Hegel: Three Studies

by Theodor W. Adorno, Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Translator & Introduction), Jeremy J. Shapiro (Introduction)

This short masterwork in twentieth-century philosophy provides both a major reinterpretation of Hegel and insight into the evolution of Adorno's critical theory. The first study focuses on the relationship of reason, the individual, and society in Hegel, defending him against the criticism that he was merely an apologist for bourgeois society. The second study examines the experiential content of Hegel's idealism, considering the notion of experience in relation to immediacy, empirical reality, science, and society. The third study, "Skoteinos," is an unusual and fascinating essay in which Adorno lays out his thoughts on understanding Hegel. In his reflections, which spring from his experience teaching at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, questions of textual and philosophical interpretation are intertwined.

Rescuing the truth value of Hegel's work is a recurring theme of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and nowhere is this goal pursued with more insight than in these three studies. The core problem Adorno sets for himself is how to read Hegel in a way that comprehends both the work and its historical context, thereby allowing conclusions to be drawn that may seem on the surface to be exactly opposed to what Hegel wrote but that are, nevertheless, valid as the present truth of the work. It is the elaboration of this method of interpretation, a negative dialectic, that was Adorno's underlying goal.

Adorno's efforts to salvage the contemporaneity of Hegel's thought form part of his response to the increasingly tight net of social control in the aftermath of World War II. In this, his work is related to the very different attempts to undermine reified thinking undertaken by the various French theorists. The continued development of what Adorno called "the administered world" has only increased the relevance of his efforts.

Genres: Philosophy, Theory, Nonfiction, German Literature, Ebooks

204 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1956

About the author

Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno was one of the most important philosophers and social critics in Germany after World War II. Although less well known among anglophone philosophers than his contemporary Hans-Georg Gadamer, Adorno had even greater influence on scholars and intellectuals in postwar Germany. In the 1960s he was the most prominent challenger to both Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. Jürgen Habermas, Germany's foremost social philosopher after 1970, was Adorno's student and assistant. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the interdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt School to which he belonged. It also stems from the thoroughness with which he examined Western philosophical traditions, especially from Kant onward, and the radicalness to his critique of contemporary Western society. He was a seminal social philosopher and a leading member of the first generation of Critical Theory.

Unreliable translations hampered the initial reception of Adorno's published work in English speaking countries. Since the 1990s, however, better translations have appeared, along with newly translated lectures and other posthumous works that are still being published. These materials not only facilitate an emerging assessment of his work in epistemology and ethics but also strengthen an already advanced reception of his work in aesthetics and cultural theory.

Reviews

[Kira · Rating 5 out of 5]

Adorno is NOT messing around here.

One argument he makes is an attempt to explain the old chestnut that Marx somehow inverted Hegel's idealist philosophy and ended up with a materialist philosophy. This is fortunate, since that account of the early Marx is ambiguous to the point of being almost meaningless.
So, Hegel thought that the reason why there's reality at all is that a sort of all-encompassing subject (mind) exists, Absolute Spirit. And those finite subjects like us tend not to figure out that this Absolute Spirit exists just by perceiving the world around us. Unless we start thinking really hard about something. Then, as our thoughts about that thing become more and more abstract, in an effort to theorize it, we notice that this theory tends to kind of self-destruct at a certain stage of development, especially when we realize that the theory is inadequate without building into it the acknowledgement that I, the subject constructing it, am actually ~part of the situation that must be explained in order to theorize that original object.~ But once we get to that stage of theorizing, we realize that this means we need a theory that explains the relationship between subject and object. But subjects are the only kinds of things that can do the explaining. So the ultimate theory of reality has to show how the apparent distinction between subject and object can be transcended from the perspective of another kind of subject-- one without the limitations that I clearly have.

More or less.

A lot of Marxist treatments of Hegel don't really take the rational motivation for his philosophy seriously-- the story in the last paragraph. Like liberal treatments of Hegel, they're kinda like "well, he made a lot of mistakes, and said a lot of weird shit, but he had some intriguing thoughts that turn out to be true about the real world, if you sort of melt away the idealism" (i.e., his philosophy). But that approach leaves a major question unanswered: ~how~ could this armchair theorist have come up with such an accurate description/theory of certain things in the actual world? Just knowing history up to the time when he lived would not be enough. How did he invent a way of thinking that seems to be fruitful a long time later, just by thinking?

In this book, Adorno proposes an answer to this question. The answer: Hegel's concept of Absolute Spirit so closely resembles the concept of society and labor (coordinated social action) because that's where Hegel (unconciously) got it. He also gives an argument that Hegel's philosophy is inadequate even by its own standards. So in other words, Adorno is arguing that Hegel's overall argument for his philosophy fails, and the reason why it fails is also the explanation for this incredible “luck” he had when he hit upon this great way of understanding society.

It's inadequate because if you try to develop the best possible theory of something, and you follow out that project to the point where it blows up, so to speak , you find that the subject alone ~can't~ explain how the distinction between subject and object came to be. That's because, if it could, then Absolute Spirit would have to be an actual subject (an “I”, or conscious perspective). If it weren't, then it could only be an abstraction. And if it were just an abstraction, then it couldn't conceptualize anything itself (it would have to be “conditioned” rather than that which “conditions” everything else). But if it couldn't conceptualize anything itself, then it can't reconceive the subject and object in a way that 1) shows that they're not really distinct 2) explain why it appears to us that they are. But if it couldn't do that, then it wouldn't be the best theory.

Adorno points out that the “logical” progression from one stage of this super-theory to the next, a.k.a. the dialectic, just sort of ~forces~ you (the reader) to acknowledge that the previous version of the theory was inferior by its own standards, and that the next version is superior by the same standards. How does that come about? Why do we feel this compulsion to accept that the next stage of the dialectic is an advancement upon the last one? Even though Hegel doesn't really give traditional, logical arguments for those claims? Adorno's answer is that the compulsion we feel to accept the progression of the dialectic (i.e., we don't know why we do, but we do) is a side-effect of the fact that the concepts which give rise to the dialectic are, in contemporary terms, socially constructed. That is, we didn't ~personally~ construct say, the concept of perception, or the concept of rights, or whatever. But we ~can think~ using those concepts just because in human history, people established conventions for thinking. Conventions which were institutionalized through the signification of the words in language. It's because we, actual thinking subjects, can't really explain ~to ourselves~ why our concepts interlock the way they do, but know ~that they do~, that the dialectic's progression seems objective, valid for every subject, “logical”. But that implicit knowledge is just the residue of actual history. And that history (Marx and Adorno believe) is not just the playing out of some biological or other deterministic “program” which created society's basic outlines. Rather, that history is the history of human beings ~actively creating~ what human beings would later become, by institutionalizing certain kinds of labor, and the conceptual systems that go along with them. This is, I guess, what Marx meant by “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please.” In many cases, it's only later in history, once we've lived through the consequences of those forms of labor and their conceptual systems being institutionalized, that we can see whether we want to perpetuate that way of living or not. But if we didn't want to, we could change them.

But if Marxists have already figured all of this out, then why bother with Hegel anymore? Why not “throw away the ladder” once we've gotten onto the roof, or something? The short answer is that everyone, including self-proclaimed Marxists, constantly forget the warnings that Hegel's dialectic gives. The result is not that we fail to see that idealism is true (it's not). The result is actually that we fail to see how society is way more complicated than a collection of people and buildings and opinions. More complicated, even, than (say) post-structuralist descriptions of it, which claim that the institutionalized systems of concepts (“structure”) are utterly arbitrary, unaffected by labor, despite miraculously appearing in history all of a sudden to change everything, every once in a while. One reason Hegel's concept of dialectic is still relevant to all this, at all, is that when ~we~, today, try to study society, we tend not to see, automatically, that there are two sides to all socially constructed facts and categories. There is the subjective side, from which it seems like that social fact is just the result of individual people agreeing to do things in a certain way. From this subjective side, it seems like society doesn't even exist, beyond the individuals who make up societies, as Margaret Thatcher is supposed to have said. From the objective side, though, it seems like individual subjects don't even exist-- they are just “effects” of the underlying cultural, economic, biological (take your pick) program that society is. So how could they possibly have any agency, any control over their own lives and the way their lives gear into those over others? But, of course, people do actually have some agency. Not much. But the point is that, to better understand what we can do to change the world (society), we need to understand which ways of seeing and describing that world there are, and which one best holds up to scrutiny. And it seems that, at least for socially-constructed categories, dialectic maps out the stages of our intellectual development as we try to improve our understanding of them. So essentially, Hegel's philosophy is (still) not just a cautionary note about interpreting history (a la lots of Marxists), but also a warning about the attempt to think through social phenomena and categories in general. I think this is what Lukács meant by saying that the method is what's essential to Marxism, not the doctrine, the particular conclusions arrived at using that method.

[Michal Lipták · Rating 4 out of 5]

Adorno is ridiculously hard to follow in all the details, his style is enjoyable, but thoroughly punishing if you seek comprehension – it seems to consist of frivolous outpourings of mind that intentionally shatter the semblance of systematic argument, attached to belief that any systematic argument can only exist as an illusion.

And yet there’s a recurrent theme in this book-length criticism of Husserl, it’s that in all his ever restarting quests for things essential, apodictic, necessary and indubitable, each and every term in Husserl’s philosophy that aspired to essential necessity was actually construed completely out of contingency. All those phenomenological methods, Wesenschauen, ideating abstractions, eidetic variations, categorical intuitions, are for Adorno just alchemical operations which recast empirical and contingent content as essential and necessary content. They don’t open new horizons for transcendental inquires, an entirely new world – as Husserl would say, for example, in Britannica article – they just, and ultimately arbitrarily, reinterpret the world of “natural attitude” as essential.

For Adorno, the philosopher whom this approach brings most closely to, actually, is Hegel – the one that Husserl detested and avoided like plague. Yet, for Adorno, their operations are quite similar – Phenomenology of Spirit’s intention is precisely this transubstantiation of historical movement as purely logical movement. It traverses the psychological, anthropological and historical oppositions in order to arrive to the position of Absolute Knowledge, which is ultimately science as it is commonly known – as a sort of historical/cultural institution – just rid of all the skeptical jesters like Hume or worse, who nag constantly with annoying childish questions… “really?” “can’t it be otherwise?” “are you sure?” “are you sure?”

Hegel, however, is transparent about this operation and is willing to confront all the antinomies and contradictions head-on. This, for Adorno, makes him superior to Husserl, who’s not only hypocritical in his denial of Hegelian legacy and “dialectics in spite of itself”, but represents a kind of regression, too. Ultimately, Husserl’s essentializations of contingents are for Adorno in parallel to capitalist process of commodification, and Husserlian phenomenology represents for him the revenge of bourgeois consciousness against the rupture opened, in philosophy, by Hegel, and in history by ascent of labor which – as opposed to bourgeois trade operations – in enmeshed thoroughly in the empirical.

It’s thus entirely correct to try to dislodge and defeat the relativism (which is, on its side, paralleled with alienation) – it’s something you should do, something you must do – but you can never, ever, convince yourself that you’ve succeeded. For most of his philosophical career, Hegel as seen by Adorno heeded this. But for Husserl, Adorno sees him as declaring victory at every step, running into inconsistencies and contradictions which are really just embarrassing and pathetic.

So much for Adorno’s diagnosis of Husserl – but is it justified? I’d argue that it’s not. I’d start by saying that Adorno’s analysis suffers by lack of sources available at the time. His analysis is based solely on Logical Investigations (where he spends unnecessarily much time on Prolegomena), Ideen I, Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic. The latter features especially prominently in the last passages of Adorno’s analysis, where he comments on the contradictory notion of “contingent a priori” with barely hidden sarcastic grin, giving away that he considers such crudely oxymoron cringeworthy. But Husserl has actually honed the art of introducing transcendental notions which are imbued through-and-through with contingent content – they’re just to be found in other writings: there’s notion of normality and optimum in Ideen II; there’s Typik in Experience and Judgment, where types are socially construed; there’s historically-imbued notion of sedimentation in Krisis; there’re also notions of Heimwelt and Fremdwelt in Krisis, too, and in other manuscripts, which goes far beyond the crude alter-ego explanation of intersubjectivity in Fifth Meditation; there’re whole accounts of historicity in analyses of phenomenology as vocation in Kaizo articles; and in letter to Metzger, Husserl quite early on e.g. calls phenomenology “a mortal enemy of all capitalism”.

There’s a pattern in this, sure. But the pattern isn’t that Husserl was dumb. The pattern is that, at the end of the day, he was aware that you can’t reach some apodictic truth. The pattern is plain to see if you look at what Husserl does, rather than at what he writes in occasional instances of pseudo-enlightened rapture. In his 1940 Journal of Philosophy article, Adorno called Husserl “the most static philosopher of his age”. Nothing is further from truth. Adorno says this, because he interprets all the terminological inconsistencies and apparent contradictions as death throes of bourgeois mind which totally succumbed to false consciousness. But they are actually nervous movements of restless curious mind. Husserl is quintessential example of dynamic philosopher – Adorno sees stillness of death where in fact there is untidy and necessarily imprecise movement of life.

It’s no surprise that Adorno can’t understand the continuing appeal of phenomenology – and all those future philosophers working in Husserl’s shadow – other than a symptom of hideous outspreading of late capitalist phantasmagoria. The truth is that its appeal lies in exactly the opposite. By holding to both transcendental and empirical poles, and devising those sometimes cringeworthy – at first sight – notions that somehow lie in-between, phenomenology actually becomes a powerful theory with which to attack, for example, all naturalisms which say that there’re no explanations but physical explanations, that we can say nothing of worth about society and psyche until we have complete map of brain. Or all those narratives about supposed ends of history. Or all those relativistic aesthetic theories which offer complete frivolousness of artistic worth as mirror of sciences’ exactitude. Phenomenology disrupts all supposed exactitudes, but immediately tries to reconstruct it, knowing that, on the one hand, the reconstruction ultimately will never be successful, but that, on the other hand, we cannot then do otherwise but start again and try again.

Funny thing is that Adorno through his critique appears more Husserlian than Husserl himself. He seems to be angry and disappointed by failures of overt promises Husserl has made at the beginning (hence the overemphasis on Prolegomena), he seems to be much more bothered by that failure than Husserl himself was. For Husserl, failure was natural part of philosophical process – Adorno is much more disturbed by it. Moreover, it seems to me that Adorno shares this attitude with Derrida, and it’s no surprise that, privately, Adorno considered this book his most important philosophical contribution in the same way Derrida valued Voice and Phenomenon the most. Both have this urge to chase Husserl away as some kind of bad consciousness reminding them that, despite all the supposed embrace of restlessness and all the active opposition to any system (as opposed to that allegedly idealistic Husserl), there’s actually all the more anxiously suppressed desire for system behind all that (to use some ad hominem – it seems accurate that author of this book will later send police on his bare-breasted revolutionary students).

Of course, the depictions of phenomenology above are both simplified and a bit too kind. Phenomenology is today a school and an undertaking. There’s no shortage of Husserlian phenomenologists who use Husserl’s often highly problematic notions as slogans – I myself am surely guilty of that from time to time. Adorno’s critique is very useful corrective to that. It’s also useful in revealing links to Hegel – “despite itself” – and in showing how the idea of dialectics can be paired with phenomenology (although already Merleau-Ponty did enough work in this last regard). This all is very welcome, and this book should be read by every Husserlian. It’s important.

But it’s surely not something that lays phenomenology – or even Husserl himself – to rest.

[Tyler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I changed my rating from four to five stars. I've read this book twice, and I've found since I read it that it's one of only a few philosophy books I keep going back to for reference.

Adorno has written this short book in lucid, cogent chapters that do more than anyone could expect to help philosophy readers understand Hegel's intriguing and distinctive brand of idealism. I couldn't have understood much of this book if I hadn't already read at least some of Hegel's works; but without reading this book I don't think my understanding of those works would be as clear as it has become. Anyone who ventures into Hegel's books will get a lot out of this thoughtful commentary.

[Ethan]

I was surprised by how good this was! I had heard mixed reception of Adorno's Hegel but I enjoyed it quite a lot.

All three essays are good, but the first is probably the most dispensable. The second, The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy has good remarks regarding Heidegger and the third, Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel (despite a cliché name) has pretty interesting remarks regarding language, i.e. that the inadequacy of language must be shown by its use, and in this regard exposes a truth above and beyond it.

Noticeable is the lack of Adorno's Freudian schtick, I do not think that this is coincidence in the quality of the essays. When Adorno drops Freud he becomes leagues better, and in some sense I think Adorno recognises this himself (not to say Freud doesn't have his place in, say, Aesthetic Theory). Further, there are some typical Adorno turns of phrase. In one place in the third essay he opens fire at Wittgenstein as antiphilosophical and "positivistic" for his well-known Tractatus quote "Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent". Here Adorno is lazy, and though his point is made in agreeable fashion, his treatment as usual is a little bit slipshod.

Overall unexpectedly good.

[isaac · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mar 31, 2024
"With the separation of mental and manual labor, privilege reserves mental labor, which despite all assertions to the contrary is the easier, for itself. But at the same time manual labor always reappears in warning in the spiritual process, which is an imitation of physical action mediated by the imagination; spirit can never get completely free of its relationship to the nature it is to dominate. Spirit obeys nature in order to master it; even its proud sovereignty is purchased with suffering. The metaphysics of spirit, however, which makes spirit, as labor unconscious of itself, an absolute, is the affirmation of its entanglement, an attempt on the part of a self-reflective spirit to reinterpret the curse to which it submits as a blessing by passing it on, and thereby to justify it. In this regard, especially, Hegel's philosophy can be accused of being ideological: in its exposition, taken to the extreme, of the bourgeois celebration of labor. It is precisely in this most elevated point of the idealist system, the 'absolute proclaimed ecstatically at the end of the Phenomenology, that the sober realistic features of Hegel take refuge. At the same time, even this deceptive identification with labour had a valid basis. To the extent to which the world forms a system, it becomes one precisely through the closed universality' of social labor; social labor is in fact radical mediation, both between man and nature and also within spirit, which exists for itself. (p.25)"

Jun 25, 2023
I probably understood more of this than Dickens' "A Tale of Two Cities." I still did not understand much and probably need more training in formal philosophy to appreciate this.

I am considering trying "Reason and Revolution" by Marcuse next, but reading this was not exactly a morale booster. I might also try Lacan's first seminar, but that might be even more audacious.

I might be mixing up the studies in retrospect. What I got from the first study was that Hegel was way edgier than Fichte or Kant, and the existential crowd misunderstood how edgy Hegel was thereby limiting themselves to superficial fads that could not hold a light to Hegel's edginess. In study two, there was a lot of distinction between how Hegel thought about what he wrote and how his writing expresses something, and how all of this is edgier than what other people try to do. The last study made some remark about naive little kiddies writing obscene notes in the margins of Hegel, so I am keeping up that tradition, I guess.

[Buck · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most brutal takedowns ive ever read. Read if you want a philosophical dismantling of any project that seeks to "go back to the immediacy of experience:"

[Chris Nagel · Rating 5 out of 5]

The butler did it.

If someone asked me for a book that really and truly explained what Hegel was doing, I would point to this book. Then I would say, "but if you don't already know what Hegel was doing, this book will be incomprehensible to you."

People who understand will know that this is the highest praise I could give this book.

[Oliver · Rating 5 out of 5]

We can quibble all day long about whether Adorno misinterprets Hegel's philosophy of history, but there's no question that he is basically unparalleled in his grasp of the relationship between the logic of Hegel's thought and its expression. For Adorno, there's nothing metaphorical about the labour of the concept; working out the dialectical movement of spirit towards absolute knowledge in writing is, in fact, a gruelling intellectual reflection of prevailing labour conditions. Did Marx really “turn Hegel on his head”, or did he merely draw out the materialist implications of his project? I must admit that, the more I read, the more I’m swayed towards the latter interpretation…

By this point in his career, Adorno possessed a marvellously rich comprehension of how the Hegelian dialectic operates. Whilst he goes into it in much greater detail in his Introduction to Dialectics lectures, here his focus on Hegel allows him to narrow down its function and character with regards to the project of a resolutely critical, outwardly directed self-conscious process at one with the “organised spirit of contradiction” (as Hegel once defined it for Goethe). Adorno is sensitive to the true radicality of the Hegelian syllogism, in the way that mediation (as subjectivity) permeates the extreme terms and moves through them, revealing the mediacy in the immediate and he immediacy in the mediate.

“For the content of Hegel’s philosophy is the notion that the truth… is the dynamic totality of all the propositions that can be generated from one another by virtue of their contradictions”

Adorno correctly reads Hegel’s spirit as inexorably immanent to its particular moments, even as it simultaneously transcends them. Taken in their isolation, the partial aspects under the gaze of a critical consciousness manifest the absolute only in fragments—that this materialises in rather abstruse and incognizable prose is only commensurate. This is, ostensibly, Adorno’s theodicy for Hegel’s notoriously obscure style (especially in the Phenomenology), which does strike me as rather compelling even if there are no doubt instances where Hegel really could have rendered his thought more intelligibly without betraying its essence. The individual sentence—and this can really be applied to all limited expressions of knowledge—means little to nothing if it is not cast in the light of the whole to which its sublation points.

Adorno locates the force behind Hegel’s critical temper in his collapse of the strict dichotomy between the a priori and the a posteriori (“the critique of reason is simultaneously a critique of the real”), investing his thought with the ability to see through the reification of consciousness in the philosophies and sciences of his day. His polemic against the procrustean imposition of static scientific laws upon a contradictory reality—a tendency infecting philosophical thinking in the form of the fetish for clarity now dominating academia— brings us back to Adorno’s defence of Hegel’s style, which in this light reveals itself to be a protest against this positivistic approach that finds itself cut to the quick by any thinking that dares to faithfully represent the contradictory web of relations expressed in the object. If Hegel’s philosophy is set on establishing an authentic identity with its objects, then it would be suspicious were it not expressed with such a contradictory dynamism.

As such, Adorno suggests reading Hegel in a psychoanalytically inflected “experimental procedure” whereby one effectively free-associates in parallax, simultaneously grasping the import of the particular without losing sight of its fluid associations with the universal. In this vein, there’s plenty of genuinely indispensable advice here for readers of Hegel, whether you’re a fresh-faced neophyte or seasoned veteran.

[Kylie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Such a useful and clarifying companion to Hegel, but only to the extent that I was prepared to follow it as a demonstration of the method and motion of Hegelian thought. Often I had no idea what was going on, and then would come passage where Adorno beautifully exposes a radical aspect of Hegel, making available to me an idea that carried with it both shock and colossal relief. There is so much I missed, and that I would like to plan on re-encountering, so I'll have to buy a copy!

[Leo Foster · Rating 3 out of 5]

I did not understand the whole but only took parts. In Adorno's explaining of Hegel I got lost several times on the trail within the smoke of the philosphy. at times I wasn't sure if I was confused by Hegel or Adorno's explanation of hegel.
Basically Hegel attemps to establish the unity of thought and Being not by connecting but by reflection, a thesis antithesis, then synthesis-which becomes the new thesis, again with the idea that the universal is the particular and the particular the universal. This unity he re-invents on different topics through a sort of polarity. Hegel's unity is a violent one. It revealed by the dialectical method working within the whole. If one could imagine that the were looking at a cone that was funneling down and a person threw a small ball at the proper angle to bounce in little triangles down to the bottom point of the cone you might have a picture of how his logic is suppose to work. which would alway eventually fall to something called Absolute Mind or Absolute Spirit or some obsolute by a difeernt name that would be the particular and the whole unified. Hegel doesn't always follow his method completely.
This seems to be some of it.

[Kevin Holden · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an absolutely amazing book. The third 'study', Skoteinos, is probably the most beautiful & brilliant piece of writing on Hegel I have ever read.

[Ina Cawl · Rating 5 out of 5]

one of the best Philosophical books i have read by the this Author

[Zelim Vit · Rating 5 out of 5]

Adorno just doesn't miss. Making me believe a Hegel renaissaince is just around the corner. I still need to finish the Phenomenology and try to get to the monstrous Logic. But for now Adorno's studies on Hegel have proved useful.

[Moses]

Husserl fachgerecht eingetütet

[Leonardo]

Resulta interesante señalar que ya fue Adorno quien, en sus Tres estudios sobre Hegel, caracterizaba críticamente el sistema de Hegel, en los mismos términos «financieros», como un sistema que vive a expensas de créditos que nunca puede devolver.

Viviendo en el Final de los Tiempos Pág.229

[Blair · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a hidden gem! My second favourite book on Hegel - to Charles Taylor's Hegel. Really shows the influence Hegelian thought had on the Frankfurt School and gives some unique perspectives on Hegel.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Last of the three is particularly brilliant. I used it for writing my essay on Nabokov's Pale Fire.

[Ryan]

superb!!!

[Rebekah · Rating 3 out of 5]

For my Hegel class