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Seminar Studies in History
Origins of the First World War
Origins of the First World War summarizes the policies, issues and crises that brought Europe to war in 1914. Examining the strategic and political problems that confronted each of the great powers and the way in which social and economic factors influenced the decision-making process, Martel discusses the position of each power and their place in the system of alliances which dominated international politics. The fourth edition has been revised and updated throughout to incorporate the body of new scholarship that has appeared since the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of war. In a clear and accessible manner, it This book also includes an updated Guide to Further Reading, Who’s Who of important figures and Glossary of key terms, and the selection of documents has been expanded to include the key treaties as well as evidence of popular militarism and nationalism. Concise, accessible and analytical, it is essential introductory reading for all students interested in the origins of the First World War.
212 pages, Paperback
Published October 18, 2016
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November 19, 2022
This book is a part of the “Seminar Studies in History” series which is intended for high school/college-level history students rather than general readers. I must say that I greatly appreciated the all-business didactic approach. This book, just under 100 pages, is concentrated objective analysis and is written well enough that the drama inherent to the subject isn’t diminished.
Instead of a chronologically-oriented narrative, this book begins with the events of the 1914 leading up to the outbreak of World War 1. Only after conveying this and some general observations about WW1 does Martell back up to the previous century of diplomatic economic, political, and military developments that played a part in the outbreak of war. I think this was a great decision by Martell, because knowing where Europe ends up in 1914 really helps the reader appreciate the significance of the events and decisions preceding it.
If this format has a weakness, it is certainly that the generalizing necessitated by its brevity could lead an unwary reader to suspect that there aren’t numerous layers of additional complexity to the internal politics and external posturing of each nation. That said, Martell doesn’t portray any nation as unified in perspective or monolithic in motivation. For all his expeditiousness, Martell takes time to describe several nuanced facets about the study of WW1. For example, he provides a brief survey of the historiography of WW1 that includes one of the coolest pieces of analysis I’ve read: Although there is no consensus among historians about the root causes of WW1, a reader can predict where a given historian lands on the question based solely on when they begin the narrative. If a historian begins with the wars Germany fought in 1864, 1866, and 1870, then German militarism will likely be the primary culprit. However, historians who begin their story in the summer of 1914, immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, typically reject “the argument that WW1 was the inevitable result of underlying forces. . . instead, they argue that had it not been for the peculiarities of the July crisis, war might have been avoided. . . Concentrating on the July crisis does not, therefore, imply that any particular state or statesman was responsible for the war, but it does reveal an assumption that this crisis could have been managed successfully, as others had in the past.”
Another example of Martell going beyond dry historical analysis is his caution to readers to keep in mind that war had a far different role and meaning in early 20th century European cultures than it does to us today. “Two world wars, numerous revolutions, a great depression, the advent of atomic weapons, and bloody ethnic conflicts separate us psychologically from the men and women of 1914. The kind of thinking that led people to rejoice at the prospect of war is now difficult to recapture- but rejoice they did.”
After the setup, Martell gets into his analysis of the “Great Powers” (Russia, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Austro-Hungary) up to 1900 beginning with what became the Triple Alliance. Essentially, the Triple Alliance consisted of Michael Jordan (Germany), Scotty Pippen in his 60’s (Austro-Hungary), and some kid who only plays basketball because his parents made him (Italy). Germany was the heart, brain, and skeleton of the Triple Alliance, and as a relatively new nation discovering its own vast strength was extremely fixated with its standing among other European nations. Following the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, France, Russia, and Great Britain had the reputations of “global powers”. Prussia had carved the German state out of Danish, Austrian, and French territory with its surprising military prowess throughout the 19th century.
Under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, Germany was able to “protect the new empire from the revenge of her neighbors [with] a system of alliances. . . The Bismarckian system of alliances was a complicated series of checks and balances, but it achieved two essential objects: it effectively deprived France of any continental ally and it established the German empire as a responsible and respectable state eager to uphold the new status quo”. Bismarck and subsequent German leaders were always looking for the next European power to play against France, who it viewed as its implacable enemy, particularly Austro-Hungary and Italy. They also tried to bring Great Britain into the Triple Alliance, hoping to capitalize on his historical enmity with France, but Britain remained aloof from continental alliances and focused on its empire and terrible food. Germany had an inconsistent foreign policy with Russia, who it regarded as a clear threat but one it occasionally tried to make an ally against British naval power.
With the hindsight of history, it is very challenging to view Austro-Hungary as anything but a nation deluded by its own distant past as a major power. Its military was fixed by agreement at a level below much smaller nations and its economic and industrial growth had lagged actual global powers for decades by the time 1900 rolled around. It does appear that at least some of the leaders of Austro-Hungary were aware of their decline, which is why when Germany gave them the infamous “blank check” after the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand they wanted to make the most of it.
Italy doesn’t feature too much against the other powers in this book, which seems consistent with its performance in later world wars.
Perhaps the most unpredictable development in the 19th century was the Dual Alliance between France, a republic, and Russia, the most unapologetic autocracy in Europe. Given their history and national ethos, no one could have anticipated a firm alliance to be brokered between them. After Wilhelm II became kaiser of Germany and forced Bismarck into retirement, he adopted a much more provocative- and somewhat less conciliatory- approach to Germany’s foreign relations. It’s not certain that his initiatives drove France and Russia together, but it probably contributed to it they were able to put a century of hostility and distrust aside to focus on the threat posed by Germany.
By 1900 the alliance system had become a stabilizing force in European international relations. All the significant powers were on one team or another except for Britain, whose preoccupation with empire and insulation from continental military threats (and terrible food) kept it aloof. When conflicts between nations arose, the consequences of the outcomes were always evaluated by their impact on the balance of power established and maintained by the Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance. This self-governing dynamic proved itself several times until 1914, when it collapsed in epic fashion. Leave it up to the Balkans, amirite?
Instead of a chronologically-oriented narrative, this book begins with the events of the 1914 leading up to the outbreak of World War 1. Only after conveying this and some general observations about WW1 does Martell back up to the previous century of diplomatic economic, political, and military developments that played a part in the outbreak of war. I think this was a great decision by Martell, because knowing where Europe ends up in 1914 really helps the reader appreciate the significance of the events and decisions preceding it.
If this format has a weakness, it is certainly that the generalizing necessitated by its brevity could lead an unwary reader to suspect that there aren’t numerous layers of additional complexity to the internal politics and external posturing of each nation. That said, Martell doesn’t portray any nation as unified in perspective or monolithic in motivation. For all his expeditiousness, Martell takes time to describe several nuanced facets about the study of WW1. For example, he provides a brief survey of the historiography of WW1 that includes one of the coolest pieces of analysis I’ve read: Although there is no consensus among historians about the root causes of WW1, a reader can predict where a given historian lands on the question based solely on when they begin the narrative. If a historian begins with the wars Germany fought in 1864, 1866, and 1870, then German militarism will likely be the primary culprit. However, historians who begin their story in the summer of 1914, immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, typically reject “the argument that WW1 was the inevitable result of underlying forces. . . instead, they argue that had it not been for the peculiarities of the July crisis, war might have been avoided. . . Concentrating on the July crisis does not, therefore, imply that any particular state or statesman was responsible for the war, but it does reveal an assumption that this crisis could have been managed successfully, as others had in the past.”
Another example of Martell going beyond dry historical analysis is his caution to readers to keep in mind that war had a far different role and meaning in early 20th century European cultures than it does to us today. “Two world wars, numerous revolutions, a great depression, the advent of atomic weapons, and bloody ethnic conflicts separate us psychologically from the men and women of 1914. The kind of thinking that led people to rejoice at the prospect of war is now difficult to recapture- but rejoice they did.”
After the setup, Martell gets into his analysis of the “Great Powers” (Russia, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Austro-Hungary) up to 1900 beginning with what became the Triple Alliance. Essentially, the Triple Alliance consisted of Michael Jordan (Germany), Scotty Pippen in his 60’s (Austro-Hungary), and some kid who only plays basketball because his parents made him (Italy). Germany was the heart, brain, and skeleton of the Triple Alliance, and as a relatively new nation discovering its own vast strength was extremely fixated with its standing among other European nations. Following the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, France, Russia, and Great Britain had the reputations of “global powers”. Prussia had carved the German state out of Danish, Austrian, and French territory with its surprising military prowess throughout the 19th century.
Under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, Germany was able to “protect the new empire from the revenge of her neighbors [with] a system of alliances. . . The Bismarckian system of alliances was a complicated series of checks and balances, but it achieved two essential objects: it effectively deprived France of any continental ally and it established the German empire as a responsible and respectable state eager to uphold the new status quo”. Bismarck and subsequent German leaders were always looking for the next European power to play against France, who it viewed as its implacable enemy, particularly Austro-Hungary and Italy. They also tried to bring Great Britain into the Triple Alliance, hoping to capitalize on his historical enmity with France, but Britain remained aloof from continental alliances and focused on its empire and terrible food. Germany had an inconsistent foreign policy with Russia, who it regarded as a clear threat but one it occasionally tried to make an ally against British naval power.
With the hindsight of history, it is very challenging to view Austro-Hungary as anything but a nation deluded by its own distant past as a major power. Its military was fixed by agreement at a level below much smaller nations and its economic and industrial growth had lagged actual global powers for decades by the time 1900 rolled around. It does appear that at least some of the leaders of Austro-Hungary were aware of their decline, which is why when Germany gave them the infamous “blank check” after the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand they wanted to make the most of it.
Italy doesn’t feature too much against the other powers in this book, which seems consistent with its performance in later world wars.
Perhaps the most unpredictable development in the 19th century was the Dual Alliance between France, a republic, and Russia, the most unapologetic autocracy in Europe. Given their history and national ethos, no one could have anticipated a firm alliance to be brokered between them. After Wilhelm II became kaiser of Germany and forced Bismarck into retirement, he adopted a much more provocative- and somewhat less conciliatory- approach to Germany’s foreign relations. It’s not certain that his initiatives drove France and Russia together, but it probably contributed to it they were able to put a century of hostility and distrust aside to focus on the threat posed by Germany.
By 1900 the alliance system had become a stabilizing force in European international relations. All the significant powers were on one team or another except for Britain, whose preoccupation with empire and insulation from continental military threats (and terrible food) kept it aloof. When conflicts between nations arose, the consequences of the outcomes were always evaluated by their impact on the balance of power established and maintained by the Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance. This self-governing dynamic proved itself several times until 1914, when it collapsed in epic fashion. Leave it up to the Balkans, amirite?
May 5, 2023
This book was mind-numbingly boring and one of my least favorites that I've had to read for school. Maybe if I was a great fanatic of World War I, I would actually be interested. However, you have to be that weird, annoying kid in history class that doesn't know how to keep his mouth shut to really enjoy and understand this book. And honestly, I prefer to stray away from that lifestyle. Yes, Martel is very knowledgeable on this topic. No, he does not write in a way that intrigues readers to learn more and try to understand. Everything was so dense and overcomplicated; it was very hard reading about a new alliance every other sentence but not having it fully explained. I was either googling every other word or falling asleep while reading this book.
Read it at your own risk; extreme boredom may follow.
Read it at your own risk; extreme boredom may follow.
February 16, 2014
This is a very good introduction to its subject, concise yet nuanced, and serves well as a means to get undergraduates or other non-historians adequately versed in the diplomatic history of Europe to get a discussion going that goes beyond “unbridled German aggression and greed” as an explanatory catch-all. This is not to say that Kaiser Wilhelm gets a “pass” for his various diplomatic blunders, but many other aspects of the tensions in Europe in 1914 are explored, including the various conflicts in the Balkans, colonial expansion and the tensions between “have” and “have-not” powers, and the decline of traditional multiethnic empires in favor of the rising nation-state. The various treaty alliances and international obligations are mapped as clearly as possible (given that they often confuse professional historians), and the reasons for each power’s interests in the apparently minor issue of an assassination in Sarajevo becomes increasingly clear.
The book includes several maps in the front matter, many of which seem a bit over-simplified (particularly Africa and East Asia), but the map of Central and Eastern Europe is likely to be helpful for many students unfamiliar with the region’s history. There is also a chronology of events from 1871 to August, 1914, which will help keep the many events outlined in the text clear. The end of the book includes many pages of reproduced primary documents, including much diplomatic correspondence that is mentioned in the main text, and there is also a glossary and a list of major political and military figures. The “guide to further reading” is one area that seems to need a bit more work – this is the third edition, and I note that most of the sources mentioned were printed before the first (1987) and only a few after the second (1996). Possibly there is already a fourth edition out that has corrected this.
The book includes several maps in the front matter, many of which seem a bit over-simplified (particularly Africa and East Asia), but the map of Central and Eastern Europe is likely to be helpful for many students unfamiliar with the region’s history. There is also a chronology of events from 1871 to August, 1914, which will help keep the many events outlined in the text clear. The end of the book includes many pages of reproduced primary documents, including much diplomatic correspondence that is mentioned in the main text, and there is also a glossary and a list of major political and military figures. The “guide to further reading” is one area that seems to need a bit more work – this is the third edition, and I note that most of the sources mentioned were printed before the first (1987) and only a few after the second (1996). Possibly there is already a fourth edition out that has corrected this.
August 14, 2014
Gordon Martel’s Origins of the First World War examines the many crises, diplomatic struggles, alliances, and war plans that contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914. As Martel discusses the various beliefs and actions of the major European powers, he refers to a collection of original documents in the back of the book. These documents, along with Martel’s arguments, reveal that no power was innocent. Each contributed to the events that led to war, but those who perceived they had more to gain, and especially those who let their generals do more of the decision making, reverted to harsher responses and brought the world closer to what was at first believed would be a short, local war.
Martel introduces the book with the most dramatized event of the July Crisis, the trigger – the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He then quickly summarizes the main events, perhaps to encourage the reader to begin placing blame and recognize how easy it is to move from one stance to another. After asking a series of questions about why each power acted as it did, he takes the reader through the most prominent underlying causes of the war that historians have probed in their attempts to go beneath the surface of the events. These underlying causes are the alliance system, nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and the tendency of leaders and the ruling class to wage aggressive foreign policy in order to dispel social conflict on the domestic front thus avoiding domestic reform.
Martel’s introduction discusses the various ways historians have dealt with the problem of the origins of WWI. He shows how each begins the story at various times depending on what the cause is believed to be. For example, those who believe the main cause was the repression of nationalities will begin their story in 1815 with the Congress of Vienna’s conservative statesmen. For Martel, the first cause discussed in detail is the alliance system. In his first chapter, The Great Powers to 1900, Martel discusses the formation of the alliances that were created in the second half of the 19th century. He examines the many crises that strengthened alliances and antagonized foes, such as the Boxer Rebellion, the two Moroccan crises, the Bosnian annexation crisis, and the Balkan wars. He describes in detail the strategic concerns of each nation. A simplified version of this would be: The Ottoman Empire was crumbling, and Russia and Germany both had eyes on the Balkans and the Middle East, while Britain didn’t want to see an upset in the balance of power. The growing naval power of Germany was making Britain nervous, while the growing logistical power of Russia was convincing the German foreign policy elite that it was now or never to make a move in the Balkans and the Middle East. Through all this France was working on her relations with Russia to avoid being reduced to the level of a German subordinate.
In his Assessment chapter, Martel tells us what he really thinks. He says, “It was not the alliance ‘system’ that drew the great powers into the war in 1914, but the belief that it was more dangerous to stay out of a war than enter into one.” The Social Darwinian idea that struggle and sacrifice were necessary ingredients of life was widely held. It was the beliefs and ambitions of the aggressive foreign policy elites that turned this Balkan war into a world war. Flawed war plans described in previous chapters, such as Molkte’s revision of the Schlieffen Plan and Russia’s Plan B (such an Orwellian name) come to be seen almost as plots made by elites who had come to think of war as an attractive policy because it not only brought them social, political, and economic rewards, but gave them prestige and an honorable reputation. Martel is brilliantly subtle on this, but his original documents in the back of the book point heavily towards it.
Martel feels that “internal structures” played a huge role in the influence of foreign policies. He describes the fears, passions, prejudices, and goals of the foreign policy elites, while noting that public support -- even if only based on an ambiguous idealism -- and the mobilization of this was a matter of extreme importance. Indeed “the issues at stake” made the continuance of the war possible. Having the moral upper hand, or at least waiting till the right moment to convince the public that it was had, was essential.
A number of things can be blamed for the war, such as the alliance system, imperialism, militarism, nationalism and concerns of social upheaval. Certainly there were vital interests at stake for each power, but if we examine those in charge and what they wrote about in their diaries and letters, we see that “the men who made the decisions, drawn mostly from the traditional ruling classes of Europe, believed it better to die honorably than to surrender in disgrace.” When generals were adhered to more than politicians, when it is the generals who set up the board, write the plans, leave no room for alternatives, and influence public support, is not war inevitable? Martel claims again and again throughout the book it was not, but this is hard to believe after examining his documents and his own approach, which seems to compliment the documents rather than the other way around. The men moving the pieces were educated, xenophobic, and most certainly driven toward prestige. Influenced by Social Darwinists and compelled by a sense of duty and honor, as well as social, political, and economic rewards, with a strong sense of now or never, these were not men who would give in to a diplomatic defeat. Power was in the hands of an illustrious, entrepreneurial military elite, passionate about the idea of the fight for survival of its race – far from Realpolitik. Speed was key and victory would go to the offensive “which stimulates moral force.” Far too much power was placed in the hands of generals.
Near the beginning of the book Martel reminds us that time has separated us from the emotional “patriotic fervor” of the time, but in his conclusion he says, “notions that different ways of life are engaged in a life-and-death struggle, that it is the destiny and the duty of the young and the heroic to kill or be killed in this struggle are still very much with us at the beginning of the twenty-first century.” There was a paradigm shift from positivism, that was most likely set in motion in 1859 or perhaps even with the birth of 19th century liberalism, and we are still experiencing it. Martel’s book not only concisely describes the origins of the first world war, but it illustrates that people who have made our decisions for us are often plagued by deep seated views which run contrary to reason, but parallel to their passions.
May 5, 2023
this was just another painfully boring book i had to read for history. also why do all historians find it impossible to DIVIDE UP YOUR CHAPTERS. the last thing i want to do is read a dense 30+ page chapter. martel knows what he’s talking about for sure, but i feel like this book could’ve been broken down into one page of bullet points
February 27, 2008
Interesting short read if you want to understand better the circumstances surrounding the begining of the first world war. It can be a little dry if you are not a history buff. I wouldn't recommend it for those who aren't.
November 23, 2014
a good concise narrative history of the events leading up to the outbreak of war, dealt with in. yo short chapters. there is also an appendix featuring a range of documents such as the krueger telegram.
December 29, 2024
an interesting look into the origins of the First World War primarily focusing on the alliance systems and how they contributed to a rise in tension. Martel's thesis is backed up by documents which are usefully put in the end of this to help back up all of his views.
September 4, 2007
It's a seminar series book. Not much more I can say about it...
April 21, 2011
ughh school readin...
September 26, 2015
Essential read for history lovers. Coincise and clear origin of WW1
September 20, 2023
read this book for class in a week. I have never almost fallen asleep more than reading this book. the information was just dense and not told in the best way as an introduction to this stuff
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews