The Philosophy of Well-Being

by Guy Fletcher

Well-being occupies a central role in ethics and political philosophy, including in major theories such as utilitarianism. It also extends far beyond philosophy: recent studies into the science and psychology of well-being have propelled the topic to centre stage, and governments spend millions on promoting it. We are encouraged to adopt modes of thinking and behaviour that support individual well-being or 'wellness'.



What is well-being? Which theories of well-being are most plausible? In this rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the topic, Guy Fletcher unpacks and assesses these questions and many more, including:





Are pleasure and pain the only things that affect well-being? Is desire-fulfilment the only thing that makes our lives go well? Can something be good for someone who does not desire it? Is well-being fundamentally connected to a distinctive human nature? Is happiness all that makes our lives go well? Is death necessarily bad for us? How is the well-being of a whole life related to well-being at particular times?




Annotated further reading and study and comprehension questions follow each chapter, and a glossary of key terms is also included, making The Philosophy of Well-Being essential reading for students of ethics and political philosophy. This title is also suitable for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

184 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2016

Reviews

[Teo]

2023.03.25–2023.04.09

Contents

Fletcher G (2016) Philosophy of Well-Being, The - An Introduction

Acknowledgement

Introduction
• Terminology
• Outline of the book
• • Overall structure
• • Chapter summary
• • How this book is written
• Notes
• References

1. Hedonism
• 1.1 Introduction
• • Questions left open
• • Hedonic levels
• 1.2 Arguments for hedonism
• • Paradigm cases and correlation arguments
• • Welfare subjects and pleasure and pain
• • Motivational arguments
• • Experience requirement
• 1.3 Objections to hedonism
• • The experience machine
• • Hedonist replies to the experience machine
• • Base pleasures
• • Base pleasures objection
• • Replies to the base pleasures objection
• • • Instrumental disvalue distractions
• • • Wrong kind of value judgement
• • • Qualitative hedonism
• • Base pleasures equality objection
• 1.4 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Notes
• References

2. Desire-fulfilment theory
• 2.1 Introduction
• • Questions left open
• 2.2 Arguments for DFT
• • DFT can explain paradigm cases of prudential value
• • DFT avoids experience machine objections
• • Attitude-dependence
• • Reason and motivation arguments
• 2.3 Objections to DFT
• 2.4 Replies to objections (1): biting the bullet
• 2.5 Replies to objections (2): refining the view
• 2.6 The scope problem
• 2.7 Filtering desires? Tracking?
• 2.8 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Further questions
• Notes
• References

3. Objective list theories
• 3.1 Introduction
• • What an objective list theory claims
• • Questions left open
• 3.2 Arguments for objective list theories
• • Avoiding the experience machine problems
• • Avoiding the scope problem
• • Pre-theoretical judgements
• • • Reply
• • Arguments from the details of particular theories
• 3.3 Objections to objective list theories
• • Arbitrariness and explanatory impotence
• • • Brute objectivism
• • • Explanatory objectivism
• • Alienation
• 3.4 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Notes
• References
• Appendix: Alienation and attitude-dependence
• • A.1 Introduction
• • A.2 Different anti-alienation constraints
• • A.3 Object of the positive response
• • A.4 Which theories of well-being are compatible with AD3?
• • A.5 Is AD3 enough to avoid alienation?
• • A.6 A plausible stronger claim than AD3?
• • A.7 Conclusion
• • Comprehension questions
• • Further question
• • Notes
• • Further reading

4. Perfectionist theories of well-being
• 4.1 Introduction
• 4.2 Perfectionism formulated
• • An initial motivation
• • Perfectionism about human well-being
• 4.3 Arguments for perfectionism
• 4.4 Supplying an account of human nature (I)
• • Objections to the uniqueness criterion
• 4.5 Supplying an account of human nature (II)
• • Hurka’s restricted essence proposal
• 4.6 Objections
• • Objection one: the bad side?
• • • Non-development of capacities
• • • Diminishment/loss of capacities
• • Objection two: problems with pleasure and pain
• • Objection three: too restrictive, leaving out rationality
• 4.7 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Notes
• References
• Further reading

5. The happiness theory of well-being
• 5.1 Introduction
• 5.2 Three views about happiness and well-being
• 5.3 The nature of happiness (1): pleasure theories of happiness
• • Comparative merits?
• • Have we rejected the pleasure theory of happiness?
• 5.4 The nature of happiness (2): life satisfaction theories of happiness
• • Problem 1: Which judgements?
• • Problem 2: Uncertainty
• • Problem 3: Satisfaction: cognitive or affective?
• 5.5 Problems for LSH2 plus the happiness theory of well-being
• • (1) Does it collapse LSH2 into the pleasure theory of happiness?
• • (2) Experience machine
• • (3) Extreme satisfaction
• 5.6 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Further questions
• Notes
• References

6. Hybrid theories of well-being
• 6.1 Introduction
• • Hybrid theories vs pluralist theories
• 6.2 Can hybrid theories deliver the goods?
• • Hybrid theory 1: Pleasure and desire-fulfilment (P&D)
• 6.3 How does P&D compare with hedonism and desire-fulfilment theory?
• • Avoiding problems with the experience machine?
• • Problematic pleasures/desire-fulfilments
• • The scope problem
• 6.4 Second guiding question: how does P&D fare in its own right?
• • Objection 1: desire-fulfilment is not necessary for prudential value
• • Objection 2: Pleasure is not necessary for prudential value
• • Interim summary
• 6.5 A second hybrid theory
• 6.6 Does TGHT fare any better than P&D?
• • Experience machine
• • Malicious pleasure/desire
• • The scope problem
• • Pleasure without desire-fulfilment
• • Pleasure without desire
• • Self-respect without desire
• • Desire-fulfilling achievement with no pleasure
• 6.7 Does TGHT fare any better than its non-hybrid equivalent?
• 6.8 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Further questions
• Notes
• References

7. Well-being and the shape of a life
• 7.1 Introduction
• 7.2 The shape of a life hypothesis introduced
• 7.3 Assessing the shape of a life hypothesis: two additivist objections
• • Objection 1: Wrong kind of evaluation
• • Objection 2: Debunking the shape of a life hypothesis
• 7.4 Assessing the shape of a life hypothesis: one final additivist objection
• • Objection 3: Uphill shape is worth little or nothing
• 7.5 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Further question
• Notes
• References

8. Well-being and death
• 8.1 Introduction
• 8.2 Why think death can be bad for us? Why think that it can’t?
• • How death makes us feel
• • How we behave with respect to death
• • Death deprives us of good things
• • Objections to the harm thesis
• • • (Objection A) One is not there to be harmed by death
• • • (Objection B) Symmetry with the time before our lives
• • • (Objection C) Death helps us avoid bad things
• 8.3 Death and harm
• • Death
• • Harm
• 8.4 Replies to objections (A)–(C)
• • (Objection A) One is not there to be harmed by death
• • • Reply
• • (Objection B) Symmetry with the time before our lives
• • (Objection C) Death helps us avoid bad things
• 8.5 Harm Thesis B
• 8.6 Conclusion
• Comprehension questions
• Further questions
• Notes
• References

Conclusion
• C.1 Summary of the book
• C.2 Related topics
• Notes
• C.3 References

List of cases
Glossary
Index

[Jordan Bright · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this book to be a very useful beginners guide to well-being. It had a ‘no-nonsense’ approach, describing the different philosophies of well-being in a straight forward and matter of fact way which I found made the learning process easier than if the text had been over-complicated.

[Chad · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic introductory text to the philosophy of well-being. Covers all the major theories of welfare, their strengths and weaknesses, and highlights problems within the field.

[Oona · Rating 2 out of 5]

Luettu elämänkatsomustiedon aineopintoja varten.

[Sawyer Lavelle · Rating 1 out of 5]

textbook for a wretched class