933 to 1938.
The myth of the German Luftwaffe - in 1938 there were greatly exaggerated reports of the lethality of the German air force and its ability to lay waste to much of England (particularly London). It did not have the range at that time to reach England. If Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, as Hitler threatened to do, the Luftwaffe would have been preoccupied with Czechoslovakia – and France and England could have attacked Germany.
Two interesting chapters entitled: “The Road from Moscow to Prague Runs through Paris” and “The Road from Paris to Prague Runs through London”. In other words the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia, but was dependent on the French for enforcing it. And the French would do nothing without an assurance of England backing them up.
The British ambassador to Berlin, Neville Henderson, was in awe of Hitler and Nazism and very anti-Czech; surely not a good sign.
Several times during September 1938, many were prepared for the outbreak of war, so when the Munich Agreement was signed there was in Europe, and America as well, a tremendous sigh of relief – many felt there was to be, as Neville Chamberlain proclaimed, “Peace in our Time”.
The author, Telford Taylor, was involved in the Nuremberg Trials as part of the team for the United States.
“It was desirable to seek an accord with Germany on Central Europe no matter what her objectives were, even if she wished to absorb some of her neighbors.”
Page 555
He [Neville Chamberlain] continued to regard the Axis leaders as men with whom one could bargain and trade, and he seems never to have grasped the irrational, tide-like quality of Hitlerian Nazism.
Page 791 Hubert Ripka (Czechoslovakian journalist)
“it was generally felt that it would be an inadmissible adventure to embark on a struggle with Germany in the state of absolute isolation to which we had been reduced by the defection of our Western friends and allies... For side by side with Germany...Poland and Hungary were preparing to act against us.”
Page 794 Leon Blum, September 20,938 (former prime minister of France)
“War has probably been avoided. But under such circumstances that I who have for many years never ceased to struggle for peace, I who have for many years dedicated my life to it, cannot feel joy. I feel myself torn between a sense of cowardly relief and shame.”
This book is a true Shakespearean tragedy as it outlines in detail the chronology of events that led to the Munich Agreement in September, 1938. Many believed peace had been achieved, but less than one year later World War II broke out.
Over half of this book is on the three meetings that occurred in September, 1938 between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. The author provides portraits of many of the personalities involved and also the very conflicting and acrimonious relationships between the nations of Europe. The book is superbly written and the author is never afraid to offer an evaluation on the topics and figures under discussion. Even at one thousand pages I found this book a page turner; but admittedly I am enthralled by this era of European history.
The two key figures are Neville Chamberlain and, of course Adolf Hitler. It was the actions of Neville Chamberlain that led to Munich. Hitler was the catalyst, but Chamberlain was extremely proactive. Chamberlain was a headstrong individual with definite points of view and would go to great efforts to implement them. Chamberlain was a “Go it alone” person. He excluded France (Britain’s principal ally) and crucially, Czechoslovakia, from the first two meetings with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and Godesberg. He felt he alone, was fully capable of dealing with Hitler, without hindrances from allied countries. It must be emphasized that it was Chamberlain who instigated these first two meetings with Hitler – almost literally saying “Let’s talk”. He sincerely believed that by giving into Hitler’s demands on Czechoslovakia peace could be attained for Europe. This was known as appeasement, which at the time many in Britain, France and elsewhere regarded positively. To some extent it was perceived as making amends for the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which many believed had unduly punished Germany.
Hitler ostensibly wanted to incorporate the Sudeten-German area of Czechoslovakia into Germany. He claimed loudly and falsely, that Sudeten Germans were persecuted by Czechoslovakia (in point of fact Sudeten Germans had far more rights in Czechoslovakia than German Jews in Germany). However, Hitler’s primary aim was to incorporate the entire nation of Czechoslovakia into the German Reich – and he was starting with the Sudetenland – which bordered Germany and Austria – and where many of the Czech military fortifications were located.
Chamberlain believed Hitler when he said “I don’t want any Czechs.” The Munich Agreement was signed on September 30, 1938 giving large swaths of Czechoslovakia over to the Reich. It was presented to the Czech government as their sacrifice for peace in Europe. In Mid-March of 1939 Hitler’s troops took what was left of Czechoslovakia.
It was indeed ironic that when the Munich Agreement was signed, the new and reduced Czech state was to be guaranteed from aggression by Britain and France. Prior to Munich, Czechoslovakia was far more defensible – so the two major European democracies were now “guaranteeing” a defenceless Czechoslovakia.
To summarize very simply – Hitler wanted Czechoslovakia either by force or diplomacy, but did not want to be attacked by France or Britain (in fact he felt they did not want to defend Czechoslovakia). Chamberlain did not want France to go to war to defend Czechoslovakia – a war which Britain would inevitably be drawn into. So he relentlessly pursued peace at the cost of Czechoslovakia.
Page 978 Winston Churchill
“You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.”
This book provides us with the multitude of reasons that led up to the tragic Munich Agreement. With different leaders, quite possibly Hitler could have been stopped in September of 1938. The German military machine was much stronger in September, 1939 when they attacked Poland, and no longer had Czechoslovakia as a foe, and had just concluded a non-aggression pact with Stalin.
A few other interesting notes in this book:
Dictators, like Hitler, always want to meet their adversaries on their own home turf. Chamberlain went to Germany three times. Interestingly at his first meeting Chamberlain did not even bring his own translator, relying on the German translator, Paul Otto Schmidt. Chamberlain was totally dominated by Hitler, where the Czechs had no input and were not even consulted beforehand. At Munich they were shunted aside in another room – and told to sign the accords at the end.
The author examines many of the preludes to Munich – Hitler’s breaking of the Treaty of Versailles by enlarging the German Army, then the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland by the army in 1936, and the annexation of Austria in early 1938. France and Britain meekly capitulated to these developments. This book is a compelling history of Europe from 1933 to 1938.
The myth of the German Luftwaffe - in 1938 there were greatly exaggerated reports of the lethality of the German air force and its ability to lay waste to much of England (particularly London). It did not have the range at that time to reach England. If Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, as Hitler threatened to do, the Luftwaffe would have been preoccupied with Czechoslovakia – and France and England could have attacked Germany.
Two interesting chapters entitled: “The Road from Moscow to Prague Runs through Paris” and “The Road from Paris to Prague Runs through London”. In other words the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia, but was dependent on the French for enforcing it. And the French would do nothing without an assurance of England backing them up.
The British ambassador to Berlin, Neville Henderson, was in awe of Hitler and Nazism and very anti-Czech; surely not a good sign.
Several times during September 1938, many were prepared for the outbreak of war, so when the Munich Agreement was signed there was in Europe, and America as well, a tremendous sigh of relief – many felt there was to be, as Neville Chamberlain proclaimed, “Peace in our Time”.
The author, Telford Taylor, was involved in the Nuremberg Trials as part of the team for the United States.
August 26, 2020
In the early morning of September 30, 1938, the political leaders of Germany, Britain, Italy, and France signed an agreement named after the city where the meeting took place: Munich.
The Munich Agreement covered only the procedures by which the territorial claims against Czechoslovakia of Germany, Poland, and Hungary should be determined, but the scope and significance of the Munich crisis far transcended the document’s provisions. The meeting was the progeny of a diplomatic convulsion that shattered the former power structure of Europe, and the culmination of an international calamity that brought the great powers to the verge of war.
Yet, at the time it was signed, the Munich agreement was applauded everywhere but in Czechoslovakia and the USSR. In their respective capitals, the four men of Munich – Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini, and Edouard Daladier – were received as heroes. Of course, dissenting opinions were heard soon: Winston Churchill pronounced the settlement a “disaster of the first magnitude”. Despite such criticism, the Western Hemisphere rejoiced over the aversion of the threat of war. Within six months, however, Czechoslovakia was no more, and within less than a year WWII began.
In the drama of the Munich Episode there were, beyond doubt, two leading actors – Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain. In that sense this book is about the those two men.
Hitler was the key individual of the Munich crisis. It was he who gave direction and timing to the exercise of Germany’s power. It was to his initiatives and decision that the other governments were reacting, and it was he who forced the confrontations of which Munich was the result.
The resolution of the crisis was the work of Neville Chamberlain, though. It was Hitler who hosted the meeting, and the agreement was initially drafter in Berlin, but it was Chamberlain who decided that Czechoslovakia could not and should not be protected against the Wehrmacht. It was him who undermined the Czech’s will to resist, destroyed the Czech-Franko-Soviet defensive pacts, rang down the curtain on the Europe of Versailles, and gave effect to his policy of appeasement.
In his book, Telford Taylor confronts the widespread portrait of Neville Chamberlain as a bumbling, naive old gentleman, waving an umbrella as a sign of subservience to a bully, and pronounces it an illusion. In fact, Chamberlain did what he did in Munich not because he thought he had to, but because he thought it right. For him, appeasement was a policy not of fear but of common sense.
Interestingly, there were many others of high station, especially in France and Britain, who approved of Chamberlain’s policy but did not share his motives. Some were strongly afraid of communism and recoiled at a war in alliance with the Soviet Union. Others saw Munich as a temporary retreat.
Another odd feature of Munich is that Hitler, the main beneficiary, was as much displeased with the outcome as Winston Churchill. For Hitler, the Sudetenland and the grievances of the German-speaking population were the excuse but not the reason for the crisis he provoked. What he actually wanted was a military invasion that would pave his way to Prague as conqueror and subjugator of the Czech nation, just as he later used Danzig and the Corridor to destroy Poland.
The reason why Munich failed so soon was that Hitler’s goal remained unchanged, and in March 1939 he took what he intended to take in 1938. Thus, what Chamberlain considered a smart act of appeasement served only to infuriate the Führer by denying him the conqueror’s laurels and absolute domination.
The biggest paradox of the Munich crisis is that nothing important was decided in Munich. The major decisions about Czechoslovakia were made earlier, in Berchtesgaden, and later, in Berlin. Munich simply symbolized the twilight of old Europe and was a harbinger of what was to come. Once the conference had been cancelled the outcome was inevitable.
While Adolf Hitler’s image of a demagogue grew and darkened into that of a powerful despot bent on conquest, many high placed Europeans were willing to pay any price for peace. Others, like Winston Churchill, thought that Hitler had no peace for sale.
Neville Chamberlain belonged to neither of those camps. He believed that Hitler be appeased, and piece purchased. He was, obviously, bitterly disappointed in the results of his bargain.
In his book Telford Taylor had provided not only a narrative of the circumstances and events leading to the Munich crisis but also a fresh assessment of the men and methods by which the crisis was “resolved”. A brilliantly written, meticulously researched, and very detailed narrative. Outstanding.
The Munich Agreement covered only the procedures by which the territorial claims against Czechoslovakia of Germany, Poland, and Hungary should be determined, but the scope and significance of the Munich crisis far transcended the document’s provisions. The meeting was the progeny of a diplomatic convulsion that shattered the former power structure of Europe, and the culmination of an international calamity that brought the great powers to the verge of war.
Yet, at the time it was signed, the Munich agreement was applauded everywhere but in Czechoslovakia and the USSR. In their respective capitals, the four men of Munich – Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini, and Edouard Daladier – were received as heroes. Of course, dissenting opinions were heard soon: Winston Churchill pronounced the settlement a “disaster of the first magnitude”. Despite such criticism, the Western Hemisphere rejoiced over the aversion of the threat of war. Within six months, however, Czechoslovakia was no more, and within less than a year WWII began.
In the drama of the Munich Episode there were, beyond doubt, two leading actors – Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain. In that sense this book is about the those two men.
Hitler was the key individual of the Munich crisis. It was he who gave direction and timing to the exercise of Germany’s power. It was to his initiatives and decision that the other governments were reacting, and it was he who forced the confrontations of which Munich was the result.
The resolution of the crisis was the work of Neville Chamberlain, though. It was Hitler who hosted the meeting, and the agreement was initially drafter in Berlin, but it was Chamberlain who decided that Czechoslovakia could not and should not be protected against the Wehrmacht. It was him who undermined the Czech’s will to resist, destroyed the Czech-Franko-Soviet defensive pacts, rang down the curtain on the Europe of Versailles, and gave effect to his policy of appeasement.
In his book, Telford Taylor confronts the widespread portrait of Neville Chamberlain as a bumbling, naive old gentleman, waving an umbrella as a sign of subservience to a bully, and pronounces it an illusion. In fact, Chamberlain did what he did in Munich not because he thought he had to, but because he thought it right. For him, appeasement was a policy not of fear but of common sense.
Interestingly, there were many others of high station, especially in France and Britain, who approved of Chamberlain’s policy but did not share his motives. Some were strongly afraid of communism and recoiled at a war in alliance with the Soviet Union. Others saw Munich as a temporary retreat.
Another odd feature of Munich is that Hitler, the main beneficiary, was as much displeased with the outcome as Winston Churchill. For Hitler, the Sudetenland and the grievances of the German-speaking population were the excuse but not the reason for the crisis he provoked. What he actually wanted was a military invasion that would pave his way to Prague as conqueror and subjugator of the Czech nation, just as he later used Danzig and the Corridor to destroy Poland.
The reason why Munich failed so soon was that Hitler’s goal remained unchanged, and in March 1939 he took what he intended to take in 1938. Thus, what Chamberlain considered a smart act of appeasement served only to infuriate the Führer by denying him the conqueror’s laurels and absolute domination.
The biggest paradox of the Munich crisis is that nothing important was decided in Munich. The major decisions about Czechoslovakia were made earlier, in Berchtesgaden, and later, in Berlin. Munich simply symbolized the twilight of old Europe and was a harbinger of what was to come. Once the conference had been cancelled the outcome was inevitable.
While Adolf Hitler’s image of a demagogue grew and darkened into that of a powerful despot bent on conquest, many high placed Europeans were willing to pay any price for peace. Others, like Winston Churchill, thought that Hitler had no peace for sale.
Neville Chamberlain belonged to neither of those camps. He believed that Hitler be appeased, and piece purchased. He was, obviously, bitterly disappointed in the results of his bargain.
In his book Telford Taylor had provided not only a narrative of the circumstances and events leading to the Munich crisis but also a fresh assessment of the men and methods by which the crisis was “resolved”. A brilliantly written, meticulously researched, and very detailed narrative. Outstanding.
February 9, 2022
" this is the best book on [ the prelude to ] WWII "
You could say that of about, say, 20-30 books of the 1930's and the war, but this one < is > extraordinary. Super book, but unless you're a history enthusiast, maybe more than you ever wanted to know about the inter-war years.
Actually, that's not true. It's fascinating and gripping all the way through.
You could say that of about, say, 20-30 books of the 1930's and the war, but this one < is > extraordinary. Super book, but unless you're a history enthusiast, maybe more than you ever wanted to know about the inter-war years.
Actually, that's not true. It's fascinating and gripping all the way through.
November 6, 2007
Very detailed account of the events leading to Neville Chamberlain's peace treaty with Hitler in 1938 that led to Chamberlain to famously say (I paraphrase) that the agreement heralded "peace with honor" and "peace in our time." Since Munich has had such an impact on the world (every leader is loath to be labeled a Chamberlain), it is an important read from someone who was the key prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials of top Nazi leaders.
April 11, 2014
Only read the first 100 pages of this very big book. Unfortunately for me author is covering territory i'm already well tuned in to. Only additions in this title were i thought random observations.
February 29, 2012
Well written telling of how Czechoslovakia was sacrificed in 1938 for the price of peace leading up to WWII . . .
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews